Suspected Chinese hackers with a proven knack for exploiting zero-days in security products are at it again, targeting BeyondTrust customers in attacks that researchers have traced back to late August. 

Mandiant researchers said a likely Chinese government-backed espionage group it previously tracked as UNC5221, and now calls Armory Castle, exploited the critical defect — CVE-2026-102764 — then showcased multiple tactics to escalate privileges, hop around the compromised network and evade detection. 

The same threat group has repeatedly exploited a series of defects in Ivanti products since 2023, a Citrix NetScaler zero-day widely known as CitrixBleed, and last year’s Brickstorm campaign that had an average dwell time of 400 days — all resulting in sweeping attack sprees.

“We are aware of only a small number of impacted organizations at this time, but given the stealth of the activity, and the use of a zero-day, it is possible that additional organizations were also compromised prior to the disclosure,” Kelli Vanderlee, senior analyst at Google Threat Intelligence Group, said in an email.

Mandiant warned organizations to “prepare for potential widespread exploitation,” adding that Armory Castle and other threat groups previously conducted broad, opportunistic exploitation following public vulnerability disclosures.

Mandiant and GTIG released their analysis of Armory Castle and its latest campaign as BeyondTrust publicly disclosed the vulnerability in its Remote Support product Thursday. The company’s security said it released a patch for the exploited defect for self-hosted customers Oct. 8 and automatically applied the update to cloud-based versions of the product that same day.

BeyondTrust, which conducted its own investigation and coordinated with Mandiant on an investigation involving a self-hosted customer that was compromised, noted Armory Castle’s prowess.

“This threat actor rotates its infrastructure and tooling for every victim, so attribution here rests on behavior. The indicators from one intrusion rarely survive to the next,” the company’s security team wrote in a blog post. “The threat actor has historically demonstrated a high degree of operational security awareness, professional practices, and tradecraft.”

A BeyondTrust spokesperson declined to answer questions about how many customers are already compromised or why it didn’t publicly disclose the actively exploited zero-day sooner, and instead referred back to its security advisory. 

The company said the first known instance of zero-day exploitation occurred Aug. 29, which it detected and contained Sept. 28. 

BeyondTrust also said it detected the malicious activity after zero-days were confirmed to be exploited in another security vendor’s product Sept. 27. That timing matches a round of zero-days Citrix NetScaler disclosed, following nearly two days of rampant worry and unconfirmed rumors. 

BeyondTrust did not say if there is any link or overlap between the attacks targeting Citrix NetScaler, which went undetected for more than three weeks, and its remote access product. 

GTIG researchers said there isn’t enough evidence to assess an overall targeting trend, but encouraged all potentially vulnerable organizations to apply the patch and hunt for pre-disclosure activity. 

The threat group’s previous targets include business-process outsourcers, government, legal services, technology companies and software-as-a-service providers.

“Armory Castle remains one of the most prominent China-nexus threat actors due to its persistent targeting of various edge device technologies, use of zero-day vulnerabilities for widespread exploitation across multiple industries and regions, and its continuously expanding and evolving arsenal of tools,” said Dan Perez, technical lead at GTIG.

“This is a well-established pattern for Armory Castle,” Vanderlee said. “Targeting edge devices, which typically do not support endpoint detection and response (EDR), allows the threat actor to minimize opportunities for detection and maintain stealthy, persistent access to targeted networks.”

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A China-aligned cyber espionage group targeted U.S. artificial intelligence policy experts through phishing emails that impersonated prominent officials, economists and an employee of AI company Anthropic, according to research released Thursday by Proofpoint.

The campaigns, which the cybersecurity company attributed to a group it calls TA419, sought access to cloud accounts held by people at think tanks, universities and law firms. The activity comes amid growing U.S.-China competition over AI development, export controls, semiconductor supply chains and military uses of the technology.

Proofpoint said the group began a campaign in July by impersonating Lynne Parker, a former principal deputy director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, and economist and foreign policy expert Heidi Crebo-Rediker. The emails invited recipients to join a supposed AI policy advisory committee or contribute to a report on AI export controls and supply chains.

