Attackers could abuse Dify's multi-tenant cloud service to read private chats, preview other tenants' documents, and reach internal APIs.

The post Data Exposure Flaws Threaten Dify AI Platform Used by 1 Million Apps appeared first on SecurityWeek.

We tracked a cryptocurrency-mining campaign exploiting CVE-2026-33017, which revealed how threat actors are now scanning exposed AI application infrastructure for their next foothold.

The European Commission is reportedly preparing to provisionally classify Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure as "gatekeepers" under the Digital Markets Act, bringing cloud infrastructure under the law's stricter competition rules for the first time. The designation could require greater interoperability and data portability, making it easier for customers to switch providers, with a final decision expected by the end of 2026. Heise reports: This investigation began in November 2025, when the EU targeted the cloud power of US tech giants. The trigger was outages in cloud services with sometimes significant impacts on other internet services. Shortly before, an approximately 15-hour outage of the AWS cloud in the US meant that not only Amazon's own streaming services but also Atlassian, Docker, Epic Games, and the Signal messenger were unavailable or severely restricted. Shortly thereafter, Microsoft Azure also struggled with an outage, preventing air passengers from checking in and interrupting votes in the Scottish Parliament. As a result, European antitrust authorities have also scrutinized cloud services under the Digital Markets Act for the first time. The major cloud providers, primarily from the US, have so far evaded the EU's Digital Markets Act because a large part of their business is handled through corporate contracts. This makes it difficult to determine the number of individual users. However, this is one of the EU's most important criteria for determining the market power of companies. [...] As gatekeepers, AWS and Azure would be obliged to ensure interoperability and data portability. This would, for example, simplify switching cloud providers and allow customers to link other services with AWS or Azure clouds, instead of being limited to AWS and Azure offerings. Significant fines could also be imposed if the cloud services are found to be in violation of existing regulations.

Read more of this story at Slashdot.

A threat actor targeting Microsoft 365 and Azure production environments is stealing data in attacks that abuse legitimate applications and administration features. [...]

Until this past weekend, a contractor for the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) maintained a public GitHub repository that exposed credentials to several highly privileged AWS GovCloud accounts and a large number of internal CISA systems. Security experts said the public archive included files detailing how CISA builds, tests and deploys software internally, and that it represents one of the most egregious government data leaks in recent history.

On May 15, KrebsOnSecurity heard from Guillaume Valadon, a researcher with the security firm GitGuardian. Valadon’s company constantly scans public code repositories at GitHub and elsewhere for exposed secrets, automatically alerting the offending accounts of any apparent sensitive data exposures. Valadon said he reached out because the owner in this case wasn’t responding and the information exposed was highly sensitive.

The GitHub repository that Valadon flagged was named “Private-CISA,” and it harbored a vast number of internal CISA/DHS credentials and files, including cloud keys, tokens, plaintext passwords, logs and other sensitive CISA assets.

Valadon said the exposed CISA credentials represent a textbook example of poor security hygiene, noting that the commit logs in the offending GitHub account show that the CISA administrator disabled the default setting in GitHub that blocks users from publishing SSH keys or other secrets in public code repositories.

“Passwords stored in plain text in a csv, backups in git, explicit commands to disable GitHub secrets detection feature,” Valadon wrote in an email. “I honestly believed that it was all fake before analyzing the content deeper. This is indeed the worst leak that I’ve witnessed in my career. It is obviously an individual’s mistake, but I believe that it might reveal internal practices.”

One of the exposed files, titled “importantAWStokens,” included the administrative credentials to three Amazon AWS GovCloud servers. Another file exposed in their public GitHub repository — “AWS-Workspace-Firefox-Passwords.csv” — listed plaintext usernames and passwords for dozens of internal CISA systems. According to Caturegli, those systems included one called “LZ-DSO,” which appears short for “Landing Zone DevSecOps,” the agency’s secure code development environment.

Philippe Caturegli, founder of the security consultancy Seralys, said he tested the AWS keys only to see whether they were still valid and to determine which internal systems the exposed accounts could access. Caturegli said the GitHub account that exposed the CISA secrets exhibits a pattern consistent with an individual operator using the repository as a working scratchpad or synchronization mechanism rather than a curated project repository.

“The use of both a CISA-associated email address and a personal email address suggests the repository may have been used across differently configured environments,” Caturegli observed. “The available Git metadata alone does not prove which endpoint or device was used.”

