ShinyHunters, the data theft and extortion crew that has stolen sensitive information belonging to millions of cancer patients, university and K-12 students, and Carnival cruisers, wanted to preserve their reputation and keep their “business” afloat. So it hacked the FBI to make a statement, the group told The Register. “It’s a game and it’s the world we live in,” a ShinyHunters spokesperson told us. “We are just protecting our business as any other business would do. It’s about who does their job better.” On Friday, the FBI confirmed the breach to The Register, after earlier in the week saying the bureau was investigating ShinyHunters’ claims. "The FBI is aware of a cyber-criminal enterprise group claiming a compromise of the FBIJobs.gov portal and alleged impact to FBI employee personally identifiable information (PII),” an FBI spokesperson told The Register. "While the point of breach is still undetermined - whether a third-party or the FBI’s enterprise - we are actively and aggressively investigating this matter and working closely with those third-party providers that support FBIJobs.gov to mitigate any and all risk." On Tuesday, the criminals told us that they broke into the bureau via yet another Oracle PeopleSoft zero-day flaw in the FBIJobs.gov portal, which remains down as of Friday. Then, they breached the FBI’s managed servers on AWS GovCloud and swiped thousands of personnel files belonging to current, former, and prospective FBI employees. “We hold very sensitive data on almost ALL FBI Agents and individuals who filed an application with the FBI for a job,” the group claimed in a message posted online and addressed to FBI Director Kash Patel and Brett Leatherman, assistant director of the FBI’s Cyber Division. Sample files reviewed by journalists and security researchers appear to contain agents’ home addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, Social Security numbers, job titles, assigned field office, and emergency contact information. 'We refuted the misinformation disseminated by the FBI' According to a spokesperson for ShinyHunters, the FBI hack isn’t about the money, and the crew did not demand a multimillion-dollar extortion payment to not leak the agents’ personal details. “Our breach of the FBI was executed specifically to contest the allegations made against ShinyHunters in their May 2026 FLASH report,” a spokesperson told The Register. The FBI bulletin, published soon after the group breached ed-tech giant Instructure's Canvas platform and claimed to have stolen data tied to hundreds of millions of students, teachers, and staff, said ShinyHunters uses “harassment strategies, sending threatening text messages and phone calls to victims and their family members, and in some cases, swatting.” The criminals, it continued, “may falsely claim to have sensitive or compromising information, including embarrassing photographs or videos of victims, which frequently do not exist.” ShinyHunters contends this is all false. By hacking the FBI and releasing its statement about the hack, “we demonstrated our technical capabilities and directly refuted the misinformation disseminated by the FBI, journalists, and industry researchers,” the spokesperson told us in an interview. “This was fundamentally a public relations and marketing initiative for our business,” they said. 'Results-driven professionals' or criminals? ShinyHunters said it believes that “future corporate partners we engage with for payment will review this documentation, reinforcing our reputation as serious, results-driven professionals focused solely on transaction and resolution.” Most people call these "future corporate partners" victim organizations, breached by the digital thieves, and threatened with data leaks unless they pay an extortion demand. The FBI intrusion “establishes our credibility, technical superiority and excellence, and capability with future corporate stakeholders, positioning us as a professional and predictable entity focused on concluding negotiations efficiently,” the spokesperson said. It also puts a huge target on the crew, and we’d bet that the FBI, already gunning to arrest ShinyHunters members, is now doubling down on those efforts. The spokesperson said they and others in the crew started off as GnosticPlayers before rebranding as ShinyHunters in 2020, and that they have since seen the “majority” of GnosticPlayers members arrested. This business, however, is a criminal operation. We asked them why they believe people will trust the words of criminals over those of law enforcement. They said it’s due to ShinyHunters’ “unique and exceptional reputation along with over five years of history in the space…We are in a unique position and due to our vast capabilities and resources, victims are more likely to resolve the situation quickly and cheaper with us instead of going down the full disclosure route.” Think of the children We also questioned how they justify doing what they do in this “business” - breaking into IT systems, stealing data, extorting victims - considering the personal toll it takes on people, especially when the stolen files contain sensitive information about children as they did in the Canvas intrusion. ShinyHunters claims that they “don't attack human beings. We attack the corporate structure. The Business. Not human beings. The money comes out of insurance pocket. Not people’s or businesses' own. Full coverage by insurance. No personal harm is being done, only business harm that they recover from within a quarter considering the type of attack.” Ransomware and other disruptive attacks are “substantially worse and costly,” they said. “There are times in the work we do sometimes we have to push the corporate to the absolute limit to get them on the table,” they continued, noting that there was an “initial issue” with the Canvas intrusion “that we cannot comment on, but it highly relates to the misinformation we are combating. It takes a lot of convincing to bring a corporate to the table to negotiate if they think you are not trustworthy and bluffing/exaggerating what you have.” While we don’t know for sure what this issue was, ShinyHunters switched to school-by-school extortion after compromising Instructure, the company that owns the Canvas online learning platform, in late April and after the initial pay-or-leak deadline passed on May 6. They injected a ransom message into about 330 Canvas school login portals, causing Instructure to take the platform offline for a day - during final exams and Advanced Placement testing for many. Meanwhile, that PeopleSoft 0day The ed-tech company ultimately “reached an agreement” with ShinyHunters, which is corporate-speak for they paid the extortion demand. Alliance Risk CEO David Vainer previously told The Register he estimates the figure sits somewhere between $5 million and $30 million. According to ShinyHunters, the PeopleSoft preauth vulnerability that they exploited in the FBI attack still doesn’t have a patch. Oracle hasn’t responded to The Register’s questions about the zero-day, or any plans for a patch. Shiny had “no comment” about whether the gang has abused the PeopleSoft bug to compromise other organizations. But they added: “the zero-day would allow us to access similar HR/Employee personal information for other corporations who are vulnerable.” They wouldn’t put a dollar amount on how much they earn from extorting businesses, but boasted: “our revenue performance significantly outperforms both our counterparts and legitimate real life businesses. We have reason to believe in a few months or soon an upcoming financial analysis or reports tracking our earnings will reflect substantial revenue growth.” And they would not comment when asked if they worried about getting arrested and criminally charged for their digital intrusions and extortion attacks. ®

The CEO of crypto exchange Bitget has confirmed that a cyberattack with all the hallmarks of a North Korean operation resulted in approximately $387.5 million worth of digital assets being stolen from the exchange’s wallets. Bitget initially estimated the loss at $351.6 million, but later revised the figure to $387.5 million after identifying additional affected assets on Zcash and TRON that were not included in the initial estimate. Blockchain intelligence company Arkham published its preliminary observations of the attack, estimating at the time that roughly $350 million was stolen and that $228 million left Bitget’s wallets in 18 minutes, between 18:58 and 19:16 UTC. Arkham said $153 million worth of XRP was taken from a wallet it identified as a Bitget cold wallet, while the stolen assets also included $66.2 million of ETH, $34.8 million of USDT, $12.9 million of USDC, and $12.8 million of Tether Gold on Ethereum. Other affected networks included Arbitrum, Optimism, BNB Smart Chain, Avalanche, and Base. However, Chen said Bitget's cold wallets and customer balances remained unaffected, while its User Protection Fund held more than $464 million worth of assets. “To be transparent about our financial position: beyond the $464M+ Protection Fund – all held in publicly verifiable wallets – Bitget holds over $1 billion in its own assets,” Chen said. “User funds are covered on a 1:1 basis.” Chen also explained that Bitget Wallet, the company’s self-custody product, operates on infrastructure separate from its exchange, and Bitget users can still make deposits and trade their tokens, despite withdrawals being temporarily suspended while additional security checks are completed. Bitget said it also engaged incident response giant Mandiant and blockchain security outfit SlowMist to help with the investigation into the attack. Chiefs at fellow exchanges rallied around Bitget in support. “MEXC stands ready to support Bitget in any way we can,” said CEO Vugar Usi. “In moments like this, the industry is stronger when we stand together.” Binance co-CEO Richard Teng also pledged Binance's support for Bitget, saying it had shared intelligence and helped trace the stolen funds. Ben Zhou, CEO of Bybit, said his company was on standby to “help in any way we can,” noting that Bitget helped it out following the $1.5 billion Bybit theft the FBI attributed to North Korea in February 2025. How and who Root cause analyses typically take some time, although according to Chen, Bitget's security team has already identified the wallet service's backend system as the source of the unauthorized transfers. “Hackers breached a key backend system of the wallet service and exploited it to forge transfer information and invoke the authorization signing process, thereby transferring funds out,” she said. “The possibility of private key leakage can be ruled out – this means a more severe risk scenario has been eliminated. Damage control has been confirmed as complete, and there is no risk of further fund outflows from the platform. “The specific intrusion methods used by the hackers are still under technical investigation, and a full report will be released upon completion of the investigation.” Chen did not go into too much detail about the alleged links to North Korean state-sponsored attackers having a hand in the attack, but said “IP behavioral patterns and on-chain signatures” suggest it was Kim’s cronies at work. It would come as little surprise if North Korea was indeed the culprit behind the attack. The regime has a knack for hacking crypto exchanges. The aforementioned hit on Bybit was perhaps North Korea’s biggest crypto haul, although similar lucrative ventures attributed to North Korean attackers have come at the expense of DMM Bitcoin and WazirX, among others. Bitget was founded in 2018, registered in the Seychelles in 2022, and operates through regional hubs across the world. Some netizens have speculated that the timing was especially inconvenient, with the transfers detected at 18:31 UTC – 02:31 on September 25 in Singapore and China, the first day of China’s three-day Mid-Autumn Festival holiday. The festival is also widely celebrated in Singapore, although it is not a public holiday there. The Register asked Bitget whether this played a role in the attack and its remediation but it did not respond. As of Friday, Bitget is offering bounties to those who help freeze or recover the stolen funds. It said eligible participants could receive 5 percent of the funds their efforts successfully freeze or recover.®

