The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency finally got a new nominee for director, with President Donald Trump on Monday nominating Michael LoSapio, chief information security officer at Palantir.

CISA has been without a Senate-confirmed director for the entirety of Trump’s second term, after his first pick, Sean Plankey, languished in the Senate before withdrawing in April.

LoSapio could face some obstacles of his own, with Palantir far from a popular company with the Democrats set to take over Congress. Democrats have scrutinized the company over its work with the Department of Homeland Security, even as Palantir has denied aiding mass surveillance of immigrants.

As of late last month, Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., was also still waiting for CISA to release a public version of a report on telecommunications cybersecurity, and he had placed one of several Senate holds on Plankey pending the receipt of that report.

Republicans will still control the Senate until January, however, and a lame-duck session began Monday.

Some CISA watchers were convinced that the agency’s acting director, Nick Andersen, was likely to continue holding the role. He was running out of days to hold the “acting” position under the law, but putting forward a nominee could pause the clock on that deadline.

The administration was thought to be looking for someone from a high-profile tech company to fill the CISA director position, a bill LoSapio fits.

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Early reports of ballot scanner malfunctions in Westchester County, New York are a sign of the challenges election officials will face in the current online information environment as voters head to the polls Tuesday on the final day of voting.

While such equipment failures and breakdowns are not uncommon and happen in a small number of precincts every election cycle, and there is no evidence of foul play, conspiracists quickly jumped on the news.

According to Kate Starbird, a professor at the University of Washington who researches online rumors and disinformation tied to elections, the rumors are already spreading within right-wing online circles as evidence of election malfeasance.

Starbird cited metrics showing that posts on X about the scanner malfunctions grew to as many as 100 a minute in the hours after the news was reported, with established election deniers, such as The Gateway Pundit, amplifying conspiracist framings.

The Westchester County Board of Elections said the problems appear related to some ballots being too thick for the machines to accept, leading to rejections. Voters with affected ballots were told to place them in designated orange emergency ballot bags that will be secured, monitored and counted by officials in compliance with election laws.

“The Board of Elections is in constant communication with New York State officials, Westchester County Government and poll workers to address this issue and ensure that voting continues with as little disruption as possible,” the board wrote in a statement. “In the meantime, voters should continue to complete their paper ballots as instructed by poll workers.”

New York Attorney General Letitia James said her office was also monitoring the situation and “is in touch with the state and local Boards of Elections as they work on a solution.”

“Westchester voters can still safely fill out and turn in their ballots at their polling locations,” James wrote on X. “Your votes will count.”

Westchester County is where many votes in the NY-17 congressional race will be cast between Republican incumbent Mike Lawler and Democratic Party nominee Cait Conley. Conley previously served as the election security lead for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency under the Biden administration.

Lawler sought to assure his supporters that the affected ballots will be transported by police escorts to a central location at the board of elections and will not be opened at the polling site.

“I want to be clear: there’s no shenanigans going on here,” Lawler said in a news conference Tuesday.

Meanwhile, the Department of Justice issued a news release announcing charges against 63 individuals, many of them lawful permanent residents who have lived in the U.S. for decades and some who later became naturalized citizens with legal voting rights, for allegedly voting as noncitizens in a past election.

The charges are part of a flurry of last-minute actions by the Trump administration to promote the specter of widespread noncitizen voting. The administration also brought lawsuits against states, like California and Alaska, in the past week that have sought to influence how ballots are treated and counted in the upcoming Senate races. Federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have thrown them out while reiterating the executive branch has no constitutional or legal role in the administration of state-run elections.

Another federal court ordered the Justice Department and the Department of Homeland Security to stop sending lists of “potential noncitizen” voters to states, after Trump administration lawyers acknowledged in court that the data they rely on for those assertions has a “high” error rate.

Nevertheless, the department continued its aggressive posture, announcing Tuesday that it would be deploying 1,000 election monitors to precincts across all 50 states.

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A federal judge dismissed a lawsuit from the federal government seeking to preemptively block Democratic Senate candidate Mary Peltola from assuming office if she wins her race.

The Department of Justice sued Alaska last month, arguing that an alleged scheme by Peltola to recruit Daniel J. Sullivan, an independent candidate who shares a name with incumbent Republican Sen. Dan S. Sullivan, would confuse voters.

Peltola’s campaign, the Democratic Senate Campaign Committee and civic groups including the League of Women Voters of Alaska and Common Cause all filed motions to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing the federal government lacks standing and constitutional authority to weigh in on Alaska’s elections.

They also said the court cannot grant relief because there is no legal way to determine whether a voter mistakenly voted for one Sullivan over the other without violating the secret ballot.

U.S. District Judge Sharon Gleason reached the same conclusion, noting in an order “the absence of any explanation from the United States as to how its requested relief could redress its alleged injury while simultaneously maintaining the secrecy of the ballot.” She also wrote that she “cannot grant the United States the relief it seeks because the United States has failed to establish the redressability prerequisite for Article III standing.”

Gleason’s opinion recounts Daniel J. Sullivan’s independent candidacy. Alaska Director of Elections Carol Beecher decertified it in June, later testifying that she did not believe he was running in good faith. State courts disagreed and restored his candidacy, and the Alaska Supreme Court upheld that ruling. 

Alaskan election officials still took steps to distinguish the two candidates, listing their full names and labeling them “Incumbent,” “Republican candidate” and “Independent.” Alaska’s ranked-choice system lets voters rank both Sullivans, so they are not limited to a single candidate.

State officials and election experts also noted that nearly 60,000 Alaskan voters have already cast early or mail ballots, and there is no feasible way to reissue them.

The government’s one-sentence response said the state could segregate ballots and asked the court to allow a federal investigation into whether any voters were deceived. Gleason rejected that approach, saying the government offered no explanation of how ballot segregation or a law enforcement inquiry into voters’ intent could be carried out while preserving ballot secrecy.

Gleason also questioned the government’s constitutional basis, writing that the executive branch has no legitimate role in determining which candidates appear on Alaska’s ballots. The government said it was not seeking to change the time, place or manner of the election, but Gleason noted that its requests, including limits on certification, ballot segregation and an investigation of voters’ intent, all concern those matters, which are the state’s responsibility.

The lawsuit drew heavy media attention and concern from democracy advocates, but legal experts widely viewed it as exceptionally weak.

“Today’s ruling marks a victory for Alaska state sovereignty and Alaskan voters,” said David Becker, executive director of the nonprofit Center for Election Innovation and Research and a former voting rights attorney at DOJ. “By soundly rejecting the administration’s unlawful and now unsuccessful attempt to interfere, the court concurred with the State of Alaska that this is purely a matter of state law and that, under the U.S. Constitution, the federal government has no role in determining how Alaska certifies its Senate election.”

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The Trump administration is taking direct aim at California state election officials, issuing grand jury subpoenas to election offices statewide ahead of the final day of voting on Nov. 3.

The investigations, first reported by Bloomberg, center on alleged administration of illegal voting. They are ostensibly tied to demands by the U.S. Justice Department that California and other states use federal voter lists to determine whether a voter is a “potential noncitizen” and should be removed.

