Victims span across the aviation, critical infrastructure, energy, logistics, public administration, and technology sectors.
The post Over 500 Organizations Hit in Years-Long Phishing Campaign appeared first on SecurityWeek.
Phishing campaigns continue to improve sophistication and refinement in blending social engineering, delivery and hosting infrastructure, and authentication abuse to remain effective against evolving security controls. A large-scale credential theft campaign observed by Microsoft Defender Research exemplifies this trend, using code of conduct-themed lures, a multi-step attack chain, and legitimate email services to distribute fully authenticated messages from attacker-controlled domains.
The campaign targeted tens of thousands of users, primarily in the United States, and directed them through several stages of CAPTCHA and intermediate staging pages designed to reinforce legitimacy while filtering out automated defenses. The lures in this campaign used polished, enterprise-style HTML templates with structured layouts and preemptive authenticity statements, making them appear more credible than typical phishing emails and increasing their plausibility as legitimate internal communications. Because the messages contained concerning accusations and repeated time-bound action prompts, the campaign created a sense of urgency and pressure to act.
The attack chain ultimately led to a legitimate sign-in experience that was part of an adversary‑in‑the‑middle (AiTM) phishing flow, which allowed the attackers to proxy the authentication session and capture authentication tokens that could provide immediate account access. Unlike traditional credential harvesting, AiTM attacks intercept authentication traffic in real time, bypassing non-phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA).
In this blog, we’re sharing our analysis of this campaign’s lures, infrastructure, and techniques. Organizations can defend against financial fraud initiated through phishing emails by educating users about phishing lures, investing in advanced anti-phishing solutions like Microsoft Defender for Office 365 and configuring essential email security settings, and encouraging users to employ web browsers that support SmartScreen. Organizations can also enable network protection, which lets Windows use SmartScreen as a host-based web proxy.
Between April 14 and 16, 2026, the Microsoft Defender Research team observed a series of sophisticated phishing campaigns targeting more than 35,000 users across over 13,000 organizations in 26 countries, with majority of targets located in the United States (92%). The campaign did not focus on a single vertical but instead impacted a broad range of industries, most notably Healthcare & life sciences (19%), Financial services (18%), Professional services (11%), and Technology & software (11%). Messages were distributed in multiple distinct waves between 06:51 UTC on April 14 and 03:54 UTC on April 16.
Emails in this campaign posed as internal compliance or regulatory communications, using display names such as “Internal Regulatory COC”, “Workforce Communications”, and “Team Conduct Report”. Subject lines included “Internal case log issued under conduct policy” and “Reminder: employer opened a non-compliance case log”.
Message bodies claimed that a “code of conduct review” had been initiated, referenced organization-specific names embedded within the text, and instructed recipients to “open the personalized attachment” to review case materials. At the top of each message, a notice stated that the message had been “issued through an authorized internal channel” and that links and attachments had been “reviewed and approved for secure access”, reinforcing the email’s purported legitimacy. To further support the confidentiality of the supposed review, the end of each message contained a green banner stating that the contents had been encrypted using Paubox, a legitimate service associated with HIPAA-compliant communications.
Analysis of the sending infrastructure indicated that the campaign emails were sent using a legitime email delivery service, likely originating from a cloud-hosted Windows virtual machine. The messages were sent from multiple sender addresses using domains that are likely attacker-controlled.
Each campaign email included a PDF attachment with filenames such as Awareness Case Log File – Tuesday 14th, April 2026.pdf and Disciplinary Action – Employee Device Handling Case.pdf. The attachment provided additional context about the supposed conduct review, including a summary of the review process and instructions for accessing supporting documentation. Recipients were directed to click a “Review Case Materials” link within the PDF, which initiated the credential harvesting flow.
When clicked, users were initially directed to one of two attacker-controlled domains (for example, acceptable-use-policy-calendly[.]de or compliance-protectionoutlook[.]de). These landing pages displayed a Cloudflare CAPTCHA, presented as a mechanism to validate that the user was coming “from a valid session”. This CAPTCHA likely served as a gating mechanism to impede automated analysis and sandbox detonation.
After completing the CAPTCHA, users were redirected to an intermediate site designed to prepare them for the final stage of the attack. This page informed users that the requested documentation was encrypted and required account authentication. While this stage of the attack has several hallmarks of device code phishing, we were only able to confirm the AITM portion of the attack chain.
After clicking the provided “Review & Sign” button, users were presented with a sign-in prompt requesting their email address.
After submission, users were required to complete a second CAPTCHA involving image selection.
Once these steps were completed, users were shown a message indicating that verification was successful and that their “case” was being prepared.
Following these steps, users were redirected to a third site hosting the final stage of the attack. Analysis of the underlying code indicates that the final destination varied depending on whether the user accessed the workflow from a mobile device or a desktop system.
On the final page, users were informed that all materials related to their code of conduct review had been “securely logged”, “time-stamped”, and “maintained within the organization’s centralized compliance tracking system”. They were then prompted to schedule a time to discuss the case, which required signing in to their account.
Selecting the “Sign in with Microsoft” option redirected users to a Microsoft authentication page, initiating an AiTM session hijacking flow designed to capture authentication tokens and compromise user accounts.
Microsoft recommends the following mitigations to reduce the impact of this threat. Check the recommendations card for the deployment status of monitored mitigations.
Microsoft Defender customers can refer to the list of applicable detections below. Microsoft Defender coordinates detection, prevention, investigation, and response across endpoints, identities, email, apps to provide integrated protection against attacks like the threat discussed in this blog.
| Tactic | Observed activity | Microsoft Defender coverage |
| Initial access | Phishing emails | Microsoft Defender for Office 365 – A potentially malicious URL click was detected – A user clicked through to a potentially malicious URL – Suspicious email sending patterns detected – Email messages containing malicious URL removed after delivery – Email messages removed after delivery – Email reported by user as malware or phish |
| Persistence | Threat actors sign in with stolen valid entities | Microsoft Entra ID Protection – Anomalous Token – Unfamiliar sign-in properties – Unfamiliar sign-in properties for session cookies Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps – Impossible travel activity |
Microsoft Security Copilot is embedded in Microsoft Defender and provides security teams with AI-powered capabilities to summarize incidents, analyze files and scripts, summarize identities, use guided responses, and generate device summaries, hunting queries, and incident reports.
Customers can also deploy AI agents, including the following Microsoft Security Copilot agents, to perform security tasks efficiently:
Security Copilot is also available as a standalone experience where customers can perform specific security-related tasks, such as incident investigation, user analysis, and vulnerability impact assessment. In addition, Security Copilot offers developer scenarios that allow customers to build, test, publish, and integrate AI agents and plugins to meet unique security needs.
Microsoft Defender XDR customers can use the following threat analytics reports in the Defender portal (requires license for at least one Defender XDR product) to get the most up-to-date information about the threat actor, malicious activity, and techniques discussed in this blog. These reports provide the intelligence, protection information, and recommended actions to prevent, mitigate, or respond to associated threats found in customer environments.
Microsoft Security Copilot customers can also use the Microsoft Security Copilot integration in Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence, either in the Security Copilot standalone portal or in the embedded experience in the Microsoft Defender portal to get more information about this threat actor.
Microsoft Defender XDR customers can run the following advanced hunting queries to find related activity in their networks:
Campaign emails by sender address
The following query identifies emails associated with this campaign using a message’s sending email address.
Login
EmailEvents
| where SenderMailFromAddress in (" cocpostmaster@cocinternal.com "," nationaladmin@gadellinet.com ","
nationalintegrity@harteprn.com”,” m365premiumcommunications@cocinternal.com”,” documentviewer@na.businesshellosign.de”)
| Indicator | Type | Description | First seen | Last seen |
| compliance-protectionoutlook[.]de | Domain | Domain hosting malicious campaign content | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
| acceptable-use-policy-calendly[.]de | Domain | Domain hosting malicious campaign content | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
| cocinternal[.]com | Domain | Domain hosting sender email address | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
| Gadellinet[.]com | Domain | Domain hosting sender email address | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
| Harteprn[.]com | Domain | Domain hosting sender email address | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
| Cocpostmaster[@]cocinternal.com | Email address | Email address used to send campaign emails | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
| Nationaladmin[@]gadellinet.com | Email address | Email address used to send campaign emails | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
| Nationalintegrity[@]harteprn.com | Email address | Email address used to send campaign emails | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
| M365premiumcommunications[@]cocinternal.com | Email address | Email address used to send campaign emails | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
| Documentviewer[@]na.businesshellosign.de | Email address | Email address used to send campaign emails | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
| Awareness Case Log File – Monday 13th, April 2026.pdf | Filename | Name of PDF attachment containing phishing link | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-14 |
| Awareness Case Log File – Tuesday 14th, April 2026.pdf | Filename | Name of PDF attachment containing phishing link | 2026-04-15 | 2026-04-15 |
| Awareness Case Log File – Wednesday 15th, April 2026.pdf | Filename | Name of PDF attachment containing phishing link | 2026-04-16 | 2026-04-16 |
| 5DB1ECBBB2C90C51D81BDA138D4300B90EA5EB2885CCE1BD921D692214AECBC6 | SHA-256 | File hash of campaign PDF attachment | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
| B5A3346082AC566B4494E6175F1CD9873B64ABE6C902DB49BD4E8088876C9EAD | SHA-256 | File hash of campaign PDF attachment | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
| 11420D6D693BF8B19195E6B98FEDD03B9BCBC770B6988BC64CB788BFABE1A49D | SHA-256 | File hash of campaign PDF attachment | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
For the latest security research from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community, check out the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Blog.
To get notified about new publications and to join discussions on social media, follow us on LinkedIn, X (formerly Twitter), and Bluesky.
To hear stories and insights from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community about the ever-evolving threat landscape, listen to the Microsoft Threat Intelligence podcast.
The post Breaking the code: Multi-stage ‘code of conduct’ phishing campaign leads to AiTM token compromise appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.
During the first quarter of 2026 (January-March), Microsoft Threat Intelligence detected approximately 8.3 billion email-based phishing threats, with monthly volumes declining slightly from 2.9 billion in January to 2.6 billion in March. By the end of the quarter, QR code phishing emerged as the fastest-growing attack vector, more than doubling over the period, while CAPTCHA-gated phishing evolved rapidly across payload types. Overall, 78% of email threats were link-based, while malicious payloads accounted for 19% of attacks in January—boosted by large HTML and ZIP campaigns—before settling at 13% in both February and March. Credential phishing remained the dominant objective behind malicious payloads throughout the quarter. This shift toward link-based delivery, combined with the payload trends, suggests that threat actors increasingly preferred hosted credential phishing infrastructure over locally-rendered payloads as the quarter progressed.
These trends reflect how threat actors continue to iterate on both scale and delivery techniques to improve effectiveness. At the same time, disruption efforts can meaningfully impact this activity. Following Microsoft’s Digital Crime Unit-led action against the Tycoon2FA phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platform in early March, associated email volume declined 15% over the remainder of the month, alongside a significant reduction in access to active phishing pages, limiting the platform’s immediate effectiveness. While Tycoon2FA has since adapted by shifting hosting providers and domain registration patterns, these changes reflect partial recovery rather than full restoration of previous capabilities. Alongside these shifts, business email compromise (BEC) activity remained prevalent, totaling approximately 10.7 million attacks in the quarter, largely driven by low-effort, generic outreach messages. At the same time, Microsoft Defender Research observed early indications of emerging techniques such as device code phishing—sometimes enabled by offerings like EvilTokens—which, while not yet at the scale of the trends discussed below, reflect continued innovation in credential theft methods.
This blog provides a view of email threat activity across the first quarter of 2026, highlighting key trends in phishing techniques, payload delivery, and threat actor behavior observed by Microsoft Threat Intelligence. We examine shifts in QR code phishing, CAPTCHA evasion tactics, malicious payloads, and BEC activity, analyze how disruption efforts and infrastructure changes influenced threat actor operations, and provide recommendations and Microsoft Defender detections to help mitigate these threats. By bringing these trends together, this blog can help defenders understand how email-based attacks are evolving and where to focus detection, mitigation, and user protection strategies.
Since its emergence in August 2023, Tycoon2FA has rapidly become one of the most widespread PhaaS platforms, leveraging adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) techniques to attempt to defeat non-phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA) defenses. The group behind the PhaaS platform (tracked by Microsoft Threat Intelligence as Storm-1747) leases malicious infrastructure and sells phishing kits that impersonate various enterprise application sign-in pages and incorporate evasion tactics, such as fake CAPTCHA pages.
The quarter began with Tycoon2FA in a period of reduced activity. January volumes represented a 54% decline from December 2025, marking the second consecutive month of sharp decreases. While post-holiday seasonal effects may have contributed to this decrease in volume, some of the reduction might also have been the result of Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit disruption of RedVDS, a service used by many Tycoon2FA customers to distribute malicious email campaigns.
After surging 44% in February, phishing attacks pointing to Tycoon2FA fell 15% in March driven largely by the effects of a coordinated disruption operation. In early March 2026, Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit, in coordination with Europol and industry partners, took action to disrupt Tycoon2FA’s infrastructure and operations, significantly impairing the platform’s hosting capabilities. While Tycoon2FA-linked messages continued to circulate after the disruption, almost one-third of March’s total volume was concentrated in a three-day period early in the month; daily volumes for the remainder of March were notably lower than historical averages, and targets’ ability to reach active phishing pages was substantially reduced.
Tycoon2FA’s infrastructure composition evolved multiple times during the first three months of 2026. In January, Tycoon2FA domains started shifting toward newer generic top-level domains (TLDs) such as .DIGITAL, .BUSINESS, .CONTRACTORS, .CEO, and .COMPANY, moving away from previous commonly used TLDs or second-level domains like .SA.COM, .RU, and .ES. This trend became even more well-established in February. Following the March disruption, however, Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed a notable increase in Tycoon2FA domains with .RU registrations, with more than 41% of all Tycoon2FA domains using a .RU TLD since the last week of March.