Clop has discovered what life is like on the receiving end of an extortion demand after rival crew ShinyHunters hijacked its leak site and demanded an eight-figure payout. The takeover surfaced over the weekend, when Clop's dark web leak site displayed a large "DOMAIN SEIZED BY SHINYHUNTERS" banner and the tagline "rooting your systems since '19 ;)." ShinyHunters told Reuters that it broke into the site on Friday by exploiting a vulnerability in the software powering it. The crew claimed this gave it extensive access to Clop's infrastructure. "We basically own them now," it said. Clop has not responded publicly, although two security researchers told Reuters that the clash appeared genuine. The Register has also viewed the defaced site, where ShinyHunters is posting increasingly colorful demands. According to ShinyHunters, the feud dates back to Clop's attacks on Oracle E-Business Suite (EBS) customers last year. ShinyHunters claims it discovered the zero-day first, only for Clop to obtain the exploit and use it against corporate networks. It now wants a share of the proceeds. In a message posted on September 19, ShinyHunters demanded an eight-figure payment, claiming the sum represented 2.333 percent of its own net worth. A later update raised the demand to "all the money you made off the EBS campaign plus more AND WITH INTEREST." ShinyHunters also threatened to identify companies that allegedly paid Clop and publish the sums and Bitcoin addresses involved. ShinyHunters turned the screw again on September 21, warning that its demands would increase with every 24 hours that Clop failed to respond. It now also wants a public apology, because apparently having your dark web extortion site hijacked isn't embarrassing enough. Clop is one of the most prolific data extortion groups in cybercrime. The gang has spent years exploiting vulnerabilities in enterprise software to steal data and extort victims, most notoriously during the 2023 MOVEit campaign, which affected thousands of organizations and exposed information belonging to tens of millions of people. ShinyHunters has an extensive rap sheet of its own, having been linked to numerous large-scale data theft and extortion campaigns. Its latest target is rather more familiar with that business model than most. The potential damage to Clop goes beyond the defacement of its leak site. If ShinyHunters has the wider access it claims and publishes records of previous ransom payments, the fallout could extend to companies that believed paying Clop had kept their identities and negotiations private. For now, though, those claims remain unverified. There is also the small matter of Clop's reputation. Leak sites are intended to demonstrate that an extortion crew has both the stolen goods and control of its operation. Having yours hijacked by a rival and repurposed to demand money from you is not exactly a glowing advertisement. ShinyHunters says the price will continue rising every 24 hours until Clop responds. The extortionists have become the extorted. ®

Scammers impersonating law enforcement or government officials have cost victims more than $1.6 billion since January 2025, the FBI reports. The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) received close to 61,000 complaints of this type between January 2025 and July 2026, putting the average per-complaint loss at more than $26,000. The most common type of scam is one involving criminals convincing targets to pay a sum of money to remove charges the fraudsters claim were filed against them. Typically contacting targets via unsolicited phone calls, the scammers usually claim that the target has committed or is connected to a crime, and threaten consequences such as arrest and prison time if a payment is not made. Accounting for roughly 11 percent of the complaints is a different type of scam, which involves alleging victims did not fulfill their assigned jury duty or missed a court date, then threatening them with a fine or arrest unless they pay. Of these 6,833 complaints, scammers caused losses amounting to nearly $36 million. A more profitable variant involves a more targeted approach. Scammers will complete some due diligence on a target, such as ascertaining their profession, and tailor the scam to their job. The IC3 has seen cases in which scammers contact medical practitioners, for example, claiming their medical license is expiring or that it was used in the commission of a crime. Payment is then demanded either under the guise of renewing the license or as part of an extortion attempt to "protect their professional reputation." Victims reported 3,322 instances of this kind of targeted scam, with total losses exceeding $37 million. A far less common tactic, deployed in 496 of the total complaints, saw scammers claim that documents such as driver's licenses or passports had expired and demand payment to renew them. Despite accounting for a minority of cases, criminals still netted $348,000 using this method. Finally, and arguably the most elaborate tactic the IC3 outlined, was the targeting of Americans from different ethnic communities, foreign nationals, and international students in the US. The nature of the targeting was not the aspect the criminals invested the most effort in. The general procedure was also similar to the other examples: Scammers impersonate foreign law enforcement or US-based foreign diplomatic officials, threatening to cancel the victim’s home-country passport or have them extradited. However, these scams sometimes involve video calls. The criminals are known to don a country’s law enforcement uniform, or in some cases even take the calls in movie-style sets they create to mimic real government facilities. The IC3 said that it received 1,809 complaints of this kind of targeted scam during the 19-month reporting period, with total losses exceeding $140 million. It means nearly 10 percent of the overall losses stemmed from one scam that accounted for less than 3 percent of the total complaints. Law enforcement impersonation scams are common across the world, although they may take different shapes from country to country. In the Netherlands, for example, police received more than 7,200 reports of fake police officer scams in the first half of 2026 alone, although the criminals behind them don’t hide behind a phone or keyboard. Scams in the Netherlands see fraudsters approach victims at their homes, usually targeting the elderly population, offering to safeguard their valuables while posing as a trusted authority. In reality, the criminals simply steal the jewelry, money, bank cards, and other valuables they are entrusted to protect. Cases like these have surged across the country in recent years, and aspiring crooks as young as 14 have tried to cash in on the trend. Police have invested more in public awareness campaigns as a result. The FBI reminded the public that neither it nor any other law enforcement agency will call an individual and demand payment or request personal or sensitive information. Citizens should remember to ask for credentials and make attempts to independently verify the identity of the caller, such as calling the relevant office using publicly available details and asking for the caller by name. The IC3 recently reported its most damaging year for internet scams. It released 2025’s data in April, covering all types of cybercrime, pegging total losses at $20.87 billion – the first time it has reported annual losses exceeding the $20 billion threshold. ®

