A ransomware attack discovered Monday at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee appears to have compromised vast amounts of student and employee personal data, prompting the university to take several digital services intermittently offline as it continues responding to the incident.

As of Tuesday morning, the university shared an update that select campus-wide systems and applications were safe to use again, including campus WiFi, Okta, Outlook, Brightspace, Zoom and YES, while others remain restricted, including CampusPrint. Students, faculty and staff were also allowed to resume use of Vanderbilt devices, following orders to shut them down Monday. 

“Vanderbilt Information Technology continues to work with government agencies and other partners to manage this situation, and we will continue to send updates today and throughout this week for as long as necessary,” the update said. 

A ransomware group known as BYOD has taken responsibility for the attack, according to a post on the group’s leak blog. The group, which emerged in September, has since taken credit for several attacks targeting academic and health care institutions including one last month on the University of New Mexico Health Sciences Center that caused system outages, disrupted patient care and impacted academics.

The group claims to have more than one million Social Security numbers from the attack on Vanderbilt.

In a video posted to YouTube, a computer from Vanderbilt University plays an audio message announcing that a system has been compromised by BYOD. 

In its original notice on social media, the university warned community members on Monday to remain vigilant, shut down university devices and disconnect from campus Wi-Fi as the IT team was “actively investigating and working to contain the situation.”

The university urged users to take immediate action if they notice unusual or suspicious activity on their accounts or devices, including unexpected pop-ups, warnings or security notifications; unusual changes to files, folders or permissions in OneDrive, Box or other cloud storage platforms; unexpected file movement, deletion, renaming or modification; unfamiliar applications, messages or prompts; or unexpected requests to enter passwords, approve authentication requests or provide login credentials.

In an interview with The Hustler, Vanderbilt University’s student publication, Student Government President Simran Fitzpatrick and Vice President William Dean said they met with Vanderbilt Student Affairs to express student frustrations and concerns about the university’s handling of the cybersecurity attack, and lack of communication. 

“Students are concerned about the cyberattacks and extortion threats, particularly what information was stolen, how it may be used, and how it could affect them personally,” Fitzpatrick and Dean said. “We are frustrated by the university’s lack of clear communication, and our priority is ensuring that students receive timely updates and are not academically penalized for circumstances beyond their control.

However, in the update on Tuesday morning, the university acknowledged that its efforts to contain and respond to the incident had disrupted normal communications.

“The cyberattack is like a building that just exploded and we are trying to gather the pieces,” a Vanderbilt IT representative said, according to the Hustler. 

The post Vanderbilt University reels following ransomware attack claimed by BYOD group appeared first on CyberScoop.

Authorities seized the domain of Virtualine, a bulletproof hosting provider that cybercriminals used to commit a large-scale sextortion scheme, ransomware, data theft, malware hosting and money laundering, the Justice Department said Tuesday. 

Virtualine facilitated prolific criminal activity, including the distribution of child sexual abuse material (CSAM), the Justice Department said. The Russian-speaking bulletproof hosting provider was among the most active this year in crypto-related crime in particular, researchers said. 

The site and its associated infrastructure stands out among the dozens of bulletproof hosting providers currently tracked by TRM Labs. “It was not among the largest by total inflows, but it received the most illicit-attributed value in 2026 to date,” the blockchain and cryptocrime research firm wrote in a blog post.

Virtualine received almost one-fifth of all illicit-attributed inflow among bulletproof hosting providers tracked by TRM this year to date.

A Russian drug marketplace accounted for nearly 44% of the direct payments Virtualine received from customers and attributed counterparties so far this year, according to TRM. A sextortion scheme accounted for nearly 17% of direct payments to Virtualine, followed by a cryptocurrency mixer at almost 13%, ransomware at nearly 5%, cybercrime services at 3% and malware at 2%.

“Virtualine is another example of Russia’s illicit economy at work: darknet markets, ransomware groups, non-compliant exchanges, and brokers all feeding the same ecosystem,” Ari Redbord, global head of policy at TRM Labs, said in a prepared statement. 

“Bulletproof hosting is the connective tissue. Seizing a domain matters, but the blockchain record doesn’t disappear with it. It shows who is paying, who is getting paid, and where they go next,” he added. 

Virtualine attracted many criminals as customers. Ransomware groups, including Coinbase Cartel, The Gentlemen, INC, DragonForce and Qilin all paid the site’s operators, according to TRM. The bulletproof hosting provider also received payments from the StealC infostealer, the Matanbuchu loader, bot and malware-distribution services and sites linked to CSAM. 

The FBI and prosecutors got a court order to seize Virtualine’s primary domain, which was also known as Secury, Massgod, Spamhouse, Lanedo and Omegatech.

Officials said Virtualine continued hosting services for a customer that distributed CSAM and a hack-for-hire service after it received numerous notices from law enforcement in Germany, Canada, Australia, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children and a victim’s attorney.

TRM underscores that Virtualine was disrupted, but not completely shut down. “A domain seizure disrupts how customers find and access a service,” researchers wrote. “It does not, by itself, establish that the operator has stopped working, or that customers have lost access to all underlying infrastructure.”

The post Officials seize domain of top bulletproof hosting provider Virtualine appeared first on CyberScoop.

A 36-year-old Ukrainian national was sentenced to 70 months in prison for participating in a string of ransomware attacks targeting various critical infrastructure operators and businesses from the middle of 2018 to late 2021, the Justice Department said Tuesday.

Artem Aleksandrovych Stryzhak was involved in ransomware attacks on hospitals that disrupted patient care, government entities, a dentist office, a company in the oil and gas transportation industry and law firms. He joined various ransomware groups during his crime spree, including Nefilim and Hive, which attacked about 1,500 victims worldwide.

“Ransomware attacks like those committed by the defendant wreak enormous havoc — harming victim companies that pay millions in remediation and ransoms, preventing hospitals and other critical facilities from accessing data, and putting sensitive information in the hands of bad actors,” Joseph Nocella Jr., U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of New York, said in a statement.

Stryzhak pleaded guilty to multiple cybercrimes in late 2025. He was arrested in Spain in June 2024 and extradited to the United States in April 2025. Authorities are still looking for his alleged co-conspirator Volodymyr Tymoshchuk and previously announced a $11 million reward for information leading to his arrest or conviction.

Attacks involving Nefilim ransomware caused millions of dollars in losses from extortion payments and damage to victim networks, officials said. Stryzhak and his co-conspirators allegedly customized executable ransomware files for each victim, creating unique decryption keys and unique ransom notes.

The ransomware group primarily targeted companies located in the United States, Canada and Australia with more than $100 million in annual revenue, and extorted victims by threatening to publish stolen data. The crew researched companies after it broke into their networks to determine their net worth, size and contact information.

Stryzhak’s victims in the United States include an engineering consulting company based in France, an aviation industry company in New York, a chemical company in Ohio, an insurance company in Illinois, a company in the construction industry in Texas, a pet care company in Missouri and an international eyewear company. 

