Major American cloud companies with data centers in the Persian Gulf "are channeling data out of the war zone through fiber-optic cables that an Iraqi telecom has strung alongside crude-oil pipelines," reports RestofWorld.org: The data centers serve customers in more than 190 countries, processing transactions, storing files, and running applications for businesses and individuals from Latin America to South Asia. When Iranian drones struck Amazon's facilities in the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain on March 1, the effects spread across the region. Apps of major banks in the UAE, including Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, stopped working. Payment and delivery platforms went offline. Snowflake, a U.S. enterprise software company used by thousands of businesses globally, reported Middle East service disruptions tied directly to the Amazon Web Services outage. Amazon told its customers to migrate their workloads out of the Middle East... [Data from] banking, payment, and enterprise platforms normally travels to Europe through cables running under the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, then connects onward to users across the world. The war has put those cables at risk. The overland route through Iraq is meant to serve as a backup if the sea cables are disabled. The overland route through Iraq is meant to serve as a backup if the sea cables are disabled... [Martin Frank, strategic adviser for IQ Networks, the company that built the network, told Rest of World this overland route is already carrying live traffic.] The company, based in Iraq's Kurdistan region, runs fiber from the southern tip of Iraq to the Turkish border. It is now extending the network through gas-pipeline corridors across Turkey to the European border, with the first link expected early next year, Frank said. When that extension is complete, cloud providers will — for the first time — have the option of an unbroken land-based fiber path from the Gulf into the European network, connecting onward to Frankfurt, Amsterdam, London, and Marseille, from where their data connects back to U.S. users. The advantage of this alternative route is that oil and gas pipelines come with their own security perimeters, access roads, and maintenance corridors already built around them, allowing a telecom company to lay fiber without digging new trenches through difficult terrain. Iraq avoided the fate of earlier overland routes that collapsed because of a sustained period of stability, and because existing pipeline infrastructure provided ready-made corridors for laying fiber, Doug Madory, director of internet analysis at network intelligence firm Kentik, told Rest of World... IQ Networks' route, called the Silk Route Transit, has been running since November 2023. The network currently carries enough data to stream about 400,000 high-definition videos simultaneously, Frank said. The land route is faster. Data traveling through submarine cables from the Gulf to Europe takes about 150 milliseconds. The Iraqi terrestrial route cuts that to roughly 70 milliseconds — a difference that matters for video calls, financial transactions, and applications that run on artificial intelligence, according to IQ Networks.

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NVIDIA has confirmed in a statement for BleepingComputer that GeForce NOW user information has been exposed in a data breach. [...]

A new malware framework called PCPJack is stealing credentials from exposed cloud infrastructure while actively removing TeamPCP's access to the systems. [...]

A deeper look at the first three pillars and outlining how our capabilities directly support government agencies working to bring this strategy to life.

TrendAI™ Research breaks down Quasar Linux (QLNX), a previously undocumented sophisticated Linux RAT with low detection rates. In this blog, we examine a full-featured Linux threat incorporating a rootkit, a PAM backdoor, credential harvesting, and more, revealing how this malware enables stealthy access, persistence, and potential supply-chain attacks.

An anonymous reader quotes a report from Ars Technica: Amazon's cloud customers will need to wait several more months before the US tech company can repair war-damaged data centers and restore normal operations in the Middle East. The announcement comes two months after Iranian drone strikes targeted three Amazon data centers in the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain -- meaning that full recovery from the cloud disruption could take nearly half a year in all. The Amazon Web Services (AWS) dashboard posted an April 30 update describing how its UAE and Bahrain cloud regions "suffered damage as a result of the conflict in the Middle East" and are unable to support customer applications. The update also said that "relevant billing operations are currently suspended while we restore normal operations" in a process that "is expected to take several months." That wording suggests Amazon will continue to avoid billing AWS customers in the affected regions -- ME-CENTRAL-1 and ME-SOUTH-1 -- after it initially waived all usage-related charges for March 2026 at an estimated cost of $150 million. AWS also "strongly" recommended that customers migrate resources to other cloud regions and rely on remote backups to restore any "inaccessible resources." Some customers, such as the Dubai-based super app Careem—which offers ride-hailing, household services, and food and grocery delivery -- were able to get back online quickly after doing an overnight migration to other data center servers.