Spain’s data protection agency (AEPD) has reported the country’s first-ever personal data breach caused by the actions of an autonomous AI agent. Francisco Pérez Bes, president and deputy of the AEPD, said in a Monday blog post that an individual deployed an AI agent that used a “known large language model (LLM)” to carry out the attack on an organization. The agent scanned “generic files” before accessing the organization’s system, then ran vulnerability scans to find flaws that would give it read/write access to files containing personal data and invoices. Pérez Bes did not name the LLM used to support the attack, but said whoever was behind it used the agent to “successfully chain together different phases of the attack.” This demonstrates that AI-supported attacks are no longer theoretical, he added, and called on organizations to embrace defense tools that are capable of keeping pace with the speed at which agentic attacks can be executed. “Human supervision remains essential, but it must be supported by detection, containment, and response mechanisms capable of operating quickly enough,” said Pérez Bes (machine-translated). “The arrival of AI agents in the offensive arena should prompt an immediate review of security and data protection models. “Data protection officers, managers, and delegates must prepare for a scenario in which the speed of attacks will increase, but in which the same fundamentals will continue to be crucial: Understanding the processing activities, minimizing data, limiting access, correcting vulnerabilities, controlling suppliers, and being prepared to respond.” The Register asked AEPD for more information. Spain’s first AI agent attack comes as the AEPD recently recorded its busiest year for data protection complaints. According to its most recent annual report, covering 2025, the agency received 30,931 complaints – the most in its history – representing a 64 percent increase compared to the year before. And although Spain is only now getting its first taste of a security mishap caused by a naughty agent, cases involving the foremost US AI houses are already heavily documented. OpenAI’s claim in July that its agents escaped a sandbox and started attacking Hugging Face kickstarted something of a battle between it and rival Anthropic over whose agents could take the most liberties with their security. Both companies have reported several instances of their agents going rogue, escaping "secure" environments and going walkies across the internet to attack unwitting organizations. OpenAI has been circumspect about the true scale of its rogue agents’ damage, as third-party reporting showed more websites than it was letting on were taken over. Similarly, Anthropic has said that its AI agents had, in four cases now, accessed third-party systems in attacks that, if carried out by a human, could see them convicted under computer laws. ®

Someone compromised the official HBO Max Reddit account and used it to push more than 100 malicious ads serving up ClickFix attacks targeting both Windows and macOS devices with information-stealing malware. A Reddit user uncovered the infostealer ads on September 6, noting that the ad showed u/hbomax as the author — this is the verified HBO Max account — and advertised a macOS app for HBO Max. The streaming service does not offer a native client for the Mac. Anyone who clicked on the malicious ad would then be taken to a “somewhat-legitimate” looking landing page (hbomaxx[.]us) that includes a join/download button. Clicking the button produced instructions telling the user to copy and paste a command into Terminal on macOS. The Reddit security sleuth described that as “the classic infostealer/clickfix paste this command to download,” noting that they tested all of this in a sandboxed environment, and didn’t actually run the executable on their machine. “My guess is that the Reddit account is compromised,” they concluded. Three days later, Reddit paused the infostealer-dropping ads, and an admin said the social media platform’s safety and security teams were investigating what happened. HBO Max’s parent company Warner Bros. Discovery didn’t immediately respond to The Register’s inquiries about the account takeover - including who hijacked the streaming service’s Reddit account and how they did it. Maybe someone who didn’t like the House of the Dragon season 3 finale? We will update this story if and when we hear back. Researchers at Hudson Rock and ADAMnetworks analyzed the ads, and in a couple of reports said the HBO Max account hijacking was part of a “massive 48-hour malvertising blitz” that pushed 108 distinct ads using multiple software lures. They named the campaign PasteSwitch, and said it serves up targeted malware aimed at victims’ operating system - either macOS or Windows. The payloads include infostealers, malware loaders, cryptocurrency clippers, and fake cryptocurrency wallet applications. The cryptocurrency clippers - PasteSwitch delivers either AnimateClipper or ZigClipper - also provide blockchain-based command-and-control fallbacks for the attackers. They use Binance Smart Chain (BSC) contracts to dynamically fetch whatever C2 domain the crooks are using at any given time. “Between March and July 2026, researchers observed 36 mainnet changes executed by the same attacker controller address,” Hudson Rock said. “Because the C2 domain is hosted directly on the blockchain, the infrastructure demonstrates dynamic resilience, allowing the threat actors to easily rotate burned domains.” In addition to HBO Max, the attackers used developer-tool, disk-cleaner, and AI-themed lures, including fake OpenAI Codex ads, which crims have previously used to push Mac malware. Of the 108 ads, 46 used an HBO Max lure, directing app seekers to either hbomaxx[.]app or hbomax-macos[.]com. Another 36 tried to trick prospective victims via an OpenAI Codex theme (with a codex-craft[.]com) landing page. Of the rest: 15 purported to be a macOS disk utility (apple.clean-disk-guide[.]com) and 11 used other developer tools as lures (code-desktop[.]com). “The campaign proves once again why trusted distribution channels are becoming prime targets for infostealer delivery,” Hudson Rock co-founder and CTO Alon Gal said in a LinkedIn post. It also shows that miscreants continue to make heavy use of ClickFix attacks, so there’s little sign this social engineering method is going away anytime soon.®

A Ukrainian lawyer who wound up coding malware for the Conti ransomware gang has been sentenced to four years in a US prison. Oleksii Oleksiyovych Lytvynenko, 44, pleaded guilty in June to conspiracy to commit wire fraud over his role in Conti, the Russia-linked ransomware operation associated with more than 1,000 victims and at least $150 million in ransom payments. Lytvynenko took an unusual route into the ransomware business. The Ukrainian national, who later lived in Cork, Ireland, trained as a lawyer before joining Conti as an intruder and developer. According to his plea agreement [PDF], Lytvynenko operated under the handle "henry" and joined a team run by another Conti conspirator known as "silver" or "buza." He was recruited to help with coding and directed to work on a malware loader – software designed to get other malicious code running on a victim's machine. Prosecutors said his Google account showed he had also been doing some homework. Investigators found books and videos about malware and hacking alongside Conti malware, ransom notes, and stolen victim data. Prosecutors said he also used Google and ZoomInfo to research potential targets. Lytvynenko wasn't confined to writing code, according to the filing. Evidence from his online accounts showed that he possessed data stolen from eight US victims and four overseas, with the eight American victims reporting more than $1.5 million in losses. Court documents identify several Bitcoin transfers tied to his Conti work, including 0.4 BTC worth $25,042 that prosecutors traced back to one of his victims. He has been ordered to forfeit the same amount. Conti disbanded in 2022 after its internal chats and source code were leaked following the gang's public support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Lytvynenko apparently didn't take that as his cue to find another line of work. When Gardaí turned up at his County Cork home in July 2023, they said they found his laptop open, Cobalt Strike running and a Rocket.Chat session connected over Tor. Prosecutors said evidence recovered from the machine showed that his involvement in ransomware activity had continued after Conti disbanded. Lytvynenko was extradited from Ireland to the US in October 2025. The Justice Department says Conti attacked organizations across 47 US states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and 31 foreign countries between 2020 and 2022. By January 2022, the FBI estimated that victim payouts associated with Conti exceeded $150 million. Lytvynenko will now have four years to contemplate a career change. ®

Cybercriminals have reeled in password hashes and corresponding salts belonging to users of popular fishing app Fishbrain, opening the door to cracking attempts. Fishbrain AB, which says its eponymous app serves more than 20 million anglers, disclosed the August 19 breach to the California Attorney General's Office this week. The unknown perpetrators helped themselves to a trawl of user data, including names, dates of birth, email addresses, phone numbers, Fishbrain usernames, country information, password hashes, and salts. "Fishbrain passwords were not stored in plaintext; however, Fishbrain has determined that the compromised password hashes for some users may be susceptible to being decoded," the company said in its disclosure [PDF]. It added: "If you use your Fishbrain password for any other online accounts, you should promptly update those passwords and any associated security questions or answers. "You should also take other appropriate steps to protect any online accounts that use the same username or email address and password combination. We recommend using a strong, unique password for each of your accounts." With the hashes and salts in hand, attackers can make password guesses using their own hardware until they potentially recover the original credentials. Whether those attempts succeed depends on the strength of each password and the hashing algorithm Fishbrain used, which the company did not disclose. Fishbrain did not comment on the scale of the breach or how many of its claimed 20 million-plus users were affected. The Register asked Fishbrain for more information. After discovering the intrusion and conducting an initial forensic investigation, Fishbrain patched the vulnerability and reset every user's password. Customers must create a new one the next time they log in. Fishbrain also said it "restricted access to the affected environment," strengthened its security controls, and initiated "a broader review of our data security measures" while the investigation continues. Fisherfolk should also keep an eye out for phisherfolk using the stolen personal data to bait follow-on attacks. ®