Stryzhak and his co-conspirators also used Nefilim ransomware to encrypt victim networks in Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland, prosecutors said. 

Authorities said Stryzhak was one of the earliest Hive affiliates and, with co-conspirators, deployed the ransomware against seven victims during the COVID-19 pandemic.

“This sentence concludes a years-long, multi-continent investigation into a defendant who participated in cyberattacks against Americans’ businesses and health care,” A. Tysen Duva, assistant attorney general of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, said in a statement. “Cybercriminals who terrorize American businesses cannot evade justice by operating from abroad or hiding behind sophisticated technology.”

The post Prolific Hive and Nefilim ransomware affiliate sentenced to 70 months in prison appeared first on CyberScoop.

The Office of the National Cyber Director has rolled out its second regional cyber pilot program, this one focused on rural hospitals.

National Cyber Director Sean Cairncross visited South Carolina on Monday to debut the six-month program, Project Lifeline 250, which connects industry with rural hospitals. The concept is similar to the first pilot program in Texas that connected industry with the water sector.

“Project Lifeline 250 connects the world-leading American industry with rural hospitals and uses the greatest American tools and capabilities to defend hospital networks; deploy physical back up devices after an initial incident to ensure an impacted hospital can still provide critical care; and identify high-risk and legacy devices and replace them,” Cairncross said in a statement.

The health care sector had a record year for breaches last year, with 804 large breaches reported to the Health and Human Services Department’s Office for Civil Rights that affected more than 140 million people. The FBI identified the sector as the top target for ransomware and other hackers in 2025.

Rural hospitals, like the water sector, lack resources compared to other kinds of critical infrastructure.

Besides industry and the ONCD, the effort is a project that draws in the South Carolina Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity program, the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division and local governments in the state.

“Cyber threats are a rising challenge to our nation’s security, and we must remain vigilant to protect the systems our communities depend on,” said South Carolina Gov. Henry McMaster. “Project Lifeline 250 is another important step toward ensuring South Carolina’s rural hospitals have the resources they need to defend against cyberattacks and continue providing critical care.”

Some of the same companies involved in providing free services in the Texas pilot are involved in the South Carolina pilot, too, along with some new participants. Among the participating firms: Abnormal AI, Cisco, Cyera, Microsoft, Rilian Partners, Trellix and Zscaler.

“The stakes for critical infrastructure are getting higher and higher,” said Yotam Segev, cofounder and CEO of Cyera. “There’s real urgency in bringing cyber expertise from some of the world’s largest and most complex enterprises to rural hospitals through Project Lifeline 250. When a hospital knows where its patient data lives and who can reach it, it can reduce the leverage behind ransomware. Every community should have that clarity, no matter the size of the hospital or its IT team.”

Members of Congress also have introduced legislation designed to aid rural hospital cybersecurity.

The ONCD hasn’t said what will happen at the end of the six-month pilots. And so far it has only partnered, or publicly discussed partnering with, GOP-led states.

The post National cyber director rolls out latest pilot in South Carolina, this time for rural hospitals appeared first on CyberScoop.

On Oct. 1, threat researchers reported that the China-linked group behind Warlock ransomware, which Microsoft tracks as Storm-2603, had attacked at least four organizations in the prior two months. A water utility and a telecommunications provider were among them, along with a regional government body and a university. This all occurred in Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking countries across Europe, Africa and Latin America.

The likely way in was on-premises Microsoft SharePoint. The researchers believe the group still carries the ToolShell flaws it exploited in July 2025, the same month Microsoft shipped the fixes, alongside newer SharePoint flaws. An exploit for a bug patched more than a year ago is still worth packing. Somewhere, a server is still waiting for its fix.

Before I ran a security company, I ran its finances. The habit I kept is reading the assumption under every number. Equipment is expected to keep producing. Inventory is expected to sell. When the assumption breaks, the asset gets written down.

Security budgets carry one too, and almost nobody writes it down. It is that the tools on the books will still be running when the attack arrives. Warlock’s operators went after that assumption directly.

Nine days in, 2 hours to disarm

One intrusion, against a critical infrastructure operator, shows the pattern.

On July 22, the attackers planted a web shell on a SharePoint server. Over the following week, they mapped the domain, set up covert remote access and added an account, apparently named to pass as a SharePoint service account, to local administrator groups. Then, for about a day, the only recorded activity was one piece of planted code running in the background.

In the early hours of July 31, they moved. First came a tool built to disable security software. Its execution was recorded on at least 40 hosts within about two hours. Next, they staged Warlock in the domain’s SYSVOL share, a folder Windows replicates to every domain controller and makes readable across the domain, and let ordinary replication carry it to at least 33 hosts. On each one, the researchers found, the ransomware showed up almost as soon as the protection was gone.

Do the arithmetic. Roughly 40 hosts in 120 minutes averages out to one machine losing its protection every three minutes.

The attackers targeted the tools watching the data before the data itself.

A line item the adversary can switch off

On the researchers’ facts, this is a patching story and an Active Directory story first. Patching and endpoint detection and response remain essential. Patching closes the door this group most likely walked through, and detection is often the only reason a team learns something is wrong. A utility that cuts either one to fund something else has made a bad trade. Tamper protection and blocking known vulnerable drivers belong switched on everywhere, too. They make the kill step harder.

But a control the adversary can switch off is worth less than its line item says.

Accountants would call it an impairment. When an event suggests an asset can no longer deliver the value it is carried at, you test it. If it fails the test, you write it down. The asset still has value. The books simply overstated it. Most security spend is expensed rather than capitalized, so no auditor will make you run this test. Run it anyway.

Warlock is that event for a lot of security budgets. Most detection spending depends on a sequence of things going right at the worst possible moment, with a sensor staying alive, a console receiving what it reports and a person reading it in time. Take away the sensor and the rest has nothing to work with. The spend remains in the budget, but the machine is left without protection.

Thinly staffed utilities carry more of that gap than their boards realize. The Congressional Research Service noted in August that 81% of the nearly 49,500 community water systems in the United States are classified as small, serving 3,300 people or fewer. Larger systems, the report says, have more capacity to hire security specialists. That likely means fewer people watching, and more hours when nobody is.

All of the victims in this latest round were outside the United States. The playbook needs no passport.

And in the early hours, when the sensors go quiet, silence looks exactly like safety.

Prevention that does not wait for the sensor

If switching off whatever is watching comes right before the payload, the protection that matters has to be in place well before then. It cannot depend on a cloud connection holding, an analyst reading an alert or a sensor surviving the night.

Start with the limit. A tool that loads a vulnerable signed driver works at the deepest level of the machine and can end any security software it finds, including the kind I am about to describe.

