The Federal Communications Commission approved new rules Thursday that boost cybersecurity regulations for the nation’s emergency alert systems and update security rules for the nation’s undersea cables.

The new rule would overhaul two national emergency systems, the Emergency Alert System and Wireless Emergency Alerts, to better protect against hijacking attacks from malicious actors.

The EAS is a national public warning system that state and local authorities use to disseminate information related to weather events, AMBER alerts and other emergencies via radio and television broadcasting stations. The WEA handles much of the same messaging via text.

A compromise of either system by a foreign government, cybercriminal group or other rogue actor could be used to sow chaos and disinformation in calmer times, or impede coordination efforts in the face of a genuine emergency. Any vulnerability in systems like the Emergency Alert System “can have serious consequences,” said FCC Commissioner Olivia Trusty in a statement after the vote.

“That is why it has been appropriate for the Commission to conduct a comprehensive review of the EAS framework by focusing on the security of the system itself,” Trusty continued. “As cybersecurity threats continue to evolve, EAS participants must take appropriate steps to safeguard the infrastructure that supports the delivery of life-saving alerts.”

The new rules amount to basic – but still critical – cyber hygiene practices for users accessing and updating the EAS and WEA systems. They must use strong passwords, quickly install security patches from vendors and use firewalls to limit access to their equipment.

The rule also creates a new authentication ID system to verify alerts before they’re submitted and avoid duplicate or unauthorized alerts from spreading.

Another rule passed by the Commission Thursday provided the first comprehensive update to the FCC’s submarine cable regulations in decades, and moves to tighten cybersecurity requirements in some areas while loosening them in others.

It exempts some undersea cable providers from submitting to stringent national security licensing reviews needed to land and operate cables that touch U.S. territory.

The review, called “Team Telecom,” is an interagency body led by the Department of Justice’s Foreign Investment Review Section and other federal agencies that advise the FCC on the national security implications of their telecom policies.

The new rules would presumptively exempt applications for undersea cable licensees when the provider can self-certify to “high security standards” that are “structured to increase certainty, predictability, and faster timelines for the licensing process.”

“Currently, all submarine cable applications get referred to Team Telecom…the changes adopted would exempt applications from applicants that have operated cables without incident, can certify to the highest national security standards, and agree to ongoing oversight and monitoring,” the FCC said in a release.

Other parts of the rule give the FCC greater oversight of critical functions within undersea cable operations. Owners and operators of submarine line terminal equipment, who connect submarine cables to land-based facilities in the U.S., will be subject to a new licensing requirement.

The rule also moves to update safeguards meant to address vulnerabilities related to principal equipment, third-party service providers, and other areas of concern in the undersea cable supply chain.

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A federal judge in Massachusetts struck down major sections of a Trump administration executive order  that would have restricted mail-in ballots through the U.S. Postal Service and required states to adopt federally approved voter lists.

The ruling Thursday from Judge Indira Talwani of the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts found those parts of the order were unconstitutional, while declaring another section that directs federal law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute noncompliant state and local officials legally nonbinding.

Talwani wrote that the U.S. Constitution empowers States and Congress in different roles but “does not grant the President any specific power over elections.”

While the White House has cited the 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA) and Civil Rights-era voting laws as justification, Talwani found those laws do not authorize the government to regulate state voter registration practices.

“Notably, nowhere in HAVA does Congress prescribe who should be included on State voter lists,” Talwani wrote. “Further, neither in HAVA nor any other federal statute does Congress authorize the federal government to create their own voting database. Instead, Congress, consistent with the Constitution, has left that authority to the States alone.”

Talwani also declined to remove President Trump and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick as named defendants in the suit, rejecting the administration’s argument that the court could not regulate or intrude upon the president’s’ constitutional authority “in the performance of his official duties.”

“Contrary to Defendants assertion, Presidential action is not inherently unreviewable,” Talwani wrote.