International law enforcement agencies, working with CrowdStrike and Shadowserver Foundation, have disrupted Sality, a 23-year-old peer-to-peer botnet used to deliver malware to more than 15,000 machines worldwide. The botnet has operated since 2003 and distributed all types of malicious code to victims, spanning credential theft, spam distribution, proxy services, network exploitation, and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. For the past eight years, Sality’s primary payload has been EggJagger, a tool that monitors clipboards for cryptocurrency wallet addresses, then silently replaces them with attacker-controlled addresses. When a victim copies a bitcoin or ethereum address to make a payment, the malware redirects funds into the criminals’ wallets. CrowdStrike estimates Sality's operator stole at least $150,000 in cryptocurrency using EggJagger alone. On Monday, CrowdStrike's Counter Adversary Operations team, working with international law enforcement agencies and industry partners, disrupted Sality by executing a peer-to-peer sinkhole operation. This operation isolated infected machines, which broke the criminal operator’s ability to communicate with devices on its network. Once isolated, the bots can no longer receive payload download instructions or direct payload transfers, effectively breaking the botnet. “In practice, the operation targeted the data structure at the heart of every bot's network awareness: its peer list,” CrowdStrike Counter Adversary Operations team said in a technical writeup about the takedown. Each Sality bot maintains a list of known super peers – publicly reachable infected machines that form the backbone of the P2P network. Every 40 minutes, the bots check to see if their peers are still online. Peers that fail to respond are purged from the network. The counterattack took advantage of this by removing legitimate super peers in each bot’s peer list, continually isolating more infected machines in the network, and inserting purpose-built sinkhole entries into peer lists. That approach gave police and cyber operatives visibility into the operation’s progress and helped them notify victims. In addition to the sinkhole operation, the US Justice Department, FBI, and Department of Defense Office of Inspector General’s Defense Criminal Investigative Service seized Sality-linked domains in the US. Meanwhile, international law enforcement in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania took action against additional Sality-linked domains hosted in Europe. Meanwhile, the Shadowserver Foundation is working with internet service providers and Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) to identify infections and aid in victim notification and remediation.®

Two major healthcare businesses, Boston Scientific and McKesson, disclosed more details over the weekend about separate cyberattacks that disrupted global operations and resulted in stolen patient data, respectively. Medical-device maker Boston Scientific, whose IT systems were hacked by unknown intruders last week, said the cyberattack remains ongoing. It also noted that pacemakers and other heart devices implanted after the August 25 breach cannot provide remote monitoring and data transmission as intended. “New remote monitoring communicators cannot be activated, thus available device data will NOT be transmitted to remote patient management systems until the communicator can be activated,” the medtech firm said in a late Friday update. This applies to all new cardiac rhythm management implants other than insertable cardiac monitors (ICM). ICM devices must be activated using the Boston Scientific Clinic Assistant app to ensure the device correctly records patients’ heart rhythms, the company added. Because of the cyberattack, “new ICMs are unable to pair to the patient remote monitoring mobile phone, therefore available episode data recorded by the ICM will NOT be transmitted to the remote monitoring system until the ICM can be paired to the patient mobile app,” according to the update. The devices will still record any episodes, and patients can transmit these to the remote monitoring system by in-person transmission via the Clinic Assistant app. This is done by selecting the “interrogate” button, according to the company. Once its IT systems are back up and running, and the heart devices can pair with home monitoring equipment, they will again transmit recorded data to the remote systems. However, the company does not have a timeline for full restoration. “We are currently working on restoring affected functions and systems access,” Boston Scientific said on Saturday. The digital intrusion also affected the firm’s manufacturing, shipping, and ordering, it noted. “We are expeditiously working towards partial restoration for the shipping of some products this week,” according to a Sunday update. “Once we can demonstrate the restoration is fully operable, we anticipate ordering and shipping will ramp up to full capacity.” Boston Scientific has hired CrowdStrike to assist with the investigation and restoration efforts, and said the attack did not affect its cloud-based systems and apps - just “certain on-premise systems” - and added that it has seen no indication of unauthorized IT activity since August 25. The firm has repeatedly declined to answer The Register’s questions about the compromise, including whether it was a ransomware infection and which criminal crew is responsible. McKesson confirms breach as ShinyHunters claims responsibility Meanwhile, in another cybersecurity incident that has been very publicly claimed by the criminal perpetrator: pharmaceutical and medical supply giant McKesson over the weekend confirmed an intrusion after ShinyHunters on Friday told The Register it broke into the company’s Snowflake and Salesforce instances and stole millions of patients’ data. “Based on our investigation thus far, including assessments by leading cybersecurity industry experts supporting our response, we’ve confirmed that the unauthorized access to certain third-party applications and the exfiltration of certain data was associated with a subset of customers within our Oncology & Multispecialty and Medical-Surgical business units,” Francisco Fraga, McKesson executive VP, chief information officer and chief technology officer, said in a Saturday statement. The medical firm did not immediately respond to The Register’s questions, including how many patients were affected and what “certain data” was stolen. McKesson supports about 3,300 oncology providers in 29 states, according to its website. Fraga’s statement noted that distribution centers remain operational and McKesson continues to ship products. The firm has “reasonable assurance” that the digital intruders have been kicked out of the third-party environments and aren’t lurking around McKesson’s systems, he added. A ShinyHunters spokesperson told us that the notorious extortion group compromised more than 284 million records of patient data, and demanded McKesson pay $55.2 million or else they would leak the stolen data. However, as Have I Been Pwned boss Troy Hunt recently reminded everyone: Don’t confuse criminals’ claims with gospel truth, and “take headline numbers with a grain of salt unless you're confident in the processes of those making the claims." This was after Hunt’s HIBP service reported 12.9 million individuals affected by retailer Carhartt’s alleged breach. This number was around half of what ShinyHunters claimed when they leaked the company’s data earlier this month. The McKesson records, according to the ShinyHunters spokesperson, include patients’ full names, home and email addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, appointment dates and notes, and sensitive illness details including cancer locations on people’s bodies. The group also claims to have swiped emails containing private information from doctors to patients. The spokesperson told us they accessed the company’s Snowflake and Salesforce instances by voice phishing “multiple employees.” This is a tried-and-true method popularized by the data-theft-and-extortion gang, which has victimized other medical providers in recent months. These include pacemaker manufacturer Medtronic in April, and cancer diagnostics business Exact Sciences in July. ®