That is why timing is the key factor. Here the kill step came after nine days inside. Before it, the attackers had to exploit a server, load their own code into memory through sideloading and work their way to rights across the domain. Each of those steps was a chance to stop them with a control that never had to survive the kill switch, because the attacker would not have gotten close enough to use one.

One way to build that control works in memory. Much of the code an intruder loads along the way depends on finding applications laid out in memory the way it expects. Change that layout each time an application loads, and code relying on those expectations should fail at the moment it runs, on endpoints and on servers, whether or not a sensor is reporting to anyone. The decision happens on the machine.

The impairment test for a utility board

Boards already run this review for every other asset. For security, it comes down to one question. What still holds once the monitoring stops?

Ask management to split the security budget into two piles. The first is protection that depends on a sensor staying online and a person responding. The second is protection that makes its decision on the machine, without waiting on a console or a person, and acts before the attacker has earned the rights to turn it off. Then ask who would learn that the sensors went quiet, and from what, since the attacker turns off the obvious messengers first.

If the second pile is empty and nobody would be told, write that in the risk register in those words. The share of the first pile that would not survive that night is the impairment. Better to book it in a board meeting than to read about it in an incident report.

40 machines went dark in two hours. Budget for the attacker who brings a switch.

The post What happens when security tools go dark before the ransomware appeared first on CyberScoop.

Federal authorities arrested a Canadian cybersecurity executive Thursday in Pennsylvania on charges of conspiracy of extortion, according to federal court records posted Friday.

Edward Dubrovsky, 54, is a former employee of CYPFER, a firm that helps organizations negotiate with ransomware operators. He is charged with conspiring to threaten the confidentiality of information in order to extort money, a violation of federal computer fraud law, and with conspiring to commit Hobbs Act extortion, which involves using threats to obstruct or affect interstate commerce to obtain money. Other details of the case remain sealed. 

While the FBI did not publicly announce Dubrovsky’s arrest, the case appears to align with actions taken in the wake of the ShinyHunters’ attack on the FBI’s IT systems, which exposed personal data about thousands of bureau employees. FBI Director Kash Patel said in a social media post that the bureau had arrested “another suspected co-conspirator” of the group, but did not name the suspect. The New York Times reported Friday that a Canadian man was arrested in Pennsylvania in connection with the attack.

When asked for further comment, the FBI pointed CyberScoop to Patel’s social media post. 

Dubrovsky’s LinkedIn page touts him as the chief operating officer and ex-founder of CYPFER. However, a firm representing CYPFER told CyberScoop that his role was Managing Director from May 2022 through Dec. 2025.

Dubrovsky “had no affiliation, operational role or relationship with CYPFER since that time, and contrary to certain reporting, was never a founder or co-founder of the company,” the firm wrote in an email to CyberScoop.

Dubrovsky’s LinkedIn page also makes reference to an affiliation with CyberSteward, which is described as a Toronto-based firm that helps breach victims negotiate ransom payments. Last month, Dubrovsky released a book covering how to deal with ransomware negotiations. 

Dubrovsky did not return CyberScoop request for comment. 

The FBI breach has drawn widespread attention. The attack marks a sobering escalation by ShinyHunters, a notorious group that previously targeted major cloud platforms, healthcare organizations, universities, technology companies, retailers and education service providers. Previous victims of ShinyHunters this year include Instructure, Salesforce, Snowflake and McKesson. 

Brett Leatherman, the FBI’s assistant director for cyber, said a review found the breach resulted from a third-party platform, where a contractor had not installed a security patch issued for the system. Reuters reported that the contractor worked for Accenture.

Since the breach was disclosed, several suspects have been taken into custody. In September, Dutch authorities arrested a 24-year-old suspected of affiliation with ShinyHunters. Additionally, a teenager, which Reuters identified as Saif Al-din Khader, had been detained and was cooperating with investigators. 

Dubrovsky’s case docket states that the case has been moved to the Eastern District of Texas, where Dubrovsky will be detained until a detention hearing is scheduled. 

UPDATE: 10/13/2026, 11:25 a.m.: This story has been updated with comment from CYPFER.

The post Canadian cybersecurity executive arrested in federal extortion case appeared first on CyberScoop.

Authorities accuse the owner of a so-called ransomware remediation company of swindling clients victimized by ransomware attacks into paying the company inflated fees under false pretenses.

Zohar Pinhasi, owner and operator of MonsterCloud, claimed he could decrypt and recover victims’ data with specialized, proprietary tools and avoid paying cybercriminals. Yet, no such tool existed, the Justice Department said Wednesday. 

Pinhasi allegedly used MonsterCloud clients’ fees to pay off cybercriminals and recover encrypted data without telling clients ransom payments were made on their behalf. The dual U.S.-Israeli national is accused of charging hundreds of clients more than $19 million and paying more than $8 million in ransom payments during a five-year period ending in 2023.

“It baffles me that companies fall for this,” Jon DiMaggio, principal researcher at Arkem Cyber, told CyberScoop. “I mean, they just got hacked and they go straight to a shady source.”

Pinhasi’s alleged criminal acts illustrate how the ransomware economy attracts money-seeking professionals of all types.

Ransomware response and remediation occurs in the shadows, providing cover for cybercriminals who fuel the scourge of extortion and, sometimes, those hired by victims to help put one of their worst days behind them. 

A trio of former ransomware negotiators were sentenced to prison earlier this year for deceiving their employers’ clients and conspiring with ransomware affiliates to extort those organizations — effectively playing both sides and victimizing clients’ twice over. 

Prosecutors charged Pinhasi with two counts of wire fraud and one count of wire fraud conspiracy. He pleaded not guilty Wednesday in a federal court in Brooklyn, N.Y., and was released on a $2 million bond.

The Florida resident, where MonsterCloud is also based, faces up to 60 years in prison. A federal judge granted a one-month delay on trial proceedings, noting that attorneys are engaged in plea negotiations. Pinhasi’s lawyer did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

“By falsely claiming to decrypt ransomware without paying off the ransomers, the defendant re-victimized his clients while extracting a hefty profit for himself,” Joseph Nocella Jr., U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of New York, said in a statement.

Pinhasi and one of his co-conspirators, an employee at MonsterCloud, allegedly drew clients into their scheme with an initial exploratory fee between $2,500 and $10,000. Pinhasi or an employee at MonsterCloud then obtained the ransom note sent to their client and a sample of encrypted files on the client’s system, according to the indictment.

After this “analysis phase,” Pinhasi allegedly provided encrypted samples to the prospective client as proof MonsterCloud could decrypt the files.

“However, in many instances, Pinhasi had actually shared the sample files with the cybercriminal and obtained decryption samples without informing or revealing to the client that MonsterCloud had not employed any proprietary technology,” prosecutors wrote in the indictment.

This preliminary phase reinforced Pinhasi’s false claims and “induced clients to contract for full ransomware recovery — a more expensive service, costing up to two or more times the ransom,” prosecutors added. 