The order, issued in March, instructs the Homeland Security secretary, the director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigrations Services and the commissioner of the Social Security Administration to compile lists of American voters for each state, including their supposed citizenship status.

To build the lists, the agencies would rely on the controversial Systemic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) database that DHS has been building under the Trump administration, as well as Social Security and federal citizenship and naturalization records.

Those lists would then be sent to states, most of which have already refused similar Trump administration efforts to control voter registration.. The order instructs the Department of Justice to investigate  and prosecute  state and local election officials who issue  ballots to ineligible voters. 

The order also requires mail-in ballots to be sent in special barcoded envelopes for tracking. Crucially, it demands states provide lists of voters eligible for mail-in voting, and threatens to deny ballots to states that refuse. It also claims the attorney general is entitled to withhold federal funding from noncompliant states.

Talwani found that states have shown they already have a rigorous voter registration and verification process to ensure non-citizens and other ineligible voters aren’t able to vote in U.S. elections, and have laws in place to investigate and prosecute those who do.

Executive branch lawyers argued the order was merely an internal federal directive that does not impedestate authorities. But Talwani noted that states like Connecticut were already pulling staff from critical activities, such as translating election materials required under the Voting Rights Act, to develop compliance plans for the order.

Nearly half of the states in the lawsuit have already purchased mail-in ballots for this election cycle that are out of compliance with the Postal Service’s envelope and design standards.

Despite a string of losses in the courts and Congress, the White House has continued to assert broad authority over the way states and localities administer elections.

The Department of Justice has sued dozens of states to force them to hand over sensitive voter data. In the 10 cases decided so far, states have won every one.

In their opinions, judges cited the executive branch’s lack of inherent authority to create state voter lists. Others accused the DOJ of misusing Civil Rights-era laws designed to protect Black and minority voters,  creating an “unreliable” database that would disenfranchise  legitimate voters.

The Massachusetts ruling comes to the same conclusion, with Talwani writing “it is clear that the federal agencies charged with compiling Confirmed Citizen Lists lack the ability to create complete and accurate lists of the U.S. citizens residing in every State.”

On Wednesday, Trump canceled a signing ceremony for a bipartisan housing bill in an attempt to pressure  congressional Republicans to pass the SAVE America Act, which would implement many of the same changes to U.S. elections. In a Truth Social post, Trump said he considered passage of the bill to be a “National Emergency.”

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The U.S. Departments of Justice and Homeland Security seized multiple internet domains this week, accusing them of being used to publishing thousands of AI or digitally-altered images and videos of nude women.

The domains, CFAKE.com and SOCFAKE.com, specialized in digital forgeries that “were made to appear to be sexual images of famous women, including politicians, first ladies of multiple countries, royalty, journalists, television presenters, athletes, entertainers, and others” either nude or engaged in sexual activity,” according to a Department of Justice release.

In addition to creating sexual images and videos of women without their consent, the service allowed people to browse by topics, including “rape,” “forced,” and “degradation.”

That description comes from a Department of Justice release describing the contents of its probable cause affidavit and search warrants. CyberScoop has not viewed the court documents.  

The sites were seized under the TAKE IT DOWN Act, a law passed last year giving federal authorities the ability to criminally prosecute those who create and distribute deepfake porn. The law was a rare moment of bipartisan agreement in Washington D.C., gaining support from both Democrats and Republicans who said their constituents were demanding tougher laws to curb the use of AI to create nonconsensual deepfake porn.

The operation marks one of the largest seizures since the law went into effect. The details of the operation disclosed by the government show how creators of deepfake porn rely on a web of international assets and infrastructure to evade law enforcement.

Robert Fraiser, U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey, said U.S. authorities worked in coordination with law enforcement agencies in France and Italy. According to U.S. officials, they were first notified about the website by Italian Polizia de Stato, while a parallel investigation run by the Paris Public Prosecutor’s Office in France resulted in the arrest of a suspect connected with the site, along with seized cryptocurrency funds.

