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Vuln in Google’s Antigravity AI agent manager could escape sandbox, give attackers remote code execution
As organizations consider agentic AI for their business and IT stacks, researchers continue to find bugs and vulnerabilities in major, commercial models that can significantly expand their attack surface.
This week, researchers at Pillar Security disclosed a vulnerability in Antigravity, an AI-powered developer tool for filesystem operations made by Google.
The bug, since patched, combined prompt injection with Antigravity’s permitted file-creation capability to grant attackers remote code execution privileges.
The research details how the exploit was able to circumvent Antigravity’s secure mode, Google’s highest security setting for its agents that runs all command operations through a virtual sandbox environment, throttles network access and prohibits the agent from writing code outside of the working directory.
Secure mode is supposed to limit the AI agent access to sensitive systems – and its ability to execute malicious or dangerous acts through shell commands. But one of the file-searching tools used by Antigravity, called “find_by_name,” is classified as a ‘native’ system tool. This means the agent can execute it directly and before protections like Secure Mode can even evaluate command level operations.
“The security boundary that Secure Mode enforces simply never sees this call,” wrote Dan Lisichkin, an AI security researcher with Pillar Security. “This means an attacker achieves arbitrary code execution under the exact configuration a security-conscious user would rely on to prevent it.”
The prompt injection attacks can be delivered through compromised identity accounts connected to the agent, or indirectly by hiding clandestine prompt instructions inside open-source files or web content the agent ingests. Antigravity has trouble distinguishing between written data it ingests for context and literal prompt instructions, so compromise can be achieved without any elevated access by getting it to read a malicious document or file.
According to a disclosure timeline provided by Pillar Security, the bug was reported to Google on Jan. 6 and patched on Feb. 28, with Google awarding a bug bounty for the discovery.
Lisichkin said this same pattern of prompt injection through unvalidated input has been found in other coding AI agents like Cursor. In the age of AI, any unvalidated input can become a malicious prompt capable of hijacking internal systems.
“The trust model underpinning security assumptions, that a human will catch something suspicious, does not hold when autonomous agents follow instructions from external content,” he wrote.
The fact that the vulnerability was able to completely bypass Google’s secure mode underscores how the cybersecurity industry must start adapting and “move beyond sanitization-based controls.”
“Every native tool parameter that reaches a shell command is a potential injection point. Auditing for this class of vulnerability is no longer optional, and it is a prerequisite for shipping agentic features safely,” Lisichkin wrote.
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Chinese hackers exploited a Dell zero-day for 18 months before anyone noticed
Researchers uncovered more worrying details about a long-running cyber espionage campaign suspected to be backed by the Chinese government, exemplifying how such attacks often go undetected until they’ve already caused significant damage.
Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant said the Chinese threat group UNC6201 has been exploiting a zero-day vulnerability in Dell RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines since at least mid-2024. The group overlaps with UNC5221, also known as Silk Typhoon, which has been burrowing into critical infrastructure and government agency networks undetected since at least 2022.
The zero-day exploitation marks an escalation from this particular cluster of actors. State-sponsored attackers spent years implanting Brickstorm malware into networks before the campaign was finally detected last summer. By September, however, the attackers had replaced Brickstorm with Grimbolt, a more advanced malware that’s harder to detect, Google security researchers said Tuesday.
The zero-day vulnerability — CVE-2026-22769 — hinges on a hardcoded administrator password in Dell RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines that was pulled from Apache Tomcat. It carries a 10/10 CVSS rating. The Chinese threat group has been using the hardcoded password, which triggers the vulnerability and allows unauthenticated remote attackers to gain full system access with root-level persistence for at least 18 months, Google said.
Dell Technologies disclosed and released a patch for the vulnerability Tuesday. A company spokesperson urged customers to follow guidance in its security advisory.
“We are aware of less than a dozen impacted organizations, but because the full scale of this campaign is unknown we recommend that organizations previously targeted by Brickstorm look out for Grimbolt in their environments,” Austin Larsen, principal analyst at GTIG, told CyberScoop.
When the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency unveiled new details about the campaign in December, Google said dozens of U.S. organizations, not including downstream victims, had already been impacted by Brickstorm.
“The actor is likely still active in unpatched and remediated environments, and because exploitation has been occurring since mid-2024, they have had significant time to establish persistence and carry out long-term espionage,” Larsen added.
The campaign — one of many concurrent efforts by China state-sponsored groups to embed themselves into networks for long-term access, disruptions and potential sabotage — remains a top area of concern for national security.
CISA, the National Security Agency and Canadian Centre for Cyber Security released new analysis on Brickstorm last week to share indicators and compromise that could help potential victims detect malicious activity on their networks.
Yet, the China-linked groups involved in this campaign have already moved on to Grimbolt, in some cases replacing older Brickstorm binaries with the new backdoor that’s more difficult to reverse engineer, according to Google.
Marci McCarthy, director of public affairs at CISA, told CyberScoop the agency will share further information on Wednesday.