In August 2023, Pinhasi charged a client approximately $150,000 and allegedly made a ransom payment of about $8,200 to recover the organization’s data. He allegedly used the monikers “Zack Silver” and “Zack Green” in some of his communications with cybercriminals. 

Officials said MonsterCloud’s contracts noted that the company would contact a cybercriminal after exhausting all other options, but dealing with cybercriminals was often Pinhasi’s first step in accessing encrypted files and the typical way he obtained proof of recovered data and decryption keys. 

MonsterCloud landed deals with hundreds of companies based in the United States and Canada. The company still has an active site with a contact form for prospective clients, packaged with testimonials from law enforcement agencies and a former FBI official.

Pinhasi and MonsterCloud reportedly operated this scheme for years. An exposé in ProPublica in 2019 detailed how the company professed to use its own data recovery methods but instead paid ransoms without informing victims, including law enforcement agencies.

“Pinhasi claimed to fix ransomware while never remediating the underlying threat. Instead, he turned the victim’s crisis into his own profit center,” James C. Barnacle Jr., assistant director of the FBI, said in a statement. “This deception is unacceptable, and the FBI is committed to ensuring accountability for those who choose to victimize the very people who trusted them for help.”

You can read the full indictment below.

The post Ransomware recovery CEO indicted after allegedly paying hackers and pocketing millions appeared first on CyberScoop.

FortiBleed, a credential compromise campaign targeting Fortinet firewalls and VPN gateways, is an ongoing threat that can lock users out of their Fortinet accounts and also lead to ransomware attacks, the FBI and Secret Service said in an alert published Tuesday.

“Affected organizations may find themselves locked out of their systems if threat actors disable accounts or change passwords, requiring remediation steps beyond standard patching and password resets,” the alert states. “In addition, the FortiBleed attack chain has been observed as an initial entry point for ransomware affiliates.”

When it was first uncovered earlier this year, SOCRadar verified more than 86,644 compromised devices across 194 countries. Ensar Seker, chief information security officer of the company, told CyberScoop that “in our later investigation, we identified more than 400,000 or 450,000 firewalls targeted by the wider operation.”

There are different aspects of the operation that make comparisons imprecise over time, but overall the numbers “show the campaign is broader and more serious than we understood at the beginning,” Seker said.

The attackers can disable accounts or change passwords to lock users out with the access they gain, making standard password resets and patching insufficient, the government alert reads.

The alert also warns that initial access brokers are making use of the FortiBleed attack to provide access to ransomware affiliates, including INC/Lynx and Payload.

The government warning provides additional confirmation about the most worrisome elements of FortiBleed, Seker said.

“What stands out for me is that FortiBleed is still an active threat, and attackers are using stolen credentials to access the exposed Fortinet devices, create new administration accounts, and in some cases, lock the real owners out,” he said. “The FBI and the Secret Service also confirm that the success can lead to ransomware attacks as well.” 

The FBI and Secret Service recommend that Fortinet customers restrict external management or remove internet administration entirely, reset credentials, set up multifactor authentication, review firewall and VPN users for unauthorized changes, review logs for potential lateral movement, and enable secure credential storage.

The agencies are seeking any information and indicators of compromise that organizations can share, including IP addresses and any usernames the attackers use.

The post Alert: FortiBleed remains active campaign, can lock out users or lead to ransomware attacks appeared first on CyberScoop.

Authorities arrested the alleged leader and two additional members of KillSec, a data extortion group primarily run by teenagers that successfully compromised about 500 organizations since 2024, Europol and the Justice Department said Thursday.

Investigators said the alleged leader of the group is 16 years old, but declined to name them. One of the group’s accused members, Fouad Eltibrizi, was arrested Wednesday in the United Kingdom and awaits extradition to the United States, the Justice Department said. 

The Dutch national, who is accused of acting as a negotiator for the group, was indicted last month in Puerto Rico and faces up to 10 years in prison for unauthorized computer access conspiracy. Europol said a suspected developer involved in the group committed multiple crimes before they turned 18 in August.

The arrests were part of “Operation KillSwitch,” a globally coordinated operation aided by 10 countries and private cybersecurity companies. Officials seized KillSec’s data-leak site and at least 110 terabytes of data, including information on the group’s criminal proceeds.

Law enforcement’s accumulated actions targeting KillSec’s infrastructure and people involved “imposed serious cost and degraded the adversary’s core capabilities,” the FBI’s Cyber Division said in a statement on X.

“We have undermined the group’s ability to rebuild, limited their operational reach and reduced the likelihood of future attacks,” the FBI added.

Europol said investigators gained control of domains and five central servers, including infrastructure the group used to manage its activities and store stolen data.

The cybercrime group, which was also known as Kill Security Ransomware Group, exploited various defects to intrude victims’ computers or cloud-based network infrastructure and steal sensitive data for extortion demands. Officials said the group obtained substantial ransom payments in some cases. 

Officials from the United States and Europe searched eight residences in Spain, Greece, the United Kingdom and Romania, and investigators are looking through evidence seized during those raids to identify other potential members of the group. 

Some of the group’s victims were identified by initials and the location and date of the attack in the indictment filed against Eltibrizi. This list includes I.D.O. in Puerto Rico in March 2025, U.S.B.L. in Washington state in March 2025 and A.A. in Louisiana in September 2025.

Three of those victims align with organizations that were listed on KillSec’s data-leak site for Instituto de Ojos, US BioTek Laboratories and Accelerated Academy. 

Prosecutors accuse Eltibrizi, who allegedly participated in the conspiracy from at least March through November 2025, of placing calls as a KillSec representative in at least one of those extortion demands. 

“The defendant and his co-conspirators carried out targeted intrusions against multiple companies and organizations, stealing highly sensitive information and attempting to extort their victims for substantial sums of money,” Héctor Ramírez‑Carbó, acting U.S. attorney for the District of Puerto Rico, said in a statement.

“Ransomware remains a serious and evolving threat to all sectors of our economy, from critical infrastructure to small businesses,” he added.

The post Authorities seize KillSec extortion group infrastructure, arrest 3 alleged members appeared first on CyberScoop.

A 35-year-old Armenian national was sentenced to two years in prison for his involvement in a series of Ryuk ransomware attacks while living in Ukraine and Russia in 2019 and 2020, the Justice Department said Tuesday.

Karen Vardanyan was extradited from Ukraine to the United States last year and pleaded guilty to computer fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud and extortion in July. Vardanyan’s sentencing, which also calls for about $1.2 million in restitution to victims, matches terms of a plea agreement he reached with prosecutors.

Vardanyan and his co-conspirators’ victims include a Michigan-based company that paid a ransom of nearly $1.2 million in January 2020, a Watsonville, Oregon-based technology company that was attacked in December 2019 and a Texas-based school breached in February 2020, according to court records.

“Like Vardanyan, many cybercriminals are not masterminds of a complex ransomware or extortion scheme but nonetheless play an integral part in the success of these crimes,” read a memo signed by U.S. attorneys in the District of Oregon.