Additionally, toward the end of March, we saw Tycoon2FA moving away from Cloudflare as a hosting service and now hosts most of its domains across a variety of alternative platforms, suggesting the group is attempting to find replacement services that offer comparable anti-analysis protections.
In recent years, QR codes have rapidly emerged as a preferred tool among phishing threat actors seeking to bypass traditional email defenses. By embedding malicious URLs within image-based QR codes in the body of an email or within the contents of an attachment, threat actors attempt to exploit the limitations of text-based scanning engines and redirect victims to phishing sites on unmanaged mobile devices.
The most significant shift in Q1 2026 was the rapid escalation of QR code phishing, with attack volumes increasing from 7.6 million in January to 18.7 million in March, a 146% increase over the quarter. After an initial 35% decline in January (continuing a late-2025 downtrend), volumes reversed course dramatically, growing 59% in February and another 55% in March. By the end of the quarter, QR code phishing had reached its highest monthly volume in at least a year.
PDF attachments were the dominant delivery method throughout the quarter, growing from 65% of QR code attacks in January to 70% in March. While the overall volume of DOC/DOCX payloads containing malicious QR codes steadily increased each month, their share of overall delivery payloads decreased from 31% in January to 24% in March. A notable late-quarter development was the emergence of QR codes embedded directly in email bodies, which surged 336% in March. While still a small share of total volume (5%), this approach eliminates the need for an attachment altogether and highlights a shift in threat actor delivery methods that defenders should continue to monitor.
Threat actors use CAPTCHA pages to delay detection and increase user interaction. These pages function as a visual decoy, giving the appearance of a legitimate security check while concealing a transition to malicious content. By forcing users to engage with the CAPTCHA before accessing the payload, threat actors reduce the likelihood of automated scanning tools identifying the threat and increase the chances of successful credential harvesting or malware delivery. Additionally, fake CAPTCHAs are used in ClickFix attacks to trick users into copying and executing malicious commands under the guise of human verification, allowing malware to bypass conventional security controls.
After declining in both January (-45%) and February (-8%), CAPTCHA-gated phishing volumes exploded in March, more than doubling (+125%) to 11.9 million attacks, the highest volume observed over the last year.
The most notable aspect of Q1 CAPTCHA trends was the rapid rotation of delivery methods, as threat actors appeared to actively experiment with which payload formats most effectively evade email defenses:
Another notable shift in CAPTCHA-gated phishing attacks was the erosion of Tycoon2FA’s impact on the landscape. At the end of 2025, more than three-quarters of CAPTCHA-gated phishing sites were hosted on Tycoon2FA infrastructure. This share decreased significantly over the course of the first three months of 2026, falling to just 41% in March. This broadening of CAPTCHA-gated phishing sites being used by an increasing number of threat actors and phishing kits, combined with the overall surge in volume, indicates that this technique is becoming a more entrenched component of the phishing playbook rather than a specialty of a small number of tools.
Between February 23 and February 25, 2026, a large, sustained campaign sent more than 1.2 million messages to users at more than 53,000 organizations in 23 countries. Messages in the campaign included a number of different themes, including an important 401K update, a credit hold warning, a question about a received payment, a payment request for a past due invoice, and a voice message notification.
Many of the messages contained a fake confidentiality disclaimer to enhance the credibility of the messages and provide a proactive excuse about why a recipient may have mistakenly received an email that may not be applicable to them.
Attached to each message was an SVG file that was named to appropriately match the theme of the email. All the file names included a Base64-encoded version of the recipient’s email address. Example of file names used in the campaign include the following:
If an attached SVG file was opened, the user’s browser would open locally and fetch content from one of the three following hostnames:
Initially, the user would be shown a “security check” CAPTCHA. Once the CAPTCHA had been successfully completed, the user would then be shown a fake sign-in page used to compromise their account credentials.
Credential phishing tightened its grip on the malicious payload landscape across Q1, growing from 89% of all payload-based attacks in January to 95% in February before settling at 94% in March. These credential phishing payloads either linked users to phishing pages or locally loaded spoofed sign-in screens on a user’s device. Traditional malware delivery continued its long-term decline, representing just 5–6% of payloads by the end of the quarter.
The most striking payload trend was the volatility across file types, driven by large campaigns that created dramatic week-to-week swings:
On March 17, 2026, Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed a massive phishing campaign that drove a significant surge in malicious HTML attachments during the month. The campaign involved more than 1.5 million confirmed malicious messages sent to over 179,000 organizations across 43 countries, accounting for approximately 7% of all malicious HTML attachments observed in March.
All messages in this campaign were likely sent using the same tool or service, which exhibited several distinct and highly consistent characteristics. Most notably, sender addresses across the campaign featured excessively long, keyword‑stuffed usernames that embedded URLs, tracking identifiers, and service references. These usernames were crafted to resemble legitimate transactional, billing, or document‑related notification senders. Examples of observed sender usernames include:
The emails themselves contained little to no message body content. While subject lines varied, they consistently impersonated routine business and workflow notifications, including payment and remittance alerts (for example, Automated Clearing House (ACH), Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT), wire), invoice or aging statements, and e‑signature or document delivery requests. These subjects relied on urgency, approval language, and transactional framing to prompt recipients to review, sign, or access an attached document.
Each message included an HTML attachment with a file name aligned to the email’s theme. When opened, the HTML file launched locally on the recipient’s device and immediately redirected the user to an initial external staging page. This page performed basic screening and then redirected the user to a secondary landing page hosting the phishing content. On the final landing page, users were presented with a CAPTCHA challenge before being directed to a fraudulent sign‑in page designed to harvest account credentials.
Interestingly, although messages in this campaign shared common tooling, structure, and delivery characteristics, the infrastructure hosting the final phishing payload was linked to multiple different PhaaS providers. Most observed phishing endpoints were associated with Tycoon2FA, while additional activity was linked to Kratos (formerly Sneaky2FA) and EvilTokens infrastructure.
Microsoft defines business email compromise (BEC) as a text-based attack targeting enterprise users that impersonates a trusted entity for the purpose of persuading a recipient into initiating a fraudulent financial transaction or sending the threat actor sensitive documents. These attacks fluctuated across Q1, totaling approximately 10.7 million attacks: rising 24% in January, dipping 8% in February, then surging 26% in March.
The composition of BEC attacks remained consistent throughout Q1. Generic outreach messages (like “Are you at your desk?”) accounted for 82–84% of initial contact emails each month, while explicit requests for specific financial transactions or documents represented just 9–10%. This pattern underscores that BEC operators overwhelmingly favor establishing a conversational rapport before making fraudulent requests, rather than leading with direct financial asks.
Within the smaller subset of explicit financial requests, two sub-categories showed notable movement. Payroll update requests grew 15% in February, reaching their highest volume in eight months, potentially reflecting tax season-related social engineering. Gift card requests fell 37% in February to their lowest level since July before rebounding sharply in March (+108%), though they still represented less than 3% of overall BEC messages. These fluctuations suggest that BEC operators adjust their specific financial pretexts seasonally while maintaining a consistent overall approach.
Microsoft recommends the following mitigations to reduce the impact of this threat.
Microsoft Defender customers can refer to the list of applicable detections below. Microsoft Defender coordinates detection, prevention, investigation, and response across endpoints, identities, email, apps to provide integrated protection against attacks like the threat discussed in this blog.
The following alert might indicate threat activity associated with this threat. The alert, however, can be triggered by unrelated threat activity.
The following alerts might indicate threat activity associated with this threat. These alerts, however, can be triggered by unrelated threat activity.
Microsoft Security Copilot is embedded in Microsoft Defender and provides security teams with AI-powered capabilities to summarize incidents, analyze files and scripts, summarize identities, use guided responses, and generate device summaries, hunting queries, and incident reports.
Customers can also deploy AI agents, including the following Microsoft Security Copilot agents, to perform security tasks efficiently:
Security Copilot is also available as a standalone experience where customers can perform specific security-related tasks, such as incident investigation, user analysis, and vulnerability impact assessment. In addition, Security Copilot offers developer scenarios that allow customers to build, test, publish, and integrate AI agents and plugins to meet unique security needs.
Microsoft Defender XDR customers can use the following Threat Analytics reports in the Defender portal (requires license for at least one Defender XDR product) to get the most up-to-date information about the threat actor, malicious activity, and techniques discussed in this blog. These reports provide intelligence, protection information, and recommended actions to prevent, mitigate, or respond to associated threats found in customer environments.
Microsoft Defender XDR threat analytics
Microsoft Security Copilot customers can also use the Microsoft Security Copilot integration in Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence, either in the Security Copilot standalone portal or in the embedded experience in the Microsoft Defender portal to get more information about this threat actor.
For the latest security research from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community, check out the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Blog.
To get notified about new publications and to join discussions on social media, follow us on LinkedIn, X (formerly Twitter), and Bluesky.
To hear stories and insights from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community about the ever-evolving threat landscape, listen to the Microsoft Threat Intelligence podcast.
The post Email threat landscape: Q1 2026 trends and insights appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.
The malicious emails claim to contain a conduct report and lure victims to a Microsoft phishing website that leverages AitM.
The post Microsoft Warns of Sophisticated Phishing Campaign Targeting US Organizations appeared first on SecurityWeek.
Phishing campaigns continue to improve sophistication and refinement in blending social engineering, delivery and hosting infrastructure, and authentication abuse to remain effective against evolving security controls. A large-scale credential theft campaign observed by Microsoft Defender Research exemplifies this trend, using code of conduct-themed lures, a multi-step attack chain, and legitimate email services to distribute fully authenticated messages from attacker-controlled domains.
The campaign targeted tens of thousands of users, primarily in the United States, and directed them through several stages of CAPTCHA and intermediate staging pages designed to reinforce legitimacy while filtering out automated defenses. The lures in this campaign used polished, enterprise-style HTML templates with structured layouts and preemptive authenticity statements, making them appear more credible than typical phishing emails and increasing their plausibility as legitimate internal communications. Because the messages contained concerning accusations and repeated time-bound action prompts, the campaign created a sense of urgency and pressure to act.
The attack chain ultimately led to a legitimate sign-in experience that was part of an adversary‑in‑the‑middle (AiTM) phishing flow, which allowed the attackers to proxy the authentication session and capture authentication tokens that could provide immediate account access. Unlike traditional credential harvesting, AiTM attacks intercept authentication traffic in real time, bypassing non-phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA).
In this blog, we’re sharing our analysis of this campaign’s lures, infrastructure, and techniques. Organizations can defend against financial fraud initiated through phishing emails by educating users about phishing lures, investing in advanced anti-phishing solutions like Microsoft Defender for Office 365 and configuring essential email security settings, and encouraging users to employ web browsers that support SmartScreen. Organizations can also enable network protection, which lets Windows use SmartScreen as a host-based web proxy.
Between April 14 and 16, 2026, the Microsoft Defender Research team observed a series of sophisticated phishing campaigns targeting more than 35,000 users across over 13,000 organizations in 26 countries, with majority of targets located in the United States (92%). The campaign did not focus on a single vertical but instead impacted a broad range of industries, most notably Healthcare & life sciences (19%), Financial services (18%), Professional services (11%), and Technology & software (11%). Messages were distributed in multiple distinct waves between 06:51 UTC on April 14 and 03:54 UTC on April 16.
Emails in this campaign posed as internal compliance or regulatory communications, using display names such as “Internal Regulatory COC”, “Workforce Communications”, and “Team Conduct Report”. Subject lines included “Internal case log issued under conduct policy” and “Reminder: employer opened a non-compliance case log”.
Message bodies claimed that a “code of conduct review” had been initiated, referenced organization-specific names embedded within the text, and instructed recipients to “open the personalized attachment” to review case materials. At the top of each message, a notice stated that the message had been “issued through an authorized internal channel” and that links and attachments had been “reviewed and approved for secure access”, reinforcing the email’s purported legitimacy. To further support the confidentiality of the supposed review, the end of each message contained a green banner stating that the contents had been encrypted using Paubox, a legitimate service associated with HIPAA-compliant communications.
Analysis of the sending infrastructure indicated that the campaign emails were sent using a legitime email delivery service, likely originating from a cloud-hosted Windows virtual machine. The messages were sent from multiple sender addresses using domains that are likely attacker-controlled.
Each campaign email included a PDF attachment with filenames such as Awareness Case Log File – Tuesday 14th, April 2026.pdf and Disciplinary Action – Employee Device Handling Case.pdf. The attachment provided additional context about the supposed conduct review, including a summary of the review process and instructions for accessing supporting documentation. Recipients were directed to click a “Review Case Materials” link within the PDF, which initiated the credential harvesting flow.
When clicked, users were initially directed to one of two attacker-controlled domains (for example, acceptable-use-policy-calendly[.]de or compliance-protectionoutlook[.]de). These landing pages displayed a Cloudflare CAPTCHA, presented as a mechanism to validate that the user was coming “from a valid session”. This CAPTCHA likely served as a gating mechanism to impede automated analysis and sandbox detonation.
After completing the CAPTCHA, users were redirected to an intermediate site designed to prepare them for the final stage of the attack. This page informed users that the requested documentation was encrypted and required account authentication. While this stage of the attack has several hallmarks of device code phishing, we were only able to confirm the AITM portion of the attack chain.
After clicking the provided “Review & Sign” button, users were presented with a sign-in prompt requesting their email address.
After submission, users were required to complete a second CAPTCHA involving image selection.
Once these steps were completed, users were shown a message indicating that verification was successful and that their “case” was being prepared.
Following these steps, users were redirected to a third site hosting the final stage of the attack. Analysis of the underlying code indicates that the final destination varied depending on whether the user accessed the workflow from a mobile device or a desktop system.