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A pair of persistent and problematic threat groups affiliated with The Com are actively targeting organizations across multiple critical infrastructure sectors for rapid data theft and extortion attacks, according to CrowdStrike.

The financially-motivated attackers, which CrowdStrike tracks as Cordial Spider and Snarky Spider, have used voice-phishing and social engineering attacks to break into victims’ identity platforms and traverse SaaS environments since at least October 2025, the company said in a report Thursday, which it shared exclusively with CyberScoop prior to release. 

Adam Meyers, senior vice president of counter adversary operations at CrowdStrike, said the subgroups composed of native English speakers primarily target U.S.-based organizations in the academic, aviation, retail, hospitality, automotive, financial services, legal and technology sectors.

This “new wave of ecrime threat actors” are closely aligned with Scattered Spider and linked to other subsets of The Com, including SLSH and ShinyHunters, Meyers said. 

Because these attacks target identity systems and can expose data in other connected services beyond the initial breach point, it’s difficult to determine how many victims have been caught up in these campaigns. 

CrowdStrike’s warning closely follows research Palo Alto Networks’ Unit 42 and the Retail & Hospitality Information Sharing and Analysis Center shared last week about Cordial Spider’s string of attacks targeting organizations in the retail and hospitality industry, among others. 

Cordial and Snarky Spider have set lures via voice calls, text messages and emails directing targeting employees to phishing pages posing as their employer’s legitimate single sign-on page or primary identity provider, researchers said. 

These phishing pages, which capture credentials, session keys or tokens, depending on the workflow, provide attackers an entry point into systems, which they exploit for widespread access across victims’ entire SaaS ecosystems.

Attackers use these initial hooks to remove and establish multi-factor authentication devices, then delete emails and other alerts that would otherwise warn organizations of potential malicious activity, researchers said. 

The data theft for extortion campaigns share striking similarities, but CrowdStrike said the tactics, techniques and procedures for each subgroup are distinct. These variances include hours of operation, different phishing domain providers, preferred operating systems, data leak sites, and the tools or devices they used to register for multi-factor authentication. 

The domain for BlackFile, Cordial Spider’s data-leak site, was offline as of Wednesday, according to Meyers.

CrowdStrike declined to put a range on the groups’ extortion demands, but Unit 42 previously said Cordial Spider, which is also tracked as CL-CRI-1116 and UNC6671, are typically in the seven-figure range.

Some victims that didn’t pay extortion demands have been subjected to DDoS attacks, and Snarky Spider has used more aggressive follow-on harassment tactics, including the swatting of victim organizations’ employees, Meyers said. 

CrowdStrike said Cordial and Snarky Spider also use residential proxy networks — including Mullvad, Oxylabs, NetNut, 9Proxy, Infatica and NSOCKS — to evade IP-based detection and blend in with typical traffic. 

Residential proxy networks, which rely on IP addresses assigned to real home users, can serve a legitimate purpose, but researchers have been warning that unethical or outright criminal operators are abusing these networks to build and support botnets, cybercrime campaigns, espionage and other malicious activity.

Cordial and Snarky Spider haven’t achieved the impact or technical capability of Scattered Spider, but the groups share many commonalities and objectives, Meyers said. 

“They’ve kind of taken their playbook and they’re using a lot of their techniques, but we haven’t really seen the technical sophistication demonstrated by them that we saw from Scattered Spider,” he said. “It’s kind of the new generation of Scattered Spider.”