“Unfortunately, high rewards and a relatively low risk of detection are basic features of cybercrime. The only way to affect the cost-benefit analysis of these crimes is to impose meaningful sentences on those who are caught,” the U.S. attorneys added.

Prosecutors previously accused Vardanyan and his co-conspirators — Ukrainian nationals Oleg Nikolayevich Lyulyava and Andrii Leonydovich Prykhodchenko, and Armenian national Levon Georgiyovych Avetisyan — of illegally accessing computer networks to deploy Ryuk ransomware on hundreds of compromised servers and workstations between March 2019 and September 2020.

Ryuk ransomware was prevalent in 2019 and 2020, infecting thousands of victims globally across the private sector, state and local municipalities, local school districts and critical infrastructure, including a wave of attacks on U.S. hospitals.

Victims of Ryuk ransomware attacks include Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center, Universal Health Services, Electronic Warfare Associates, a North Carolina water utility and multiple U.S. news outlets.

Justice Department officials said Vardanyan and his co-conspirators received about 1,160 bitcoins — valued at more than $15 million at the time — in ransom payments from victim companies.

Prosecutors said they found no evidence Vardanyan was still engaged in criminal activity at the time of his arrest. Vardanyan’s incarceration will be followed by three years of supervised release, and his conviction will have immigration consequences resulting in removal from the United States after serving his sentence.

The post Ryuk ransomware operator sentenced to 2 years in prison appeared first on CyberScoop.

The FBI is investigating an attack on its own systems after ShinyHunters claimed responsibility for the incident, putting the prolific cybercrime group in the most direct conflict yet with agents responsible for investigating data extortion attacks.

The Monday breach, first reported by 404 Media, allowed ShinyHunters to temporarily deface the FBI jobs site. The group claimed it stole “very sensitive data on almost all FBI agents and individuals who filed an application with the FBI for a job,” in a lengthy post on its data-leak site.

“The FBI is aware of claims regarding unauthorized activity affecting FBIjobs.gov and is currently investigating,” a spokesperson for the agency said in a statement.

An alert on the FBI jobs site notes that apply.fbijobs.gov and the Special Agent Application Portal are currently unavailable.

The attack marks a sobering escalation by ShinyHunters, a notorious group that previously targeted major cloud platforms, healthcare organizations, universities, technology companies, retailers and education service providers. Previous victims of ShinyHunters this year include Instructure, Salesforce, Snowflake and McKesson.

“The ShinyHunters ransomware group appears to be actively trying to put a target on their back,” Cynthia Kaiser, senior vice president at Halcyon’s ransomware research center, told CyberScoop. 

ShinyHunters claims it targeted the FBI in response to a public service announcement it says contains false allegations about the group. The FBI issued the PSA following ShinyHunters’ May attack on Instructure, the company behind Canvas, a widely used central hub for K-12 and university coursework, exams and communication. 

The group responded with its own “PSA” on its data-leak site, insisting it is not affiliated with The Com, has never conducted swatting attacks or claimed it had sensitive or compromising information, including embarrassing photos or videos, to extort victims. 

The PSA was addressed to Brett Leatherman, assistant director of the FBI’s cyber division, and FBI Director Kash Patel. 

“While ShinyHunters has in the past been hyperbolic about the criticality of the data they’ve accessed, the group has established itself as a legitimate threat,” Flashpoint analysts told CyberScoop. 

“This attack benefits ShinyHunters by bolstering their reputation as a credible threat,” the analysts added. “In the group’s statement on their leak site regarding the breach, they portray the FBI’s PSA as an “attempt to ‘disrupt’ our operations and hinder clients’ trust in our organization hoping nobody pays us.”

The threat group typically uses social engineering, abuses weaknesses in identity systems or exploits vulnerabilities to gain access to cloud-hosted environments containing troves of sensitive or proprietary data, which it threatens to leak if the victim doesn’t pay a ransom.

ShinyHunters doesn’t appear to be seeking a payoff in this case, but rather a bid to coerce the FBI into amending or removing the May PSA. The group didn’t make any direct threat in the data-leak site post to release the stolen data, but it set a deadline of one week for action.

That coercive approach toward the FBI could backfire, according to experts. 

“Ransomware groups are largely successful because they operate like businesses,” said Kaiser, a former deputy assistant in the FBI’s cyber division. “Targeting other criminal groups or law enforcement — especially in ways intended to publicly shame — demonstrates a lack of discipline that historically has led to takedowns, takeovers or defections.”

The post ShinyHunters claims attack on FBI exposes almost all agents appeared first on CyberScoop.

A 44-year-old Ukrainian national was sentenced to four years in prison for his long-running participation in Conti, a ransomware group that attacked more than 1,000 organizations globally before it disbanded in 2022, the Justice Department said Thursday.

Oleksii Oleksiyovych Lytvynenko, also known as Alexsey Alexseevich Litvinenko, pleaded guilty in June to conspiracy to commit wire fraud as a result of some of those attacks. At that time, he admitted he joined the prolific cybercrime group in September 2021, developed malware and held data on 12 victims, including eight based in the United States.

“For years, the Conti ransomware group executed a sustained and sophisticated campaign that victimized hundreds of organizations across the United States and abroad, including critical infrastructure entities, causing losses in the millions of dollars,” A. Tysen Duva, assistant attorney general of the Justice Department’s criminal division, said in a statement. 

“Lytvynenko joined that conspiracy as both an intruder and a developer — personally harming at least 12 companies, storing stolen data from victims, and helping build the malicious tools Conti used to extort and threaten communities,” Duva added. “Even after the Conti conspiracy ended, he continued engaging in active ransomware operations until his arrest. Cybercriminals who build, deploy, or profit from malware like Conti — no matter where they operate — will face justice and meaningful consequences in U.S. courts.”

When Lytvynenko was arrested in Ireland, where he was living with temporary protective status in July 2023, authorities said he “was asleep but within arms’ reach of an open laptop running Cobalt Strike.” He was extradited to the United States in October 2025. 

Prosecutors said Lytvynenko and his co-conspirators extorted about $634,000 in Bitcoin from two victims in Tennessee, including an undisclosed government entity that resulted in the compromise of a sheriff’s department, local emergency medical services and a local police department. According to an indictment that was unsealed last fall, Lytvynenko and his co-conspirators also leaked data they stole from another Tennessee-based victim after it refused to pay a $3 million ransom demand.

Four of Lytvynenko’s alleged co-conspirators — Maksim Galochkin, Maksim Rudenskiy, Mikhail Mikhailovich Tsarev and Andrey Yuryevich Zhuykov — were indicted in 2023 in the same federal court for crimes related to their suspected involvement in Conti attacks from 2020 to 2022. 