CRPx0, a cybercrime crew that has rapidly evolved from a scam service to a ClickFix-delivered ransomware and crypto-theft business over the summer, claims its victim count jumped from fewer than 10 in June to 48 organizations on its clear-web leak site at the time of publication. Keep in mind: criminals aren’t always the most trustworthy bunch, so take their claims with a healthy dose of salt. Still, the ransomware biz’s expanding operations, unique payload, and white-label hacking service make it one to watch, and a few recent analyses provide tips for defenders to keep the crooks out of their IT environments. Rakesh Krishnan, a threat-intel analyst who writes about cybercrime investigations on TheRavenFile blog, was one of the first researchers to publish details about CRPx0 at the beginning of the month, including previously unreleased malware samples. The operators offer a hacking service, providing “complete database extraction” from victim organizations and “optional public leak coordination upon request.” This platform also advertises full network compromise, “from initial access, through lateral movement, to full domain compromise,” plus persistent access across the victim’s infrastructure. A second, white-label, ransomware-as-a-service platform makes it really easy for wannabe crooks to get into the data-theft and extortion biz. CRPx0 builds, deploys, and configures everything from command-and-control infrastructure to the negotiation panel and malware, allowing its criminal customers to bring their own brand identity to their operations - and originally offered these services for a $10,000 one-time fee. At first, the operators promised to allow affiliates to keep 100 percent of their profits - this is unheard of in ransomware-as-a-service operations. This has since shifted to a 70-30 model, with affiliates receiving 70 percent of the extortion payments (after a one-time $333 enrollment fee) and the remaining 30 percent going to the operators. CRPx0 rules prohibit affiliates from infecting Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member countries and organizations based in these countries. This is a pretty common rule among Russia-based ransomware operations, and in an earlier interview with The Register, Recorded Future threat intelligence analyst Allan Liska called it the “first rule of ransomware club: you don't attack organizations in the Commonwealth of Independent States.” The gang also prefers Monero (XMR) payments, rather than Bitcoin (BTC). ClickFix ransomware delivery Affiliates can also customize their own ClickFix payload delivery. The operators offer two lures, a fake Windows Update and a fake Google reCAPTCHA, to socially engineer victims into executing the initial command, according to a Ransom-ISAC research team analysis published on Thursday. The Windows lure tricks a victim into pasting a PowerShell command into the Run dialog. This drops a DLL stager chain and ultimately deploys Python-based ransomware. The macOS lure, however, uses a curl|bash command that downloads portable Python and the ransomware directly. The lures and the rest of CRPx0’s malware run on Windows and macOS, and according to the researchers, there are four payload formats: “the two HTML lures plus a standalone DLL and a standalone EXE, both of which discard the social engineering step entirely.” All four deliver the same ransomware: a 1,769-line Python script that steals high-value files before encrypting them with AES-128-CBC (Fernet). The malware moves laterally via WMI/schtasks, and delivers a ransom note that gives victims a 48-hour deadline to pay up - or see their files leaked. 'Complete, professional offensive control center' On August 23, the CRPx0 operators published a v3.0 update note on the group’s clearnet leak site, promising “a complete, professional offensive control center for managing compromised remote machines from a single web dashboard.” It provides crims with tools to steal valuable files, credentials, and wallet recovery phrases and keys, while “watching stolen cryptocurrency wallet addresses flow in.” This service also provides scripts to run remote commands, and the control panel sets up “automated attack reactions that fire on their own when something valuable happens on a target.” As the operators note: “Everything is built to be operated by a human with no technical background: point-and-click panels, plain-language rules, and clear status indicators. The underlying attack engine is hidden behind a clean, dark-themed interface.” CRPx0’s hacking and ransomware services, enabling everything from crypto theft to encryptors and full network compromise, “could be a strategic move to attract new recruits, or a scam targeting a range of affiliate hopefuls seeking cybercrime services,” according to an August 12 analysis from Jade Brown, a threat researcher at Bitdefender. What defenders should do Still, “other threat actors may attempt to adopt similar techniques,” she warns. “This is a reminder that organizations should balance detection capabilities in preparation for different types of compromises, configuring technologies to detect and block malicious behavior that aligns with both crypto theft and encryption processes.” The Ransomware-ISAC team says defenders should prioritize five actions, in this order. “The first three cost nothing and blunt the entire ClickFix class of attack, not just CRPx0,” they note. First: remove the Run dialog for standard users - this will entirely block the Windows path. For macOS users: restrict Terminal via MDM for non-technical staff. Next, the threat-intel analysts advise defenders to alert on RunMRU writes containing powershell, curl or long base64 strings. “Every ClickFix victim leaves a trace at HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU,” they wrote. “This is the highest-fidelity ClickFix detection available and it is trivial to deploy.” The team also lists adversary network indicators and suggests blocking those. Make sure to hunt for indicators and malicious behavior in the pre-encryption exfiltration window. “Data leaves before a single file is encrypted, so .crpx0 extensions and ransom notes are a post-mortem indicator, not a warning,” according to the Ransomware-ISAC. Finally, confirm backups are unreachable from the account that would be compromised, and treat anything reachable with the victim's credentials as destroyed. ®

The US government disclosed that crims targeted more than 100 internet-exposed water systems during July cyberattacks. That's the first time the feds have put a number on the digital intrusions, but they have yet to attribute the campaign, widely suspected to be linked to Iran, to a particular group. “In July 2026, CISA observed malicious cyber activity targeting over 100 internet-exposed systems in the Water and Wastewater Systems (WWS) Sector, commonly via programmable logic controllers (PLCs) connected directly to a cellular modem,” America’s lead cyber-defense agency said, adding that connecting PLCs directly to the internet “can create significant security risks.” Suspected Iranian attackers targeted water and wastewater facilities across at least a dozen states in July, including internet-exposed PLCs. While neither federal nor state officials have identified all 12, we know that the cyberattacks occurred at mostly small, rural utilities in Minnesota, Michigan, Georgia, South Dakota, and New Jersey. “This is very serious. What stands out isn't any single incident. It's the scale,” Matt Hartman, chief strategy officer at the Merlin Group and CISA’s former acting head of cyber, told The Register. “More than 100 water systems with internet-exposed assets were hit in a single month, which points to a systemic vulnerability across the sector, not a run of isolated, unlucky targets,” Hartman said. “Much of this infrastructure runs on operational technology that was built for closed, physical environments. It was never designed with the assumption that it would be reachable from the open internet.” John Gallagher, VP at Viakoo, an OT and IoT cybersecurity provider, told us that while 100 systems represent a small fraction - only about 0.5 percent - of water utilities in the US, the “real threat is that these are test runs for a larger-scale attack.” While the 100-plus water incidents occurred in July, just last week five US federal agencies warned that attackers are using AI-generated exploitation scripts to break into internet-exposed Siemens S7 Series PLCs at water, manufacturing, energy, and other critical facilities. “This appears to be a continuation of the same suite of activity we suspect is affiliated with Iran targeting PLCs,” Halcyon Ransomware Research Center SVP Cynthia Kaiser told The Register a week ago. “Iran-affiliated actors and adversaries are actively targeting a wide swath of operational technology because these PLCs underpin essential health, safety, and critical infrastructure across society,” Kaiser, a former FBI cyber division deputy assistant director, added. While third-party analysts have largely blamed Iran for the intrusions, the federal government has not attributed the attacks to anyone. “Attribution in cyber incidents is inherently difficult and often takes time. Adversaries deliberately obscure their infrastructure, reuse tools and techniques, and route activity through compromised systems, so the government needs to be diligent before publicly assigning responsibility,” Hartman said. “In this case, CISA has done the most important thing: quickly getting actionable information into the hands of water-sector operators so they can defend their systems,” he added. “From a defender’s perspective, the ‘who’ matters less in the immediate term than understanding how the attacks are occurring and taking steps to stop them.” In its advisory, CISA recommended organizations disconnect PLCs from the internet and ensure any remote access goes through a VPN or gateway device rather than connecting directly to the PLC. The cyber-defense agency also advised owner-operators to enable password protection (we suggest multi-factor authentication) and change any default passwords. Also: ensure that allowlist IPs only allow remote access from known engineering laptops or other critical OT assets.®

A ransomware affiliate appears to have found a new way to squeeze victims for cash: pose as the good guy and undercut the criminals it was working with. Researchers at GuidePoint Security say an outfit calling itself "Ransom Busters" has been contacting ransomware victims before their attacks become public, offering to recover encrypted files and delete stolen data for a considerably smaller payment than the original extortion demand. The catch, according to GuidePoint's Research and Intelligence Team (GRIT), is that Ransom Busters isn't an enterprising band of ransomware hunters at all. The researchers assess with "moderate confidence" that it's a ransomware affiliate working across several ransomware-as-a-service operations and attempting to steer payments away from its criminal partners. GuidePoint came across Ransom Busters while investigating attacks linked to DragonForce, Settra, and Anubis. The outfit emailed victims claiming it had hacked the ransomware gangs themselves and discovered their stolen data on the crooks' servers. Ransom Busters claimed it could delete that data and retrieve encryption keys, all for the bargain-basement price of between $20,000 and $60,000. It also demonstrated access to the same datasets held by the ransomware affiliate behind the attacks, GuidePoint said. That alone raised eyebrows, but the forensic evidence proved rather harder to explain away. GuidePoint examined two incidents in which Ransom Busters approached victims and found the intrusions shared a collection of unusually specific fingerprints. Both used SoftPerfect Network Scanner for reconnaissance, s5cmd to shovel data into AWS cloud storage, and the Remotely remote-management tool installed using PowerShell. More damningly, the attacker created a local backdoor account using the password "Numlock!123" in both environments. The same attacker-controlled hostname, "DESKTOP-BBETH6K," also turned up in both intrusions. This might be explained by ransomware operators sharing tools or a prebuilt attack environment. GuidePoint said it has seen the same activity across several separate RaaS programs, however, leading it to conclude that one affiliate is likely moonlighting across multiple gangs and then cutting its employers out of the payday. GuidePoint also warned that paying the supposed rescuers provides no assurance that stolen information will actually disappear. So if a mysterious stranger somehow knows you've been ransomwared before you've told anyone, and generously offers to make the whole problem disappear for $20,000, you may want to question how they got your number in the first place. ®