The Los Angeles County Registrar of Voters told CyberScoop it received multiple grand jury subpoenas last week related to the investigation. The office called the federal efforts an attempt to intimidate California election officials into accepting federal supremacy over state voter registration authority.

“At every step, the U.S. Department of Justice has taken a confrontational, adversarial approach,” said Los Angeles County Registrar Dean Logan in a statement. “Election officials are acting in accordance with state and federal law. Clear court rulings at both the U.S. District Court level and the Court of Appeals have confirmed that. Threats and intimidation have no place in elections. We will take whatever steps necessary to ensure the safety of our employees and to remain focused on serving the voters of Los Angeles County so they can exercise their voting franchise.”

California Secretary of State Shirley Weber, also reportedly a target of the federal probe, did not respond to a request for comment from CyberScoop.

One California election official, Clint Curtis, the outgoing registrar of voters in Shasta County, endorsed the federal government’s efforts to remove 20,000 voters from California voter rolls. Curtis, whose term ends in January, was previously part of a failed effort to hire Tina Peters, a felon and former Mesa County, Colorado, election clerk to help with the upcoming midterms. Curtis has long believed in widespread election fraud.

He told CyberScoop earlier this year that he believed Shasta County elections in 2024 were plagued by suspicious mail-in ballots, saying they looked, felt and “smelled” different from normal mail ballots.

The U.S. Constitution gives states the authority to administer elections and Congress the power to make election laws, something courts have repeatedly upheld in dozens of legal challenges by the Trump administration.

The Department of Justice has claimed there are at least 20,000 such potential noncitizens on California’s voter lists, while the Department of Homeland Security told CyberScoop the figure could be as many as 190,000. The administration’s data, drawn from public voter lists, federal databases and commercially purchased personal information, has been repeatedly criticized by election officials, voting experts and federal courts as inaccurate and unreliable for determining voter eligibility.

Most people identified as “potential noncitizens” turn out to be naturalized citizens who have since gained voting rights, or the result of state administrative errors that mistakenly registered a small number of ineligible voters. Many of those mistakenly registered never cast a ballot.

State officials have had to defend against attempts at federal coercion as well as third-party activists who are constantly testing and probing election procedures nationwide, sometimes without understanding the laws election officials must follow to verify voters.

On Wednesday, the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office in Minnesota announced felony charges against a pair of right-wing provocateurs, James O’Keefe and Cam Higby, for unlawful voting and identity theft. According to a statement from Hennepin County Attorney Mary Moriarty, the two showed up at various election offices, provided false identities of real voters to election judges, violating state laws against misrepresenting their identity in applying for a ballot.

“Elections are the bedrock of democracy and their protection is one of our highest priorities. Individuals engaging in unlawful conduct related to our elections will be held accountable,” said Moriarty. “Our office has had regular meetings with Hennepin County Elections staff in preparation for both the primary and the general elections this year and we are fully prepared.”

Voting rights and civil society groups are also executing short- and long-term plans to combat potential voter disenfranchisement ahead of Tuesday.

Jessica Ayoub, deputy political director for the Michigan American Civil Liberties Union, said her organization has “never been more prepared” for any expected fights with the federal government or local officials seeking to disenfranchise voters, saying they first began planning for different scenarios 18 months ago, cultivating relationships with hundreds of clerks and election staff across Michigan.

“We’ve gamed out 25 potential scenarios and have rapid response strategies that we’ll deploy to ensure our elections are protected and that our democracy remains intact,” said Ayoub, who cited a desire not to publicize further details ahead of next month.

On Friday, voting rights groups filed a new lawsuit against the Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security in California, seeking to block the federal government’s efforts against state election officials.

The groups are asking a judge to declare that the federal government has exceeded its constitutional authority and that state officials are legally carrying out their duties. They also want the court to force the departments to contact all California election officials who received subpoenas and tell them the investigation has halted due to a court order.

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A series of federal raids and arrests of voters in California has escalated the Trump administration’s ongoing efforts to take administrative control of U.S. elections.

The arrests, paired with comments from top officials at the departments of Justice and Homeland Security, also make it clear that the federal government is willing to act on its past threats to investigate, arrest, or prosecute more than 190,000 California voters who the administration claims are “potential” noncitizens.

The Department of Justice announced Monday it made 28 arrests across California, part of what it was calling “Operation Protect the Vote.” All those arrested were foreign nationals and permanent green card holders, charged with fraudulently registering to vote in U.S. elections and making false statements in a naturalization application.

The Department of Justice said on Oct. 13 it provided a “list” of 20,000 registered California voters to California Secretary of State Shirley Weber, claiming they were ineligible to vote based on federal records.

“Each of the 28 defendants charged today appears on the list of more than 20,000 likely noncitizen registrants we provided to California election officials last week,” said Acting Deputy Attorney General Trent McCotter in a statement. “California refused to look at that list. Today’s charges show exactly what that refusal puts at risk. California must verify the citizenship of those more than 20,000 registrants before mail-in ballots are counted.”

A DHS spokesperson said Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Homeland Security Investigations are “actively rooting out and investigating” alleged voter fraud while claiming the Trump administration has “repeatedly” proven that noncitizens vote in elections.  

“DHS and DOJ are laser focused on prosecuting and removing aliens who vote and preventing the dilution of the votes of U.S. citizens,” the unnamed DHS spokesperson wrote in response to questions about the raid. “ONLY Americans should elect American leaders.”

There is no credible evidence of widespread voter fraud in U.S. elections, either among legal voters or noncitizens. The Trump administration’s record, in public statements as well as lawsuits and other court actions, reflects a history of wildly overinflated claims of actual fraud, while casting routine or isolated errors in voter registration as evidence of larger election malfeasance.

Over the course of Trump’s first term, his subsequent time as a private citizen, and his current second term, he has had many chances to provide evidence of widespread voter fraud or noncitizen voting in court, and he has lost each time. His administration has also filed dozens of lawsuits against state and locally run elections. In these cases, the administration argues the federal government’s authority to investigate and prosecute voter fraud outweighs states’ authority to run elections. In the lawsuits seeking states’ voter registration records, the federal government has lost every case so far. 

In the past two years, the Department of Justice and Republican secretaries of state have regularly announced findings of hundreds of thousands of “potential noncitizens” registered to vote. In nearly every single instance, follow-up investigations confirm the number of confirmed noncitizens registered was a tiny fraction of the original claims, with the vast majority being simple mistakes with no evidence of a larger plot.

A DHS spokesperson told CyberScoop that its internal list contains more than 190,000 registered California voters alleged to be “potential noncitizens.” The spokesperson said the list was culled from publicly available state voter registration data, federal databases and “commercial third-party data,” that cross-referenced them “with known aliens in our systems.”

“Our message to aliens who vote in American elections is clear: we will find you, arrest you, and you will face the consequences — including criminal charges and deportation,” the spokesperson said.

California Secretary of State Shirley Weber’s office did not respond to a request for comment on the raids.

“190,000 remains the number of potential noncitizens registered to vote in California that DHS asked Secretary Weber to review,” the spokesperson continued. “The 20,000 referenced by DOJ is a subset of registrants that have gone through the manual verification process so far.”