The initial messages did not immediately request passwords or direct recipients to a sign-in page. Instead, they appeared designed to begin a conversation and establish trust. After a target replied, the group sent a shortened link said to contain more information.

The link redirected recipients through several websites before leading to a false Microsoft OneDrive sign-in page. Proofpoint said the setup was intended to capture account credentials and active browser sessions.

The firm described the operation as an adversary-in-the-middle phishing attack. In such attacks, the victim interacts with genuine Microsoft infrastructure during part of the process, looking and behaving like a legitimate sign-in. The person may enter a password, complete a multifactor authentication prompt and pass access checks while the attacker captures the session information created by the login.

Proofpoint said TA419 used a modified version of an open-source phishing tool known as Frameless BitB. The tool creates a false browser window within a webpage, imitating a familiar sign-in prompt. In this case, it was used to present a fake Microsoft login window over a page that resembled a OneDrive document-sharing site.

Proofpoint also identified a February campaign in which the same group impersonated a senior Anthropic employee. That message asked an AI policy analyst at a U.S. think tank for feedback on the military’s use of Anthropic’s Claude AI models, which was a highly controversial topic at time.

The report did not identify victims or state whether any accounts were compromised.

Proofpoint said TA419 has targeted individuals connected to U.S. and Japanese think tanks, defense contractors, universities and law firms since at least April 2025. Its interest in AI policy, the firm said, appears to extend an existing focus on defense, national security, energy, international relations and foreign policy. The group also registered domains resembling real organizations, including the Heritage Foundation, the World Economic Forum and the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association.

The report does not directly link the activity to the Chinese government. China has repeatedly denied conducting cyber espionage, while accusing the United States of cyber operations against Chinese interests.

The White House, along with several AI companies, have also accused China of distilling U.S. models in order to power open-weight models run by Chinese companies.

Indicators of compromise can be found on Proofpoint’s website.

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Artificial intelligence has removed the skill advantage that once set state-sponsored hackers apart from lone criminals, according to a threat report Anthropic published Thursday that documents misuse of its Claude models across seven areas of harm.

The report, which details activity observed between December 2025 and August 2026, covers cyber operations, influence operations, surveillance, scams and fraud, biological misuse, conventional weapons development and distillation. Anthropic said it disrupted each operation, strengthened safeguards and shared intelligence with authorities and industry partners where appropriate. 

“The cases we share here aren’t typical misuse, but rather examples of the most notable and novel threat activity we’ve identified to date,” the report reads. “We’re publishing this work because we believe we have a responsibility to disclose malicious misuse of our services. As models become increasingly capable, their risks will increase, unless AI developers and society’s defenders act to make them safer.”

The cyber operations the company detailed were a Russian-aligned espionage campaign that hit more than 20 government and defense organizations across Ukraine and Europe, two Chinese undergraduates who ran an automated exploit foundry that produced more than a dozen potential zero-days in a single month, affiliates of the ShinyHunters crime collective who dumped 2,100 cloud access tokens across 40 corporate tenants in 34 hours, and a lone hacktivist who targeted European political parties via stolen API keys. 

For decades, cybersecurity researchers and investigators have pointed to sophisticated operations as a signature of state-sponsored tradecraft, while crude intrusions suggested amateurs or petty criminals. Anthropic posits in the report that AI has erased that conventional thinking, especially since a “majority of the operations described in this report were enabled by AI via direct execution or orchestration.”

“For threat intelligence investigators, sophistication has stopped being a reliable signal of who is behind an operation,” the report said, adding that a hacktivist on stolen API keys, scattered criminals and a state espionage operator each ran campaigns that a year earlier “would have required many skilled operators and specialist knowledge.”

The most extensive case involved a malicious actor using the handle “JackPoterz” whose actions aligned with Russian state espionage, matching behaviors linked to Midnight Blizzard. 

According to the report, the actor employed a custom toolkit composed of two families of Windows-based implants, a mobile exploitation kit, a credential stealing tool that targets browser password stores, a phishing platform designed to mimic priority targets like government organizations, and an administrative console used to manage compromised accounts. Targets included military intelligence bodies in Ukrainian and European governments, diplomatic and defense organizations, and people connected to U.S. foreign policy.