The post Two new extortion crews are speedrunning the Scattered Spider playbook appeared first on CyberScoop.

The growth of data centers — and adversaries’ targeting of them — left lawmakers at a hearing Wednesday contemplating whether the federal government has the right setup for defending them.

Some industry witnesses and experts at the hearing of the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection testified that the answer might be to give data centers their own standalone designation as a critical infrastructure sector.

The question of how to secure data centers against cyber and physical attacks coincides with artificial intelligence fuelling a boom in the building of such facilities across the United States. Last month, Iranian drones targeted two Amazon data centers in response to the U.S.-Israel bombing campaign on Iran, and a third data center in Bahrain was struck as well.

“If a major data center is attacked, disrupted, or taken offline, the consequences can reach far beyond one company or one sector,” Rep. Andy Ogles, R-Tenn., said in prepared opening remarks. “Yet our current framework does not provide a clear, unified approach to data center security. It does not clearly answer which federal agency is responsible for understanding the risk, coordinating with industry, or leading the response when this infrastructure is targeted.”

Three providers account for 63 percent of the market share of data centers: Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud Platform. 

The United Kingdom already has deemed data centers as a standalone critical infrastructure sector. Reps. Vince Fong, R-Calif., and LaMonica McIver, D-N.J., asked panel witnesses Wednesday about federal protection of them.

“Given the scrutiny that is required to make sure that those data centers are secure, there would be a benefit in having them work together as a unique coordinating council,” said Robert Mayer, senior vice president for cybersecurity and innovation at USTelecom, an industry group.

The Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Mark Montgomery suggested a sector that combines data centers and cloud providers, given the overlap in ownership. The 2024 rewrite of a White House national security memo left some experts disappointed that it didn’t designate cloud computing as a critical infrastructure sector. 

Samuel Visner, chair of the board of directors of the Space Information Sharing and Analysis Center, said he agreed, given the role data centers are playing in the U.S. economy, military and other dependencies. “Finding a way to regard them as part of our critical infrastructure and protect them accordingly is sine qua non, absolutely necessary,” he said.

A fourth witness didn’t weigh in on the need for a separate critical infrastructure designation. But Scott Algeier, executive director of Information Technology Information Sharing and Analysis Center, said his organization had created a “special interest group” for data center providers.

“The data centers are integrated already into the critical infrastructure discussions,” he told the panel.

The post Congress, industry ponder government posture for protecting data centers appeared first on CyberScoop.

Researchers found more than 80 high-impact cloud and AI vulnerabilities during the event, which had a $5 million prize pool.

The post Microsoft Paid Out $2.3 Million at Zero Day Quest 2026 Hacking Contest appeared first on SecurityWeek.

Enterprises aiming to predict and mitigate human, machine, and AI‑agent risks at scale demand AI‑powered identity‑first security without compromise.

The first quarter of 2026 has reinforced a hard truth: U.S. government agencies and educational institutions are operating in the most hostile cyber threat environment ever recorded.

Palo Alto Networks has disclosed the details of its analysis of Google Cloud Platform’s Vertex AI.

The post Google Addresses Vertex Security Issues After Researchers Weaponize AI Agents appeared first on SecurityWeek.

This blog looks at how AI‑driven vibecoding speeds up software development while increasing security risk by outpacing traditional review and ownership. It explains why security needs to move earlier and be built into modern development workflows.

The company has disclosed a cybersecurity incident involving one of its electronic health record environments.

The post Healthcare IT Platform CareCloud Probing Potential Data Breach appeared first on SecurityWeek.

Litellm PyPI breach explained: malicious versions steal cloud credentials, SSH keys, and Kubernetes secrets. Learn impact and urgent mitigation steps.