Last week three Democratic senators, including Alex Padilla, D-Calif., wrote to Attorney General Todd Blanche pressing him to commit that the Department of Justice, FBI or other federal law enforcement agencies will not seize live ballots or voting machines during the upcoming midterm elections.

The administration has already carried out federal raids in Georgia and Arizona to seize ballots from the 2020 election, and the senators called out personal efforts “by President Trump directly to DOJ attorneys to influence election-related investigations in California and elsewhere.”

Padilla’s office did not respond to a request for comment on the arrests.

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Members of Congress are pressing the Trump administration to expand the federal government’s role in securing artificial intelligence, wanting new safety standards and regulations, independent testing of models and more “aggressive” use of AI for defensive cybersecurity purposes.

In a letter, Sens. Maria Cantwell, D-Wash., and Mike Rounds, R-S.D., said that multiple incidents of frontier AI models escaping sandbox protections and breaching real companies, organizations and governments necessitate a stronger federal role in regulating the technology.

Recent revelations that hundreds, and possibly “tens of thousands,” of such incidents may have occurred for months without OpenAI’s staff detecting them makes the need for federal intervention even more urgent, the senators argued.

“These incidents come as AI systems are becoming dramatically more capable at discovering software vulnerabilities, writing and executing code, using digital tools, and operating autonomously,” the senators wrote.

The letter, addressed to Jay Clayton, director of national intelligence and new White House “AI czar” and Michael Kratsios, director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, urges the federal government “to bring its full capacities to bear on this challenge, building a coordinated national response around standards, testing, auditing, and defensive AI.”

The Center for Advancing Innovation and Standards for Super Intelligence (CAISSI), housed within the Department of Commerce, has become the Trump administration’s main body for evaluating and testing AI models. In the letter, the senators are seeking to expand the center’s resources and mandate.

Under the Trump administration, testing of frontier models has been voluntary and focused on evaluating model capabilities, not restricting them. The administration has since said it has reached a safety testing framework with OpenAI, Anthropic and other AI companies to govern safety testing, but has not made the agreement public.

The senators call for CAISSI to spearhead the development of “technically grounded and measurable standards and risk management frameworks for advanced AI safety and security.” Those standards would address potential risks like cyberattacks, automated attacks on critical infrastructure and other threats.

“The standards should also address the security of the environments in which advanced AI systems are developed, trained, tested, and used internally, including protections against agents escaping testing environments, gaining unauthorized access to external systems, or taking actions beyond their intended permissions,” the senators wrote.

The letter argues the center and federal technology hubs like the National Institute of Standards and Technology should hire additional expertise in AI, cybersecurity, model evaluation and national security.

It also calls for a much broader community of independent and third-party testers. Currently, that testing is done almost entirely by AI companies and hand-selected auditors, like Model Evaluation and Threat Research (METR), Redwood Research and others.

Last month, Chris Painter, president of METR, told Congress that the firm’s investigation of the Hugging Face hacking incident was at the invitation of OpenAI, which tightly controls which organizations and testers get access to its unreleased models. While they are permitted to publicize some findings, such as those that relate to potentially catastrophic risks to humanity, researchers are otherwise restricted from discussing other parts of their investigation through nondisclosure agreements.

Additionally, Painter suggested that frontier companies are relying too heavily on their own technology, rather than technical controls, to monitor and restrain their models in testing.

“Because of the scale and speed at which AI agents are deployed, companies depend on AI monitoring and controls instead of human supervision, to prevent unwanted agent behavior,” Painter said. “That is, monitoring of AI is now in large part done by other AI systems.”

The senators call for CAISSI, national laboratories and the Department of Energy to become federal testing sites. There, the government would evaluate AI models for advanced cyber capabilities, biological or chemical threats, threats to critical infrastructure, sandbox evasion techniques and other autonomous rule-breaking behavior. They also want testing opened to universities, independent research organizations and “qualified third-party evaluators,” including private sector companies.

Other federal bodies, like the National Security Agency, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and National Science Foundation can help develop new standards and testbeds for AI tools used in defensive cybersecurity that can then be shared across government and with the public.

“The recent incidents make clear that the security infrastructure surrounding advanced AI must advance as quickly as the technology itself,” the senators wrote. “The United States has an opportunity to lead both sides of this challenge: building the standards, testing, and auditing infrastructure needed for increasingly powerful AI, while harnessing those same capabilities to make American networks harder to attack.”

You can read the full letter here.

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The summer’s cyberattacks by Iranian hackers on water systems in 12 states underscored how vulnerable U.S. water systems are to foreign adversaries. A broad attack on water infrastructure could have consequences comparable to a public health crisis that impacts the country’s entire population.

The threat to water has long been clear. As the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment from the U.S. intelligence community states “Cyber actors from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and ransomware groups . . .  pose critical threats to U.S. networks and critical infrastructure.”

Advances in artificial intelligence have heightened those vulnerabilities. Advanced AI models, such as Anthropic’s Claude Mythos, have demonstrated the ability to identify thousands of zero-day vulnerabilities in critical software systems, including major operating systems and browsers. Other systems, including some developed in China, are demonstrating similar capabilities. AI systems can now “plan, test, and execute attacks in rapid cycles,” ranging from minutes down to seconds.

U.S. water systems are vulnerable to cyberattacks for technical, legal and practical reasons.

Technical: About 80% of U.S. water systems lack even basic cyber hygiene, a weakness exploited in the summer attacks. Even systems that serve most of the population (approximately 450 large and 4500 medium-sized water systems) have not adopted advanced cybersecurity capabilities used in other sectors where failure can have catastrophic consequences, including aviation, rail, mass transit, medical devices, finance, and nuclear power.

Legal: The Environmental Protection Agency lacks clear statutory authority to impose broad cybersecurity requirements on water systems. In 2023, EPA issued a memo interpreting existing regulations to strengthen the cybersecurity of water systems. The action met widespread opposition from the water sector as well as formal legal challenges, and the EPA ultimately withdrew the memo. The agency retains limited authority. It can require water systems to complete  risk and resilience assessments, maintain emergency response plans and, in emergencies, address critical cybersecurity flaws.  

Practical: Most U.S. water systems are small.  Some 45,000 serve 3,300 persons or fewer. Because of their size, many fall outside the EPA’s regulatory authority and below the “cyber poverty line,” lacking the funding, staff and expertise necessary for effective cybersecurity.

Not surprisingly, the summer attacks drew attention from the administration and Congress. The EPA ,in partnership with the FBI, and CISA each issued guidance on remedial actions, including disconnecting operational technology, from the internet where feasible and adopting robust password practices.

Sens. Amy Klobuchar, D-Minn., and Adam Schiff (D-Calif., introduced the Water Safety Shield Act, a bill that would require tiered cybersecurity standards for the water sector and dedicate a proposed $600 million annually to water cybersecurity. It would go beyond earlier, less prescriptive efforts to improve resilience in the sector.  

The administration has also established a pilot program with Texas and private-sector cybersecurity companies to identify and address water-system vulnerabilities at no cost to utilities. These efforts are well intentioned, but they do not address the underlying causes of the problem.