On the final page, users were informed that all materials related to their code of conduct review had been “securely logged”, “time-stamped”, and “maintained within the organization’s centralized compliance tracking system”. They were then prompted to schedule a time to discuss the case, which required signing in to their account.
Selecting the “Sign in with Microsoft” option redirected users to a Microsoft authentication page, initiating an AiTM session hijacking flow designed to capture authentication tokens and compromise user accounts.
Microsoft recommends the following mitigations to reduce the impact of this threat. Check the recommendations card for the deployment status of monitored mitigations.
Microsoft Defender customers can refer to the list of applicable detections below. Microsoft Defender coordinates detection, prevention, investigation, and response across endpoints, identities, email, apps to provide integrated protection against attacks like the threat discussed in this blog.
| Tactic | Observed activity | Microsoft Defender coverage |
| Initial access | Phishing emails | Microsoft Defender for Office 365 – A potentially malicious URL click was detected – A user clicked through to a potentially malicious URL – Suspicious email sending patterns detected – Email messages containing malicious URL removed after delivery – Email messages removed after delivery – Email reported by user as malware or phish |
| Persistence | Threat actors sign in with stolen valid entities | Microsoft Entra ID Protection – Anomalous Token – Unfamiliar sign-in properties – Unfamiliar sign-in properties for session cookies Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps – Impossible travel activity |
Microsoft Security Copilot is embedded in Microsoft Defender and provides security teams with AI-powered capabilities to summarize incidents, analyze files and scripts, summarize identities, use guided responses, and generate device summaries, hunting queries, and incident reports.
Customers can also deploy AI agents, including the following Microsoft Security Copilot agents, to perform security tasks efficiently:
Security Copilot is also available as a standalone experience where customers can perform specific security-related tasks, such as incident investigation, user analysis, and vulnerability impact assessment. In addition, Security Copilot offers developer scenarios that allow customers to build, test, publish, and integrate AI agents and plugins to meet unique security needs.
Microsoft Defender XDR customers can use the following threat analytics reports in the Defender portal (requires license for at least one Defender XDR product) to get the most up-to-date information about the threat actor, malicious activity, and techniques discussed in this blog. These reports provide the intelligence, protection information, and recommended actions to prevent, mitigate, or respond to associated threats found in customer environments.
Microsoft Security Copilot customers can also use the Microsoft Security Copilot integration in Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence, either in the Security Copilot standalone portal or in the embedded experience in the Microsoft Defender portal to get more information about this threat actor.
Microsoft Defender XDR customers can run the following advanced hunting queries to find related activity in their networks:
Campaign emails by sender address
The following query identifies emails associated with this campaign using a message’s sending email address.
EmailEvents
| where SenderMailFromAddress in (" cocpostmaster@cocinternal.com "," nationaladmin@gadellinet.com ","
nationalintegrity@harteprn.com”,” m365premiumcommunications@cocinternal.com”,” documentviewer@na.businesshellosign.de”)
| Indicator | Type | Description | First seen | Last seen |
| compliance-protectionoutlook[.]de | Domain | Domain hosting malicious campaign content | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
| acceptable-use-policy-calendly[.]de | Domain | Domain hosting malicious campaign content | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
| cocinternal[.]com | Domain | Domain hosting sender email address | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
| Gadellinet[.]com | Domain | Domain hosting sender email address | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
| Harteprn[.]com | Domain | Domain hosting sender email address | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
| Cocpostmaster[@]cocinternal.com | Email address | Email address used to send campaign emails | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
| Nationaladmin[@]gadellinet.com | Email address | Email address used to send campaign emails | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
| Nationalintegrity[@]harteprn.com | Email address | Email address used to send campaign emails | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
| M365premiumcommunications[@]cocinternal.com | Email address | Email address used to send campaign emails | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
| Documentviewer[@]na.businesshellosign.de | Email address | Email address used to send campaign emails | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
| Awareness Case Log File – Monday 13th, April 2026.pdf | Filename | Name of PDF attachment containing phishing link | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-14 |
| Awareness Case Log File – Tuesday 14th, April 2026.pdf | Filename | Name of PDF attachment containing phishing link | 2026-04-15 | 2026-04-15 |
| Awareness Case Log File – Wednesday 15th, April 2026.pdf | Filename | Name of PDF attachment containing phishing link | 2026-04-16 | 2026-04-16 |
| 5DB1ECBBB2C90C51D81BDA138D4300B90EA5EB2885CCE1BD921D692214AECBC6 | SHA-256 | File hash of campaign PDF attachment | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
| B5A3346082AC566B4494E6175F1CD9873B64ABE6C902DB49BD4E8088876C9EAD | SHA-256 | File hash of campaign PDF attachment | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
| 11420D6D693BF8B19195E6B98FEDD03B9BCBC770B6988BC64CB788BFABE1A49D | SHA-256 | File hash of campaign PDF attachment | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-16 |
For the latest security research from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community, check out the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Blog.
To get notified about new publications and to join discussions on social media, follow us on LinkedIn, X (formerly Twitter), and Bluesky.
To hear stories and insights from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community about the ever-evolving threat landscape, listen to the Microsoft Threat Intelligence podcast.
The post Breaking the code: Multi-stage ‘code of conduct’ phishing campaign leads to AiTM token compromise appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.
Still under development, Bluekit provides users with automated domain registration and an AI Assistant.
The post New Bluekit Phishing Kit Features AI Assistant appeared first on SecurityWeek.
During the first quarter of 2026 (January-March), Microsoft Threat Intelligence detected approximately 8.3 billion email-based phishing threats, with monthly volumes declining slightly from 2.9 billion in January to 2.6 billion in March. By the end of the quarter, QR code phishing emerged as the fastest-growing attack vector, more than doubling over the period, while CAPTCHA-gated phishing evolved rapidly across payload types. Overall, 78% of email threats were link-based, while malicious payloads accounted for 19% of attacks in January—boosted by large HTML and ZIP campaigns—before settling at 13% in both February and March. Credential phishing remained the dominant objective behind malicious payloads throughout the quarter. This shift toward link-based delivery, combined with the payload trends, suggests that threat actors increasingly preferred hosted credential phishing infrastructure over locally-rendered payloads as the quarter progressed.
These trends reflect how threat actors continue to iterate on both scale and delivery techniques to improve effectiveness. At the same time, disruption efforts can meaningfully impact this activity. Following Microsoft’s Digital Crime Unit-led action against the Tycoon2FA phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platform in early March, associated email volume declined 15% over the remainder of the month, alongside a significant reduction in access to active phishing pages, limiting the platform’s immediate effectiveness. While Tycoon2FA has since adapted by shifting hosting providers and domain registration patterns, these changes reflect partial recovery rather than full restoration of previous capabilities. Alongside these shifts, business email compromise (BEC) activity remained prevalent, totaling approximately 10.7 million attacks in the quarter, largely driven by low-effort, generic outreach messages. At the same time, Microsoft Defender Research observed early indications of emerging techniques such as device code phishing—sometimes enabled by offerings like EvilTokens—which, while not yet at the scale of the trends discussed below, reflect continued innovation in credential theft methods.
This blog provides a view of email threat activity across the first quarter of 2026, highlighting key trends in phishing techniques, payload delivery, and threat actor behavior observed by Microsoft Threat Intelligence. We examine shifts in QR code phishing, CAPTCHA evasion tactics, malicious payloads, and BEC activity, analyze how disruption efforts and infrastructure changes influenced threat actor operations, and provide recommendations and Microsoft Defender detections to help mitigate these threats. By bringing these trends together, this blog can help defenders understand how email-based attacks are evolving and where to focus detection, mitigation, and user protection strategies.
Since its emergence in August 2023, Tycoon2FA has rapidly become one of the most widespread PhaaS platforms, leveraging adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) techniques to attempt to defeat non-phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA) defenses. The group behind the PhaaS platform (tracked by Microsoft Threat Intelligence as Storm-1747) leases malicious infrastructure and sells phishing kits that impersonate various enterprise application sign-in pages and incorporate evasion tactics, such as fake CAPTCHA pages.
The quarter began with Tycoon2FA in a period of reduced activity. January volumes represented a 54% decline from December 2025, marking the second consecutive month of sharp decreases. While post-holiday seasonal effects may have contributed to this decrease in volume, some of the reduction might also have been the result of Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit disruption of RedVDS, a service used by many Tycoon2FA customers to distribute malicious email campaigns.
After surging 44% in February, phishing attacks pointing to Tycoon2FA fell 15% in March driven largely by the effects of a coordinated disruption operation. In early March 2026, Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit, in coordination with Europol and industry partners, took action to disrupt Tycoon2FA’s infrastructure and operations, significantly impairing the platform’s hosting capabilities. While Tycoon2FA-linked messages continued to circulate after the disruption, almost one-third of March’s total volume was concentrated in a three-day period early in the month; daily volumes for the remainder of March were notably lower than historical averages, and targets’ ability to reach active phishing pages was substantially reduced.
Tycoon2FA’s infrastructure composition evolved multiple times during the first three months of 2026. In January, Tycoon2FA domains started shifting toward newer generic top-level domains (TLDs) such as .DIGITAL, .BUSINESS, .CONTRACTORS, .CEO, and .COMPANY, moving away from previous commonly used TLDs or second-level domains like .SA.COM, .RU, and .ES. This trend became even more well-established in February. Following the March disruption, however, Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed a notable increase in Tycoon2FA domains with .RU registrations, with more than 41% of all Tycoon2FA domains using a .RU TLD since the last week of March.
Additionally, toward the end of March, we saw Tycoon2FA moving away from Cloudflare as a hosting service and now hosts most of its domains across a variety of alternative platforms, suggesting the group is attempting to find replacement services that offer comparable anti-analysis protections.
In recent years, QR codes have rapidly emerged as a preferred tool among phishing threat actors seeking to bypass traditional email defenses. By embedding malicious URLs within image-based QR codes in the body of an email or within the contents of an attachment, threat actors attempt to exploit the limitations of text-based scanning engines and redirect victims to phishing sites on unmanaged mobile devices.
The most significant shift in Q1 2026 was the rapid escalation of QR code phishing, with attack volumes increasing from 7.6 million in January to 18.7 million in March, a 146% increase over the quarter. After an initial 35% decline in January (continuing a late-2025 downtrend), volumes reversed course dramatically, growing 59% in February and another 55% in March. By the end of the quarter, QR code phishing had reached its highest monthly volume in at least a year.
PDF attachments were the dominant delivery method throughout the quarter, growing from 65% of QR code attacks in January to 70% in March. While the overall volume of DOC/DOCX payloads containing malicious QR codes steadily increased each month, their share of overall delivery payloads decreased from 31% in January to 24% in March. A notable late-quarter development was the emergence of QR codes embedded directly in email bodies, which surged 336% in March. While still a small share of total volume (5%), this approach eliminates the need for an attachment altogether and highlights a shift in threat actor delivery methods that defenders should continue to monitor.
Threat actors use CAPTCHA pages to delay detection and increase user interaction. These pages function as a visual decoy, giving the appearance of a legitimate security check while concealing a transition to malicious content. By forcing users to engage with the CAPTCHA before accessing the payload, threat actors reduce the likelihood of automated scanning tools identifying the threat and increase the chances of successful credential harvesting or malware delivery. Additionally, fake CAPTCHAs are used in ClickFix attacks to trick users into copying and executing malicious commands under the guise of human verification, allowing malware to bypass conventional security controls.
After declining in both January (-45%) and February (-8%), CAPTCHA-gated phishing volumes exploded in March, more than doubling (+125%) to 11.9 million attacks, the highest volume observed over the last year.
The most notable aspect of Q1 CAPTCHA trends was the rapid rotation of delivery methods, as threat actors appeared to actively experiment with which payload formats most effectively evade email defenses:
Another notable shift in CAPTCHA-gated phishing attacks was the erosion of Tycoon2FA’s impact on the landscape. At the end of 2025, more than three-quarters of CAPTCHA-gated phishing sites were hosted on Tycoon2FA infrastructure. This share decreased significantly over the course of the first three months of 2026, falling to just 41% in March. This broadening of CAPTCHA-gated phishing sites being used by an increasing number of threat actors and phishing kits, combined with the overall surge in volume, indicates that this technique is becoming a more entrenched component of the phishing playbook rather than a specialty of a small number of tools.
Between February 23 and February 25, 2026, a large, sustained campaign sent more than 1.2 million messages to users at more than 53,000 organizations in 23 countries. Messages in the campaign included a number of different themes, including an important 401K update, a credit hold warning, a question about a received payment, a payment request for a past due invoice, and a voice message notification.
Many of the messages contained a fake confidentiality disclaimer to enhance the credibility of the messages and provide a proactive excuse about why a recipient may have mistakenly received an email that may not be applicable to them.
Attached to each message was an SVG file that was named to appropriately match the theme of the email. All the file names included a Base64-encoded version of the recipient’s email address. Example of file names used in the campaign include the following:
If an attached SVG file was opened, the user’s browser would open locally and fetch content from one of the three following hostnames:
Initially, the user would be shown a “security check” CAPTCHA. Once the CAPTCHA had been successfully completed, the user would then be shown a fake sign-in page used to compromise their account credentials.
Credential phishing tightened its grip on the malicious payload landscape across Q1, growing from 89% of all payload-based attacks in January to 95% in February before settling at 94% in March. These credential phishing payloads either linked users to phishing pages or locally loaded spoofed sign-in screens on a user’s device. Traditional malware delivery continued its long-term decline, representing just 5–6% of payloads by the end of the quarter.
The most striking payload trend was the volatility across file types, driven by large campaigns that created dramatic week-to-week swings:
On March 17, 2026, Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed a massive phishing campaign that drove a significant surge in malicious HTML attachments during the month. The campaign involved more than 1.5 million confirmed malicious messages sent to over 179,000 organizations across 43 countries, accounting for approximately 7% of all malicious HTML attachments observed in March.