“These seizures stopped a website that trafficked in humiliation, exploitation, and the violation of personal privacy on a massive scale,” said Frazer in a statement. “For the victims whose images were distributed without their consent, the harm is not virtual — it is deeply personal and often enduring.”

According to the Paris Prosecutor’s Office, Cyrille B., a 47-year-old French national was arrested and accused of being an administrator for CFAKE. A search of his home in Nice found computer equipment related to the site and a little more than $48,000 in Ethereum cryptocurrency that they said came from the site’s advertising.

The French investigation identified 300,000 images, 7,000 videos depicting 14,000 individuals from different countries. The site had approximately 200,000 user accounts, 4 million views per month and uploaded 50 pieces of new content every day.

The suspect had no prior criminal record, and will go to trial on July 7. The charges carry potential penalties of up to seven years in prison and €500,000.

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigation division is leading the federal investigation, in conjunction with the U.S. Attorney’s office for New Jersey.

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The Trump administration released a legal opinion outlining the legal rationale behind its nationwide voter data collection efforts, justifying an aggressive federal role in vetting voter eligibility, a position courts have repeatedly rejected in related litigation.

The memo, released Tuesday by the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, concedes that while election administration is “primarily the purview of the states,” the administration’s efforts are a lawful exercise of federal oversight. 

The Justice Department grounds that rationale in a provision of the 1960 Civil Rights Act, requiring election officials to keep voter records for 22 months after an election so it can investigate potential civil rights violations. Under the memo’s reading, that retention rule also gives the Attorney General authority to obtain copies of those records “upon demand in writing.” 

The memo also cites several other federal election laws – like the Help America Vote Act, the National Voter Registration Act and the Voting Rights Act – as support for the executive branch’s efforts. It argues that those statutes have long required states to modernize and secure voting systems (including accessibility upgrades) and maintain accurate voter rolls by removing ineligible voters.

The memo further argues that the potential presence of one or more non-citizens on state voter rolls is enough to trigger the federal government’s nationwide data collection and sharing efforts with immigration authorities.

“Because illegal aliens are ineligible to vote, these generally applicable laws are also implicated by an illegal alien’s presence on a state’s voter rolls,” the memo states.

Multiple federal courts have come to the opposite conclusion, dismissing half a dozen lawsuits from DOJ and the Department of Homeland Security that would force states to comply. Further, states have repeatedly confirmed through recounts, audits, investigations and lawsuits that the number of non-citizens registered to vote (and who end up actually casting ballots) in U.S. elections is infinitesimal.

David Becker, executive director of the Center of Election Innovation and Research, noted in a post on BlueSky that “6 courts, including 2 judges appointed by the current president, think this ‘opinion’ isn’t worth the paper it’s written on.” Becker, a former DOJ senior trial attorney in the voting section of the Civil Rights Division, has consistently argued that the executive branch and White House have no legal or constitutional role to play in vetting state voter registration. 

Sarah Copeland Hanzas, Secretary of State for Vermont, gave a similar reaction when CyberScoop reached out for comment.

“It’s not worth the paper it’s printed on,” Hanzas said in a statement. “Or the electrons it takes to store and transmit 41 pages of fantasy.”

Election officials have largely resisted the federal government’s demands. Earlier this year, West Virginia Secretary of State Kris Warner told CyberScoop he had no intentions of handing over more information than is already publicly available.

“If they want it, they can have it: $500 dollars for [anyone to buy] the statewide list, but they’re not getting personal information,” Warner said in a January interview. “State law says we’re not sharing that and my job is to carry out the law laid out by the West Virginia legislature.”

The inability of the federal government to point to serious evidence of mass voter fraud or non-citizen voting has led states to rebuff attempts to collect sensitive data on every voter in their state, including names, social security numbers, home addresses, voter history and other details.

The administration says it intends to cross-check state data against immigration records, share that data with DHS and immigration enforcement agencies and ultimately create its own list of eligible voters. An executive order issued by the White House earlier this year sought to deny federal funding to states that did not accept voter lists from the federal government and directed the Attorney General to investigate state election officials for voter roll discrepancies. Voting groups have challenged the order’s legality, and a previous election-related executive order was largely ruled unconstitutional by the courts.