Large and midsize U.S. water systems have long been targets of sophisticated adversaries. China’s Volt Typhoon revealed deep Chinese penetration of critical infrastructure, including water systems, that support national security, economic security, and civil society. Those systems remain vulnerable because many have not adopted well-known protections, such as zero-trust architecture. More fundamentally, the software on which they depend remains vulnerable to exploitation.

Policymakers have struggled to respond for two reasons: the cost and complexity of adopting stronger technical defenses, and the highly fragmented nature of the water sector. A relatively small number of large systems serve about half the U.S. population. Roughly 49,000 systems serve the rest, including the 80% of the systems serving 3,300 people or fewer. Those smaller systems serve about 7% of the population.

Despite these challenges, the capabilities needed to significantly strengthen U.S. water-system security are well known and widely used in other sectors where failure can be devastating, including those listed above.

A five-part federal program could provide high-level cybersecurity for U.S. water systems.

Establish stronger technical capabilities. Water systems should adopt zero-trust architecture, which permits only authenticated, minimum-necessary access to resources and segments networks so that a breach in one area does not compromise the entire system. Such architecture could have blocked the unauthorized intrusions used in the summer attacks. Zero-trust systems are already widely used across multiple sectors, and commercial providers can support their adoption. The Department of Defense has certified several companies to provide zero-trust architecture for department components.

Water systems should also use formal methods to reduce or eliminate vulnerabilities in software that cannot safely fail.  Although the summer attackers did not appear to exploit flaws in the water systems’ code, a high-level adversary such as China would be likely to do so.

Formal methods range from “memory-safe” programming languages, which prevent coding errors that leave computer memory open to attack, to rigorous mathematical proofs that verify that software behaves as intended. They also support secure “microkernels,” which strictly separate software functions and make it far more difficult for an attacker to move laterally through a system.

Safe code development draws on the principles of formal methods but is a more practical, semi-formal approach. AI tools developed by companies including Google and CrowdStrike can identify and help repair software vulnerabilities, a process sometimes called “code mending.” Water systems should use such tools to defend against advanced adversaries.

Developing formally verified code for water systems would not be simple. But much of the software that directs the mechanical operations of water utilities comes from a small group of companies, including Siemens, Schneider, and Rockwell Automation. Those companies have the technical expertise to develop more secure code where it is necessary. Secure microkernels are also commercially available.

Support large water systems.  Congress should require large water systems to adopt zero-trust architecture, code-mending tools, and formal methods for critical software. The requirements should be phased in over time.  The legislation should also provide tax credits to help cover the costs of developing, implementing, and maintaining these protections.

Assist midsize water systems. The federal government should establish a program that provides technical expertise and financial support to midsize water systems, including municipal utilities. The program should help them adopt zero-trust architecture, code-mending tools, and formal methods for software development.

Midsize systems will likely need a longer phase-in period than large utilities.  A federally funded cohort of experts drawn from government and the private sector could provide the necessary support. Regional teams, organized by geography or technical specialty, could address the different needs of different water systems.

Create a safe operations posture for small water systems. Few, if any, systems serving 3,300 people or fewer are run by organization with substantial cybersecurity resources. Many cash-strapped systems rely on remote monitoring because on-site service is beyond their budgets. But remote monitoring can create serious risk when industrial devices are exposed directly to the public internet without proper firewalls or virtual private networks. 

The summer attacks primarily exploited such exposed devices. The EPA, FBI, and CISA guidance said the affected systems could be protected by locking them into “run” mode, which prevents remote reprogramming. That step may reduce immediate risk, but it also requires systems to be operated in person.

Small utilities therefore need either the staff and funding for manual operations or secure remote-access systems operated by trained personnel.

A voluntary cybersecurity corps could help address the budget and staffing challenges facing small water systems.  One model would follow the National Guard approach: State governors would oversee the effort, while the federal government would provide funding. A state-led program could begin with water systems and later expand to other vulnerable critical-infrastructure sectors.

The Texas pilot, which brings together the state, the federal government and private-sector companies, could serve as a model. It could also serve as a test for a regional approach, something we suggested in a prior op-ed.  

Build an AI-capable cybersecurity cohort. The proposed cohort should include specialists in artificial intelligence, including experts from leading AI companies. They could use AI tools to develop and deploy cybersecurity programs, including zero-trust architectures and code-mending systems, for utilities of all sizes. AI is advancing rapidly and applying it to protect water systems should be a national priority. The AI specialists should work with major industrial-technology companies, including Siemens, Schneider, and Rockwell, as well as directly with the water systems, both larger and smaller.

U.S. water systems face a significant and growing threat. The Trump administration, Congress, states and private sector should work together urgently to ensure that every American can rely on safe, clean water.

Franklin D. Kramer is a former assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

Robert J. Butler is the co-founder and managing director of Cyber Strategies LLC, served as the first deputy assistant secretary of defense for space and cyber policy, and served as the Chief Security Officer for IO Data Centers, a global data center enterprise, among other cybersecurity-related roles in both corporate and government organizations.

Melanie J. Teplinsky is an adjunct professor and senior fellow in the Technology, Law and Security Program at American University (AU), Washington College of Law.  She previously practiced technology law at Steptoe & Jonson LLP and served on the pre-IPO advisory board for CrowdStrike.

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The Supreme Court has rejected a petition by the Trump administration to implement changes to the way the U.S. Postal Service handles mail-in ballots for the upcoming 2026 midterm elections, calling it “arbitrary and capricious.”

The 7-2 decision was handed down Monday with little explanation by the court. Writing for the majority, Justice Kentaji Brown Jackson said the administration “is unlikely to succeed on the merits of its challenge to the District Court’s preliminary injunction” and had failed to articulate a valid reason for seeking emergency relief from the court.

However, in a concurring statement, Justice Brett Kavanaugh said he believed there was “a fair prospect” that the final USPS final regulation would be within their legal authority and appeared to cite unreasonably short timelines imposed on states and his primary reason for denying the stay.

“But applying the rule in the 2026 elections would be arbitrary and capricious and in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act because state and local election officials do not have sufficient time to reasonably implement the rule before the elections,” wrote Kavanaugh.

The executive order would have tasked the USPS with verifying  voter citizenship and the validating ballot materials. The order would have created a barcode tracking system for mail ballot envelopes and “State Citizenship Lists” compiled by the Department of Homeland Security.

The order was quickly challenged by states and voting rights organizations, who argued the executive branch had no constitutional authority to dictate how they maintained their voter rolls.

The White House has justified the order by claiming the federal government has “an unavoidable duty” under Article II of the Constitution to maintain confidence in election outcomes by preventing violations of criminal law, including noncitizen voting.

Lower courts disagreed, blocking the executive order from being put in place before November. The petition to the Supreme Court represented the administration’s best and final hope for judicial relief.

As the administration fought the matter in courts, it moved ahead finalizing the USPS rule. A whistleblower complaint alleged that a “rushed” effort by the White House and U.S. Postal Service to install three new restrictive IT systems meant to verify citizenship that could potentially deny thousands of mail-in ballots if the federal government disagrees with states on a voter or ballot’s eligibility.