All messages in this campaign were likely sent using the same tool or service, which exhibited several distinct and highly consistent characteristics. Most notably, sender addresses across the campaign featured excessively long, keyword‑stuffed usernames that embedded URLs, tracking identifiers, and service references. These usernames were crafted to resemble legitimate transactional, billing, or document‑related notification senders. Examples of observed sender usernames include:
The emails themselves contained little to no message body content. While subject lines varied, they consistently impersonated routine business and workflow notifications, including payment and remittance alerts (for example, Automated Clearing House (ACH), Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT), wire), invoice or aging statements, and e‑signature or document delivery requests. These subjects relied on urgency, approval language, and transactional framing to prompt recipients to review, sign, or access an attached document.
Each message included an HTML attachment with a file name aligned to the email’s theme. When opened, the HTML file launched locally on the recipient’s device and immediately redirected the user to an initial external staging page. This page performed basic screening and then redirected the user to a secondary landing page hosting the phishing content. On the final landing page, users were presented with a CAPTCHA challenge before being directed to a fraudulent sign‑in page designed to harvest account credentials.
Interestingly, although messages in this campaign shared common tooling, structure, and delivery characteristics, the infrastructure hosting the final phishing payload was linked to multiple different PhaaS providers. Most observed phishing endpoints were associated with Tycoon2FA, while additional activity was linked to Kratos (formerly Sneaky2FA) and EvilTokens infrastructure.
Microsoft defines business email compromise (BEC) as a text-based attack targeting enterprise users that impersonates a trusted entity for the purpose of persuading a recipient into initiating a fraudulent financial transaction or sending the threat actor sensitive documents. These attacks fluctuated across Q1, totaling approximately 10.7 million attacks: rising 24% in January, dipping 8% in February, then surging 26% in March.
The composition of BEC attacks remained consistent throughout Q1. Generic outreach messages (like “Are you at your desk?”) accounted for 82–84% of initial contact emails each month, while explicit requests for specific financial transactions or documents represented just 9–10%. This pattern underscores that BEC operators overwhelmingly favor establishing a conversational rapport before making fraudulent requests, rather than leading with direct financial asks.
Within the smaller subset of explicit financial requests, two sub-categories showed notable movement. Payroll update requests grew 15% in February, reaching their highest volume in eight months, potentially reflecting tax season-related social engineering. Gift card requests fell 37% in February to their lowest level since July before rebounding sharply in March (+108%), though they still represented less than 3% of overall BEC messages. These fluctuations suggest that BEC operators adjust their specific financial pretexts seasonally while maintaining a consistent overall approach.
Microsoft recommends the following mitigations to reduce the impact of this threat.
Microsoft Defender customers can refer to the list of applicable detections below. Microsoft Defender coordinates detection, prevention, investigation, and response across endpoints, identities, email, apps to provide integrated protection against attacks like the threat discussed in this blog.
The following alert might indicate threat activity associated with this threat. The alert, however, can be triggered by unrelated threat activity.
The following alerts might indicate threat activity associated with this threat. These alerts, however, can be triggered by unrelated threat activity.
Microsoft Security Copilot is embedded in Microsoft Defender and provides security teams with AI-powered capabilities to summarize incidents, analyze files and scripts, summarize identities, use guided responses, and generate device summaries, hunting queries, and incident reports.
Customers can also deploy AI agents, including the following Microsoft Security Copilot agents, to perform security tasks efficiently:
Security Copilot is also available as a standalone experience where customers can perform specific security-related tasks, such as incident investigation, user analysis, and vulnerability impact assessment. In addition, Security Copilot offers developer scenarios that allow customers to build, test, publish, and integrate AI agents and plugins to meet unique security needs.
Microsoft Defender XDR customers can use the following Threat Analytics reports in the Defender portal (requires license for at least one Defender XDR product) to get the most up-to-date information about the threat actor, malicious activity, and techniques discussed in this blog. These reports provide intelligence, protection information, and recommended actions to prevent, mitigate, or respond to associated threats found in customer environments.
Microsoft Defender XDR threat analytics
Microsoft Security Copilot customers can also use the Microsoft Security Copilot integration in Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence, either in the Security Copilot standalone portal or in the embedded experience in the Microsoft Defender portal to get more information about this threat actor.
For the latest security research from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community, check out the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Blog.
To get notified about new publications and to join discussions on social media, follow us on LinkedIn, X (formerly Twitter), and Bluesky.
To hear stories and insights from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community about the ever-evolving threat landscape, listen to the Microsoft Threat Intelligence podcast.
The post Email threat landscape: Q1 2026 trends and insights appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.
Legitimate-looking emails coming from Robinhood systems lured recipients to phishing websites.
The post Robinhood Vulnerability Exploited for Phishing Attacks appeared first on SecurityWeek.
New analysis from Abnormal AI reveals how attackers have abandoned technical exploits to weaponize routine workflows and internal trust.
The post The Behavioral Shift: Why Trusted Relationships Are the Newest Attack Surface appeared first on SecurityWeek.
A core leader of the hacker subset of The Com responsible for a series of high-profile phishing attacks and cryptocurrency thefts from September 2021 to April 2023 pleaded guilty to federal charges, the Justice Department said Friday.
Tyler Robert Buchanan of Dundee, Scotland, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and aggravated identity theft. The 24-year-old was arrested by Spanish police in Palma in 2024 as he attempted to board a charter flight to Naples, Italy.
Buchanan has been in federal custody since April 2025 and faces up to 22 years in federal prison at his sentencing, which is scheduled for August 21.
The British national and his co-conspirators, including Noah Michael Urban, who was sentenced to a 10-year federal prison sentence last year, harvested thousands of credentials via phishing and stole more than $8 million in cryptocurrency from U.S. residents via SIM-swapping attacks.
Victims included high net worth individuals and businesses in the entertainment, telecom, technology, business process outsourcing, IT, cloud and virtual currency sectors, officials said.
Buchanan and his co-conspirators were part of an aggressive subset of The Com coined Scattered Spider. While The Com and its offshoots don’t operate with formal leaders in the traditional sense, Buchanan played a crucial role in the operation, according to Allison Nixon, chief research officer at Unit 221B.
“[Buchanan] was the glue that held this gang together. His success at wiping out victims’ savings made him a target for both law enforcement and rival Com gangs,” Nixon told CyberScoop.
“[Buchanan] is part of an older generation that came from certain toxic gaming servers before the pandemic. People from this generation learned hacking in order to steal vanity usernames and bully kids before using it to steal peoples’ savings,” she added.
Federal authorities filed charges against five individuals with links to the Scattered Spider cybercrime outfit in 2024. Buchanan and Urban’s alleged co-conspirators — Ahmed Hossam Eldin Elbadawy, Evans Onyeaka Osiebo and Joel Martin Evans — still face charges in the case, officials said.
Nixon lauded law enforcement for acting decisively to arrest Buchanan during a brief window of opportunity while he was traveling internationally.
“Com members are obsessed with private jets and foreign vacations, and the feds took that dream away with one arrest,” she said.
The tactic, which U.S. officials also use against Russian cybercriminals, works because most countries are willing to support in the arrest of foreign criminals, thereby keeping them out of their respective jurisdictions, Nixon said.
“As a foreigner, he was caught in a weaker legal position than if he was arrested at home, and cases following this tactic tend to have very long sentences,” she added. “The takeaway for Com members watching this case is that criminal foreigners associated with violence are the lowest class in every country. And that’s what Com members are when they travel.”
The Justice Department said Buchanan and his co-conspirators defrauded at least a dozen companies and their employees throughout the United States. A digital device police found at his residence in April 2023 contained personal data on numerous individuals and victim companies, according to his plea agreement.
It’s unclear what transpired between that search in April 2023 in Scotland and his June 2024 arrest at a resort city on the Spanish island of Mallorca. Moreover, his plea agreement doesn’t include the entirety of his alleged crimes.
Buchanan attracted a lot of attention and successfully coordinated many attacks before a rival Com gang allegedly broke into his home and used a blowtorch on him to extract crypto keys in his possession, according to Nixon.
Following his arrest, Spanish police said Buchanan had gained control of bitcoin worth more than $27 million at that time.
While early leaders of Scattered Spider have been arrested or sentenced for their crimes, others have filled those roles with even more exceptional impact.
The Com has grown to thousands of members, typically between 11 and 25 years old, splintered into three primary subsets the FBI describes as Hacker Com, In Real Life Com and Extortion Com.
Criminal acts committed by these multiple, interconnected networks include swatting, extortion and sextortion of minors, production and distribution of child sexual abuse material, violent crime and various other cybercrimes.
You can read the indictment against Buchanan and some of his co-conspirators below.
The post Scottish man pleads guilty to attack spree that created Scattered Spider’s notoriety appeared first on CyberScoop.
Threat actors are reusing Tycoon 2FA tools across other phishing kits following the platform’s disruption.
The post Tycoon 2FA Loses Phishing Kit Crown Amid Surge in Attacks appeared first on SecurityWeek.
Executive summary
Microsoft Threat Intelligence uncovered a macOS‑focused cyber campaign by the North Korean threat actor Sapphire Sleet that relies on social engineering rather than software vulnerabilities. By impersonating a legitimate software update, threat actors tricked users into manually running malicious files, allowing them to steal passwords, cryptocurrency assets, and personal data while avoiding built‑in macOS security checks. This activity highlights how convincing user prompts and trusted system tools can be abused, and why awareness and layered security defenses remain critical.
Microsoft Threat Intelligence identified a campaign by North Korean state actor Sapphire Sleet demonstrating new combinations of macOS-focused execution patterns and techniques, enabling the threat actor to compromise systems through social engineering rather than software exploitation. In this campaign, Sapphire Sleet takes advantage of user‑initiated execution to establish persistence, harvest credentials, and exfiltrate sensitive data while operating outside traditional macOS security enforcement boundaries. While the techniques themselves are not novel, this analysis highlights execution patterns and combinations that Microsoft has not previously observed for this threat actor, including how Sapphire Sleet orchestrates these techniques together and uses AppleScript as a dedicated, late‑stage credential‑harvesting component integrated with decoy update workflows.
After discovering the threat, Microsoft shared details of this activity with Apple as part of our responsible disclosure process. Apple has since implemented updates to help detect and block infrastructure and malware associated with this campaign. We thank the Apple security team for their collaboration in addressing this activity and encourage macOS users to keep their devices up to date with the latest security protections.
This activity demonstrates how threat actors continue to rely on user interaction and trusted system utilities to bypass macOS platform security protections, rather than exploiting traditional software vulnerabilities. By persuading users to manually execute AppleScript or Terminal‑based commands, Sapphire Sleet shifts execution into a user‑initiated context, allowing the activity to proceed outside of macOS protections such as Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC), Gatekeeper, quarantine enforcement, and notarization checks. Sapphire Sleet achieves a highly reliable infection chain that lowers operational friction and increases the likelihood of successful compromise—posing an elevated risk to organizations and individuals involved in cryptocurrency, digital assets, finance, and similar high‑value targets that Sapphire Sleet is known to target.
In this blog, we examine the macOS‑specific attack chain observed in recent Sapphire Sleet intrusions, from initial access using malicious .scpt files through multi-stage payload delivery, credential harvesting using fake system dialogs, manipulation of the macOS TCC database, persistence using launch daemons, and large-scale data exfiltration. We also provide actionable guidance, Microsoft Defender detections, hunting queries, and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help defenders identify similar threats and strengthen macOS security posture.
Sapphire Sleet is a North Korean state actor active since at least March 2020 that primarily targets the finance sector, including cryptocurrency, venture capital, and blockchain organizations. The primary motivation of this actor is to steal cryptocurrency wallets to generate revenue, and target technology or intellectual property related to cryptocurrency trading and blockchain platforms.
Recent campaigns demonstrate expanded execution mechanisms across operating systems like macOS, enabling Sapphire Sleet to target a broader set of users through parallel social engineering workflows.
Sapphire Sleet operates a well‑documented social engineering playbook in which the threat actor creates fake recruiter profiles on social media and professional networking platforms, engages targets in conversations about job opportunities, schedules a technical interview, and directs targets to install malicious software, which is typically disguised as a video conferencing tool or software developer kit (SDK) update.
In this observed activity, the target was directed to download a file called Zoom SDK Update.scpt—a compiled AppleScript that opens in macOS Script Editor by default. Script Editor is a trusted first-party Apple application capable of executing arbitrary shell commands using the do shell script AppleScript command.
Lure file and Script Editor execution
The malicious Zoom SDK Update.scpt file is crafted to appear as a legitimate Zoom SDK update when opened in the macOS Script Editor app, beginning with a large decoy comment block that mimics benign upgrade instructions and gives the impression of a routine software update. To conceal its true behavior, the script inserts thousands of blank lines immediately after this visible content, pushing the malicious logic far below the scrollable view of the Script Editor window and reducing the likelihood that a user will notice it.
Hidden beneath this decoy, the script first launches a harmless looking command that invokes the legitimate macOS softwareupdate binary with an invalid parameter, an action that performs no real update but launches a trusted Apple‑signed process to reinforce the appearance of legitimacy. Following this, the script executes its malicious payload by using curl to retrieve threat actor‑controlled content and immediately passes the returned data to osascript for execution using the run script result instruction. Because the content fetched by curl is itself a new AppleScript, it is launched directly within the Script Editor context, initiating a payload delivery in which additional stages are dynamically downloaded and executed.
Cascading curl-to-osascript execution
When the user opens the Zoom SDK Update.scpt file, macOS launches the file in Script Editor, allowing Sapphire Sleet to transition from a single lure file to a multi-stage, dynamically fetched payload chain. From this single process, the entire attack unfolds through a cascading chain of curl commands, each fetching and executing progressively more complex AppleScript payloads. Each stage uses a distinct user-agent string as a campaign tracking identifier.