According to the report, AI monitored whether security products flagged the actor’s malware. When a detection occurred, “agents would then set about the process of autonomously modifying and rebuilding the malware to evade the existing detections,” the report said.

The same actor bulk-exported mailboxes at drone component manufacturers and stole a complete software development kit for a drone vision system, then spent days recovering its architecture and details of an unannounced product. The actor also compromised hotel Wi-Fi vendors to reach guests through DNS hijacking, took over WhatsApp accounts with headless browsers, and stole more than 300,000 national identity records from a North African government agency, along with registry data on more than half a million companies.

The Chinese-speaking operators, which the company says were partly carried out by undergraduates at a Chinese university, put Claude to work on vulnerability research around the clock. One workflow iterating on network appliance firmware “yielded more than a dozen possible zero day findings in a single month.” It ran “agent swarms,” in which a lead agent divided work among parallel subagents, and kept campaign memory between sessions. 

Clusters linked to ShinyHunters showed how AI shortens criminal timelines. One supply-chain breach ended with a dump of more than 2,100 Azure access tokens spanning more than 40 corporate tenants in about 34 hours. “AI agents performed nearly all of the work,” the report said. Another compromise moved from a single stolen developer token to full control of a victim’s cloud environment in roughly three hours.

The report also has a section dedicated to distillation attacks that Anthropic claims were carried out since February by seven labs based in China, including Alibaba, DeepSeek, Moonshot AI, Xiaomi and Zhipu. Operators affiliated with Alibaba ran the largest attack Anthropic has measured, peaking “at nearly 3 million exchanges per day launched from more than 3,500 fraudulent accounts” to harvest the outputs of Claude Opus models for training its Qwen systems.

The outputs were culled from users who never knew they were involved. The report said Moonshot and DeepSeek silently forwarded their own customers’ requests to Claude and returned its answers as their own, exposing data users had not agreed to share, including surveillance footage of a tracked individual pulled by a user likely affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army. Those practices are “likely inconsistent with privacy laws and the labs’ own terms of service,” the report said.

Earlier this week, a joint cybersecurity advisory from the National Security Agency, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and the FBI accused Chinese AI companies of engaging in a deliberate and “systematic” effort to illegally distill U.S. frontier AI models and their capabilities.

Anthropic said it published the cases to give outsiders a view of how these threats form, framing the disclosures as an early look at a shifting landscape. 

“As models become increasingly capable, their risks will increase, unless AI developers and society’s defenders act to make them safer,” the report said. The old idea of “security through obscurity,” it added, “is no longer viable in this new AI-assisted world: everything connected to the internet is a potential target for exploitation.”

You can read the full report on Anthropic’s website.

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Proofpoint researchers have spotted at least four state-aligned threat groups chain a trio of zero-day vulnerabilities to conduct espionage on various targets of interest to China’s government since late August. 

The Chinese espionage group that Proofpoint tracks as TA412, also known as Violet Typhoon and APT31, struck first, exploiting the chain of vulnerabilities Aug. 28. At least three additional espionage threat groups followed suit, exploiting the same vulnerabilities in subsequent waves of attacks days later, researchers said.

The exploit chain Proofpoint calls BlueMoon targets Chrome, Chromium-based browsers and Microsoft Windows. It allows attackers to run code in the browser’s sandbox, escape the sandbox and gain system privileges to access a targeted machine, said Mark Kelly, staff threat researcher at Proofpoint.

“All three vulnerabilities were exploited before patches were available to the public,” he said.

The vulnerabilities include: CVE-2026-85046 and CVE-2026-87491, remote-code execution defects in the JavaScript engine for Chromium-based browsers; and CVE-2026-85880, a privilege-escalation zero-day that Microsoft disclosed Tuesday in Windows Advanced Local Procedure Call. 

“While the V8 vulnerabilities were known and fixed in Chromium source code, they were not yet patched in the latest publicly available browsers at the time of the activity, meaning they effectively functioned as zero-days in those products,” Kelly said.

Proofpoint said the exploit kit developer likely reverse engineered the publicly available Chromium patches to weaponize the browser exploit chain during that gap.