An anonymous reader quotes a report from 404 Media: Apple provided the FBI with the real iCloud email address hidden behind Apple's 'Hide My Email' feature, which lets paying iCloud+ users generate anonymous email addresses, according to a recently filed court record. The move isn't surprising but still provides uncommon insight into what data is available to authorities regarding the Apple feature. The data was turned over during an investigation into a man who allegedly sent a threatening email to Alexis Wilkins, the girlfriend of FBI director Kash Patel. "On or about February 28, 2026, Person 1 received an email from the email address peaty_terms_1o@icloud.com," the affidavit reads. Earlier on, the document explicitly says that Person 1 is Alexis Wilkins. [...] The affidavit says Apple then provided records that indicated the peaty_terms_1o@icloud.com email address was associated with an Apple account in the name of Alden Ruml. The records showed that account generated 134 anonymized email addresses, according to the affidavit. Law enforcement agents later interviewed Ruml and he confirmed he had sent the email, the affidavit says. Ruml said he sent the email after reading a February 28 article about how the FBI was using its own resources to provide security to Wilkins. The specific article is not named or linked in the affidavit, but a New York Times article published that same day described how Patel ordered a team to ferry his girlfriend on errands and to events.

Read more of this story at Slashdot.

The TeamPCP hacking group is targeting Kubernetes clusters with a malicious script that wipes all machines when it detects systems configured for Iran. [...]

ProPublica reports that federal cybersecurity reviewers had serious, yearslong concerns about Microsoft's GCC High cloud offering, yet they approved it anyway because the product was already deeply embedded across government. As one member of the team put it: "The package is a pile of shit." From the report: In late 2024, the federal government's cybersecurity evaluators rendered a troubling verdict on one of Microsoft's biggest cloud computing offerings. The tech giant's "lack of proper detailed security documentation" left reviewers with a "lack of confidence in assessing the system's overall security posture," according to an internal government report reviewed by ProPublica. For years, reviewers said, Microsoft had tried and failed to fully explain how it protects sensitive information in the cloud as it hops from server to server across the digital terrain. Given that and other unknowns, government experts couldn't vouch for the technology's security. Such judgments would be damning for any company seeking to sell its wares to the U.S. government, but it should have been particularly devastating for Microsoft. The tech giant's products had been at the heart of two major cybersecurity attacks against the U.S. in three years. In one, Russian hackers exploited a weakness to steal sensitive data from a number of federal agencies, including the National Nuclear Security Administration. In the other, Chinese hackers infiltrated the email accounts of a Cabinet member and other senior government officials. The federal government could be further exposed if it couldn't verify the cybersecurity of Microsoft's Government Community Cloud High, a suite of cloud-based services intended to safeguard some of the nation's most sensitive information. Yet, in a highly unusual move that still reverberates across Washington, the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program, or FedRAMP, authorized the product anyway, bestowing what amounts to the federal government's cybersecurity seal of approval. FedRAMP's ruling -- which included a kind of "buyer beware" notice to any federal agency considering GCC High -- helped Microsoft expand a government business empire worth billions of dollars. "BOOM SHAKA LAKA," Richard Wakeman, one of the company's chief security architects, boasted in an online forum, celebrating the milestone with a meme of Leonardo DiCaprio in "The Wolf of Wall Street." It was not the type of outcome that federal policymakers envisioned a decade and a half ago when they embraced the cloud revolution and created FedRAMP to help safeguard the government's cybersecurity. The program's layers of review, which included an assessment by outside experts, were supposed to ensure that service providers like Microsoft could be entrusted with the government's secrets. But ProPublica's investigation -- drawn from internal FedRAMP memos, logs, emails, meeting minutes, and interviews with seven former and current government employees and contractors -- found breakdowns at every juncture of that process. It also found a remarkable deference to Microsoft, even as the company's products and practices were central to two of the most damaging cyberattacks ever carried out against the government.

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Learn how east-west traffic visibility helps detect and stop lateral movement attacks inside electric grid infrastructure and critical OT networks.

Learn how TrendAI™ and our researchers contributed threat intelligence and analysis to support INTERPOL against cybercrime.