While Jackson and Kavanaugh’s rationale took up less than half a page, a dissenting opinion written by Justice Samuel Alito and signed by Justice Clarence Thomas was more than 7 pages long.

Alito wrote that he would have granted the Trump administration their request for a stay, allowing the order to be implemented in time for the 2026 elections. He said states and organizations suing the government lacked standing, and dismissed their concerns that implementing the USPS order ahead of the 2026 elections would thwart their ability to educate voters about mail-in voting, calling them “abstract social interests.”

Ahead of the decision, David Becker, executive director of the nonprofit Center for Election Integrity and Research, told reporters that he doubted members of the Supreme Court majority “want to own the chaos that would ensure” as the USPS, states and voters attempt to navigate changes put in place just months before elections and after many states have begun sending out ballots that do not comply with the proposed rules.

He also said that it would be in line with previous Supreme Court decisions that have recognized state supremacy when it comes to specific election administration authorities, like where and how their citizens vote.

“When they consider issues related to the administration of elections, the casting and counting of ballots, they have sided with the states every time,” said Becker.

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A newly released whistleblower complaint reveals details about the “rushed” effort by the Trump administration and U.S. Postal Service to install three new restrictive IT systems that would potentially deny thousands of mail-in ballots, if the federal government disagrees on their eligibility.

According to the complaint, written by attorneys at the nonprofit Whistleblower Aid and released by Sen. Richard Blumenthal, D-Conn., the individual is a federal employee with “direct knowledge of potentially catastrophic problems” related to USPS’ handling of mail-in ballots for the upcoming 2026 midterm elections.

The person claims that USPS is deploying entirely “new and untested” IT systems, including a new Federal Ballot Mail Portal that would potentially give USPS more control over whether and when voters receive federal mail ballots.

The disclosure describes the portal and other systems as “new IT systems and corresponding protocols [that] will govern the delivery of ballots to voters as soon as the 2026 mid-term federal elections and beyond.” It calls the development process “secretive, rushed, chaotic and fundamentally flawed,” and part of a larger effort by agency leaders to rush implementation of the system ahead of the 2026 elections.

That rush has forced USPS to forgo much of the pre-release testing of those systems to ensure they work as intended and can safely interoperate with other federal systems. As a result, the whistleblower says the portal is so restrictive it can potentially reject large batches of mail-in ballots based on a single identified ballot error.

According to the letter, there are three primary new IT systems USPS is rolling out this election cycle. The Federal Ballot Mail Portal stores both voter names and newly placed ballot barcodes, while a new verification system will compare ballot batch manifests with information in the portal. A third system is described as a new physical barcode sampling verification standard “with a zero percent failure rate.”

“The Whistleblower paints a dire picture of a slapdash software development process as the USPS attempted to create this complex IT system, with multiple points of ballot review, in a matter of weeks,” the letter said. “The very manner in which the project is being developed deviates dangerously from even the most basic software development best practices.”

In all three cases, the onus is explicitly placed on state election officials to resolve discrepancies between federal and state systems.

For example, when the federal government and election officials have different data on batch manifests, which can include tens of thousands of ballots, “election officials will be responsible for resolving any errors purportedly identified in the scan, and for resubmitting the batch manifest – USPS will refuse to accept the ballot batch until the errors are resolved.”

A similarly restrictive approach is described for verifying ballot bar codes.

“As presently designed, if even one bar code on one single ballot in a bulk-mailing of 10,000 ballots fails to properly scan during the verification process, the entire batch is rejected and sent back to the state – effectively stopping the ballots from being mailed to voters,” the letter stated.

But the whistleblower said those kinds of small errors are likely to happen in any process that relies on scanning barcodes. In this case, the rushed development and specific location of the barcodes on federal mail ballots means the portal “will almost certainly have significant operating problems.”

The letter says the whistleblower is aware of concerns “among those whose job it is to build this software” that the project is not subject to standard testing and debugging work, and that the systems were escalated to other testing environments before they were even finished. It also claims that the systems’ development was siloed across different teams, with no time to test different software components individually or the system as a whole.

The whistleblower also claims that the USPS rule changes,  which have been subject to multiple court injunctions, have continued throughout, in violation of federal court orders. Despite those orders, the agency is believed to have started work on the IT systems in June 2026.

In response, Democrats on the House Committee on Oversight and Reform led by Robert Garcia, D-Calif., wrote to Postmaster General David Steiner saying the disclosures indicate the new IT systems are “faulty” and demanding USPS “immediately cease implementation of this irresponsible and illegal scheme.”

“To be clear, any actions taken by the Postal Service that prevent any registered voter, let alone millions, from voting are unacceptable, a violation of Americans’ voting rights, and likely illegal,” the members wrote.

David Becker, executive director of the Center for Election Innovation and Research, said the disclosures could potentially lead to new lawsuits against USPS and the federal government.

“This seems to confirm that the USPS is totally unprepared and unqualified to take on this vast responsibility interjecting itself into state’s mail voting processes,” said Becker on Bluesky. “And could incur liability if USPS truly plans to reject thousands of ballots if there’s even one error.”

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More than 100 companies and organizations, including OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Microsoft and Amazon Web Services, have signed an open letter calling for a global effort to improve cybersecurity defenses as artificial intelligence capabilities advance.

The letter, published Thursday, argues that the timeframe to strengthen defenses before AI-enabled attacks become more widespread and complex is rapidly dwindling. Conversely, the letter says the same advances can give defenders new ways to find and fix vulnerabilities that have accumulated over years, a period the signatories call a “defenders’ window.”

“Each of us can reduce risk now,” the letter reads. “All organizations, cybersecurity companies, technology partners, governments, and AI frontier companies have an important role: accelerate defenders’ priorities with tools, funding, and hands-on support, especially for critical infrastructure organizations with limited budgets.”

Aside from AI-centric companies, financial institutions like Capital One, Mastercard and Visa, and cybersecurity firms like CrowdStrike, Palo Alto Networks, and Proofpoint, also signed the letter. Organizers describe the effort as ongoing, with more organizations expected to join over time.

The letter states that “status quo security won’t be enough.” It cites longstanding bugs, excessive permissions, misconfigurations, unpatched software, weak authentication and technical debt in legacy systems as sources of exposure. Security teams, particularly those protecting critical infrastructure, have been historically under-resourced, the letter says, and need what it describes as a surge in tools, resources and hands-on support.

In a conversation with CyberScoop Wednesday, top brass from Palo Alto Networks said they had seen enough from internal frontier AI model testing and malicious in-the-wild use of commercially available AI tools to be genuinely concerned.

“I can tell you without exaggeration that we believe that this is a generational shift in cybersecurity,” Sam Rubin, senior vice president of Palo Alto Networks’ threat intelligence arm, said Wednesday. 

John Doyle, CEO of Cape, a privacy-first mobile network operator and whose company signed the letter, echoed the warning about status-quo security.

“It was already failing us in telecom–critical infrastructure that’s been breached time and again with serious consequences for both our military and regular people,” Doyle told CyberScoop. “It’s going to get immeasurably worse without collective action and leaning into innovative cyber defense.”