Google’s fresh research on the China state-sponsored campaign demonstrates how the threat group’s tenacity, and ability to dwell undetected in networks longer than 400 days, keeps defenders and cyber authorities at a disadvantage.
The threat groups typically target edge applications and devices running on systems without endpoint detection and response, but researchers don’t know how attackers broke into the networks of the most recently discovered victims.
Researchers only have a narrow view of the threat groups’ activities at large.
“We suspect a significant portion of UNC5221 and UNC6201’s activity likely remains unknown, and there is a strong probability that they are developing or using undiscovered zero-days and malware,” Larsen said. “The most concerning aspect of this campaign is that additional organizations were likely compromised as part of this campaign and do not know it yet.”
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Active - Virtual Machines and dependent services - Service management issues in multiple regions
Impact statement: As early as 19:46 UTC on 2 February 2026, we became aware of an issue causing customers to receive error notifications when performing service management operations - such as create, delete, update, scaling, start, stop - for Virtual Machines (VMs) affecting multiple regions. These issues are also impacting services with dependencies on these service management operations - including Azure Arc Enabled Servers, Azure Batch, Azure Cache for Redis, Azure Container Apps, Azure DevOps (ADO), Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS), Azure Backup, Azure Load Testing, Azure Firewall, Azure Search, Azure Virtual Machine Scale Sets (VMSS), GitHub (see https://www.githubstatus.com)..
Current status: We determined that these issues were caused by a recent configuration change that affected public access to certain Microsoft‑managed storage accounts, used to host extension packages. We have applied our mitigation across all impacted regions and have performed validation checks to ensure that all affected resources have had their configurations updated. At this stage, customers should see signs of recovery across regions. We are currently monitoring downstream services for any further impact. Our next update will be provided by 08:00 UTC, approximately 2 hours from now, or sooner if we have progress to share.
Microsoft seizes RedVDS infrastructure, disrupts fast-growing cybercrime marketplace
Microsoft announced Wednesday that it worked with international law enforcement to seize infrastructure used to run cybercrime subscription service RedVDS and organized civil actions in the United States and United Kingdom to disrupt its further use.
RedVDS has enabled at least $40 million in fraud losses in the U.S. since March 2025, according to Microsoft. Victims that are joining Microsoft as co-plaintiffs in the civil action include Alabama-based H2 Pharma, a pharmaceutical company that lost more than $7.3 million, and Florida-based Gatehouse Dock Condominium Association, which was tricked out of nearly $500,000.
“For as little as US $24 a month, RedVDS provides criminals with access to disposable virtual computers that make fraud cheap, scalable and difficult to trace,” Steven Masada, assistant general counsel at Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit, said in a blog post. “It provides access to cheap, effective, and disposable virtual computers running unlicensed software, including Windows, allowing criminals to operate quickly, anonymously and across borders.”
Microsoft said a joint operation with Europol and authorities in Germany allowed it to seize RedVDS’s infrastructure and take the marketplace offline. Cybercriminals used the site, which included a loyalty program and referral bonuses for customers, to send high-volume phishing attacks, host infrastructure for scams and facilitate fraud such as business email compromise.
Microsoft customers were among those impacted by RedVDS’s tools and services.
“Since September 2025, RedVDS‑enabled attacks have led to the compromise or fraudulent access of more than 191,000 Microsoft email accounts across over 130,000 organizations worldwide,” Masada said in the blog post. “These figures represent only a subset of the impacted accounts across all technology providers, illustrating how quickly this infrastructure increases the scale of cyberattacks.”
Over the course of a month, more than 2,600 RedVDS virtual machines sent Microsoft customers an average of one million phishing messages per day, Masada added.
RedVDS facilitated payment diversion fraud against organizations like H2 Pharma and the Gatehouse Dock Condominium Association through business email compromise. The marketplace was also used to compromise the accounts of realtors, escrow agents and title companies to divert payments, according to Microsoft.
More than 9,000 customers, many in Canada and Australia, were directly impacted by real estate-related fraud aided by RedVDS. Microsoft Threat Intelligence said other scams enabled by RedVDS hit organizations in construction, manufacturing, healthcare, logistics, education and legal services.
Researchers said the marketplace’s user interface was loaded with features that allowed eager cybercriminals to purchase unlicensed and inexpensive Windows-based remote desktop protocol servers with full administrator control. RedVDS reused a single, cloned Windows host image across the service, which allowed researchers to find unique technical fingerprints.
The group that develops and operates RedVDS is tracked by Microsoft as Storm-2470. At least five additional cybercrime groups and cybercriminals who used the Racoon0365 phishing service prior to its takedown in October were also using RedVDS infrastructure, according to Microsoft Threat Intelligence.
RedVDS’s site first launched in 2019 and has remained in operation since providing servers in the U.S., U.K., Canada, France, the Netherlands and Germany. The marketplace “has become a prolific tool for cybercriminals in the past year, facilitating thousands of attacks, including credential theft, account takeovers and mass phishing,” researchers said in a report.