The main payload fetched by the mac-cur1 user agent is the attack orchestrator. Once executed within the Script Editor, it performs immediate reconnaissance, then kicks off parallel operations using additional curl commands with different user-agent strings.
Note the URL path difference: mac-cur1 through mac-cur3 fetch from /version/ (AppleScript payloads piped directly to osascript for execution), while mac-cur4 and mac-cur5 fetch from /status/ (ZIP archives containing compiled macOS .app bundles).
The following table summarizes the curl chain used in this campaign.
| User agent | URL path | Purpose |
| mac-cur1 | /fix/mac/update/version/ | Main orchestrator (piped to osascript) beacon. Downloads com.apple.cli host monitoringcomponent and services backdoor |
| mac-cur2 | /fix/mac/update/version/ | Invokes curl with mac-cur4 which downloads credential harvester systemupdate.app |
| mac-cur3 | /fix/mac/update/version/ | TCC bypass + data collection + exfiltration (wallets, browser, keychains, history, Apple Notes, Telegram) |
| mac-cur4 | /fix/mac/update/status/ | Downloads credential harvester systemupdate.app (ZIP) |
| mac-cur5 | /fix/mac/update/status/ | Downloads decoy completion prompt softwareupdate.app (ZIP) |
After execution, the malware next identifies and registers the compromised device with Sapphire Sleet infrastructure. The malware starts by collecting basic system details such as the current user, host name, system time, and operating system install date. This information is used to uniquely identify the compromised device and track subsequent activity.
The malware then registers the compromised system with its command‑and‑control (C2) infrastructure. The mid value represents the device’s universally unique identifier (UUID), the did serves as a campaign‑level tracking identifier, and the user field combines the system host name with the device serial number to uniquely label the targeted user.
Host monitoring component: com.apple.cli
The first binary deployed is a host monitoring component called com.apple.cli—a ~5 MB Mach-O binary disguised with an Apple-style naming convention.
The mac-cur1 payload spawns an osascript that downloads and launches com.apple.cli:
The host monitoring component repeatedly executes a series of system commands to collect environment and runtime information, including the macOS version (sw_vers), the current system time (date -u), and the underlying hardware model (sysctl hw.model). It then runs ps aux in a tight loop to capture a full, real‑time list of running processes.
During execution, com.apple.cli performs host reconnaissance while maintaining repeated outbound connectivity to the threat actor‑controlled C2 endpoint 83.136.208[.]246:6783. The observed sequencing of reconnaissance activity and network communication is consistent with staging for later operational activity, including privilege escalation, and exfiltration.
In parallel with deploying com.apple.cli, the mac-cur1 orchestrator also deploys a second component, the services backdoor, as part of the same execution flow; its role in persistence and follow‑on activity is described later in this blog.
Credential harvester: systemupdate.app
After performing reconnaissance, the mac-cur1 orchestrator begins parallel operations. During the mac‑cur2 stage of execution (independent from the mac-cur1 stage), Sapphire Sleet delivers an AppleScript payload that is executed through osascript. This stage is responsible for deploying the credential harvesting component of the attack.
Before proceeding, the script checks for the presence of a file named .zoom.log on the system. This file acts as an infection marker, allowing Sapphire Sleet to determine whether the device has already been compromised. If the marker exists, deployment is skipped to avoid redundant execution across sessions.
If the infection marker is not found, the script downloads a compressed archive through the mac-cur4 user agent that contains a malicious macOS application named (systemupdate.app), which masquerades as the legitimate system update utility by the same name. The archive is extracted to a temporary location, and the application is launched immediately.
When systemupdate.app launches, the user is presented with a native macOS password dialog that is visually indistinguishable from a legitimate system prompt. The dialog claims that the user’s password is required to complete a software update, prompting the user to enter their credentials.
After the user enters their password, the malware performs two sequential actions to ensure the credential is usable and immediately captured. First, the binary validates the entered password against the local macOS authentication database using directory services, confirming that the credential is correct and not mistyped. Once validation succeeds, the verified password is immediately exfiltrated to threat actor‑controlled infrastructure using the Telegram Bot API, delivering the stolen credential directly to Sapphire Sleet.
Decoy completion prompt: softwareupdate.app
After credential harvesting is completed using systemupdate.app, Sapphire Sleet deploys a second malicious application named softwareupdate.app, whose sole purpose is to reinforce the illusion of a legitimate update workflow. This application is delivered during a later stage of the attack using the mac‑cur5 user‑agent. Unlike systemupdate.app, softwareupdate.app does not attempt to collect credentials. Instead, it displays a convincing “system update complete” dialog to the user, signaling that the supposed Zoom SDK update has finished successfully. This final step closes the social engineering loop: the user initiated a Zoom‑themed update, was prompted to enter their password, and is now reassured that the process completed as expected, reducing the likelihood of suspicion or further investigation.
Primary backdoor and persistence installer: services binary
The services backdoor is a key operational component in this attack, acting as the primary backdoor and persistence installer. It provides an interactive command execution channel, establishes persistence using a launch daemon, and deploys two additional backdoors. The services backdoor is deployed through a dedicated AppleScript executed as part of the initial mac‑cur1 payload that also deployed com.apple.cli, although the additional backdoors deployed by services are executed at a later stage.
During deployment, the services backdoor binary is first downloaded using a hidden file name (.services) to reduce visibility, then copied to its final location before the temporary file is removed. As part of installation, the malware creates a file named auth.db under ~/Library/Application Support/Authorization/, which stores the path to the deployed services backdoor and serves as a persistent installation marker. Any execution or runtime errors encountered during this process are written to /tmp/lg4err, leaving behind an additional forensic artifact that can aid post‑compromise investigation.
Unlike com.apple.cli, the services backdoor uses interactive zsh shells (/bin/zsh -i) to execute privileged operations. The -i flag creates an interactive terminal context, which is required for sudo commands that expect interactive input.
Additional backdoors: icloudz and com.google.chromes.updaters
Of the additional backdoors deployed by services, the icloudz backdoor is a renamed copy of the previously deployed services backdoor and shares the same SHA‑256 hash, indicating identical underlying code. Despite this, it is executed using a different and more evasive technique. Although icloudz shares the same binary as .services, it operates as a reflective code loader—it uses the macOS NSCreateObjectFileImageFromMemory API to load additional payloads received from its C2 infrastructure directly into memory, rather than writing them to disk and executing them conventionally.
The icloudz backdoor is stored at ~/Library/Application Support/iCloud/icloudz, a location and naming choice intended to resemble legitimate iCloud‑related artifacts. Once loaded into memory, two distinct execution waves are observed. Each wave independently initializes a consistent sequence of system commands: existing caffeinate processes are stopped, caffeinate is relaunched using nohup to prevent the system from sleeping, basic system information is collected using sw_vers and sysctl -n hw.model, and an interactive /bin/zsh -i shell is spawned. This repeated initialization suggests that the component is designed to re‑establish execution context reliably across runs.
From within the interactive zsh shell, icloudz deploys an additional (tertiary) backdoor, com.google.chromes.updaters, to disk at ~/Library/Google/com.google.chromes.updaters. The selected directory and file name closely resemble legitimate Google application data, helping the file blend into the user’s Home directory and reducing the likelihood of casual inspection. File permissions are adjusted; ownership is set to allow execution with elevated privileges, and the com.google.chromes.updaters binary is launched using sudo.
To ensure continued execution across reboots, a launch daemon configuration file named com.google.webkit.service.plist is installed under /Library/LaunchDaemons. This configuration causes icloudz to launch automatically at system startup, even if no user is signed in. The naming convention deliberately mimics legitimate Apple and Google system services, further reducing the chance of detection.
The com.google.chromes.updaters backdoor is the final and largest component deployed in this attack chain, with a size of approximately 7.2 MB. Once running, it establishes outbound communication with threat actor‑controlled infrastructure, connecting to the domain check02id[.]com over port 5202. The process then enters a precise 60‑second beaconing loop. During each cycle, it executes minimal commands such as whoami to confirm the execution context and sw_vers -productVersion to report the operating system version. This lightweight heartbeat confirms the process remains active, is running with elevated privileges, and is ready to receive further instructions.
TCC bypass: Granting AppleEvents permissions
Before large‑scale data access and exfiltration can proceed, Sapphire Sleet must bypass macOS TCC protections. TCC enforces user consent for sensitive inter‑process interactions, including AppleEvents, the mechanism required for osascript to communicate with Finder and perform file-level operations. The mac-cur3 stage silently grants itself these permissions by directly manipulating the user-level TCC database through the following sequence.
The user-level TCC database (~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db) is itself TCC-protected—processes without Full Disk Access (FDA) cannot read or modify it. Sapphire Sleet circumvents this by directing Finder, which holds FDA by default on macOS, to rename the com.apple.TCC folder. Once renamed, the TCC database file can be copied to a staging location by a process without FDA.
Sapphire Sleet then uses sqlite3 to inject a new entry into the database’s access table. This entry grants /usr/bin/osascript permission to send AppleEvents to com.apple.finder and includes valid code-signing requirement (csreq) blobs for both binaries, binding the grant to Apple-signed executables. The authorization value is set to allowed (auth_value=2) with a user-set reason (auth_reason=3), ensuring no user prompt is triggered. The modified database is then copied back into the renamed folder, and Finder restores the folder to its original name. Staging files are deleted to reduce forensic traces.
With TCC bypassed, credentials stolen, and backdoors deployed, Sapphire Sleet launches the next phase of attack: a 575-line AppleScript payload that systematically collects, stages, compresses, and exfiltrates seven categories of data.
Exfiltration architecture
Every upload follows a consistent pattern and is executed using nohup, which allows the command to continue running in the background even if the initiating process or Terminal session exits. This ensures that data exfiltration can complete reliably without requiring the threat actor to maintain an active session on the system.
The auth header provides the upload authorization token, and the mid header ties the upload to the compromised device’s UUID.
Data collected during exfiltration
Exfiltration summary
| # | Data category | ZIP name | Upload port | Estimated sensitivity |
| 1 | Telegram session | tapp_<user>.zip | 8443 | Critical — session hijack |
| 2 | Browser data + Keychain | ext_<user>.zip | 8443 | Critical — all passwords |
| 3 | Ledger wallet | ldg_<user>.zip | 8443 | Critical — crypto keys |
| 4 | Exodus wallet | exds_<user>.zip | 8443 | Critical — crypto keys |
| 5 | SSH + shell history | hs_<user>.zip | 8443 | High — lateral movement |
| 6 | Apple Notes | nt_<user>.zip | 8443 | Medium-High |
| 7 | System log | lg_<user> (no zip) | 8443 | Low — fingerprinting |
| 8 | Recon log | flog (no zip) | 8443 | Low — inventory |
| 9 | Credentials | Telegram message | 443 (Telegram API) | Critical — sign-in password |
All uploads use the upload authorization token fwyan48umt1vimwqcqvhdd9u72a7qysi and the machine identifier 82cf5d92-87b5-4144-9a4e-6b58b714d599.
As part of a coordinated response to this activity, Apple has implemented platform-level protections to help detect and block infrastructure and malware associated with this campaign. Apple has deployed Apple Safe Browsing protections in Safari to detect and block malicious infrastructure associated with this campaign. Users browsing with Safari benefit from these protections by default. Apple has also deployed XProtect signatures to detect and block the malware families associated with this campaign—macOS devices receive these signature updates automatically.
Microsoft recommends the following mitigation steps to defend against this activity and reduce the impact of this threat:
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint customers can also apply the following mitigations to reduce the environmental attack surface and mitigate the impact of this threat and its payloads:
Microsoft Defender customers can refer to the list of applicable detections below. Microsoft Defender coordinates detection, prevention, investigation, and response across endpoints, identities, email, apps to provide integrated protection against attacks like the threat discussed in this blog.
| Tactic | Observed activity | Microsoft Defender coverage |
| Initial access | – Malicious .scpt file execution (Zoom SDK Update lure) | Microsoft Defender Antivirus – Trojan:MacOS/SuspMalScript.C – Trojan:MacOS/FlowOffset.A!dha Microsoft Defender for Endpoint – Sapphire Sleet actor activity – Suspicious file or content ingress |
| Execution | – Malicious osascript execution – Cascading curl-to-osascript chains – Malicious binary execution | Microsoft Defender Antivirus – Trojan:MacOS/SuspMalScript.C – Trojan:MacOS/SuspInfostealExec.C – Trojan:MacOS/NukeSped.D Microsoft Defender for Endpoint – Suspicious file dropped and launched – Suspicious script launched – Suspicious AppleScript activity – Sapphire Sleet actor activity – Hidden file executed |
| Persistence | – LaunchDaemon installation (com.google.webkit.service.plist) | Microsoft Defender for Endpoint – Suspicious Plist modifications – Suspicious launchctl tool activity |
| Defense evasion | – TCC database manipulation – Reflective code loading (NSCreateObjectFileImageFromMemory) | Microsoft Defender for Endpoint – Potential Transparency, Consent and Control bypass – Suspicious database access |
| Credential access | – Fake password dialog (systemupdate.app, softwareupdate.app) – Keychain exfiltration | Microsoft Defender Antivirus – Trojan:MacOS/PassStealer.D – Trojan:MacOS/FlowOffset.D!dha – Trojan:MacOS/FlowOffset.E!dha Microsoft Defender for Endpoint – Suspicious file collection |
| Collection and exfiltration | – Browser data, crypto wallets, Telegram session, SSH keys, Apple Notes theft – Credential exfiltration using Telegram Bot API | Microsoft Defender Antivirus – Trojan:MacOS/SuspInfostealExec.C Microsoft Defender for Endpoint – Enumeration of files with sensitive data – Suspicious File Copy Operations Using CoreUtil – Suspicious archive creation – Remote exfiltration activity – Possible exfiltration of archived data |
| Command and control | – Mach-O backdoors beaconing to C2 (com.apple.cli, services, com.google.chromes.updaters) | Microsoft Defender Antivirus – Trojan:MacOS/NukeSped.D – Backdoor:MacOS/FlowOffset.B!dha – Backdoor:MacOS/FlowOffset.C!dha Microsoft Defender for Endpoint – Sapphire Sleet actor activity – Network connection by osascript |
Microsoft Security Copilot is embedded in Microsoft Defender and provides security teams with AI-powered capabilities to summarize incidents, analyze files and scripts, summarize identities, use guided responses, and generate device summaries, hunting queries, and incident reports.