Conti was among the most active ransomware groups globally, impacting hundreds of critical infrastructure providers, Costa Rica’s government in 2022, and ultimately leading the State Department to offer a $10 million reward for information related to Conti’s leaders. The group was notoriously resilient, bouncing back with new infrastructure and hitting new targets after a massive leak exposed chats between the group’s members in 2022.

Conti disbanded later that year, but members of the Cyrillic-language group rebranded under three subgroups: Zeon, Black Basta and Quantum, which quickly rebranded to Royal, before rebranding again to BlackSuit in 2024.

“Lytvynenko and his co-conspirators used Conti ransomware to attack computers and networks in nearly every state, and today’s sentence reflects the gravity and extent of those crimes,” Brett Leatherman, assistant director of the FBI’s cyber division, said in a statement. 

“Ransomware criminals should know they are not anonymous and operating from overseas does not mean operating without consequences,” he added. “The FBI and our partners will use every lawful tool to dismantle their infrastructure and bring them to justice.”

The post Conti ransomware crew member sentenced to four years in prison appeared first on CyberScoop.

McKesson said its business and distribution centers remain operational in the wake of a cyberattack it disclosed Friday that resulted in data theft and temporary service interruptions.

Attackers gained access to some of the health care vendor’s third-party applications and stole data associated with a subset of customers in the company’s oncology, multispecialty and medical-surgical business units, Francisco Fraga, chief information and technology officer at McKesson, said in a statement Saturday. 

McKesson is a major player in the healthcare sector, claiming it distributes about one-third of all pharmaceuticals used throughout North America. It reported $403.4 billion in revenue for the one-year period ending in March. 

The company’s size and critical role it serves also makes it a high-profile target for cybercriminals. McKesson did not identify the group behind the attack, but ShinyHunters, a cybercrime group known for targeting large organizations with extortion demands after stealing massive amounts of sensitive data, claimed responsibility.

The company declined to answer questions about ShinyHunter’s claims. Yet, on Friday, McKesson disclosed the attack in a regulatory filing while ShinyHunters added the company to its data-leak site. 

McKesson said it discovered the attack Aug. 25. A period of widespread data theft was over by then, following a four-day intrusion beginning Aug. 21, according to researchers.

“Upon discovery, we immediately activated our incident response protocols, launched an investigation, and engaged leading cybersecurity industry experts to support our response,” Fraga said in a statement. 

“We have reasonable assurance of no ongoing unauthorized activity in our systems. Customers can continue to connect to and use our systems and services as intended,” he added. 

While McKesson’s investigation continues, it faces a more urgent deadline of Sept. 1 from ShinyHunters, which is reportedly seeking a ransom demand in excess of $55 million. 

The company did not answer questions about any ransom demand or whether it responded to the alleged attackers. 

The circumstances of the attack against McKesson are similar to other recent victims of ShinyHunters. The threat group typically uses social engineering or abuses weaknesses in identity to gain access to cloud-hosted environments containing troves of sensitive or proprietary data, which it threatens to leak if the victim doesn’t pay a ransom. 

“Opportunistic data extortionists have been able to identify weaknesses within identity and access management, making these campaigns both cheap and scalable,” said Ian Gray, vice president of cyber threat intelligence at Flashpoint. 

“These attacks are particularly difficult to detect early because they often occur entirely within vendor-hosted environments using valid, socially-engineered credentials,” he added. “Since this activity mimics normal support or data-warehouse tasks, it typically doesn’t trip traditional malware alerts or show anomalies, meaning organizations often remain unaware of the breach until the extortionists make contact.”

Researchers have linked ShinyHunters to multiple attack sprees targeting major cloud platforms, including Oracle, Salesforce and Snowflake. The decentralized crew of cybercriminals was also linked to an expansive compromise last summer impacting hundreds of Salesloft Drift customers that put any platform integrated with the AI chat agent at risk as well. 

In April, ShinyHunters broke into the systems of Canvas — a central hub for K-12 and university coursework, exams, grades and communication — causing widespread outages and data theft. When an early deadline passed without payment, ShinyHunters escalated its pressure on Instructure, the company behind Canvas, by defacing the platform’s login pages with an extortion message that was visible to hundreds of schools.

Instructure ultimately relented and said it reached an agreement with the cybercriminals, insisting the stolen data was returned with assurances that other copies were destroyed.

The FBI issued a public service announcement about ShinyHunters days later, warning potential downstream victims of the threat group’s pressure tactics and claims.

In late July, less than a month before McKesson was hit, Health-ISAC warned organizations in the sector of an increase in successful attacks by ShinyHunters.

The post McKesson copes with fallout from data theft extortion attack appeared first on CyberScoop.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives insists the cyberattack that it publicly disclosed Wednesday was limited to investigation targets, and has not impacted other agency systems.

ATF said it is responding to the breach, which first became public after a prolific ransomware group claimed it accessed the federal agency’s network “The incident involved a standalone computer system containing information about targets of ATF investigations,” Tanya Roman, ATF’s public affairs chief, told CyberScoop in an email.

“The standalone system was not connected to any other ATF systems, including any case management systems, laboratory systems, or eForms systems, and it was quickly shut down when the breach was discovered,” Roman added. 

Qilin, a financially-motivated threat group composed of Russian-speaking operators, claimed responsibility for the attack, but its involvement hasn’t been independently confirmed. The group has claimed hundreds of victims from more than 60 countries since 2022 and became one of the most active ransomware threats globally by mid-2025, according to Halcyon. 

ATF declined to comment on Qilin’s alleged involvement, the root cause of the attack or when it occurred. Yet, the agency disclosed the attack hours after Qilin claimed it breached ATF’s systems.

“This is an ongoing investigation, and no further details can be shared at this time,” Roman said. 

The federal law enforcement agency, which is under the Justice Department, said senior officials designated the event a “major incident” and completed notifications. “The incident has not impacted ATF’s ability to perform its missions,” ATF said in a statement.

Qilin operates an affiliate-based ransomware model and remains highly active, claiming dozens of new victims monthly across manufacturing, health care, financial services, education and government sectors.

The FBI said Qilin was among the five-most reported ransomware variants reported to Internet Crime Complaint Center last year. Google also said the group was one of the most active ransomware brands in 2025.

The majority of Qilin’s victims are based in the United States and nearly 1 in 4 alleged targets are in the manufacturing industry, according to Halcyon. The extortion group has formed strategic partnerships with Scattered Spider and Moonstone Sleet, and uses infrastructure overlapping with BianLian. 

While Qilin has targeted organizations in the government sector before, its claimed attack against a federal law enforcement agency could mark an escalation in targeting. Yet, its objectives in this case are unclear as any ransom payment is very unlikely.

The post ATF confirms cyberattack hit system containing info on its investigation targets appeared first on CyberScoop.

Colorado police arrested a man last week over charges that he impersonated both Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts and head of the National Security Agency’s famed Tailored Access Operations hacking unit.