The letter further asks every organization to make cybersecurity an immediate leadership priority, fix the highest-risk weaknesses and raise security standards for technology they buy, build and deploy, including AI-generated code. Cybersecurity companies and technology partners are asked to test defenses against frontier AI capabilities and make AI-powered defense accessible to critical infrastructure operators. 

Governments are urged to coordinate defense across borders, fund protection for essential services that lack staff or budget, and impose costs on attackers. Frontier AI companies are asked to provide responsible model access, funding, training and support, and to ensure that AI systems acting autonomously remain traceable and accountable.

The letter frames AI as both a threat and a remedy throughout the document. It mirrors what security experts have been saying for months, positioning the industry as entering an unprecedented two- to three-year period of upheaval, driven by AI systems that are discovering vulnerabilities exponentially faster than defenders can respond and threatening to render decades of security practices obsolete.

The U.S. government has taken steps to stay ahead of AI-enabled cyberthreats. As part of an executive order issued by President Donald Trump in June, a federal clearinghouse known as Gold Eagle was stood up for sharing AI cyber threat information between the government and private sector.

You can read the full letter here.

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Citing cyber and other security threats, President Donald Trump signed an executive order Wednesday that declares a national emergency to secure the U.S. bulk-power system and aims to prohibit certain foreign-produced equipment, software and systems from being used in the  country.

The order says it forbids “any acquisition, importation, transfer, or installation” of such foreign-produced equipment if it’s determined to pose a significant national security risk.

“To deal with the threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, the Order, among other things, generally prohibits certain foreign-produced bulk-power system electric equipment, including associated critical software and digital capabilities that could pose cybersecurity or operational risks, from being purchased or installed in the United States, or appropriately conditions such purchases and installations to address those risks,” the White House said in a fact sheet.

The executive order is a response to fears of Chinese-made equipment housed within U.S. energy infrastructure, and a continuation of other measures from the Trump administration to shun that equipment.

The order, “Declaring a National Energy Emergency to Secure the United States Bulk-Power System,” cites “malicious cyber activities” as one impetus.

“The minimal restrictions on acquisition or operation in the United States of foreign-produced bulk-power system electric equipment augment the ability of some foreign entities to create and exploit vulnerabilities in such equipment; for instance, such equipment might have digital backdoors built into their systems that allow a foreign country to access that equipment remotely,” it states.

China supplies 85% of solar supply chain production capacity, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, and China is a major player in the power transformer manufacturing business.

In 2024, then-FBI Director Christopehr Wray told Congress that hackers prepositioning themselves in small office and home routers had the electricity grid as one of their targets should China and the United States go to war.

Near the end of Trump’s first term he also signed an executive order seeking to limit the purchase of foreign-made bulk-power equipment. The Biden administration suspended that order, citing the need to review its scope, and revoked and replaced a related Energy Department order. Some utilities found compliance with the 2020 executive order difficult.

For the new order, the Energy Department has 120 days to develop rules to implement the order, in consultation with other key departments.

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The top election official for Shasta County, Calif. said he has offered convicted felon and former Mesa County, Colo. clerk Tina Peters a position as a consultant to help with the 2026 elections, but that she hasn’t accepted the position yet.  

Earlier this month, Shasta County registrar Clint Curtis told local news outlets that he intended to hire Peters as assistant registrar of voters to help with the upcoming 2026 elections, months after she was released from prison in Colorado.

In an interview with CyberScoop this week, Curtis said he was looking to hire Peters as a consultant, citing the length of time involved in hiring her as a full-time employee and the need for immediate help running the upcoming midterm elections.

Curtis said that he initially believed Peters had accepted the position, only to later hear from her that she needed to consult her legal team after her prison sentence was commuted in June.

“She’s got to check it all out, make sure it’s okay, make sure there’s not any roadblocks in there that we don’t know about [or are] illegal, so you got to walk through the whole mess,” said Curtis.

A Colorado Department of Corrections official told CyberScoop that as part of her parole conditions, Peters must be employed and live in Colorado. Peters can request a transfer to another state, but she must first receive permission from both states and go through a formal review process.

According to Curtis, hiring Peters as a consultant means she would not have local access to county email or election systems. Peters’ past conviction “doesn’t matter” because her access to county IT would be limited.

“If she’s on staff she’d have logins to the network, logins in the system, she’d basically have full access,” Curtis said in a phone interview. “But consultants don’t have any of that, nor should they, right?”

Consultants “are basically there to actually watch other people do it and make sure they do it right rather than do it themselves,” he added.

At the same time, when asked what responsibilities Peters would have, Curtis described an expansive role, with Peters helping him oversee the registrar’s office and direct his full-time staff of about 12.

Asked what drew him to Peters, Curtis said “well, she’s out [of prison] and I have this position become available [and] I need somebody that can actually supervise and knows something about elections.”

In 2024, Peters was convicted of seven felony crimes related to the theft of voting machine software from Mesa County election facilities, in a failed attempt to prove that the machines had been involved in election fraud during the 2020 election.

She served less than two years of that sentence, as legal appeals, relentless pressure from the Trump administration and eventually a commutation by Colorado Governor Jared Polis saw her released from prison in June.

Curtis said he did not reach out to any Mesa County officials before offering Peters the job, but did cite conversations with her that impressed him and his confidence that he would remain in control of the county’s elections.

“I talked to her and basically, she’s very even tempered, she’s not wild and crazy which is good,” said Curtis. “And so basically I’d still be in charge so it wouldn’t really be a problem…there’s no way she would get out of bounds on me.”

A request to Mesa County’s press office seeking comment was not returned. At Peters’ sentencing hearing in 2024, multiple Mesa County officials testified about the negative impact her crimes and behavior had on the county’s elections, finances and reputation.

When reached for comment, a representative for Peter Ticktin, Peters’ lawyer, provided CyberScoop with a statement from last week regarding Peters’ intentions.

“Tina Peters is giving consideration to helping in the efforts in Shasta County as there most definitely has been monkey business in the way the election was handled,” Ticktin said. “Tina is one of the key voices leading the effort to get the invasive machines out of our election process.”

Earlier this month, Curtis was censured by the Shasta County Board of Supervisors following investigations into  allegations of verbal abuse and threatening language to staff.

Curtis, who was appointed county registrar in 2025, also made a number of claims about what he called suspicious mail-in ballots used during the 2024 election. He claimed the ballots were different sizes and looked, felt and “smelled” different from normal mail-in ballots.

Curtis told CyberScoop he did not follow up with the county’s ballot manufacturer to ask if there was a credible explanation, saying he lacked investigative authority to do so. He also could not answer how many instances of voter fraud his office had confirmed. 

A day after speaking with CyberScoop, the Shasta County Board of Supervisors said Curtis’ claims were “frivolous” and that they “welcomed” investigations by state and federal authorities.

“Mr. Curtis was hired to enhance transparency, strengthen election integrity and restore trust. While some progress has been achieved, including the promotion of meaningful observation within the Elections Office, Mr. Curtis has failed significantly in other core responsibilities, undermining the very principles he was appointed to uphold.”

The press office for California Secretary of State Shirley Weber’s told CyberScoop that irrespective of whom a county employs or contracts with, they must comply with California law, security and confidentiality requirements, and “maintain the integrity of our state’s elections and election processes.”  