Customers can also deploy AI agents, including the following Microsoft Security Copilot agents, to perform security tasks efficiently:
Security Copilot is also available as a standalone experience where customers can perform specific security-related tasks, such as incident investigation, user analysis, and vulnerability impact assessment. In addition, Security Copilot offers developer scenarios that allow customers to build, test, publish, and integrate AI agents and plugins to meet unique security needs.
Microsoft Defender XDR customers can use the following threat analytics reports in the Defender portal (requires license for at least one Defender XDR product) to get the most up-to-date information about the threat actor, malicious activity, and techniques discussed in this blog. These reports provide the intelligence, protection information, and recommended actions to prevent, mitigate, or respond to associated threats found in customer environments.
Microsoft Defender XDR threat analytics
Microsoft Security Copilot customers can also use the Microsoft Security Copilot integration in Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence, either in the Security Copilot standalone portal or in the embedded experience in the Microsoft Defender portal to get more information about this threat actor.
Microsoft Defender XDR customers can run the following advanced hunting queries to find related activity in their networks:
Suspicious osascript execution with curl piping
Search for curl commands piping output directly to osascript, a core technique in this Sapphire Sleet campaign’s cascading payload delivery chain.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where FileName == "osascript" or InitiatingProcessFileName == "osascript"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "curl" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("osascript", "| sh", "| bash")
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
Suspicious curl activity with campaign user-agent strings
Search for curl commands using user-agent strings matching the Sapphire Sleet campaign tracking identifiers (mac-cur1 through mac-cur5, audio, beacon).
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where FileName == "curl" or ProcessCommandLine has "curl"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("mac-cur1", "mac-cur2", "mac-cur3", "mac-cur4", "mac-cur5", "-A audio", "-A beacon")
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
Detect connectivity with known C2 infrastructure
Search for network connections to the Sapphire Sleet C2 domains and IP addresses used in this campaign.
let c2_domains = dynamic(["uw04webzoom.us", "uw05webzoom.us", "uw03webzoom.us", "ur01webzoom.us", "uv01webzoom.us", "uv03webzoom.us", "uv04webzoom.us", "ux06webzoom.us", "check02id.com"]); let c2_ips = dynamic(["188.227.196.252", "83.136.208.246", "83.136.209.22", "83.136.208.48", "83.136.210.180", "104.145.210.107"]); DeviceNetworkEvents | where Timestamp > ago(30d) | where RemoteUrl has_any (c2_domains) or RemoteIP in (c2_ips) | project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
TCC database manipulation detection
Search for processes that copy, modify, or overwrite the macOS TCC database, a key defense evasion technique used by this campaign to grant unauthorized AppleEvents permissions.
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where FolderPath has "com.apple.TCC" and FileName == "TCC.db"
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified", "FileRenamed")
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, ActionType, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
Suspicious LaunchDaemon creation masquerading as legitimate services
Search for LaunchDaemon plist files created in /Library/LaunchDaemons that masquerade as Google or Apple services, matching the persistence technique used by the services/icloudz backdoor.
DeviceFileEvents | where Timestamp > ago(30d) | where FolderPath startswith "/Library/LaunchDaemons/" | where FileName startswith "com.google." or FileName startswith "com.apple." | where ActionType == "FileCreated" | project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256
Malicious binary execution from suspicious paths
Search for execution of binaries from paths commonly used by Sapphire Sleet, including hidden Library directories, /private/tmp/, and user-specific Application Support folders.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where FolderPath has_any (
"Library/Services/services",
"Application Support/iCloud/icloudz",
"Library/Google/com.google.chromes.updaters",
"/private/tmp/SystemUpdate/",
"/private/tmp/SoftwareUpdate/",
"com.apple.cli"
)
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName, SHA256
Credential harvesting using dscl authentication check
Search for dscl -authonly commands used by the fake password dialog (systemupdate.app) to validate stolen credentials before exfiltration.
DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(30d) | where FileName == "dscl" or ProcessCommandLine has "dscl" | where ProcessCommandLine has "-authonly" | project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
Telegram Bot API exfiltration detection
Search for network connections to Telegram Bot API endpoints, used by this campaign to exfiltrate stolen credentials.
DeviceNetworkEvents | where Timestamp > ago(30d) | where RemoteUrl has "api.telegram.org" and RemoteUrl has "/bot" | project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
Reflective code loading using NSCreateObjectFileImageFromMemory
Search for evidence of reflective Mach-O loading, the technique used by the icloudz backdoor to execute code in memory.
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType has "NSCreateObjectFileImageFromMemory"
or AdditionalFields has "NSCreateObjectFileImageFromMemory"
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, AdditionalFields
Suspicious caffeinate and sleep prevention activity
Search for caffeinate process stop-and-restart patterns used by the services and icloudz backdoors to prevent the system from sleeping during backdoor operations.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ProcessCommandLine has "caffeinate"
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("icloudz", "services", "chromes.updaters", "zsh -i")
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
Detect known malicious file hashes
Search for the specific malicious file hashes associated with this Sapphire Sleet campaign across file events.
let malicious_hashes = dynamic([
"2075fd1a1362d188290910a8c55cf30c11ed5955c04af410c481410f538da419",
"05e1761b535537287e7b72d103a29c4453742725600f59a34a4831eafc0b8e53",
"5fbbca2d72840feb86b6ef8a1abb4fe2f225d84228a714391673be2719c73ac7",
"5e581f22f56883ee13358f73fabab00fcf9313a053210eb12ac18e66098346e5",
"95e893e7cdde19d7d16ff5a5074d0b369abd31c1a30962656133caa8153e8d63",
"8fd5b8db10458ace7e4ed335eb0c66527e1928ad87a3c688595804f72b205e8c",
"a05400000843fbad6b28d2b76fc201c3d415a72d88d8dc548fafd8bae073c640"
]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
Data staging and exfiltration activity
Search for ZIP archive creation in /tmp/ directories followed by curl uploads matching the staging-and-exfiltration pattern used for browser data, crypto wallets, Telegram sessions, SSH keys, and Apple Notes.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (ProcessCommandLine has "zip" and ProcessCommandLine has "/tmp/")
or (ProcessCommandLine has "curl" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("tapp_", "ext_", "ldg_", "exds_", "hs_", "nt_", "lg_"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
Script Editor launching suspicious child processes
Search for Script Editor (the default handler for .scpt files) spawning curl, osascript, or shell commands—the initial execution vector in this campaign.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName == "Script Editor" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "Script Editor"
| where FileName has_any ("curl", "osascript", "sh", "bash", "zsh")
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
Microsoft Sentinel customers can use the TI Mapping analytics (a series of analytics all prefixed with ‘TI map’) to automatically match the malicious domain indicators mentioned in this blog post with data in their workspace. If the TI Map analytics are not currently deployed, customers can install the Threat Intelligence solution from the Microsoft Sentinel Content Hub to have the analytics rule deployed in their Sentinel workspace.
Detect network indicators of compromise
The following query checks for connections to the Sapphire Sleet C2 domains and IP addresses across network session data:
let lookback = 30d; let ioc_domains = dynamic(["uw04webzoom.us", "uw05webzoom.us", "uw03webzoom.us", "ur01webzoom.us", "uv01webzoom.us", "uv03webzoom.us", "uv04webzoom.us", "ux06webzoom.us", "check02id.com"]); let ioc_ips = dynamic(["188.227.196.252", "83.136.208.246", "83.136.209.22", "83.136.208.48", "83.136.210.180", "104.145.210.107"]); DeviceNetworkEvents | where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback) | where RemoteUrl has_any (ioc_domains) or RemoteIP in (ioc_ips) | summarize EventCount=count() by DeviceName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName
Detect file hash indicators of compromise
The following query searches for the known malicious file hashes associated with this campaign across file, process, and security event data:
let selectedTimestamp = datetime(2026-01-01T00:00:00.0000000Z);
let FileSHA256 = dynamic([
"2075fd1a1362d188290910a8c55cf30c11ed5955c04af410c481410f538da419",
"05e1761b535537287e7b72d103a29c4453742725600f59a34a4831eafc0b8e53",
"5fbbca2d72840feb86b6ef8a1abb4fe2f225d84228a714391673be2719c73ac7",
"5e581f22f56883ee13358f73fabab00fcf9313a053210eb12ac18e66098346e5",
"95e893e7cdde19d7d16ff5a5074d0b369abd31c1a30962656133caa8153e8d63",
"8fd5b8db10458ace7e4ed335eb0c66527e1928ad87a3c688595804f72b205e8c",
"a05400000843fbad6b28d2b76fc201c3d415a72d88d8dc548fafd8bae073c640"
]);
search in (AlertEvidence, DeviceEvents, DeviceFileEvents, DeviceImageLoadEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents, SecurityEvent, ThreatIntelligenceIndicator)
TimeGenerated between ((selectedTimestamp - 1m) .. (selectedTimestamp + 90d))
and (SHA256 in (FileSHA256) or InitiatingProcessSHA256 in (FileSHA256))
Detect Microsoft Defender Antivirus detections related to Sapphire Sleet
The following query searches for Defender Antivirus alerts for the specific malware families used in this campaign and joins with device information for enriched context:
let SapphireSleet_threats = dynamic([
"Trojan:MacOS/NukeSped.D",
"Trojan:MacOS/PassStealer.D",
"Trojan:MacOS/SuspMalScript.C",
"Trojan:MacOS/SuspInfostealExec.C"
]);
SecurityAlert
| where ProviderName == "MDATP"
| extend ThreatName = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatName)
| extend ThreatFamilyName = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatFamilyName)
| where ThreatName in~ (SapphireSleet_threats) or ThreatFamilyName in~ (SapphireSleet_threats)
| extend CompromisedEntity = tolower(CompromisedEntity)
| join kind=inner (
DeviceInfo
| extend DeviceName = tolower(DeviceName)
) on $left.CompromisedEntity == $right.DeviceName
| summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by DisplayName, ThreatName, ThreatFamilyName, PublicIP, AlertSeverity, Description, tostring(LoggedOnUsers), DeviceId, TenantId, CompromisedEntity, ProductName, Entities
| extend HostName = tostring(split(CompromisedEntity, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(CompromisedEntity, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(CompromisedEntity, DomainIndex + 1), CompromisedEntity)
| project-away DomainIndex
| project TimeGenerated, DisplayName, ThreatName, ThreatFamilyName, PublicIP, AlertSeverity, Description, LoggedOnUsers, DeviceId, TenantId, CompromisedEntity, ProductName, Entities, HostName, HostNameDomain
Malicious file hashes
| File | SHA-256 |
| /Users/<user>/Downloads/Zoom SDK Update.scpt | 2075fd1a1362d188290910a8c55cf30c11ed5955c04af410c481410f538da419 |
| /Users/<user>/com.apple.cli | 05e1761b535537287e7b72d103a29c4453742725600f59a34a4831eafc0b8e53 |
| /Users/<user>/Library/Services/services services / icloudz | 5fbbca2d72840feb86b6ef8a1abb4fe2f225d84228a714391673be2719c73ac7 |
| com.google.chromes.updaters | 5e581f22f56883ee13358f73fabab00fcf9313a053210eb12ac18e66098346e5 |
| com.google.webkit.service.plist | 95e893e7cdde19d7d16ff5a5074d0b369abd31c1a30962656133caa8153e8d63 |
| /private/tmp/SystemUpdate/systemupdate.app/Contents/MacOS/Mac Password Popup | 8fd5b8db10458ace7e4ed335eb0c66527e1928ad87a3c688595804f72b205e8c |
| /private/tmp/SoftwareUpdate/softwareupdate.app/Contents/MacOS/Mac Password Popup | a05400000843fbad6b28d2b76fc201c3d415a72d88d8dc548fafd8bae073c640 |
Domains and IP addresses
| Domain | IP address | Port | Purpose |
| uw04webzoom[.]us | 188.227.196[.]252 | 443 | Payload staging |
| check02id[.]com | 83.136.210[.]180 | 5202 | chromes.updaters |
| 83.136.208[.]246 | 6783 | com.apple.cli invocated with IP and port and beacon | |
| 83.136.209[.]22 | 8444 | Downloadsservices backdoor | |
| 83.136.208[.]48 | 443 | services invoked with IP and port | |
| 104.145.210[.]107 | 6783 | Exfiltration |
Existing blogs with similar behavior tracked:
For the latest security research from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community, check out the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Blog.
To get notified about new publications and to join discussions on social media, follow us on LinkedIn, X (formerly Twitter), and Bluesky.
To hear stories and insights from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community about the ever-evolving threat landscape, listen to the Microsoft Threat Intelligence podcast.
The post Dissecting Sapphire Sleet’s macOS intrusion from lure to compromise appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.
It is no secret that phishing campaigns utilizing various ClickFix techniques have been a commonly used method of social engineering. One of the main reasons for this is simply because they work. You know this and Rapid7 does as well. As a company offering managed detection and response (MDR), our customers expect us to be knowledgeable about and able to detect attacks as common as ClickFix campaigns.
Recently, Rapid7 observed a small grouping of ClickFix events across customers in the EU and US. At the time of discovery, this campaign had very little traction on sites like VirusTotal or within the online security landscape. This campaign was particularly interesting as it appeared to be masquerading as an installer for Claude, an AI tool that has received a considerable amount of attention.