Australian aparthotel chain Quest has revealed it leaked customer data. A Reg reader kindly shared an email from the chain with the subject line “Important Security Update Regarding Your Quest Data.” That missive opens with unwelcome news that “I am writing to inform you of a recent data security incident involving some of your personal information.” “On Monday, 17 August 2026, we identified unauthorised access to a database system and immediately took steps to contain the incident,” the email continues. “The incident arose from a vulnerability through our third-party service provider.” Exposed data “relates to records from before June 2025” and includes guests’ full name, plus what Quest described as “Your email and/or other contact details.” The Register asked the company for comment, and it told us “A small number of data entries also involve Date of Birth.” Which means whoever accessed this info is now in a decent position to attempt identity fraud. Quest did not, however, identify the third-party that was the source of the breach, how the breach happened, or the number of customers impacted by the leak. The company also ignored our question about the extent of the lost data. Quest started operating more than 30 years ago, so we’re keen to know how far back this leak goes. Quest operates over 120 properties, most in Australia, plus some in New Zealand and Fiji. The Register has found listings for Quest properties on popular third-party travel booking sites such as Expedia, Wotif, and Booking.com – suggesting overseas visitors who stayed in the company’s properties may also be at risk. The accommodation outfit told The Register it has contacted all affected guests, contained and fixed the leaky systems, completed remediation, commenced forensic investigations, and hired external cyber security and privacy advisers. This is a developing story and The Register will update it as more information becomes available. ®

Some 1.6 million unique email addresses tied to RingCentral have been leaked online, alongside names, physical addresses, and phone numbers, according to Have I Been Pwned. RingCentral disclosed the breach on July 28 and said “it was the target of a sophisticated social engineering campaign” affecting a “limited portion of RingCentral customers.” The comms platform said that it promptly responded to the intrusion upon detecting it, “took steps to stop the unauthorized activity,” and immediately launched an investigation into the security incident with help from a “leading third-party forensic firm.” “We have not seen any new unauthorized activity since taking these remediation efforts,” the company added. RingCentral did not immediately respond to The Register’s request for comment on this story. We will update it as needed. While the company hasn’t named its attacker, notorious data theft and extortion gang ShinyHunters previously claimed it compromised the collaboration platform, according to a post on its data leak site, viewed by The Register. Screenshots of the post also circulated on social media. The crooks claimed they stole more than 623 GB of data, and set a July 30 deadline for RingCentral to pay up - or else the crew would dump the stolen information online. RingCentral apparently didn’t pay the extortion demand, and ShinyHunters followed through on its threat, posting customers’ details on the internet. “The company failed to reach an agreement with us despite our incredible patience, all the chances and offers we made. They don’t care,” the crims wrote on August 3. A ShinyHunters spokesperson told us that the group broke into RingCentral by voice-phishing an employee and tricking them into giving the crooks their password. This same group, which security sleuth Dominic Alvieri says is his “top threat group and probably is for most analysts,” has hacked hundreds of organizations since the start of the year, including education tech firms that provide services for schools and universities along with healthcare-sector organizations. Recently, ShinyHunters dumped data stolen from Abbott’s cancer diagnostics business with the leak containing 10.9 million unique email addresses alongside personal and health information. The crooks claim that they made off with more than 30 million rows of customer information, including more than one million Social Security numbers and 7.5 million dates of birth. More concerning, however, they said the haul includes 22 million-plus rows of client notes containing confidential doctor-patient conversations and health information, and more than 20 million medical-order records containing patient IDs, prescription types, order dates, and refill information.® Editor's note: This story was amended post-publication with comment from ShinyHunters.

AI is becoming both an attack tool and a high-value target, with attacks by AI-enabled adversaries rising 89 percent in 2025, according to CrowdStrike. The security firm's annual Threat Hunting Report details criminal gangs and nation states using AI throughout the attack chain. Attackers are also targeting organizations' AI infrastructure and poisoning popular software packages to compromise their users. "AI is both the weapon and the target," CrowdStrike counter adversary division senior VP Adam Meyers told reporters. "AI is a high-value attack surface, and it's being used by more and more threat actors." These attacks include LLMjacking, in which criminals steal corporate credentials to access frontier-model APIs, and cost harvesting – deliberately inflating a victim's AI usage to run up its bill. In one campaign, CrowdStrike documented a token thief sending about 200,000 API requests in just two minutes. The security vendor's threat hunting team now tracks AI agent-triggered leads at 2.5x the rate of human-triggered threats, and Meyers said this increased volume remains true across both government-backed goons and financially motivated criminals. CrowdStrike tracks more than 290 adversary groups, having added about ten this year. Of the 290, a North Korean crew it tracks as Famous Chollima – a sub-unit operating under the Lazarus Group umbrella and best known for its fake IT worker scams – "demonstrated the most advanced AI usage" over the second half of 2025 and first half of 2026, according to the report. This government-backed crew created "entire fake companies with AI-generated websites, GitHub accounts, and email infrastructure to support insider threat operations," the authors wrote. AI supply-chain compromise was the second most common MITRE ATLAS technique used by attackers to gain initial access, and Famous Chollima's campaign targeting AI-focused development environments "was one of the most sophisticated examples of this technique in practice," the report noted. This included a supply-chain attack in January and February targeting cryptocurrency and blockchain companies. In these attacks, the Norks published trojanized repositories, primarily hosted on GitHub, that contained legitimate-looking project files alongside hidden, malicious scripts. When developers opened these repos, malicious scripts automatically executed commands that gave Famous Chollima access to their environments. "AIs themselves are being targeted through that supply chain and through the CI/CD pipelines that they're dependent on," Meyers said. Threat hunters suspect another Lazarus Group offshoot, tracked as Stardust Chollima or Sapphire Sleet, was behind the March Axios supply chain attack. Last week, Amazon attributed four npm compromises over the past 18 months to the same North Korean crew. Meanwhile, a financially motivated crew tracked by CrowdStrike as Altered Spider and elsewhere as TeamPCP targeted developers' AI tools, compromising more than 300 software dependencies in one day. It harvested credentials and secrets before pivoting into cloud environments for theft and extortion. Altered Spider "hits the endpoint in seconds and within minutes, they're inside of the cloud," Meyers said. "It gives you a sense of how quickly they can move throughout that environment, and this is all tied again to software supply chains." Patching window slams shut CrowdStrike argues that AI is helping attackers exploit newly disclosed vulnerabilities at machine speed. From January to June, 88 percent of the exploitation observed by CrowdStrike using public proof-of-concept (PoC) code occurred within 48 hours of the code's release. The company said China-linked groups such as Vault Panda and Genesis Panda moved even faster, launching attacks within 24 hours of disclosure. "Vulnerabilities are weaponized through the use of AI," Meyers said. "This is creating a rich ecosystem of vulnerabilities for attackers to use against various systems, and what this really means is that the 30-day patch window, which frankly, was aspirational, is completely obsolete. We're down to 24-hour, 48-hour patch cycles, and organizations are really struggling under that." Meanwhile, as anyone who follows Microsoft's Patch Tuesday – or any other software vendors' vulnerability disclosures over the past few months – knows, AI is also really good at finding bugs in code. This means more CVEs and more patching for sysadmins racing to fix flaws before miscreants reverse-engineer the updates and develop exploits. "In 2025, there were something like 48,200 CVEs that were registered," Meyers said. "We're already, as of last week, at 43,000 for this year. We're not even into August yet, and we're already coming very close to the number from last year." June alone saw more than 7,600 software bugs reported and tracked through CVEs, he added. "The vulnerability ecosystem is going to be the big story for the next couple of months." ®