Weber also sharply questioned Peters’ involvement in California elections.

“As Secretary Weber has stated, ‘The mere thought of letting someone near any part of California’s elections when that person was convicted of serious election-related crimes while serving as an election official, is simply outrageous,’” Weber’s office wrote in an email. “Our office is monitoring the situation and, as always, will act within our authority and work closely with law enforcement officials to ensure that all elections in our state remain transparent, safe, and fair for all eligible voters.”

Curtis expressed frustration to CyberScoop at the delays, saying he needed immediate help and expressing concern that Peters’ legal roadblocks may make it harder to hire her at all.

“You know, if they stall sufficiently enough, then she won’t be able to get any help to me,” said Curtis. “So I need her fairly quickly. We start early voting in…30 days, something like that. So we need it quickly, we need to get her in here, tell her what to do, set people up and get it ready to go. Otherwise, I have to do it all, and that’s going to be a pain.”

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The Supreme Court dismissed one of two lawsuits blocking the Trump administration from implementing changes to U.S. Postal Service regulations regarding mail-in ballots, saying that states lacked standing because they could not prove that the regulations would cause “concrete harm.”

 California and 23 other states sued the federal government after a White House executive order directed USPS to begin creating “State Citizenship Lists” for each state, consisting of voters who, according to federal data, are eligible to receive mail-in ballots. 

The order states that the lists will be updated and transmitted to states 60 days before the election, and states that “An individual’s identification on the State Citizenship List does not indicate that the individual has been properly registered to vote in the State” and that “there may be State laws, not reflected in the State Citizenship List, that preclude voter registration, or the individual may choose not to be registered.”

That provision was thrown out by two federal courts, who found them unconstitutional and likely to result in the federal government intruding on the constitutional rights of states to run their elections.

But the Supreme Court’s conservative majority voted 6-3 to dismiss the lawsuit, saying that states have no standing to sue because “The Order is an internal directive from the President to his subordinates mandating that certain agencies pursue certain policies” and the order “neither requires nor forbids anything of anyone outside the executive branch.”

Because the section of the order is prefaced to say that the Secretary of Homeland Security will transmit the lists “to the extent feasible and consistent with applicable law,” the majority said the claims of harm by states are, at this point, entirely speculative.

 “The true ‘source of any injury’ to the States would be the downstream action that the Secretary ‘might take in the future’ to implement” the USPS sections,” the court wrote. “Emphasis on might.” 

At the same time, another section directs the Department of Justice to prioritize investigation and prosecution of state and local election officials who “knowingly” allow instances of non-citizen voting.  

The majority argued the DOJ directive was internal guidance  that neither regulated states’ voter registration nor limited states’ authority to set their own election rules. Since it only prioritized enforcement of existing laws, the court said it did “nothing” to states.

“The States lack standing to challenge for much the same reason: It does nothing to them,” the majority wrote. “This provision directs the Attorney General to ‘prioritize’ the investigation and prosecution of those who violate existing federal laws by issuing ballots to ineligible voters.”

The USPS regulations remain blocked under a separate injunction issued by federal court in Massachusetts, but the ruling demonstrates there are major differences between the Supreme Court majority and lower federal courts on the Trump administration’s years-long effort to assert more federal control over elections. On Friday, USPS moved to finalize the new regulations despite the nationwide injunction.

The three remaining liberal justices – Elena Kagan, Sonia Sotomayor and Kentaji Brown Jackson – laid out their opposition to the ruling across two dissenting opinions. In one, Sotomayor and Kagan wrote that the majority’s decision “merely postpones adjudication” and does not address or rule in favor of the administration on many substantive constitutional questions.

Both would have granted relief to the states, writing that “a commonsense reading of the executive order, corroborated by the government’s own representations, make clear that the respondent states face a sufficiently concrete and imminent injury.”

Sotomayor also expressed incredulity at the majority’s view that the order’s sections on USPS state citizenship lists and directing DOJ to prosecute election officials were unrelated or nonthreatening.

“To pretend that the lists assembled [in one section] bear no relation to the prosecutions directed by [the second section] is to ignore the structure of the Executive Order and the Government’s words alike,” she wrote. “As this Court has long recognized, ‘[p]eople do not lightly disregard public officers’ thinly veiled threats to institute criminal proceedings against them if they do not come around.”

Justice Jackson, in her own dissent, was even blunter.

“The District Court held that the President’s Order is unlawful, the Government does not defend the lawfulness of the Order before this Court, and no judge or Justice has held (or holds today) that the Order comports with the Constitution,” wrote Jackson. “Still, the Court sees fit to grant the Government equitable relief to proceed with implementing the challenged Order on the grounds that, because the Government had not yet issued a final rule at the time the complaint was filed, the Plaintiff States lacked a concrete injury for Article III purposes.”

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As part of its “economic D-Day” against Iran, the Treasury Department designated four Iranians for sanctions Monday stemming from their alleged role in hacking critical infrastructure targets and waging cybertheft against the United States.

It’s the second time in as many weeks that the Trump administration has taken aim at the same group of alleged hackers, following on an indictment recently unsealed against cybercriminals that federal law enforcement authorities say are affiliated with the Tehran-based Mabna Institute.

A Treasury Department release points the finger at three people — Keyvan Fayyaz Ghareh Blagh, Saber Shahbazi Balujeh, Mohammad Reza Kadkhoda’i and Mojtaba Ghal’eh-Kuhi — as specifically conducting the hacks.

“Since at least late 2023, these three individuals have successfully compromised and exfiltrated data from multiple U.S. companies in various critical infrastructure sectors, including energy companies, defense contractors, healthcare institutions, information technology companies, and financial institutions,” the release states.

A fourth individual included in Monday’s sanctions, Mojtaba Ghal’eh-Kuhi, is listed as one of the leaders of the gang carrying out the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)-directed attacks. Another listed leader, Behzad Mesri, first faced sanctions in 2018, as part of another round of sanctions focused on the Mabna Institute.

Finally, the Treasury Department designated one additional person Monday over related activity, Arman Kahzadian, for his alleged role in receiving or using business information stolen via cyber-enabled means.

The department said the Iranian hackers sometimes turn their gaze to domestic targets.

“The members of this group are also heavily motivated by personal enrichment and greed, leading some members to prioritize their own profits over operations that benefit the MOIS,” it said. “This has driven some of the group to target Iranian companies.“

Hackers that the U.S. government has identified as Iranian have been behind a spate of attacks on U.S. water facilities, despite denials from President Donald Trump himself about Iranian culpability.  The Treasury Department did not immediately respond to a request for comment Monday about whether the sanctions designees were involved in those attacks, nor has the National Security Agency responded to requests for comment on whether Iran was responsible for attacks at the center of an alert about attacks on water facilities.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced a fuller list of sanctions Monday as the war with Iran nears its five-month anniversary with no end in apparent sight.

“In the Second World War, D-Day marked the historic beginning of a campaign with our allies to target and drive the enemy from its positions, including those in third countries,” he said. “Today, in that same spirit, we are launching an economic onslaught against Iran’s financial connections around the globe. Our objective is to sever every economic lifeline that sustains this tyrannical regime until Tehran stands alone.”