Using Rapid7 InsightIDR detection rules, our SOC analysts were able to detect and respond to the threat, preventing further compromise. This campaign demonstrates the strength Rapid7 customers get from our MDR service, while peeling back the curtain to provide a real-world example on how we operate behind the scenes. In this blog, we will detail a brief technical analysis of the observed threat actor activities and discuss how this serves as an example of the service we aim to provide our MDR customers. The analysis highlights both the multi-step delivery of the payload as well as the work Rapid7 performs when investigating threats.
On April 9, Rapid7 was alerted to mshta executed on a customer asset using the Windows run utility. The alert was generated by the detection rule Attacker Technique - Remote Payload Execution via Run Utility (shell32.dll). This rule will generate an alert when a suspicious process, such as mshta, is added to the RunMRU registry key. This key is important for the detection of ClickFix campaigns, as it tracks the last 26 commands executed by the Windows run utility. One thing that stuck out about this particular mshta command is that the URL, download-version[.]1-5-8[.]com/claude.msixbundle, appeared to be impersonating an MSIX bundle for the popular AI tool, Claude.
MSIX files are Windows app packages that one would typically see from the Microsoft store, definitely not something you would see being passed as an argument to mshta. While the host was quickly taken down before Rapid7 was able to obtain the claude.msixbundle payload, a copy was obtainable on VirusTotal. Looking at the payload, it does initially appear to be an MSIX bundle. The file header signature, PK, indicates that the file is a ZIP archive and contains a string reference to the MSIX bundle, MicrosoftBing_1.1.37.0_ARM64.msix:
⠀
⠀
Exploring the payload deeper, however, reveals an HTML Application (HTA) embedded within the ZIP archive:
⠀
The Visual Basic script within the HTA file contains a series of obfuscated strings that are deobfuscated with the following VBS function:
⠀
Additionally, one of the functions serves to generate an encoded PowerShell script that will serve as the next step in the chain:
⠀
After the deobfuscation routine is complete, these strings contain references to the required objects and function calls to craft and execute – via ShellExec – the following command:
c:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe” /v:on /c “set x=pow&&set y=ershell&&call %windir%\SysWOW64\WindowsPowershell\v1.0\!x!!y! -E [ENCODED COMMAND]
⠀
⠀
The encoded PowerShell acts as a staging payload. The script will first generate an MD5 hash value based on the COMPUTERNAME and USERNAME environment variables. It will then take the first 16 characters of the hash value and use it to craft a URL to pull another, much larger, PowerShell script. The script also contains a string deobfuscation routine that is responsible for crafting the following strings to be passed to various .NET functions:
Assembly
System.Mangement.Automation.AmsiUtils
amsiContext
NonPublic,Static
0x41414141
⠀
The script will then call the deobfuscation routine to craft a call to WriteInt32 in the .NET Marshal library to overwrite the amsiContext field in System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils with the value 0x41414141. Once amsiContext is overwritten, the script will download and execute the next stage:
⠀
The URL is hosting yet another PowerShell script containing highly obfuscated strings and a large byte array. Upon execution of the script, the strings decode to contain the necessary .NET types and method calls to create and execute a PowerShell ScriptBlock. This ScriptBlock is derived from the byte array, which is first base64 decoded and then run through a deobfuscation routine:
⠀
This ScriptBlock again contains another series of obfuscated strings and a large byte array containing yet another PowerShell ScriptBlock. Following the execution of the script, the code once again creates and executes a PowerShell ScriptBlock:
⠀
This ScriptBlock culminates in a process injection routine using the .NET interoperability library. The code contains a byte array with encrypted shellcode that gets passed through a XOR routine. The script then obtains handles to the following Windows API calls:
NtAllocateVirtualMemory
Copy
NtProtectVirtualMemory
NtCreateThreadEx
NtWaitForSingleObject
NtFreeVirtualMemory
NtClose
After obtaining the handles, the script crafts delegate functions for the Windows API calls and invokes the delegates to perform the process injection routine:
Rapid7 MDR customers receive the security knowledge of our threat intelligence, detection engineering, incident response, and security operations center analysts. Input from all of these sources directly feeds into how we create detections and respond to alerts. Following is an explanation of how we use events like these to further provide and enhance our services for customers.
As previously mentioned, ClickFix activity is not new. Detection engineers in the MDR service know this and build rules to address these techniques, such as the rule that caught the activity discussed in this blog.. Detection rules are created in response to activity observed in incident response, customer requests, activity observed from the SOC, threat intelligence, and observations of the security landscape. Rapid7’s detection engineers work with the SOC to monitor these rules for efficacy. Rules that are primarily used to detect initial compromise, such as the one that alerted on this campaign, are additionally monitored to identify any new campaigns.
Once the campaign is identified, our detection engineers research it to create additional rules. They can also perform retroactive threat hunts across the Rapid7 customer base using IOCs or any new behavioral detections created from researching the campaign. Results from researching campaigns like this one then go on to feed threat intelligence and help inform our detection strategy. This campaign provides a great example of how Rapid7 works on the backend to detect and prevent threats in customer environments.
Monitor the following registry key to watch for potential ClickFix attacks such as the one observed in this case:
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU
While Rapid7 MDR customers were covered by the managed SOC, Rapid7 recommends the following actions for containment:
If the activity is not expected, apply containment and review the user's browsing history for the source of the command. The initial lure is often presented to the user when they attempt to browse the internet for free downloads (media, software, etc.). In some cases the malicious command may have been copied to the user's clipboard when visiting the initial webpage, and can be viewed by inspecting the source code of the site. If the infection is successful, an information stealer is often executed as the final payload, meaning that any credentials stored on the infected system should be reset as part of restoration.
System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta | T1218.005 |
Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File | T1027.013 |
Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation | T1027.010 |
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell | T1059.001 |
Process Injection | T1055 |
Cloude.Msixbundle:
2b99ade9224add2ce86eb836dcf70040315f6dc95e772ea98f24a30cdf4fdb97
Domains observed by Rapid7:
Oakenfjrod[.]ru
download-version[.]1-5-8[.]com
download[.]get-version[.]com
An apparent hack-for-hire campaign from a group with suspected Indian government connections targeted Middle Eastern and North African journalists and activists using spyware, three collaborating organizations said in reports published Wednesday.
The attacks shared infrastructure that pointed to the advanced persistent threat group known as Bitter, which most frequently targets government, military, diplomatic and critical infrastructure sectors across South Asia, according to conclusions from researchers at Access Now, Lookout and SMEX.
Each group took on a different piece of the puzzle:
One of the victims, independent Egyptian journalist Mostafa Al-A’sar, said he contacted Access Now after receiving a suspicious link from someone he’d been talking to about a job position. He was skeptical because his phone had been targeted before, when he was arrested in Egypt in 2018.
The lesson for journalists and civil society groups is that cybersecurity “is not a luxury,” he said.
“I feel like I’m threatened,” Al-A’sar said, and even though he was living in exile, he feels like “they are still following me. I also felt worried about my family, about my friends, about my sources.”
The combined research found a wider campaign than just the original victims.
“Our joint findings expose an espionage campaign that has been operational since at least 2022 until present day primarily targeting civil society members and potentially government officials in the Middle East,” Lookout wrote. “The operation features a combination of targeted spearphishing delivered through fake social media accounts and messaging applications leveraging persistent social engineering efforts, which may result in the delivery of Android spyware depending on the target’s device.”
The Committee to Protect Journalists condemned the campaign.
“Spying on journalists is often the first step in a broader pattern of intimidation, threats, and attacks,” said the group’s regional director, Sara Qudah. “These actions endanger not only journalists’ personal safety, but also their sources and their ability to do their work. Authorities in the region must stop weaponizing technology and financial resources to surveil journalists.”
Access Now said it didn’t have enough information to attribute who was behind the attacks it identified.
ESET first published research on the ProSpy malware last year, after finding it targeting residents of the United Arab Emirates.
The post Hack-for-hire spyware campaign targets journalists in Middle East, North Africa appeared first on CyberScoop.
Cybercrime remains a booming business.
Annual cybercrime losses amounted to almost $20.9 billion last year, reflecting a 26% increase from 2024, the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) said in its annual report Tuesday.
The comprehensive study exposes a worsening digital crime environment that is driving financial losses, with momentum moving in the wrong direction and compounding at an alarming rate. Annual cybercrime losses have jumped almost 400% from $4.2 billion in 2020, and cumulative losses in that five-year period surpassed $71.3 billion.
The FBI’s IC3, which formed as the country’s central hub for cybercrime reporting in 2000, is busier than ever. “We now average almost 3,000 complaints per day,” Jose Perez, the FBI’s operations director for its criminal and cyber branch, wrote in the report.
The annual internet crime report highlights growing and sustaining trends. Yet, the scope of the study is limited and relies entirely on cybercrime incidents submitted to the FBI.
The full impact of cybercrime remains murky, as an unknown number of victims suffer in the shadows and never report the crimes they endure.
The FBI received more than 1 million complaints last year, with victims aged over 60 reporting the largest amount of crimes that also resulted in the greatest amount of total losses by age group. Victims at least 60 years old filed 201,000 complaints with losses totaling nearly $7.75 billion, or about 37% of all cybercrime-related losses last year.
Investment-related fraud remained the largest component of cybercrime losses in 2025, reaching almost $8.65 billion. Business email compromise took the No. 2 spot with almost $3.05 billion in losses, followed by tech support scams at more than $2.1 billion.
Cryptocurrency was the primary conduit for fraud linked to investment and tech support scams last year, while wire transfers composed the bulk of fraud resulting from business email compromise, according to the report.
Phishing was the most commonly reported type of cybercrime last year, followed by extortion, investment scams and personal data breaches. The FBI tallied losses amounting to $122.5 million from extortion and $32.3 million from ransomware last year.
The FBI also received more than 75,000 reports of sextortion last year, including more than 5,700 submissions that were referred to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children.
The top five cyber threats reported to IC3 in 2025 included data breaches at 39%, ransomware at 36%, SIM swapping at 10%, malware at 9% and botnets at 7%.
The FBI received more than 3,600 complaints reporting ransomware last year. The five most reported variants included Akira, Qilin, INC, BianLian and Play.
Each of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors reported ransomware attacks last year, and the most heavily targeted included health care, manufacturing, financial services, government and IT.
The IC3 primarily receives complaints from U.S. residents and businesses, but it also received complaints from more than 200 countries last year, which accounted for nearly $1.6 billion in total losses.
While losses and the sheer amount of cybercrime continued to climb last year, “the FBI continues to disrupt and deter malicious cyber actors — and shift the cost from victims to our adversaries,” Perez wrote in the report.
“It has never been more important to be diligent with your cybersecurity, social media footprint, and electronic interactions,” he added. “Cyber threats and cyber-enabled crime will continue to evolve as the world embraces emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence.”
The post Cybercrime losses jumped 26% to $20.9 billion in 2025 appeared first on CyberScoop.
Microsoft Defender Security Research has observed a widespread phishing campaign leveraging the device code authentication flow to compromise organizational accounts at scale. While traditional device code attacks are typically narrow in scope, this campaign demonstrated a higher success rate, driven by automation and dynamic code generation that circumvented the standard 15-minute expiration window for device codes. This activity aligns with the emergence of EvilTokens, a phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) toolkit identified as a key driver of large-scale device code abuse.
This campaign is distinct because it moves away from static, manual scripts toward an AI-driven infrastructure and multiple automations end-to-end. This activity marks a significant escalation in threat actor sophistication since the Storm-2372 device code phishing campaign observed in February 2025.
Once authentication tokens were obtained, threat actors focused on post-compromise activity designed to maintain access and extract data. Stolen tokens were used for email exfiltration and persistence, often through the creation of malicious inbox rules that redirected or concealed communications. In parallel, threat actors conducted Microsoft Graph reconnaissance to map organizational structure and permissions, enabling continued access and potential lateral movement while tokens remained valid.
Device code authentication is a legitimate OAuth flow designed for devices with limited interfaces, such as smart TVs or printers, that cannot support a standard interactive login. In this model, a user is presented with a short code on the device they are trying to sign in from and is instructed to enter that code into a browser on a separate device to complete authentication.
While this flow is useful for these scenarios, it introduces a security tradeoff. Because authentication is completed on a separate device, the session initiating the request is not strongly bound to the user’s original context. Threat actors have abused this characteristic as a way to bypass more traditional MFA protections by decoupling authentication from the originating session.
Device code phishing occurs when threat actors insert themselves into this process. Instead of a legitimate device requesting access, the threat actor initiates the flow and provides the user with a code through a phishing lure. When the user enters the code, they unknowingly authorize the threat actor’s session, granting access to the account without exposing credentials.
The threat actor begins by verifying account validity using the GetCredentialType endpoint. By querying this specific Microsoft URL, the threat actor confirms whether a targeted email address exists and is active within the tenant. This reconnaissance phase is a critical precursor, typically occurring 10 to 15 days before the actual phishing attempt is launched.
The campaign uses a multi-stage delivery pipeline designed to bypass traditional email gateways and endpoint security. The attack begins when a user interacts with a malicious attachment or a direct URL embedded within a high-pressure lure (e.g., “Action Required: Password Expiration”).
To evade automated URL scanners and sandboxes, the threat actors do not link directly to the final phishing site. Instead, they use a series of redirects through compromised legitimate domains and high-reputation “Serverless” platforms. We observed heavy reliance on Vercel (*.vercel.app), Cloudflare Workers (*.workers.dev), and AWS Lambda to host the redirect logic. By using these domains, the phishing traffic “blends in” with legitimate enterprise cloud traffic, preventing simple domain-blocklist triggers.