Joshua Culver, also known as “Maverick Young,” appeared in a Colorado court Tuesday after his arrest stemming from an indictment in Indiana in July on four counts of falsely impersonating an officer of the court and one count of using a forged signature of a judge.

Culver allegedly pretended to be an officer of the NSA in September of last year and said in that capacity he “could take adverse action” against the Tippecanoe County sheriff’s office in Lafayette, Ind. if it didn’t provide him information he sought, including the location of his biological daughter.

He also allegedly pretended to be an NSA officer again that month, then produced a document purportedly from the head of the Tailored Access Operations (TAO) elite hacking unit in February to the Clerk of the Lake County, Ind. Superior Court.

“The document, which purported to bear official letterhead, falsely stated that it was a directive issued by the ‘Director of TAO’ and that Culver was a ‘federal asset’ active in multiple investigations,” the indictment reads. “The document commanded that certain actions be taken as required by ‘federal directive,’ including that the case pending against Culver be dismissed with prejudice, that warrants be quashed, and that Lake County officials cooperate with a ‘federal audit’ of individuals identified in the document.”

TAO has gone by the name of Office of Computer Network Operations since 2017, although in July it indicated that it was resuming its old name. TAO garnered unflattering attention in 2017 after the global WannaCry ransomware outbreak used an exploit that the NSA developed.

The indictment also alleges that Culver used a forged signature of Roberts in September for an “Order of Dismissal With Prejudice” in a case against Culver in Grant County, Indiana.

A defender appointed to Culver did not immediately respond to a request for comment Tuesday.

You can read the indictment below.

The post Arrested man allegedly impersonated NSA elite hacking unit, Supreme Court chief justice appeared first on CyberScoop.

A notorious cybercrime group has once again exploited a critical zero-day vulnerability on a large scale, claiming it stole data from dozens of organizations, including some of the world’s largest publicly traded companies.

Clop, a prolific but calculated data theft extortion group that’s been active since 2020, began sending threatening emails to its alleged victims in mid-July, according to researchers. 

The fallout from the attack spree, which followed a familiar pattern for Clop and its targeted pool of victims, is still evolving as companies hunt for potential signs of compromise.

The vulnerability at the center of Clop’s latest campaign affects a pair of software products from PTC — Windchill and FlexPLM — which manufacturers and retailers, particularly in the manufacturing, aerospace, and automotive industries, use to automate supply chain systems and manage product lifecycles.

“This continues Clop’s trend of targeting SaaS logistics companies’ platforms with zero-days and carrying out mass-exploitation campaigns,” Allan Liska, field chief information security officer at Recorded Future, told CyberScoop.

PTC disclosed the vulnerability — CVE-2026-12569 — on June 17 and issued a patch and initial indicators of compromise the following day. 

Yet, that was too late for some of Clop’s known victims who were likely compromised by exploitation of the zero-day in early June, according to Ransom-ISAC.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency added the defect, which allows unauthenticated attackers to execute code remotely, to its known exploited vulnerabilities catalog June 25.

PTC consistently added new indicators of compromise as they were discovered by researchers. But the company hasn’t said how it first became aware of the vulnerability and ensuing attacks, when the earliest known instance of exploitation occurred or how many customers are known to be compromised. 

PTC did not respond to a request for comment. 

Clop’s claimed victim set is diverse. The point-of-sale restaurant management platform Toast and software vendor Zebra both told CyberScoop they detected and contained system intrusions, but claimed limited impacts. Other alleged victims, including GE, Philips and Shell, did not respond to requests for comment. 

Researchers continue to uncover new details about the tools Clop used once it exploited and gained access to PTC customer systems. ReliaQuest said the group used a custom web shell that gave attackers a direct path to credential theft and large-scale data theft.

The fully equipped extortion platform, which was purpose-built for Windchill, decrypts credentials, delivers malware, and includes tools for sustained access, network traversal and data encryption, ReliaQuest researchers wrote in a report Tuesday.

The toolkit allows attackers to move quickly from initial access to data theft and additional post-exploitation activity without executing manual commands — a framework that mimics Windchill’s standard functions and limits defenders’ ability to detect any malicious activity.

“This campaign is another reminder that Clop remains a sleeping dragon, always looking and preparing to mass exploit vulnerabilities in software that holds sensitive data,” ReliaQuest researchers wrote in the report. “The group commonly goes inactive between campaigns but springs to life with custom-built web shells whenever there is another opportunity for mass extortion.” 

The drawn-out impact of Clop’s latest attack spree also mirrors some of its previous campaigns. The threat group has successfully exploited zero-days across multiple technology vendors’ systems, allowing it to steal sensitive data for weeks — sometimes months — from many downstream customers.

Clop targeted dozens of Oracle E-Business Suite customers for more than three months, beginning in the summer of 2025, before it started bombarding victims with extortion emails. The group also achieved mass exploitation as it infiltrated MOVEit environments in 2023, ultimately exposing data from more than 2,300 organizations, making it the largest and most significant cyberattack that year.

The post The long tail of Clop’s PTC hack is just beginning to emerge appeared first on CyberScoop.

The ransomware-as-a-service group Medusa has adopted fresh tactics to gain access and added hundreds of victims in a little more than a year, according to an updated U.S. government advisory published Tuesday.

The gang is relying on access brokers,compensating them anywhere from $100 to $1 million, with higher prices going to those who work exclusively with Medusa. However, most of the brokers work simultaneously for “multiple variants at the same time,” the advisory from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, FBI and Health and Human Services Department states in one of the updated portions of the advisory.

Tuesday’s update advisory expands upon aMarch 2025 advisory, drawing on ongoing FBI investigations.nIt includes information on the kinds of software vulnerabilities Medusa has exploited, such as Fortra GoAnywhere and BeyondTrust flaws.

“Medusa actors operate opportunistically by targeting victims with unpatched software rather than focusing on specific organizations or sectors; however, the Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) Sector has been a frequent victim of Medusa operations,” according to the advisory. “Medusa actors leverage newly announced exploits within 24 hours and have been observed to use exploits up to a week before public vulnerability disclosure.’

“However, there is no indication Medusa actors develop their own zero-day or N-day vulnerabilities, preferring instead to obtain advanced access to exploits from unknown sources or to quickly leverage newly announced exploits before potential victims can mitigate vulnerabilities through patching,” the advisory continues.

The approach appears to be netting gains: From March 2025 to April of this year, the victim tally in the advisory jumped from more than 300 to more than 500. The group was first identified in 2021.

“Medusa actors often use legitimate tools and living off the land techniques to evade detection. They may also leverage remote monitoring and management software and remote access services, including Remote Desktop Protocol, for lateral movement,” as updated sections of the advisory detail. “Once inside a network, they use common utilities and tools to support credential access, data exfiltration, and ransomware deployment.”

Earlier this year, Microsoft detailed how a group it dubbed Storm-1175 was making use of Medusa ransomware in speedy operations. Symantec and Carbon Black also detailed earlier this year how North Korean hackers were leaning on Medusa to target the health care sector.