Caturegli said he validated that the exposed credentials could authenticate to three AWS GovCloud accounts at a high privilege level. He said the archive also includes plain text credentials to CISA’s internal “artifactory” — essentially a repository of all the code packages they are using to build software — and that this would represent a juicy target for malicious attackers looking for ways to maintain a persistent foothold in CISA systems.

“That would be a prime place to move laterally,” he said. “Backdoor in some software packages, and every time they build something new they deploy your backdoor left and right.”

In response to questions, a spokesperson for CISA said the agency is aware of the reported exposure and is continuing to investigate the situation.

“Currently, there is no indication that any sensitive data was compromised as a result of this incident,” the CISA spokesperson wrote. “While we hold our team members to the highest standards of integrity and operational awareness, we are working to ensure additional safeguards are implemented to prevent future occurrences.”

A review of the GitHub account and its exposed passwords show the “Private CISA” repository was maintained by an employee of Nightwing, a government contractor based in Dulles, Va. Nightwing declined to comment, directing inquiries to CISA.

CISA has not responded to questions about the potential duration of the data exposure, but Caturegli said the Private CISA repository was created on November 13, 2025. The contractor’s GitHub account was created back in September 2018.

The GitHub account that included the Private CISA repo was taken offline shortly after both KrebsOnSecurity and Seralys notified CISA about the exposure. But Caturegli said the exposed AWS keys inexplicably continued to remain valid for another 48 hours.

CISA is currently operating with only a fraction of its normal budget and staffing levels. The agency has lost nearly a third of its workforce since the beginning of the second Trump administration, which forced a series of early retirements, buyouts, and resignations across the agency’s various divisions.

The now-defunct Private CISA repo showed the contractor also used easily-guessed passwords for a number of internal resources; for example, many of the credentials used a password consisting of each platform’s name followed by the current year. Caturegli said such practices would constitute a serious security threat for any organization even if those credentials were never exposed externally, noting that threat actors often use key credentials exposed on the internal network to expand their reach after establishing initial access to a targeted system.

“What I suspect happened is [the CISA contractor] was using this GitHub to synchronize files between a work laptop and a home computer, because he has regularly committed to this repo since November 2025,” Caturegli said. “This would be an embarrassing leak for any company, but it’s even more so in this case because it’s CISA.”

NVIDIA has confirmed in a statement for BleepingComputer that GeForce NOW user information has been exposed in a data breach. [...]

A new malware framework called PCPJack is stealing credentials from exposed cloud infrastructure while actively removing TeamPCP's access to the systems. [...]

A deeper look at the first three pillars and outlining how our capabilities directly support government agencies working to bring this strategy to life.

TrendAI™ Research breaks down Quasar Linux (QLNX), a previously undocumented sophisticated Linux RAT with low detection rates. In this blog, we examine a full-featured Linux threat incorporating a rootkit, a PAM backdoor, credential harvesting, and more, revealing how this malware enables stealthy access, persistence, and potential supply-chain attacks.

A pair of persistent and problematic threat groups affiliated with The Com are actively targeting organizations across multiple critical infrastructure sectors for rapid data theft and extortion attacks, according to CrowdStrike.

The financially-motivated attackers, which CrowdStrike tracks as Cordial Spider and Snarky Spider, have used voice-phishing and social engineering attacks to break into victims’ identity platforms and traverse SaaS environments since at least October 2025, the company said in a report Thursday, which it shared exclusively with CyberScoop prior to release. 

Adam Meyers, senior vice president of counter adversary operations at CrowdStrike, said the subgroups composed of native English speakers primarily target U.S.-based organizations in the academic, aviation, retail, hospitality, automotive, financial services, legal and technology sectors.

This “new wave of ecrime threat actors” are closely aligned with Scattered Spider and linked to other subsets of The Com, including SLSH and ShinyHunters, Meyers said. 

Because these attacks target identity systems and can expose data in other connected services beyond the initial breach point, it’s difficult to determine how many victims have been caught up in these campaigns. 

CrowdStrike’s warning closely follows research Palo Alto Networks’ Unit 42 and the Retail & Hospitality Information Sharing and Analysis Center shared last week about Cordial Spider’s string of attacks targeting organizations in the retail and hospitality industry, among others. 

Cordial and Snarky Spider have set lures via voice calls, text messages and emails directing targeting employees to phishing pages posing as their employer’s legitimate single sign-on page or primary identity provider, researchers said. 

These phishing pages, which capture credentials, session keys or tokens, depending on the workflow, provide attackers an entry point into systems, which they exploit for widespread access across victims’ entire SaaS ecosystems.