The administration has sued dozens of states who have refused to hand such data over, though it has yet to convince courts of the merit. One judge called the administration’s efforts “unprecedented and illegal” and accused the administration of twisting the Civil Rights Act and other federal laws that were passed “to protect hard won civil rights victories allowing access to the ballot box” in order to obtain unfettered access to state voter data.

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An operation to crack down on the widely used RedLine infostealer has netted the extradition of an Armenian man to the United States, where he made an initial appearance in a Texas court Wednesday.

Authorities charged Hambardzum Minasyan with conspiracy to commit access device fraud, conspiracy to violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and conspiracy to commit money laundering for his alleged role with RedLine. Infostealers thieve billions of user credentials such as passwords annually.

“Hambardzum Minasyan allegedly conspired with others to enrich himself by developing and administering RedLine, one of the most prevalent infostealing malware variants in the world, which has previously been used to conduct intrusions against major corporations,” a Justice Department news release said. “When executed, RedLine would steal data, including access devices, from victims’ computers.”

According to a summary of the indictment, Minasyan allegedly registered two virtual private servers to host RedLine, established repositories of online file sharing for distributing Redline to affiliates and registered a cryptocurrency account to receive affiliate payments.

Collectively, the conspirators also responded to questions and requests from affiliates, conspired to steal and own financial information and laundered cybercrime proceeds through cryptocurrency exchanges, the indictment states.

In 2024, the U.S. Justice Department teamed with Belgium, the Netherlands, Eurojust and others on Operation Magnus to disrupt the RedLine and Meta infostealers, the latter of which derived from the former. That same year, the Justice Department charged a Russian man, Maxim Rudometov, for his alleged role in developing RedLine.

Eurojust assisted with the extradition of Minasyan.

Court records related to Minasyan’s case had not been posted on the Pacer court system as of Wednesday afternoon. The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Texas, which is prosecuting the case, did not immediately respond to requests for a copy of the indictment.

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A Ukrainian man indicted in 2012 for conspiring with a prolific hacking group to steal tens of millions of dollars from U.S. businesses was arrested in Italy and is now in custody in the United States, KrebsOnSecurity has learned.

Sources close to the investigation say Yuriy Igorevich Rybtsov, a 41-year-old from the Russia-controlled city of Donetsk, Ukraine, was previously referenced in U.S. federal charging documents only by his online handle “MrICQ.” According to a 13-year-old indictment (PDF) filed by prosecutors in Nebraska, MrICQ was a developer for a cybercrime group known as “Jabber Zeus.”

The Jabber Zeus name is derived from the malware they used — a custom version of the ZeuS banking trojan — that stole banking login credentials and would send the group a Jabber instant message each time a new victim entered a one-time passcode at a financial institution website. The gang targeted mostly small to mid-sized businesses, and they were an early pioneer of so-called “man-in-the-browser” attacks, malware that can silently intercept any data that victims submit in a web-based form.

Once inside a victim company’s accounts, the Jabber Zeus crew would modify the firm’s payroll to add dozens of “money mules,” people recruited through elaborate work-at-home schemes to handle bank transfers. The mules in turn would forward any stolen payroll deposits — minus their commissions — via wire transfers to other mules in Ukraine and the United Kingdom.

The 2012 indictment targeting the Jabber Zeus crew named MrICQ as “John Doe #3,” and said this person handled incoming notifications of newly compromised victims. The Department of Justice (DOJ) said MrICQ also helped the group launder the proceeds of their heists through electronic currency exchange services.

Two sources familiar with the Jabber Zeus investigation said Rybtsov was arrested in Italy, although the exact date and circumstances of his arrest remain unclear. A summary of recent decisions (PDF) published by the Italian Supreme Court states that in April 2025, Rybtsov lost a final appeal to avoid extradition to the United States.