RedVDS rented servers from third-party hosting providers, including at least five hosting companies in the U.S., Canada, U.K., France and the Netherlands. This allowed RedVDS to provision IP addresses in geolocations close to targets, allowing cybercriminals to evade location-based security filters and blend in with normal data center traffic, researchers added.
“Cybercrime today is powered by shared infrastructure, which means disrupting individual attackers is not enough,” Masada said. “Through this coordinated action, Microsoft has disrupted RedVDS’s operations, including seizing two domains that host the RedVDS marketplace and customer portal, while also laying the groundwork to identify the individuals behind them.”
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Multi-service impact in Switzerland North
Impact Statement: Starting at 23:54 UTC on 26 September 2025, customers in Switzerland North may experience service unavailability or degraded performances for resources hosted in the region. Virtual Machines may have shutdown to preserve data integrity.
Current Status: We were alerted to this issue by our telemetry informing us in a significant drop in traffic. It was discovered that a recent deployment introduced a malformed prefix in one of the certificates used for connection authorization. We have pinpointed the deployment error involving the certificate prefix and are rolling back the faulty deployment to restore normal traffic flow and service availability.
Majority of the impacted services have been fully recovered, and a subset are nearing completion. We continue to monitor traffic and service stability to ensure full recovery.
Networking issues impacting Azure Services in East US2
Summary of Impact: As early as 22:00 UTC on 08 Jan 2025, we noticed a partial impact to some of the Azure Services in East US2 due to a configuration change in a regional networking service. The configuration change caused inconsistent service state. This could have resulted in intermittent Virtual machine connectivity issues or failures in allocating resources or communicating with resources in the region. The services impacted include Azure Databricks, Azure Container Apps, Azure Function Apps, Azure App Service, SQL Managed Instances, Azure Data Factory, Azure Container Instances, PowerBI, VMSS, PostgreSQL flexible servers etc. Customers using resources with Private Endpoint NSG communicating with other services would also be impacted.
The impact is limited to a single zone in East US2 region. No other regions are impacted by this issue.
Current Status:
As early as 22:00 UTC on 08 Jan 2025, service monitoring alerted us to a networking issue in East US2 impacting multiple services. As part of the investigation, it was identified that a network configuration issue in one of the zones resulted in three of the Storage partitions going unhealthy. As an immediate remediation measure, traffic was re-routed away from the impacted zone, which brought some relief to the non-zonal services, and helped with newer allocations. However, services that sent zonal requests to the impacted zone continued to be unhealthy. Some of the impacted services initiated their own Disaster Recovery options to mitigate some of them.
Additional workstreams to rehydrate the impacted zone by bringing back the impacted partitions to a healthy state have been ongoing as per the plan. To avoid any further impact, we are validating the fix on one of the partitions, and once that is confirmed, the mitigation will be applied to the other unhealthy partitions as well. We have completed the validation process successfully for one of the partitions and are working on applying the mitigation to all the partitions. Once the mitigation is applied, we intend to complete additional validations before bringing the partitions online.
We do not have an ETA available at this time, but we expect to be able to share more details on our progress in the next update. We continue to advise customers to execute Disaster Recovery to expedite recovery of their impacted services. Customers that have already failed out of the region should not fail back until this incident is fully mitigated. The next update will be provided in 1 hour or as events warrant.
For customers impacted due to Private Link, a patch was applied, and we confirm dependent services should be available.
We have been able to confirm that customers impacted by Azure Databricks, App Services multi-tenant, Azure Function Apps, Logic Apps, and Azure Synapse should start seeing some recovery.
Active - Storage latency, timeouts, or HTTP 500 errors in South Central US
Impact Statement: Starting at 18:44 UTC on 26 December 2024, a power incident in South Central US may have resulted in degradation in service availability.
Current Status: We have determined that an unexpected power incident in one of the availability zones in South Central US impacted the availability of multiple Azure services. At approximately 20:43 UTC, power was confirmed to be fully restored, and services have started to recover.
Mitigation steps are being applied, and services are on the path of recovery.
- Service Bus, Log Analytics, Logic Apps, Azure Firewall, Storage accounts, and Application Gateway have been fully recovered.
- Virtual Machines are close to mitigation.
- CosmosDB, SQL DB, and App Service are on path of recovery.
We are actively monitoring recovery progress and further updates will be provided in the next 2 hours, or as events develop.
If you are impacted and it is possible, we advise you to consider failing your services to a different Availability Zone or region until we are fully restored.
QEMU, MSYS2, and Emacs: Open-Source Solutions to Run Virtual Machines on Windows

As a tester, I do all my work inside a Virtual Machine (VM). Recently, I found myself in a situation where I needed to get a VM on a Windows […]
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Build a Home Lab: Equipment, Tools, and Tips

by Martin Pearson || Guest Author This article was originally published in the second edition of the InfoSec Survival Guide. Find it free online HERE or order your $1 physical […]
The post Build a Home Lab: Equipment, Tools, and Tips appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..