Attackers use these initial hooks to remove and establish multi-factor authentication devices, then delete emails and other alerts that would otherwise warn organizations of potential malicious activity, researchers said. 

The data theft for extortion campaigns share striking similarities, but CrowdStrike said the tactics, techniques and procedures for each subgroup are distinct. These variances include hours of operation, different phishing domain providers, preferred operating systems, data leak sites, and the tools or devices they used to register for multi-factor authentication. 

The domain for BlackFile, Cordial Spider’s data-leak site, was offline as of Wednesday, according to Meyers.

CrowdStrike declined to put a range on the groups’ extortion demands, but Unit 42 previously said Cordial Spider, which is also tracked as CL-CRI-1116 and UNC6671, are typically in the seven-figure range.

Some victims that didn’t pay extortion demands have been subjected to DDoS attacks, and Snarky Spider has used more aggressive follow-on harassment tactics, including the swatting of victim organizations’ employees, Meyers said. 

CrowdStrike said Cordial and Snarky Spider also use residential proxy networks — including Mullvad, Oxylabs, NetNut, 9Proxy, Infatica and NSOCKS — to evade IP-based detection and blend in with typical traffic. 

Residential proxy networks, which rely on IP addresses assigned to real home users, can serve a legitimate purpose, but researchers have been warning that unethical or outright criminal operators are abusing these networks to build and support botnets, cybercrime campaigns, espionage and other malicious activity.

Cordial and Snarky Spider haven’t achieved the impact or technical capability of Scattered Spider, but the groups share many commonalities and objectives, Meyers said. 

“They’ve kind of taken their playbook and they’re using a lot of their techniques, but we haven’t really seen the technical sophistication demonstrated by them that we saw from Scattered Spider,” he said. “It’s kind of the new generation of Scattered Spider.”

The post Two new extortion crews are speedrunning the Scattered Spider playbook appeared first on CyberScoop.

The growth of data centers — and adversaries’ targeting of them — left lawmakers at a hearing Wednesday contemplating whether the federal government has the right setup for defending them.

Some industry witnesses and experts at the hearing of the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection testified that the answer might be to give data centers their own standalone designation as a critical infrastructure sector.

The question of how to secure data centers against cyber and physical attacks coincides with artificial intelligence fuelling a boom in the building of such facilities across the United States. Last month, Iranian drones targeted two Amazon data centers in response to the U.S.-Israel bombing campaign on Iran, and a third data center in Bahrain was struck as well.

“If a major data center is attacked, disrupted, or taken offline, the consequences can reach far beyond one company or one sector,” Rep. Andy Ogles, R-Tenn., said in prepared opening remarks. “Yet our current framework does not provide a clear, unified approach to data center security. It does not clearly answer which federal agency is responsible for understanding the risk, coordinating with industry, or leading the response when this infrastructure is targeted.”

Three providers account for 63 percent of the market share of data centers: Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud Platform. 

The United Kingdom already has deemed data centers as a standalone critical infrastructure sector. Reps. Vince Fong, R-Calif., and LaMonica McIver, D-N.J., asked panel witnesses Wednesday about federal protection of them.

“Given the scrutiny that is required to make sure that those data centers are secure, there would be a benefit in having them work together as a unique coordinating council,” said Robert Mayer, senior vice president for cybersecurity and innovation at USTelecom, an industry group.

The Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Mark Montgomery suggested a sector that combines data centers and cloud providers, given the overlap in ownership. The 2024 rewrite of a White House national security memo left some experts disappointed that it didn’t designate cloud computing as a critical infrastructure sector. 

Samuel Visner, chair of the board of directors of the Space Information Sharing and Analysis Center, said he agreed, given the role data centers are playing in the U.S. economy, military and other dependencies. “Finding a way to regard them as part of our critical infrastructure and protect them accordingly is sine qua non, absolutely necessary,” he said.

A fourth witness didn’t weigh in on the need for a separate critical infrastructure designation. But Scott Algeier, executive director of Information Technology Information Sharing and Analysis Center, said his organization had created a “special interest group” for data center providers.

“The data centers are integrated already into the critical infrastructure discussions,” he told the panel.

The post Congress, industry ponder government posture for protecting data centers appeared first on CyberScoop.

Researchers found more than 80 high-impact cloud and AI vulnerabilities during the event, which had a $5 million prize pool.

The post Microsoft Paid Out $2.3 Million at Zero Day Quest 2026 Hacking Contest appeared first on SecurityWeek.