According to the mugshot website lockedup[.]wtf, Rybtsov arrived in Nebraska on October 9, and was being held under an arrest warrant from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

The data breach tracking service Constella Intelligence found breached records from the business profiling site bvdinfo[.]com showing that a 41-year-old Yuriy Igorevich Rybtsov worked in a building at 59 Barnaulska St. in Donetsk. Further searching on this address in Constella finds the same apartment building was shared by a business registered to Vyacheslav “Tank” Penchukov, the leader of the Jabber Zeus crew in Ukraine.

Penchukov was arrested in 2022 while traveling to meet his wife in Switzerland. Last year, a federal court in Nebraska sentenced Penchukov to 18 years in prison and ordered him to pay more than $73 million in restitution.

Lawrence Baldwin is founder of myNetWatchman, a threat intelligence company based in Georgia that began tracking and disrupting the Jabber Zeus gang in 2009. myNetWatchman had secretly gained access to the Jabber chat server used by the Ukrainian hackers, allowing Baldwin to eavesdrop on the daily conversations between MrICQ and other Jabber Zeus members.

Baldwin shared those real-time chat records with multiple state and federal law enforcement agencies, and with this reporter. Between 2010 and 2013, I spent several hours each day alerting small businesses across the country that their payroll accounts were about to be drained by these cybercriminals.

Those notifications, and Baldwin’s tireless efforts, saved countless would-be victims a great deal of money. In most cases, however, we were already too late. Nevertheless, the pilfered Jabber Zeus group chats provided the basis for dozens of stories published here about small businesses fighting their banks in court over six- and seven-figure financial losses.

Baldwin said the Jabber Zeus crew was far ahead of its peers in several respects. For starters, their intercepted chats showed they worked to create a highly customized botnet directly with the author of the original Zeus Trojan — Evgeniy Mikhailovich Bogachev, a Russian man who has long been on the FBI’s “Most Wanted” list. The feds have a standing $3 million reward for information leading to Bogachev’s arrest.

The core innovation of Jabber Zeus was an alert that MrICQ would receive each time a new victim entered a one-time password code into a phishing page mimicking their financial institution. The gang’s internal name for this component was “Leprechaun,” (the video below from myNetWatchman shows it in action). Jabber Zeus would actually re-write the HTML code as displayed in the victim’s browser, allowing them to intercept any passcodes sent by the victim’s bank for multi-factor authentication.

“These guys had compromised such a large number of victims that they were getting buried in a tsunami of stolen banking credentials,” Baldwin told KrebsOnSecurity. “But the whole point of Leprechaun was to isolate the highest-value credentials — the commercial bank accounts with two-factor authentication turned on. They knew these were far juicier targets because they clearly had a lot more money to protect.”

Baldwin said the Jabber Zeus trojan also included a custom “backconnect” component that allowed the hackers to relay their bank account takeovers through the victim’s own infected PC.

“The Jabber Zeus crew were literally connecting to the victim’s bank account from the victim’s IP address, or from the remote control function and by fully emulating the device,” he said. “That trojan was like a hot knife through butter of what everyone thought was state-of-the-art secure online banking at the time.”

Although the Jabber Zeus crew was in direct contact with the Zeus author, the chats intercepted by myNetWatchman show Bogachev frequently ignored the group’s pleas for help. The government says the real leader of the Jabber Zeus crew was Maksim Yakubets, a 38-year Ukrainian man with Russian citizenship who went by the hacker handle “Aqua.”

The Jabber chats intercepted by Baldwin show that Aqua interacted almost daily with MrICQ, Tank and other members of the hacking team, often facilitating the group’s money mule and cashout activities remotely from Russia.

The government says Yakubets/Aqua would later emerge as the leader of an elite cybercrime ring of at least 17 hackers that referred to themselves internally as “Evil Corp.” Members of Evil Corp developed and used the Dridex (a.k.a. Bugat) trojan, which helped them siphon more than $100 million from hundreds of victim companies in the United States and Europe.