With a limited group of organizations exposed to all three vulnerabilities, attackers moved quickly and likely rushed development to target a narrow pool of potential targets. “In all observed cases, the infrastructure used for exploit delivery was created on the same day as — or in the days immediately preceding — the associated campaigns,” Proofpoint wrote in a threat intelligence report.

APT31, a group that’s committed espionage on behalf of China’s Ministry of State Security, including seven Chinese nationals indicted by the Justice Department in 2024, dropped various lures containing the exploit chain loader in phishing emails targeting non-governmental organizations, mining companies and commodity trading firms in the United States. 

The phishing link installed a malicious browser extension disguised as Google Gemini on targeted machines, enabling attackers to surveil browser activity, steal credentials and execute commands, according to Proofpoint. 

Other distinct threat groups have also used the BlueMoon exploit chain with some slight technical changes and variances in targeting. 

“Proofpoint observed BlueMoon usage as recently as Sept. 8,” Kelly said. “The activity peaked Sept. 2-3 immediately prior to the Chrome patch being released and has continued intermittently since then.”

A China-aligned espionage threat group Proofpoint tracks as UNK_LateNight targeted multiple U.S. aerospace companies Sept. 2. Researchers also that day observed UNK_DoubleCheck, a suspected espionage-motivated threat group targeting Vietnamese manufacturing organizations with emails from a compromised Southeast Asian government account. 

Researchers said UNK_QuietRacket, another espionage group aligned with China, targeted government, consulting and financial sector organizations in Indonesia and Singapore Sept. 3.

Proofpoint has directly observed fewer than 20 organizations targeted globally thus far, but Kelly said the true number of impacted organizations is likely much higher. 

While Proofpoint attributes most of the observed attacks to Chinese espionage groups, attackers of other origins and motivations could strike soon as well. 

“Given its ease of adoption, we expect the exploit kit is likely to proliferate further and be adopted by additional espionage-motivated and financially motivated threat actors as patched versions are fully rolled out across all Chromium-based browsers,” Kelly said.

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Federal authorities Wednesday revealed a multi-layered Chinese state-sponsored espionage operation that’s targeted and compromised U.S. critical infrastructure, including multiple federal agencies, since 2018. 

Officials seized domains and unsealed an affidavit detailing how a Chinese government-funded front company assembled a botnet and complementary systems that allowed attackers to intrude highly sensitive networks.

The FBI and Justice Department said the state-sponsored group, known as “QTFY,” has targeted and intruded the networks of the Departments of Energy, Justice, Health and Human Services, the Federal Reserve, NASA, National Institutes of Health, and, unsuccessfully in March, the Senate. 

Financial institutions, defense contractors, utility companies, telecom providers and hospitals have also been targeted by the threat group, which includes former members of China’s military, according to court records. 

Officials said QTFY also attempted, but was unsuccessful, in gaining access to a U.S. election system in June. 

The long-running operation, which officials obstructed by seizing malicious infrastructure, provided an expansive set of services. QTFY’s full hacking suite allowed attackers to scan and exploit vulnerabilities, infect IoT devices for a botnet, and conceal or reroute traffic.

QTFY’s operation was comprehensive with features that provided continuous reconnaissance capabilities and flexibilities designed for specific targets or objectives, said Ryan English, information security engineer at Lumen Technologies’ Black Lotus Labs, which aided the disruption efforts. 

Officials said they seized three domains, which cut off access to QScan and QTRouter, the group’s primary platforms. 

“Today’s announcement demonstrates the Justice Department’s steadfast commitment to going on the offensive against cyber threats to national security,” John A. Eisenberg, assistant attorney general for national security, said in a statement. “These court-authorized seizures deny People’s Republic of China-linked hackers access to tools they use to mount online attacks against our nation’s critical infrastructure.”

The FBI, National Security Agency and Cyber National Mission Force released a joint cybersecurity advisory with QTFY’s known indicators of compromise Wednesday. Officials also detailed the China-linked hacking group’s affiliations and collaborations with other state-sponsored groups.

QTFY targeted sensitive networks in the U.S. and globally by exploiting vulnerabilities in multiple vendors’ products, including Pulse Secure, Fortinet, Citrix, Microsoft, F5, Kentico CMS, Atlassian Confluence, Ivanti, Check Point, CrushFTP and BeyondTrust, officials said.