Enterprises aiming to predict and mitigate human, machine, and AI‑agent risks at scale demand AI‑powered identity‑first security without compromise.

The first quarter of 2026 has reinforced a hard truth: U.S. government agencies and educational institutions are operating in the most hostile cyber threat environment ever recorded.

This blog looks at how AI‑driven vibecoding speeds up software development while increasing security risk by outpacing traditional review and ownership. It explains why security needs to move earlier and be built into modern development workflows.

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The TeamPCP hacking group is targeting Kubernetes clusters with a malicious script that wipes all machines when it detects systems configured for Iran. [...]

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Learn how TrendAI™ and our researchers contributed threat intelligence and analysis to support INTERPOL against cybercrime.

Professional NBA and NFL athletes were allegedly deceived and victimized by a 34-year-old Georgia man’s sneaky social-engineering scheme that he ran while impersonating a well-known adult film star, the Justice Department said Monday.

Kwamaine Jerell Ford allegedly initiated and committed some of the crimes while incarcerated in federal prison for a similar, widespread phishing scam that also targeted college and professional athletes and musical artists starting in 2015. 

“While serving time for stealing credit card numbers from athletes and celebrities to fund his lifestyle, Ford allegedly engaged in the same conduct again,” Theodore S. Hertzberg, U.S. attorney for the Northern District of Georgia, said in a statement.

The alleged repeat offender, while adopting the persona of an adult film model, tricked professional athletes into providing him their iCloud login credentials and multifactor authentication codes for those accounts to steal financial and personally identifiable information to pay for personal expenses.

Ford is accused of executing more than 2,000 unauthorized transactions on professional athletes’ debit and credit cards from November 2020 to September 2024, according to an unsealed indictment. He was in federal custody for the first 14 months of the conspiracy and released on probation for prior crimes in January 2022.

Prosecutors did not name victims, divulge how many athletes Ford allegedly victimized during his latest scheme, or how much money he obtained through the conspiracy. 

He pleaded not guilty Friday to 22 charges for crimes including wire fraud, obtaining information by computer from a protected computer, access device fraud, aggravated identity theft and sex trafficking. Ford is being held without bail pending a trial. 

Using the adult film model’s identity, Ford allegedly enticed his high-profile victims to communicate with him on social media by falsely claiming he would send them adult film content through iCloud.

When a professional athlete responded, Ford allegedly sent phishing messages to the victim designed to look like legitimate Apple customer service text messages. Officials said Ford spoofed legitimate Apple customer service accounts and posed as an Apple customer support representative to request victims’ login details via text messages.

Prosecutors said Ford told his victims the messages contained a video file shared through an iCloud link that required them to reply with an MFA code. Ford allegedly attempted to access his victims’ iCloud accounts at the same time, triggering an MFA code delivery to the victim’s device.

Professional athletes who provided their iCloud MFA codes to Ford were ultimately tricked into giving him complete access to their iCloud accounts, officials said. Ford allegedly used that access to steal sensitive data, driver’s licenses and credit card information that he used for personal spending.

Ford also, while impersonating the adult film star, allegedly victimized an OnlyFans model by claiming he would advance their career. Prosecutors said Ford enticed the OnlyFans model to engage in and record commercial sex acts with professional athletes without their consent. 

“Ford clearly did not learn from his prior conviction for a similar scheme. This time, he allegedly escalated his criminal activity — stealing identities and money while also moving into coercion and sex trafficking,” Peter Ellis, acting special agent in charge at the FBI Atlanta office, said in a statement. 

Ford allegedly advertised the victim to targeted athletes, coordinated their travel to coincide with athletes’ known locations, and negotiated payments from the athletes for sex with the victim. Prosecutors said Ford took a financial cut from those commercial sex acts, many of which the victim was coerced into filming without the athletes’ knowledge. 

Ford is also accused of using these videos from the OnlyFans model to engage with additional athletes under false pretenses. When the OnlyFans model resisted filming the sex acts, Ford allegedly coerced them to send him money in lieu of the videos.

In 2019, Ford was sentenced to three years in prison and ordered to pay restitution of almost $700,000 after he pleaded guilty to computer fraud and aggravated identity theft. That scheme, which also ran for about four years, allowed Ford to hack into more than 100 Apple accounts belonging to high-profile professional athletes and rappers. 

Ford was still in prison for those crimes when he allegedly established a new scheme targeting similar victims on some of the same technology platforms.

You can read the indictment below.

The post Zero lessons learned: Convicted scammer allegedly ran another athlete-focused phishing scam from federal prison appeared first on CyberScoop.