This 2019 story about the government’s $5 million bounty for information leading to Yakubets’s arrest includes excerpts of conversations between Aqua, Tank, Bogachev and other Jabber Zeus crew members discussing stories I’d written about their victims. Both Baldwin and I were interviewed at length for a new weekly six-part podcast by the BBC that delves deep into the history of Evil Corp. Episode One focuses on the evolution of Zeus, while the second episode centers on an investigation into the group by former FBI agent Jim Craig.

The world’s largest and most disruptive botnet is now drawing a majority of its firepower from compromised Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices hosted on U.S. Internet providers like AT&T, Comcast and Verizon, new evidence suggests. Experts say the heavy concentration of infected devices at U.S. providers is complicating efforts to limit collateral damage from the botnet’s attacks, which shattered previous records this week with a brief traffic flood that clocked in at nearly 30 trillion bits of data per second.

Since its debut more than a year ago, the Aisuru botnet has steadily outcompeted virtually all other IoT-based botnets in the wild, with recent attacks siphoning Internet bandwidth from an estimated 300,000 compromised hosts worldwide.

The hacked systems that get subsumed into the botnet are mostly consumer-grade routers, security cameras, digital video recorders and other devices operating with insecure and outdated firmware, and/or factory-default settings. Aisuru’s owners are continuously scanning the Internet for these vulnerable devices and enslaving them for use in distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks that can overwhelm targeted servers with crippling amounts of junk traffic.

As Aisuru’s size has mushroomed, so has its punch. In May 2025, KrebsOnSecurity was hit with a near-record 6.35 terabits per second (Tbps) attack from Aisuru, which was then the largest assault that Google’s DDoS protection service Project Shield had ever mitigated. Days later, Aisuru shattered that record with a data blast in excess of 11 Tbps.

By late September, Aisuru was publicly flexing DDoS capabilities topping 22 Tbps. Then on October 6, its operators heaved a whopping 29.6 terabits of junk data packets each second at a targeted host. Hardly anyone noticed because it appears to have been a brief test or demonstration of Aisuru’s capabilities: The traffic flood lasted less only a few seconds and was pointed at an Internet server that was specifically designed to measure large-scale DDoS attacks.

Aisuru’s overlords aren’t just showing off. Their botnet is being blamed for a series of increasingly massive and disruptive attacks. Although recent assaults from Aisuru have targeted mostly ISPs that serve online gaming communities like Minecraft, those digital sieges often result in widespread collateral Internet disruption.

For the past several weeks, ISPs hosting some of the Internet’s top gaming destinations have been hit with a relentless volley of gargantuan attacks that experts say are well beyond the DDoS mitigation capabilities of most organizations connected to the Internet today.

Steven Ferguson is principal security engineer at Global Secure Layer (GSL), an ISP in Brisbane, Australia. GSL hosts TCPShield, which offers free or low-cost DDoS protection to more than 50,000 Minecraft servers worldwide. Ferguson told KrebsOnSecurity that on October 8, TCPShield was walloped with a blitz from Aisuru that flooded its network with more than 15 terabits of junk data per second.

Ferguson said that after the attack subsided, TCPShield was told by its upstream provider OVH that they were no longer welcome as a customer.

“This was causing serious congestion on their Miami external ports for several weeks, shown publicly via their weather map,” he said, explaining that TCPShield is now solely protected by GSL.

Traces from the recent spate of crippling Aisuru attacks on gaming servers can be still seen at the website blockgametracker.gg, which indexes the uptime and downtime of the top Minecraft hosts. In the following example from a series of data deluges on the evening of September 28, we can see an Aisuru botnet campaign briefly knocked TCPShield offline.

Paging through the same uptime graphs for other network operators listed shows almost all of them suffered brief but repeated outages around the same time. Here is the same uptime tracking for Minecraft servers on the network provider Cosmic (AS30456), and it shows multiple large dips that correspond to game server outages caused by Aisuru.