Once the targeted user is redirected to the final landing page, the user is presented with the credential theft interface. This is hosted as browser-in-the-browser (an exploitation technique commonly leveraged by the threat actor that simulates a legitimate browser window within a web page that loads the content threat actor has created) or displayed directly within the web-hosted “preview” of the document with a blurred view, “Verify identity” button that redirects the user to “Microsoft.com/devicelogin” and device code displayed.
Below is an example of the final landing page, where the redirect to DeviceLogin is rendered as browser-in-the-browser.
The campaign utilized diverse themes, including document access, electronic signing, and voicemail notifications. In specific instances, the threat actor prompted users for their email addresses to facilitate the generation of a malicious device code.
Unlike traditional phishing that asks for a password, this “Front-End” is designed to facilitate a handoff. The page is pre-loaded with hidden automation. The moment the “Continue to Microsoft” button is clicked, the authentication begins, preparing the victim for the “Device Code” prompt that follows in the next stage of the attack.
The threat actor used a combination of domain shadowing and brand-impersonating subdomains to bypass reputation filters. Several domains were designed to impersonate technical or administrative services (e.g., graph-microsoft[.]com, portal-azure[.]com, office365-login[.]com). Also, multiple randomized subdomains were observed (e.g., a7b2-c9d4.office-verify[.]net). This is a common tactic to ensure that if one URL is flagged, the entire domain isn’t necessarily blocked immediately. Below is a distribution of Domain hosting infrastructure abused by the threat actor:
The threat actor distributes deceptive emails to the intended victims, utilizing a wide array of themes like invoices, RFPs, or shared files. These emails contain varied payloads, including direct URLs, PDF attachments, or HTML files. The goal is to entice the user into interacting with a link that will eventually lead them to a legitimate-looking but threat actor-controlled interface.
When a user clicks the malicious link, they are directed to a web page running a background automation script. This script interacts with the Microsoft identity provider in real-time to generate a live Device Code. This code is then displayed on the user’s screen along with a button that redirects them to the official microsoft.com/devicelogin portal.
The 15-Minute race: Static vs. dynamic
A pivotal element of this campaign’s success is dynamic device code generation, a technique specifically engineered to bypass the inherent time-based constraints of the OAuth 2.0 device authorization flow. A generated device code remains valid for only 15 minutes. (Ref: OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant). In older, static phishing attempts, the threat actor would include a pre-generated code within the email itself. This created a narrow window for success: the targeted user had to be phished, open the email, navigate through various redirects, and complete a multi-step authentication process all before the 15-minute timer lapsed. If the user opened the email even 20 minutes after it was sent, the attack would automatically fail due to the expired code.
Dynamic Generation effectively solves this for the threat actor. By shifting the code generation to the final stage of the redirect chain, the 15-minute countdown only begins the moment the victim clicks the phishing link and lands on the malicious page. This ensures the authentication code is always active when the user is prompted to enter it.
Generating the device code
The moment the user is redirected to the final landing page, the script on the page initiates a POST request to the threat actor’s backend (/api/device/start/ or /start/). The threat actor’s server acts as a proxy. The request carries a custom HTTP header “X-Antibot-Token” with a 64-character hex value, and an empty body (content-length: 0)
It contacts Microsoft’s official device authorization endpoint on-demand and provides the user’s email address as hint. The server returns a JSON object containing Device Code (with a full 15-minute lifespan) and a hidden Session Identifier Code. Until this is generated, the landing page takes some time to load.
To minimize user effort and maximize the success rate, the threat actor’s script often automatically copies the generated device code to the user’s clipboard. Once the user reaches the official login page, they paste the code. If the user does not have an active session, they are prompted to provide their password and MFA. If they are already signed in, simply pasting the code and confirming the request instantly authenticates the threat actor’s session on the backend.
Clipboard manipulation
To reduce a few seconds in 15-minute window and to enable user to complete authentication faster, the script immediately executes a clipboard hijack. Using the navigator.clipboard.writeText API, the script pushes the recently generated Device Code onto the victim’s Windows clipboard. Below is a screenshot of a campaign where the codes were copied to the user’s clipboard from the browser.
Immediately following a successful compromise, the threat actor performs a validation check. This automated step ensures that the authentication token is valid and that the necessary level of access to the target environment has been successfully granted.
The polling
After presenting the code to the user and opening the legitimate microsoft.com/devicelogin URL, the script enters a “Polling” state via the checkStatus() function to monitor the 15-minute window in real-time. Every 3 to 5 seconds (setInterval), the script pings the threat actor’s /state endpoint. It sends the secret session identifier code to validate if the user has authenticated yet. While the targeted user is entering the code on the real Microsoft site, the loop returns a “pending” status.
The moment the targeted user completes the MFA-backed login, the next poll returns a success status. The threat actor’s server now possesses a live Access Token for the targeted user’s account, bypassing MFA by design, due to the use of the alternative Device Code flow. The user is also redirected to a placeholder website (Docusign/Google/Microsoft).
The final stage varies depending on the threat actor’s specific objectives. In some instances, within 10 minutes of the breach, threat actor’s registered new devices to generate a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) for long-term persistence. In other scenarios, they waited several hours before creating malicious inbox rules or exfiltrating sensitive email data to avoid immediate detection.
Post compromise
Following the compromise, attack progression was predominantly observed towards Device Registration and Graph Reconnaissance.
In a selected scenario, the attack progressed to email exfiltration and account persistence through Inbox rules created using Microsoft Office Application. This involved filtering the compromised users and selecting targets:
Below is an example of an Inbox rule created by the threat actor using Microsoft Office Application.
To harden networks against the Device code phishing activity described above, defenders can implement the following:
Microsoft recommends the following best practices to further help improve organizational defences against phishing and other credential theft attacks:
Microsoft Defender XDR customers can refer to the list of applicable detections below. Microsoft Defender XDR coordinates detection, prevention, investigation, and response across endpoints, identities, email, and apps to provide integrated protection against attacks like the threat discussed in this blog.
Customers with provisioned access can also use Microsoft Security Copilot in Microsoft Defender to investigate and respond to incidents, hunt for threats, and protect their organization with relevant threat intelligence.
Using Safe Links and Microsoft Entra ID protection raises high confidence Device Code phishing alerts from Defender.
| Tactic | Observed activity | Microsoft Defender coverage |
| Initial Access | Identification and blocking of spearphishing emails that use social engineering lures to direct users to threat actor-controlled pages that ultimately redirect to legitimate Microsoft device sign-in endpoints (e.g., microsoft.com/devicelogin). Detection relies on campaign-level signals, sender behavior, and message content rather than URL reputation alone, enabling coverage even when legitimate Microsoft authentication URLs are abused. | Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Predelivery protection for device code phishing emails. |
| Credential Access | Detects anomalous device code authentication using authentication patterns and token acquisition after successful device code auth. | Microsoft Defender For Identity Anomalous OAuth device code authentication activity. |
| Initial Access / Credential Access | Detection of anomalous sign-in patterns consistent with device code authentication abuse, including atypical authentication flows and timing inconsistent with normal user behaviour. | Microsoft Defender XDR Suspicious Azure authentication through possible device code phishing. |
| Credential Access | The threat actor successfully abuses the OAuth device code authentication flow, causing the victim to authenticate the threat actor’s session and resulting in issuance of valid access and refresh tokens without password theft | Microsoft Defender XDR User account compromise via OAuth device code phishing. |
| Credential Access | Detects device code authentication after url click in an email from a non-prevalent sender | Microsoft Defender XDR Suspicious device code authentication following a URL click in an email from rare sender. |
| Defence Evasion | Post-authentication use of valid tokens from threat actor-controlled or known malicious infrastructure, indicating token replay or session hijacking rather than interactive user login. | Microsoft Defender XDR Malicious sign-in from an IP address associated with recognized threat actor infrastructure. Microsoft Entra ID Protection Activity from Anonymous IP address (RiskEventType: anonymizedIPAddress). |
| Defence Evasion / Credential Access | Authentication activity correlated with Microsoft threat intelligence indicating known malicious infrastructure, suspicious token usage, or threat actor associated sign-in patterns following device code abuse. | Microsoft Entra ID Protection Microsoft Entra threat intelligence (sign-in) (RiskEventType: investigationsThreatIntelligence). |
Microsoft Sentinel customers can use the TI Mapping analytics (a series of analytics all prefixed with ‘TI map’) to automatically match the malicious indicators mentioned in this blog post with data in their workspace. Additionally, Microsoft Sentinel customers can use the following queries to detect phishing attempts and email exfiltration attempts via Graph API. These queries can help customers remain vigilant and safeguard their organization from phishing attacks:
Security Copilot customers can use the standalone experience to create their own prompts or run the following prebuilt promptbooks to automate incident response or investigation tasks related to this threat:
Note that some promptbooks require access to plugins for Microsoft products such as Microsoft Defender XDR or Microsoft Sentinel.
Microsoft customers can use the following reports in Microsoft products to get the most up-to-date information about the threat actor, malicious activity, and techniques discussed in this blog. These reports provide intelligence, protection information, and recommended actions to prevent, mitigate, or respond to associated threats found in customer environments.
Defender XDR customers can run the following queries to identify possible device code phishing related activity in their networks:
Validate errorCode 50199 followed by success in 5-minute time interval for the interested user, which suggests a pause to input the code from the phishing email.
EntraIdSigninEvents
| where ErrorCode in (0, 50199)
| summarize ErrorCodes = make_set(ErrorCode) by AccountUpn, CorrelationId, SessionId, bin(Timestamp, 1h)
| where ErrorCodes has_all (0, 50199)
Validate Device code authentication from suspicious IP Ranges.
EntraIdSigninEvents
| where Call has “Cmsi:cmsi”
| where IPAddress has_any (“160.220.232.”, “160.220.234.”, “89.150.45.”, “185.81.113.”, “8.228.105.”)
Correlate any URL clicks with suspicious sign-ins that follow with user interrupt indicated by the error code 50199.
let suspiciousUserClicks = materialize(UrlClickEvents
| extend AccountUpn = tolower(AccountUpn)
| project ClickTime = Timestamp, ActionType, UrlChain, NetworkMessageId, Url, AccountUpn);
//Check for Risky Sign-In in the short time window
let interestedUsersUpn = suspiciousUserClicks
| where isnotempty(AccountUpn)
| distinct AccountUpn;
EntraIdSigninEvents
| where ErrorCode == 0
| where AccountUpn in~ (interestedUsersUpn)
| where RiskLevelDuringSignin in (10, 50, 100)
| extend AccountUpn = tolower(AccountUpn)
| join kind=inner suspiciousUserClicks on AccountUpn
| where (Timestamp - ClickTime) between (-2min .. 7min)
| project Timestamp, ReportId, ClickTime, AccountUpn, RiskLevelDuringSignin, SessionId, IPAddress, Url
Monitor for suspicious Device Registration activities that follow the Device code phishing compromise.
CloudAppEvents | where AccountDisplayName == "Device Registration Service" | extend ApplicationId_ = tostring(ActivityObjects[0].ApplicationId) | extend ServiceName_ = tostring(ActivityObjects[0].Name) | extend DeviceName = tostring(parse_json(tostring(RawEventData.ModifiedProperties))[1].NewValue) | extend DeviceId = tostring(parse_json(tostring(parse_json(tostring(RawEventData.ModifiedProperties))[6].NewValue))[0]) | extend DeviceObjectId_ = tostring(parse_json(tostring(RawEventData.ModifiedProperties))[0].NewValue) | extend UserPrincipalName = tostring(RawEventData.ObjectId) | project TimeGenerated, ServiceName_, DeviceName, DeviceId, DeviceObjectId_, UserPrincipalName
Surface suspicious inbox rule creation (using applications) that follow the Device code phishing compromise.
CloudAppEvents
| where ApplicationId == “20893” // Microsoft Exchange Online
| where ActionType in ("New-InboxRule","Set-InboxRule","Set-Mailbox","Set-TransportRule","New-TransportRule","Enable-InboxRule","UpdateInboxRules")
| where isnotempty(IPAddress)
| mv-expand ActivityObjects
| extend name = parse_json(ActivityObjects).Name
| extend value = parse_json(ActivityObjects).Value
| where name == "Name"
| extend RuleName = value
// we are extracting rule names that only contains special characters
| where RuleName matches regex "^[!@#$%^&*()_+={[}\\]|\\\\:;""'.?/~` -]+$"
Surface suspicious email items accessed that follow the Device code phishing compromise.
CloudAppEvents | where ApplicationId == “20893” // Microsoft Exchange Online | where ActionType == “MailItemsAccessed” | where isnotempty(IPAddress) | where UncommonForUser has "ISP"
| The threat actor’s authentication infrastructure is built on well-known, trusted services like Railway.com (a popular Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS)), Cloudflare, and DigitalOcean. By using these platforms, these malicious scripts can blend in with benign Device code authentication. This approach was to ensure it is very difficult for security systems to block the attack without accidentally stopping legitimate business services at the same time. Furthermore, the threat actor compromised multiple legitimate domains to host their phishing pages. By leveraging the existing reputation of these hijacked sites, they bypass email filters and web reputation systems. Indicator | Type | Description |
| 160.220.232.0 (Railway.com) | IP Range | Threat actor infrastructure observed with sign-in |
| 160.220.234.0 (Railway.com) | IP Range | Threat actor infrastructure observed with sign-in |
| 89.150.45.0 (HZ Hosting) | IP Range | Threat actor infrastructure observed with sign-in |
| 185.81.113.0 (HZ Hosting) | IP Range | Threat actor infrastructure observed with sign-in |
This research is provided by Microsoft Defender Security Research with contributions from Krithika Ramakrishnan, Ofir Mastor, Bharat Vaghela, Shivas Raina, Parasharan Raghavan, and other members of Microsoft Threat Intelligence.
Review our documentation to learn more about our real-time protection capabilities and see how to enable them within your organization.
The post Inside an AI‑enabled device code phishing campaign appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.