Europol and its partners' investigators flagged 4,340 “horrific” URLs for removal over several weeks in June and July as part of an ongoing crackdown on The Com (short for community), a loosely knit network of online groups whose young members participate in a range of illicit activities. These range from hacking, swatting, and digital extortion to real-life shootings, stabbings, and other physical violence. Europol’s recent Referral Action Days, aimed at disrupting The Com’s online ecosystem and stopping the spread of its propaganda, is part of the larger Project Compass operation. Project Compass began in 2025, and its partner law-enforcement agencies span the US, UK, and EU member states. Investigators from Belgium, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden participated in the Referral Action Days during June and July. Various groups linked to The Com post content online to recruit members and groom young victims using social media, gaming platforms, and messaging apps. “The more extreme and harmful the content a user or group can produce or extort, the higher their status within the online community,” according to Europol. “These acts are often livestreamed on social media platforms, where online bystanders cheer them on, and later saved and disseminated.” The URLs flagged for removal during this latest push to disrupt The Com’s recruiting activities included “violent videos and images depicting self-harm, suicide, child sexual abuse material (CSAM), animal cruelty, and violent attacks,” the international cops said. This, the European cops say, includes so-called blood walls, which are paintings made with blood that display the extorter’s alias and group affiliation, and cut-signs, where the victims are forced to carve the extorter’s name into their bodies. It also includes videos of street attacks and arson, plus manuals on how to commit these violent attacks, along with instructions on grooming and extorting vulnerable minors, and conducting doxxing and swatting. Europol says its European Counter Terrorism Centre has received “hundreds” of requests from member states and others over the past two years to help investigate crimes linked to The Com. It describes the online network as a “global threat, particularly concerning minors as both victims and perpetrators.” Last year, both the UK and US issued similar warnings about a subset of The Com that recruits children and teens for contract shootings, kidnappings, and other real-life violent crimes. In July 2025, the FBI said that In Real Life (IRL) Com had become increasingly brazen in its swat-for-hire and violence-as-a-service solicitations. The FBI's alert followed a similar notice from the UK National Crime Agency about a "deeply concerning" trend of The Com recruiting teenage boys to commit a range of criminal acts, from cyber fraud and ransomware to child sexual abuse.®

Apparently, being a leading destination for AI development doesn't mean AI will bail you out. AI agents broke into Hugging Face's production infrastructure, but commercial LLM guardrails blocked the forensic investigation, forcing it to turn to a Chinese open-weight model instead. The intrusion, “driven, end to end, by an autonomous AI agent system,” compromised a “limited set” of Hugging Face’s internal datasets and “several” credentials used by its services, according to a Thursday security incident disclosure. While the ML platform says that it’s still investigating whether any partner or customer data was exposed in the breach, there’s “no evidence of tampering with public, user-facing models, datasets, or Spaces, and our software supply chain (container images and published packages) was verified clean.” It also doesn't know which model the attackers used to power a swarm of AI agents, which, we're told, executed many thousands of individual actions across short-lived sandboxes, using self-migrating command-and-control staged on public services. “This matches the ‘agentic attacker’ scenario the industry has been forecasting,” according to the Hugging Face blog. Additionally, after unsuccessfully using unnamed frontier models to start the forensic analysis, the Hugging Face security team ultimately ran the log analysis on GLM 5.2, an open-weight model developed by Chinese AI firm Z.ai, on the platform’s own infrastructure. The advanced commercial models didn’t work because their analysis required submitting real attack commands, exploit payloads, and command-and-control artifacts - all of the things that the LLMs’ guardrails have been trained to block so that the AI systems can’t be used in real-life attacks. “The attacker was bound by no usage policy, while our own forensic work was blocked by the guardrails of the hosted models we first tried,” the security team wrote, noting that it’s not arguing against safety measures on hosted models and has shared this information with the LLM providers. Using GLM 5.2 had another benefit, Hugging Face noted: “No attacker data, and none of the credentials it referenced, left our environment.” This also serves as an important reminder to defenders, according to the AI platform. “Have a capable model you can run on your own infrastructure vetted and ready before an incident, both to avoid guardrail lockout and to keep attacker data and credentials from leaving your environment.” The Hugging Face intrusion is yet another indication that attacks carried out by autonomous AI agents are no longer a future threat, but rather the current state of AI-based intrusions. Last week, The Register spoke with TrendAI VP of AI and security threat research Tom Kellermann about another recent attack, during which a jailbroken Google Gemini did 90 percent of the work - including spinning up a new C2 server in just six minutes. The human did just 10 percent. Additionally, earlier in July, Sysdig threat hunters documented what they say is the first-ever documented agentic ransomware infection with an LLM - not a human - driving the entire extortion operation, from gaining initial access to compromising a production database server and destroying data. “Think of a burglar that never gets tired, never needs sleep, and instead of jiggling one door handle at a time, is trying a thousand of them simultaneously,” Zero Networks field CTO Chris Boehm said in an email to The Register about the Hugging Face intrusion. “That's basically what happened here. Not one guy typing commands into a terminal, a swarm of little automated processes hammering away nonstop, hopping between hiding spots to make it harder to trace,” Boehm said. He added, the “part that actually unsettles” him most is that the platform’s security team couldn’t get commercial AI tools to help analyze the attack, “because those tools were built to refuse anything that looked like a real attack command. It didn't matter that it was the good guys asking.” Boehm said the takeaway for security teams is twofold: “These agents can now move faster and more relentlessly than any human ever could, and the safety tools we're building aren't always ready to help us respond at that speed.”®

Threat intel outfit Group-IB has detailed a previously undocumented macOS information stealer that doesn't bother hunting for software bugs. Instead, it persuades users to pwn themselves by pasting a command into Terminal, after which it helps itself to passwords, crypto wallets, browser data, and anything else worth stealing. The boffins have dubbed the malware “ClickLock Stealer,” a nod to its use of the increasingly popular ClickFix social engineering technique and a coercive "locker" feature that pressures victims into handing over their Mac login password. According to the researchers, the operation has been active since around May and has already targeted at least 100 victims across 33 countries, with more than half located in Europe. Group-IB said it discovered the malware after analyzing a malicious shell script uploaded to VirusTotal on June 9 that had zero antivirus detections at the time. The attackers appear to distribute the malware via fake verification pages using ClickFix, host payloads on compromised WordPress sites, and rely on Telegram infrastructure for command-and-control. "The current malware doesn't even need any elevated privileges or rely on exploits for the successful execution," the researchers wrote. Instead, victims are tricked into launching the infection themselves. After they paste the supplied command into Terminal, the malware displays what appears to be a Cloudflare verification sequence, complete with a fake progress animation, while quietly downloading additional components in the background. Group-IB says ClickLock targets data from eight browsers, 31 cryptocurrency wallet browser extensions, seven password manager extensions, eight desktop wallet applications, macOS Keychain, shell history, FTP credentials, and blockchain addresses spanning six different chains. The malware also deploys a modified version of the open source GSocket tool to provide the attackers with remote access. The researchers believe the malware is still under active development based on its code structure and other artifacts, suggesting operators are continuing to expand its capabilities. The nastiest touch comes when victims refuse to play along. During the fake verification process, ClickLock prompts for the user's macOS password. If the password isn't entered, the malware repeatedly kills visible applications, effectively preventing normal use of the machine until the victim complies. If the password is supplied, the theft completes quietly. If the machine is rebooted instead, persistence mechanisms are designed to resume the attack. "The entire attack chain from initial access to full credential theft and data exfiltration relies on a single moment of trust: the user pasting a command into Terminal," Group-IB wrote. The researchers say defenders will need to watch for suspicious behavior rather than known malware signatures. Among the warning signs are unexpected password prompts, applications being repeatedly forced to close, unusual access to browser data and stored credentials, and connections sending stolen information to Telegram. For everyone else, the advice is considerably simpler. If a website claiming to be Cloudflare, Google, or anyone else asks you to open Terminal and paste in a command, close the tab. ®