BOTNETS R US

Ferguson said he’s been tracking Aisuru for about three months, and recently he noticed the botnet’s composition shifted heavily toward infected systems at ISPs in the United States. Ferguson shared logs from an attack on October 8 that indexed traffic by the total volume sent through each network provider, and the logs showed that 11 of the top 20 traffic sources were U.S. based ISPs.

AT&T customers were by far the biggest U.S. contributors to that attack, followed by botted systems on Charter Communications, Comcast, T-Mobile and Verizon, Ferguson found. He said the volume of data packets per second coming from infected IoT hosts on these ISPs is often so high that it has started to affect the quality of service that ISPs are able to provide to adjacent (non-botted) customers.

“The impact extends beyond victim networks,” Ferguson said. “For instance we have seen 500 gigabits of traffic via Comcast’s network alone. This amount of egress leaving their network, especially being so US-East concentrated, will result in congestion towards other services or content trying to be reached while an attack is ongoing.”

Roland Dobbins is principal engineer at Netscout. Dobbins said Ferguson is spot on, noting that while most ISPs have effective mitigations in place to handle large incoming DDoS attacks, many are far less prepared to manage the inevitable service degradation caused by large numbers of their customers suddenly using some or all available bandwidth to attack others.

“The outbound and cross-bound DDoS attacks can be just as disruptive as the inbound stuff,” Dobbin said. “We’re now in a situation where ISPs are routinely seeing terabit-per-second plus outbound attacks from their networks that can cause operational problems.”

“The crying need for effective and universal outbound DDoS attack suppression is something that is really being highlighted by these recent attacks,” Dobbins continued. “A lot of network operators are learning that lesson now, and there’s going to be a period ahead where there’s some scrambling and potential disruption going on.”

KrebsOnSecurity sought comment from the ISPs named in Ferguson’s report. Charter Communications pointed to a recent blog post on protecting its network, stating that Charter actively monitors for both inbound and outbound attacks, and that it takes proactive action wherever possible.

“In addition to our own extensive network security, we also aim to reduce the risk of customer connected devices contributing to attacks through our Advanced WiFi solution that includes Security Shield, and we make Security Suite available to our Internet customers,” Charter wrote in an emailed response to questions. “With the ever-growing number of devices connecting to networks, we encourage customers to purchase trusted devices with secure development and manufacturing practices, use anti-virus and security tools on their connected devices, and regularly download security patches.”

A spokesperson for Comcast responded, “Currently our network is not experiencing impacts and we are able to handle the traffic.”

9 YEARS OF MIRAI

Aisuru is built on the bones of malicious code that was leaked in 2016 by the original creators of the Mirai IoT botnet. Like Aisuru, Mirai quickly outcompeted all other DDoS botnets in its heyday, and obliterated previous DDoS attack records with a 620 gigabit-per-second siege that sidelined this website for nearly four days in 2016.

The Mirai botmasters likewise used their crime machine to attack mostly Minecraft servers, but with the goal of forcing Minecraft server owners to purchase a DDoS protection service that they controlled. In addition, they rented out slices of the Mirai botnet to paying customers, some of whom used it to mask the sources of other types of cybercrime, such as click fraud.

Dobbins said Aisuru’s owners also appear to be renting out their botnet as a distributed proxy network that cybercriminal customers anywhere in the world can use to anonymize their malicious traffic and make it appear to be coming from regular residential users in the U.S.

“The people who operate this botnet are also selling (it as) residential proxies,” he said. “And that’s being used to reflect application layer attacks through the proxies on the bots as well.”

The Aisuru botnet harkens back to its predecessor Mirai in another intriguing way. One of its owners is using the Telegram handle “9gigsofram,” which corresponds to the nickname used by the co-owner of a Minecraft server protection service called Proxypipe that was heavily targeted in 2016 by the original Mirai botmasters.