QScan, the reconnaissance and vulnerability scanning tool, included more than 200 proof-of-concept exploits, according to court records. 

“It was designed for large-scale deployment. On a single day in 2024 for example, QScan processed over two million scanning and exploit tasks,” a special agent for the FBI said in the affidavit.

The Chinese hacking collective exploited multiple Ivanti zero-day vulnerabilities in September 2024 to intrude the networks of three DOE national laboratories, NIH, an HHS agency and a U.S.-based security device manufacturer. Officials said the seized domains were all used in those attacks. 

The FBI has been investigating QTFY, which operated out of a private China-based front company, Nanjing Xinjiuwei Network Technology Company, since at least 2019. The group has been consistently active for more than eight years. 

“Discovery of these private companies building networks for China is becoming more frequent,” English said. “We’re starting to see that when they’re getting exposed, some of these have been in business a few years before they’re found.”

The takedown follows a series of technical operations aimed at dismantling China state-sponsored attackers’ infrastructure, including an operation in early 2025 that allowed officials to remove PlugX malware from thousands of U.S.-based computers.

“State-sponsored malicious hackers preying on America’s critical infrastructure will be stopped and prosecuted,” Attorney General Todd Blanche said in a statement. “We are here to ensure security for the American people and will use every tool we have to keep that promise.”

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A Russian state-sponsored threat group has been stealing sensitive data from governments and commercial organizations since July 2025 via a novel exploit in popular Linux-based enterprise software, U.S. authorities and cyber officials from more than a dozen other countries warned in a joint cybersecurity advisory Thursday.

Laundry Bear’s most recent espionage campaign involves the exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability in Zimbra Collaboration Suite that wasn’t patched until November 2025, five months after attacks were well underway, officials said. 

The exploit just requires a view — no clicks — and allows attackers to steal the previous 90 days’ worth of email, the account’s password, search history, the victim organization’s email directory, two-factor authentication tokens and other newly created passwords.

“The covert and persistent nature of this activity, along with the absence of any known financial extortion, almost certainly indicates this group’s involvement in espionage activities with Russian government backing,” officials wrote in the advisory. 

“Additionally, extensive Ukrainian targeting, prior to use against U.S. and other NATO allies, outlines an increasing trend within Russian cyber threat groups to target Ukrainian users first—both as a priority target and as a testbench for malicious cyber techniques before broader global deployment.”

The state-sponsored espionage group, also known as Void Blizzard, has compromised governments and organizations in the defense, education, energy, law enforcement, media, finance, transportation and technology sectors. 

Laundry Bear’s year-long campaign involving the exploitation of CVE-2025-66376 showcases more technical capabilities, including a custom JavaScript payload it delivers to targeted victims via phishing emails. The threat group could also likely adapt the novel data exfiltration and aggregation capability, dubbed “beehive,” to exploit other vulnerabilities, officials warned.

The defect’s medium-severity rating of 6.1 underscores the challenge defenders regularly confront in prioritizing patching schedules based on measure of severity alone.

The Russian state-supported group, which has been active since at least 2024, is still actively exploiting Zimbra Collaboration Suite instances that remain unpatched, officials said.

Authorities shared Thursday indicators of compromise, mitigation steps and urged organizations to update their vulnerable software.

“This campaign’s targeted victimology and limited exploitation capabilities likely indicate this group manually identifies and targets the victim organizations” by identifying organizations with public-facing infrastructure, officials wrote in the advisory.

Once a target is identified, Laundry Bear also likely compiles email addresses for users to target with the exploit via phishing emails. Officials did not identify specific victims or describe the volume of organizations already compromised.

The joint cybersecurity advisory was issued by the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, Moldova, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and Sweden.

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European governments sanctioned Russian individuals and organizations Monday over what they said was a years-long campaign of cyberespionage from Turla and other Russian government-led “destructive attacks” against the bloc.

Monday’s confrontation of Moscow included action from the European Union, its individual member governments and the United Kingdom. It mostly took aim at Center 16 of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) over its control of the cyber threat group known by a list of names including Turla, Secret Blizzard and Waterbug.