The post Medusa ransomware tallies hundreds of new victims, says updated advisory on group’s tactics appeared first on CyberScoop.

U.S. and South Korean cyber agencies warned Monday about a ransomware-as-a-service outfit, Gunra, that reportedly recruits ethical hackers and penetration testers and benefits from North Korean government-linked hackers’ tools to target government and critical infrastructure organizations.

Gunra has gone after sectors such as academia, financial services and insurance, government services and facilities, healthcare, manufacturing and construction, media, retail, transportation and utilities. Its global scope is far-ranging, according to Monday’s alert: Africa, the Americas, the Asia-Pacific, Europe and the Middle East.

“Gunra is another variant in the ongoing trend of ransomware attacks causing disruption and harm to U.S. and international organizations,” said Chris Butera, acting assistant director for cybersecurity at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, which produced the advisory with the Department of Defense’s Cyber Crime Center, FBI, National Security Agency, Secret Service and Republic of Korea’s National Police Agency.

The alert is part of the #StopRansomware series, a joint FBI-CISA project aimed at network defenders.

The FBI first took notice of Gunra in April of last year. The double-extortion group established a data leak site on Tor to list victims and publish purloined data. By January of this year, Gunra had launched a formal ransomware-as-a-service affiliate and was growing in its ambition, Monday’s alert states.

“The FBI observed the group adopting new branding aliases (notably operating under the name Golden Community) to support this expansion,” it reads. “Gunra has further commercialized its platform by actively recruiting penetration testers and ethical hackers to serve as initial access brokers, offering a share of the ransom profits in exchange for enterprise network access.”

Gunra seeks initial access with known vulnerabilities in internet-facing devices like firewalls or virtual private networks, and is based on or influenced by the Conti ransomware code leaked in 2022, according to the agencies.

Research published in July by a South Korean cybersecurity firm took note of Gunra overlap with Lazarus Group, although it doesn’t explicitly mention the latter group’s name.

“These commonalities suggest that although the state-sponsored threat group and the Gunra ransomware group appear to be separate threat actors with different ultimate objectives, they may have shared certain techniques, tools, and infrastructure or collaborated to a limited extent during the attacks,” AhnLab wrote in its report.

That kind of North Korean government-ransomware gang collaboration dates back to at least 2024. Nor is Gunra alone among ransomware-as-a-service outfits recruiting penetration testers.

The post U.S., South Korean government agencies caution to be on lookout for Gunra ransomware gang appeared first on CyberScoop.

A longtime cybercriminal was sentenced to 16 years in prison for creating and running Ransom Cartel, a ransomware strain linked to attacks on at least 18 companies between 2021 and 2023, the Justice Department said Wednesday. 

Maksim Silnikau, a Belarusian national, actively participated in Russian-speaking cybercrime forums since at least 2005, and was a member of the cybercrime site Direct Connection from 2011 to 2016, officials said. The 40-year-old created Ransom Cartel and began recruiting participants from cybercrime forums in 2021. 

Silnikau and his co-conspirators attempted to extort at least $5.2 million from victims during the multi-year scheme. 

Victims included a group of law firms, medium-sized businesses, a small medical technology startup, educational institutions and large multinational corporations based in California, New York, Nebraska and elsewhere. Some of the victims’ operations were disrupted for several months, officials said. 

Officials said Silnikau provided his co-conspirators information and tools to attack systems, including stolen credentials and mechanisms to encrypt compromised computers. He also built a site to monitor and control ongoing attacks, communicate with co-conspirators and victims, negotiate payment demands with victims and manage the distribution of funds between co-conspirators. 

Silnikau, also known as “J.P. Morgan,” “xxx,” and “lansky,” fled from Spain while awaiting extradition to the United States and was arrested in Poland in July 2023 as he tried to return to Belarus, according to court records. He was extradited to the United States in August 2023. 

Ransom Cartel’s operations ended when Silnikau was arrested. Authorities applauded his capture at the time, noting that Ransom Cartel didn’t grow large enough to inflict losses comparable to larger ransomware variants. 

Silnikau pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and aggravated identity theft.

The post Ransom Cartel creator sentenced to 16 years in prison appeared first on CyberScoop.

Researchers said INC ransomware, one of the most active ransomware groups globally, has been the main attacker exploiting a pair of SonicWall zero-days soon after they were disclosed last month.

The prolific ransomware-as-a-service operation wasn’t the first group to exploit the flaws, which were actively exploited for three weeks before the vendor disclosed and patched the defects July 14, but it has been the most assertive and concerning group to target and chain both vulnerabilities together for full access.

“Since public disclosure, INC ransomware has emerged as the most commonly named threat actor actively weaponizing this vulnerability chain,” Brett Deroche, director of incident response at Rapid7, told CyberScoop. “While Inc is the name driving the post-disclosure wave, we can’t attribute the full body of exploitation to INC specifically.”

SonicWall did not respond to a request for comment.

The SonicWall vulnerabilities — CVE-2026-15409 and CVE-2026-15410 — are the latest in a series of security issues confronting the vendor’s customers, including actively exploited zero-days, previously disclosed defects, and an attack last year that allowed a state-sponsored threat group to steal the firewall configurations of every SonicWall customer. 

Just last week, Huntress researchers spotted an attack spree that compromised 30 SonicWall customers in less than two days. 

Ransomware groups have taken a special interest in SonicWall. Ten of the 17 SonicWall defects added to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s known exploited vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog since late 2021 are known to be used in ransomware campaigns.

INC ransomware, which has claimed nearly 900 victims across 71 countries since it was first discovered three years ago, is just the latest financially-motivated group to target SonicWall customers. 

Researchers haven’t determined how many organizations have been impacted by the latest SonicWall zero-days, including attacks linked to INC ransomware. 

“Attribution here isn’t a single clean answer. The earliest exploitation we observed, beginning June 22, traced back to common hosted infrastructure, though those attacks were largely unsuccessful,” Deroche said. 

“INC’s confirmed activity that we’ve observed came after public disclosure, using different infrastructure and moving from initial access to ransomware deployment in short order. That’s a meaningfully different operational tempo and skill level than what we saw pre-disclosure,” he added. 

Deroche said Rapid7 has successfully prevented data theft and encryption in the majority of recent cases, yet noted ransomware was deployed in at least one case the security vendor observed.

Yet, there could be other attacks outside the purview of Rapid7’s telemetry. INC ransomware has listed multiple new alleged victims on its data leak site, including organizations and government agencies in Australia, the United States, the United Arab Emirates, Colombia and Switzerland, Resecurity said in a blog post Saturday.

The company said it has aided several victims with incident response, and learned multiple victims received emails and phone calls from alleged hackers who pressured them to engage in negotiations.

The post Prolific ransomware group behind SonicWall zero-day attacks appeared first on CyberScoop.