Robert Coelho co-ran Proxypipe back then along with his business partner Erik “9gigsofram” Buckingham, and has spent the past nine years fine-tuning various DDoS mitigation companies that cater to Minecraft server operators and other gaming enthusiasts. Coelho said he has no idea why one of Aisuru’s botmasters chose Buckingham’s nickname, but added that it might say something about how long this person has been involved in the DDoS-for-hire industry.

“The Aisuru attacks on the gaming networks these past seven day have been absolutely huge, and you can see tons of providers going down multiple times a day,” Coelho said.

Coelho said the 15 Tbps attack this week against TCPShield was likely only a portion of the total attack volume hurled by Aisuru at the time, because much of it would have been shoved through networks that simply couldn’t process that volume of traffic all at once. Such outsized attacks, he said, are becoming increasingly difficult and expensive to mitigate.

“It’s definitely at the point now where you need to be spending at least a million dollars a month just to have the network capacity to be able to deal with these attacks,” he said.

RAPID SPREAD

Aisuru has long been rumored to use multiple zero-day vulnerabilities in IoT devices to aid its rapid growth over the past year. XLab, the Chinese security company that was the first to profile Aisuru’s rise in 2024, warned last month that one of the Aisuru botmasters had compromised the firmware distribution website for Totolink, a maker of low-cost routers and other networking gear.

“Multiple sources indicate the group allegedly compromised a router firmware update server in April and distributed malicious scripts to expand the botnet,” XLab wrote on September 15. “The node count is currently reported to be around 300,000.”

Aisuru’s operators received an unexpected boost to their crime machine in August when the U.S. Department Justice charged the alleged proprietor of Rapper Bot, a DDoS-for-hire botnet that competed directly with Aisuru for control over the global pool of vulnerable IoT systems.

Once Rapper Bot was dismantled, Aisuru’s curators moved quickly to commandeer vulnerable IoT devices that were suddenly set adrift by the government’s takedown, Dobbins said.

“Folks were arrested and Rapper Bot control servers were seized and that’s great, but unfortunately the botnet’s attack assets were then pieced out by the remaining botnets,” he said. “The problem is, even if those infected IoT devices are rebooted and cleaned up, they will still get re-compromised by something else generally within minutes of being plugged back in.”

BOTMASTERS AT LARGE

XLab’s September blog post cited multiple unnamed sources saying Aisuru is operated by three cybercriminals: “Snow,” who’s responsible for botnet development; “Tom,” tasked with finding new vulnerabilities; and “Forky,” responsible for botnet sales.

KrebsOnSecurity interviewed Forky in our May 2025 story about the record 6.3 Tbps attack from Aisuru. That story identified Forky as a 21-year-old man from Sao Paulo, Brazil who has been extremely active in the DDoS-for-hire scene since at least 2022. The FBI has seized Forky’s DDoS-for-hire domains several times over the years.

Like the original Mirai botmasters, Forky also operates a DDoS mitigation service called Botshield. Forky declined to discuss the makeup of his ISP’s clientele, or to clarify whether Botshield was more of a hosting provider or a DDoS mitigation firm. However, Forky has posted on Telegram about Botshield successfully mitigating large DDoS attacks launched against other DDoS-for-hire services.

In our previous interview, Forky acknowledged being involved in the development and marketing of Aisuru, but denied participating in attacks launched by the botnet.

Reached for comment earlier this month, Forky continued to maintain his innocence, claiming that he also is still trying to figure out who the current Aisuru botnet operators are in real life (Forky said the same thing in our May interview).

But after a week of promising juicy details, Forky came up empty-handed once again. Suspecting that Forky was merely being coy, I asked him how someone so connected to the DDoS-for-hire world could still be mystified on this point, and suggested that his inability or unwillingness to blame anyone else for Aisuru would not exactly help his case.

At this, Forky verbally bristled at being pressed for more details, and abruptly terminated our interview.

“I’m not here to be threatened with ignorance because you are stressed,” Forky replied. “They’re blaming me for those new attacks. Pretty much the whole world (is) due to your blog.”