“Cybercriminals, self-proclaimed hacktivists and private companies linked to Russia, including actors operating under its instructions, direction or control, have also carried out, enabled and facilitated a wide range of malicious activities,” European Union High Representative Kaja Kallas said in a statement.

The EU called out Russia for the Turla campaign that dated back to 2010 in France with targeting of the government there, and has also featured activity against Germany, Poland, Cyprus, the Netherlands, Austria, Slovakia, Romania and Finland. It made special mention of blaming the FSB for last December’s attacks on Poland’s energy grid, which left half a million people without heat.

In all, the European Union sanctioned nine Russian individuals and four entities. While the EU didn’t name them, Kallas’s statement said it also included officers of Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU).

The United Kingdom’s cyber sanctions, the first it’s done in coordination with the EU, featured a longer list of 24 individuals and entities. The U.K. named GRU senior leadership figures Vyacheslav Stafeyev, Ivan Senin and Ivan Kasyanenko for their alleged hybrid cyberattacks in conjunction with cybercriminals and recruitment of hackers across Russian universities. The U.K. also sanctioned individuals behind Lumma Stealer, the target of an international takedown last year.

“These sanctions strike at the core of the cybercriminal networks propping up the Russian state’s aggression, and the UK and EU are sending a clear message that Russia cannot hide behind its use of these proxy groups,” Foreign Secretary, Yvette Cooper, said in a news release that mentioned “destructive attacks” by Russia. “From directing criminals to targeting businesses, and striking Poland’s energy grid in the depths of winter, the Russian state is sinking to new lows in its attempts to undermine European security.”

At least two European governments, Germany and France, said they would be summoning Russia’s ambassadors in their nations over the attacks.

Also Monday, the European Union announced sanctions against the company behind Russia’s messaging app, Max, citing its use of surveillance features to clamp down on dissent. And separately, 13 nations including the United States issued a warning on Monday about Russian government hackers targeting routers to carry out critical infrastructure attacks.

Russia routinely denies allegations of responsibility for any malicious cyber activity.

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China-aligned attackers broke into the networks of U.S. and Canadian universities to steal sensitive data and establish persistent access via webshells and backdoors, Proofpoint threat researchers said Tuesday. 

The espionage-motivated attacks targeted physics and engineering departments, focusing on administrators and professors with national security links or organizations researching astrophysics and particle physics.

Proofpoint identified less than 10 university victims and estimates a few dozen universities may be impacted, Greg Lesnewich, principal threat researcher at Proofpoint, told CyberScoop. The company first observed the campaign in May and believes the campaign is ongoing. 

“There is a high likelihood that many victims have not been made aware of this activity yet,” Lesnewich added.

Researchers traced the attacks to a pair of critical vulnerabilities in Roundcube, an open-source email client, that were exploited and chained together to steal credentials and gain long-term access.

The threat cluster, which Proofpoint tracks as UNK_MassTraction, exploited CVE-2024-42009 to execute JavaScript inside the victim’s browser, then exploited CVE-2025-49113 to gain a foothold in the mailserver. 

The initial exploit in the chain only requires a victim to open an email, and the attackers sent victims a series of generic lures to trigger the initial access.

Proofpoint attributes the campaign to a China-aligned cluster because the attackers used a known covert network used by multiple China-aligned threat groups, an infection chain leading to VShell and left Chinese language artifacts in the phishing emails. 

Researchers haven’t drawn any conclusions about why attackers targeted the universities and what they are seeking. 

“We do not have data to suggest what got stolen, as we only observe the initial inbound email attempt,” Lesnewich said. 

The engineering aspects do align with China’s strategic initiatives, he added. Google threat hunters recently spotted a Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that burrowed into systems for years, stealing data across academia, medicine, military, cybersecurity and foreign policy. 

“China-aligned adversaries have been targeting other types of edge devices such as routers and VPN concentrators for years with various exploits to create a foothold into a target network, not using email for delivery,” Lesnewich said. “This campaign flips that on its head, using email to deliver an exploit chain to compromise a mail server, instead of using email to deliver a credential harvesting URL or malware to target an end user, not a server.”

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