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Microsoft details Storm-0501’s focus on ransomware in the cloud

A financially motivated threat group operating since 2021 has refined its technical tradecraft, honing its focus on cloud-based systems that allow it to expand ransomware operations beyond the scope of on-premises infrastructure, Microsoft Threat Intelligence said in a report released Wednesday.

By leveraging cloud-native capabilities, Storm-0501 has exfiltrated large volumes of data with speed, destroying data and backups within victim environments and encrypted systems. β€œThis is in contrast to threat actors who may have relied solely on malware deployed to endpoints,” Sherrod DeGrippo, director of threat intelligence strategy at Microsoft, said in an email.

β€œThis evolution is about both a technical shift and a change in impact strategy,” DeGrippo said. β€œInstead of just encrypting files and demanding ransom for decryption, Storm-0501 now exfiltrates sensitive cloud data, destroys backups, and then extorts victims by threatening permanent data loss or exposure.”

Storm-0501 targets opportunistically by searching for unmanaged devices and security gaps in hybrid cloud environments. By exploiting these vulnerabilities, it can evade detection, escalate its access privileges and sometimes move between user accounts. This approach amplifies the impact of its attacks and raises its chance for a payout, according to Microsoft.

The threat group recently compromised a large enterprise with multiple subsidiaries that each operated standalone Active Directory domains and separate Microsoft Azure instances with varying security tool coverage linked to several Entra ID tenants. β€œThis fragmented deployment created visibility gaps across the environment,” researchers said in the report.Β 

Storm-0501 searched for Active Directory domains that did not have endpoint detection enabled. Once it gained a foothold in an Active Directory environment, it hopped to other domains and eventually compromised a separate Entra Connect server associated with a different Entra ID tenant and Active Directory domain.

β€œMany organizations have on-prem assets that are of extremely high criticality, often too fragile or legacy to move to the cloud,” DeGrippo said. β€œThis is what provides such a significant weakness in these environments.”

The reconnaissance allowed the threat group to gain deep visibility into the organization’s security tooling and infrastructure. Storm-0501 identified a non-human identity associated with Global Administrator privileges on that Entra ID account that lacked multifactor authentication.Β 

The threat group successfully reset the user’s on-premises password, synced it to the cloud identity of that user and registered a new MFA method under their control. With that level of access, Storm-0501 achieved full control over the cloud domain and used the highest possible cloud privileges to achieve their goals, researchers said.Β 

Storm-0501 eventually took control of the victim organization’s Azure environment, located critical assets and abused their Azure Owner role to access and steal keys that allowed it to exfiltrate data. Microsoft said the threat group then performed cloud-based encryption and deleted Azure resources en masse before it initiated extortion by contacting victims on Microsoft Teams using one of the previously compromised user’s accounts.

β€œStorm-0501 is driving a major shift in ransomware tactics,” DeGrippo said. β€œHybrid and cloud environments are uniquely vulnerable. Storm-0501 exploits gaps between on-prem and cloud security, showing that organizations with hybrid architectures are at greater risk if they don’t have unified visibility and controls.”

The post Microsoft details Storm-0501’s focus on ransomware in the cloud appeared first on CyberScoop.

Detecting ADCS Privilege Escalation

Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) is used to manage certificates for systems, users, applications, and more in an enterprise environment. Misconfigurations in ADCS can introduce critical vulnerabilities into an enterprise Active Directory environment.

The post Detecting ADCS Privilege Escalation appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..

Abusing S4U2Self for Active Directory Pivoting

TL;DR If you only have access to a valid machine hash, you can leverage the Kerberos S4U2Self proxy for local privilege escalation, which allows reopening and expanding potential local-to-domain pivoting paths, such as SEImpersonate!

The post Abusing S4U2Self for Active Directory Pivoting appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..

Attack Tactics 9: Shadow Creds for PrivEsc w/ Kent & Jordan

In this video, Kent Ickler and Jordan Drysdale discuss Attack Tactics 9: Shadow Credentials for Primaries, focusing on a specific technique used in penetration testing services at Black Hills Information Security

The post Attack Tactics 9: Shadow Creds for PrivEsc w/ Kent & Jordan appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..

Abusing Active Directory Certificate Services (Part 3)

| Alyssa Snow In PART ONE and PART TWO of this blog series, we discussed common misconfigurations of Active Directory certificate templates. In this post, we will walk through exploitation […]

The post Abusing Active Directory Certificate Services (Part 3) appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..

Abusing Active Directory Certificate Services (Part 2)

Misconfigurations in Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) can introduce critical vulnerabilities into an Enterprise Active Directory environment, such as paths of escalation from low privileged accounts to domain administrator.

The post Abusing Active Directory Certificate Services (Part 2) appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..

Abusing Active Directory Certificate Services (Part 1)

Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) is used for public key infrastructure in an Active Directory environment. ADCS is widely used in enterprise Active Directory environments for managing certificates for systems, users, applications, and more.

The post Abusing Active Directory Certificate Services (Part 1) appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..

PlumHound Reporting Engine for BloodHoundAD

Kent Ickler // It’s been over two years since Jordan and I talked about a Blue Team’s perspective on Red Team tools.Β Β  A Blue Team’s Perspective on Red Team Hack […]

The post PlumHound Reporting Engine for BloodHoundAD appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..

Webcast: Weaponizing Active Directory

Click on the timecodes to jump to that part of the video (on YouTube) Slides for this webcast can be found here: https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/SLIDES_WeaponizingActiveDirectory.pdf 0:54 Background behind this webcast, what and […]

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PODCAST: RDP Logging Bypass and Azure Active Directory Recon

For this podcast we cover a couple of different topics. First, we talk about how to password spray in a non-attributable sort of way. Beau found a way to obfuscate […]

The post PODCAST: RDP Logging Bypass and Azure Active Directory Recon appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..

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WEBCAST: RDP Logging Bypass and Azure Active Directory Recon

For this webcast we cover a couple of different topics. First, we talk about how to password spray in a non-attributable sort of way. Beau found a way to obfuscate […]

The post WEBCAST: RDP Logging Bypass and Azure Active Directory Recon appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..

Red Teaming Microsoft: Part 1 – Active Directory Leaks via Azure

Mike Felch // With so many Microsoft technologies, services, integrations, applications, and configurations it can create a great deal of difficulty just to manage everything. Now imagine trying to secure […]

The post Red Teaming Microsoft: Part 1 – Active Directory Leaks via Azure appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..

How To Disable LLMNR & Why You Want To

Kent Ickler // Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) This one is a biggie, and you’ve probably heard Jordan, John, me, and all the others say it many many times. LLMNR […]

The post How To Disable LLMNR & Why You Want To appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..

How to Build Super Secure Active Directory Infrastructure*

CJ Cox // We frequently get requests from customers asking us if we provide consultation defending their systems. The other day I got a question from a customer asking us […]

The post How to Build Super Secure Active Directory Infrastructure* appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..

What’s trust among schoolchildren: Kerberos Authentication Explained

Logan Lembke // Kerberos authentication can be daunting but is an important protocol to understand for any IT professional, and especially important in the field of information security. While you […]

The post What’s trust among schoolchildren: Kerberos Authentication Explained appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..

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