The two British Scattered Spider members collared for carrying out the 2024 cyberattack on Transport for London (TfL) will each spend five and a half years in prison after being sentenced on Thursday. Owen Flowers, 18, and Thalha Jubair, 20, were sentenced to five years and six months' imprisonment each, having pleaded guilty in June, in turn receiving a 15 percent reduction in their sentences. Sentencing the pair at Woolwich Crown Court, Mr Justice Turner noted both cybercriminals' immaturity, but acknowledged the sophistication of the offending, the scale of the impact on TfL, the significant planning behind the attack, and that both knew the criminality of their actions. Mr Justice Turner further noted the age gap between the pair, and that the one year and four months Jubair has on Flowers "marks a potentially significant distinction in maturity." The judge also acknowledged both defendants' neurodiversity in passing the sentence, which he said was the most lenient, while still reflecting the seriousness of their offenses. Flowers and Jubair were described by authorities as members of Scattered Spider, the loosely connected group of English-speaking individual cybercriminals thought to be mostly young men aged 16-25. Scattered Spider has been one of the most prominent cybercrime groups of the past few years, claiming responsibility for major attacks such as those on MGM Resorts in 2023 and the attacks on British retail giants in 2025. The National Crime Agency (NCA) said the group presented the most significant cyber threat to the UK, and today's sentencing closes the book on the biggest prosecution of cyber offenders in UK history. NCA officials have continually refused to comment on whether Flowers or Jubair were linked in any way to other major attacks claimed by Scattered Spider. The sentencing marks only the second conviction under Section 3ZA of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (CMA) – reserved for the most serious offenses. Section 3ZA covers unauthorized acts involving computers that cause, or create a significant risk of, serious damage, where the offender intends to cause that damage or is reckless as to whether it occurs. Flowers and Jubair pleaded guilty on the basis that their actions were reckless. The only previous 3ZA conviction came last year and involved a former GCHQ intern who was jailed for six years following a national security investigation. The NCA said there were no parallels between this case and the TfL attack. Deputy Director Paul Foster, head of the NCA's National Cyber Crime Unit, said: "This is the largest cybercrime prosecution ever brought before the UK courts and the culmination of nearly two years of painstaking work by the NCA, CPS, and our policing partners. "Scattered Spider has been the most significant cybercrime threat to the UK in recent years. Through this investigation, we have severely disrupted that threat and brought key offenders to justice. "The attack on Transport for London caused significant financial harm and disruption to a vital part of the UK's critical infrastructure. These convictions would likely not have been possible had Transport for London not engaged with law enforcement early, so I would urge any other organization to please do the same in such circumstances. "We will continue working with partners in the UK and overseas to identify offenders and bring them to justice." Andy Lord, London's Transport Commissioner, said: "We welcome the news that two people charged in relation to the cyber incident which impacted our operations in 2024 have now been sentenced. "The security of our systems and customer data is extremely important to us, and we continually monitor our systems to ensure only those authorised can gain access and continue to take the necessary actions to protect TfL." How TfL attack unfolded Scattered Spider members are known for their phishing, voice phishing ("vishing"), and social engineering tactics to gain footholds in target networks, and TfL was no different. Flowers and Jubair purchased partial TfL credentials from "well-known criminal forums" and used those to reset the 2FA on employee accounts, a process that took multiple attempts. Woolwich Crown Court heard that the pair impersonated an employee and socially engineered a TfL helpdesk worker into resetting the password for their account. The pair gained access to TfL's network on August 31, 2024, and held on to that access until September 3. During this time, they worked to elevate their privileges and gain access to key internal systems, including databases containing information on what was originally thought to be only around 5,000 people. It wasn't until earlier this year that it became known that Scattered Spider actually gained access to around 7 million users' data. The attack had minimal disruption to the transport network in real terms, although the availability of several services suffered, such as account logins, customer portals, and third-party apps reliant on TfL data. TfL was not able to issue photo travel cards to Londoners until December 4, 2024. A limited number of ticket machines also malfunctioned as a result of the attack, and travelers paying by contactless card were unable to view their journey histories online. All of the organization's employees, around 28,000 of them, a considerable proportion of whom were allowed to work remotely, were summoned to TfL's offices to reset their passwords because of uncertainties around whether the attackers were still in the network. Although train and bus services were not affected, the costs associated with remediating the attack climbed to £29 million ($39 million). Several complexities The NCA said the investigation that led to today's sentencing was perhaps even more complicated than Operation Chronos, which crippled the once-dominant LockBit ransomware group. Bringing Flowers and Jubair to justice involved delicate management, owing to their ages, backgrounds, and neurodiversity. Flowers, for example, was known to UK law enforcement prior to the TfL attack, and investigating officers suspected his involvement from the outset, although he could not be named until September last year due to his age. The teenager was initially arrested on suspicion of his involvement in the TfL attack on September 6, 2024, at his three-bedroom home in Walsall, where he lived with his maternal grandmother and uncle. Officials say Flowers spent most of his time at home in his bedroom playing computer games and using chat forums, and was primarily motivated by gaining notoriety among cybercrime circles. He was charged and later released on bail conditions, which he breached twice in October 2024 and again in May 2025 after being handed a warning two months earlier. Before TfL, Flowers had committed lower-level computer offenses. He was visited by police in October 2023 and handed a cease-and-desist order, which officers hoped would deter the then-16-year-old from reoffending. Flowers was also offered training and given advice around CMA offences but officials say he did not want to engage in any of this. Between then and the TfL attack a year later, Flowers continued to commit offenses of increasing severity. The NCA's Foster said the proposed Cyber Crime Risk Orders, announced in the most recent King's Speech, could have enabled officers to arrest Flowers sooner and impose restrictions that could have better prevented possible reoffending. Existing powers, such as serious crime prevention orders, cannot be applied to offenders under the age of 18, and some CMA offenses do not meet the criteria for serious crime, leaving a gap in the police's ability to manage the risk of reoffending. "The proposed cybercrime risk orders would provide law enforcement with a proportionate preventative tool, similar in principle to sexual risk orders to impose conditions that help to protect the public and businesses whilst an investigation continues," said Foster. "Those conditions would be actively monitored, and any breach could result in criminal sanctions, including imprisonment, and that's regardless of whether the underlying investigation has concluded. "And I'd suggest that a Cyber Crime Risk Order, should one have been available to us, would have allowed us to arrest Flowers sooner, potentially acting on information provided by US or Australian partners." Both Flowers and Jubair have autism, and Jubair is also diagnosed as having depression and severe mood disorder. Like Flowers, Jubair was also previously known to UK police, principally due to his prior conviction in 2023 related to his involvement in the Lapsus$ crew that hacked the likes of BT/EE and Nvidia. During the proceedings, Jubair sat in court alongside fellow Lapsus$ member Arion Kurtaj, who BBC's Joe Tidy recently revealed is now awaiting trial after his indefinite hospital order ended. Under the age of 18 at the time, and therefore unable to be named publicly, Jubair received an 18-month youth rehabilitation order, which included a ban on using a VPN, but quickly began reoffending. Officials pointed to Jubair's reoffending as another example of why Cyber Crime Risk Orders are needed, since the existing legal mechanisms that limit the freedoms of criminals such as burglars and sexual predators are not effective for cyber offenders. Jubair lived in a two-bedroom apartment on the third floor of a 21-storey council block in Bow, London, with his two Bangladeshi parents, who both work as carers. He also faces charges further afield in the US, which were unsealed in September 2025. Acting through his Scattered Spider role, between May 2022 and September 2025, Jubair is accused of compromising 120 networks belonging to 47 US entities, including critical national infrastructure and the federal court system, which resulted in more than $115 million in ransom payments being transmitted. In the UK, Jubair has 22 previous convictions in total, including 13 for fraud and one for blackmail. He was also previously sentenced for stalking and harassing two young women online. His offending began when he was 14 years old, and officials said he had an interest in computers from an early age. Jubair, who was first arrested in February 2021, learned to code by age 13. He attended school in the Bow region of London, had a number of GCSE qualifications, and had attempted to enroll in local colleges. Arrests and evidence gathering Flowers' arrest was by far the more significant of the two in terms of collecting evidence linking the pair to the TfL attack. NCA officers arresting Flowers also seized a number of devices, including laptops, tower computers, and USB storage devices. The analysis of one Acer laptop, owned by Flowers, proved to be the pair’s undoing. Forensic analysis revealed that Flowers had accessed the remote infrastructure and virtual machines that were used to carry out the TfL attack. Damningly, officers also found videos and screenshots, produced by Flowers, depicting the TfL attack in progress. Woolwich Crown Court heard that the pair livestreamed the 16-hour attack online. They were able to tie the payment used for the remote infrastructure to a cryptocurrency account found on Flowers' computer and prove that the laptop was connected to this infrastructure at the time of the attack. Further, Flowers used the same cryptocurrency account to pay for food deliveries he ordered to his home address. The teen's computer stored spreadsheets containing partial credentials for TfL employees and contained evidence linking him to cyberattacks on US healthcare organizations SSM Health Care Corporation and Sutter Health. The same computer also contained artifacts linking the activity to Jubair. Officials said they had access to certain chat logs within which a specific moniker appeared frequently. They tied this alias to Jubair because it was the same one used to discuss specific flight bookings, hotel bookings, and food deliveries, all of which could clearly be linked to the 20-year-old. And Officers found evidence of a cloud storage account containing TfL data, to which Flowers and Jubair had access. Devices seized from Jubair revealed comparatively little, other than that he had shown an interest in TfL's systems as far back as 2022. ®