There are questions about whether the sanctions themselves are likely to change any behavior, particularly based on how they will be enforced. Iran has vowed “consequences” for the United States.

As part of the sanctions announced Monday, according to the department, “Treasury is expanding the categories of Iran-related conduct that may be subject to secondary sanctions in the future, making it easier to take action against those facilitating the regime. Treasury has issued determinations against five critical sectors –– digital assets, technology, gold, aviation, and shipping––  that the Iranian regime uses to try to prop up its failing economy.”

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In a late Friday night posting to the Federal Register, the U.S. Postal Service said it is finalizing new regulations that would give the federal government potentially vast powers to control mail-in ballots for voters.

The changes are part of an executive order signed by President Donald Trump in March, which directed USPS to develop lists of residents “eligible” for mail-in voting — standards that would be defined by the federal government.

The U.S. Constitution vests states and Congress with the power to regulate elections, and the USPS rules have already been struck down by multiple lower courts. But as the White House appeals to the Supreme Court to reverse those decisions, it is still moving ahead in finalizing the regulations, though USPS says it will not move to implement them until after the Supreme Court rules.

But USPS said it must begin moving forward now in order to ensure the changes are in place by the mid-term elections.

“To ensure the faithful execution of federal law in connection with federal elections, this rule has an immediate effective date,” USPS wrote. “Delaying the effective date would jeopardize implementation of this rule in time for the 2026 general election, which will be held on November 3, 2026.”

According to the notice, USPS has received an astonishing 200,000 comments from the public in response to the proposed rule. It doesn’t provide a breakdown of how many comments were in support or opposition.

By the agency’s own admission, the vast majority of supportive comments appear to argue that the rules would help with the perception among voters that fraud is a “significant problem.”  Phrases like “strengthens confidence” and “reduce uncertainty” are peppered throughout the descriptions.

But no credible evidence of coordinated mail-in voter fraud is presented, and Trump and his allies have been the primary force in American politics spreading the perception that voter fraud by noncitizens, dead people and Democrats is rampant. Courts, post-election audits and independent experts have repeatedly debunked these arguments.

“Whether or not voter fraud is common or uncommon, the Postal Service has the legal authority to take the measures in this rule to facilitate enforcement of federal law, reduce the risk of fraud, and help protect the integrity of federal elections,” the notice stated.

According to the notice, the comments in opposition pointed out that two courts have already blocked the White House’s USPS rules, finding them unconstitutional. Others expressed concerns that the Postal Service “would refuse to accept certain ballots for federal elections that states tender without satisfying the data-entry obligations that the rule would impose,” echoing concerns that election experts have conveyed to CyberScoop in interviews.

The notice also dismisses comments “influenced by partisan political speculation,” that include “conjecture about the underlying intent” of the order, its impact on voter turnout and elections.

“Such remarks are speculative and exceed the scope of this proceeding,” USPS wrote in its notice. “In any event … this rule does not—nor is it intended to—facilitate any form of voter suppression, affect election outcomes, or target particular demographics, districts, or states.”

Last week the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts, which ruled against the administration’s USPS order in an ongoing lawsuit brought by states and voter groups, took the unusual step of issuing a second, separate injunction against the USPS rules. It’s not clear whether the Supreme Court will address both injunctions in the same ruling or separately ahead of election day in November.

“The court has already answered and will again resolve the question clearly and affirmatively,” Judge Indira Talwani wrote when issuing the second injunction. “The executive branch has no authority to regulate elections.”

Some voting groups quickly moved to condemn the Friday night posting, saying it will confuse voters about a state-led voting process that is, as of today, still the law of the land.

“For the 2026 election, voters can continue to rely on the voting rules established by their state unless and until a court orders otherwise,” said Michael McNulty, senior policy director at the nonprofit Issue One. “Yet, because the Trump administration continues its attempts to undermine trust in an effort to centralize control of elections, we all must remain vigilant and continue to build trust in our election system.”

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A newly-signed presidential memorandum enlisting private sector companies in federal law enforcement hacking operations against criminal organizations could present a number of legal, practical and moral pitfalls, cyber experts told CyberScoop a day after the order was released.

While some have celebrated the memo as an overdue maneuver to more aggressively combat cybercriminals, others view it as risky at best and potentially destructive at worst. Supporters, critics and everyone in between also said that how it plays out could be decided in the 60-day timeframe the memo sets to establish the program.

But ultimately, “it’s a massive shift in the cyber policy community,” said Michael Garcia, a former top official at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency. “This is a philosophical shift.”

The Concerns

On the most critical end of the spectrum is security consultant Davi Ottenheimer, who has been a proponent of concepts like “hack back” or “active defense” that envision a bigger role for the private sector. But he was unsparing in his criticism of the Trump memo. 

“It’s an embarrassment to America,” he told CyberScoop. “It’s like seeing somebody strapped onto a horse backwards, looking at the wrong end of a rifle.”

The Trump memo’s approach has been likened to the “letters of marque” concept used in early U.S. history, when it authorized sea privateers to attack and capture enemy ships and goods on behalf of the country. But Ottenheimer, founder of Ottenheimer GmbH, noted that the practice fell out of favor for good reason in the 1800s because of the violence it unleashed and how it contributed to mercenarism.

Additionally, the memo raises a number of targeting-related issues, he said. Ottenheimer is concerned about Trump’s intentions. The memo specifically pertains to the use of participating companies against transnational criminal organizations.

“Left-wing opposition, liberals, anti-fascists —they’re all criminals to him,” Ottenheimer said. “So to authorize attacking criminals under this means private organizations can go hack people that he designates as criminals.”

Under the memo, the program must establish legal and constitutional procedures for the prior approval of the targeting of U.S. citizens, as well as develop procedures to halt any unintentional targeting of U.S. people or systems. 

However, the limitation on targeting criminals only creates a perverse incentive for attackers and a peculiar defense for anyone who’s attacked, Ottenheimer said.

He envisioned a scenario for a company participating in the program where “you’re hacking [a target], and they go, ‘Hey, we’re the state.’ And then [private companies] are like, ‘Oh, I can’t hack you anymore.’ Boom. They decided when you can and can’t hack.”

Furthermore, “you incentivize people to know as little as possible so [operations] can be authorized,” he said.

The memo raises ethical concerns for him as well: “You can’t attack somebody and then say it’s your fault that you didn’t notify them you didn’t want to be attacked.”

“There’s no notice for you being designated. There’s no prevention of you being designated. There’s no way for you to know you’re being designated,” Ottenheimer said. “That’s like a person sitting down next to you and smoking a cigarette and blowing smoke in your face and saying, ‘Hey, you got to say you don’t like cancer if you don’t want me to do this to you right now.’”

Garcia, now vice president of the cybersecurity practice at Monument Advocacy, said he supports some of the ideas of the memo, but worries about how it will be executed.

“It comes down to attribution, and if you make a risky bet on who we’re attributing [attacks] to, that’s where things can get dicey,” Garcia told CyberScoop.

There could be pressure to attribute faster, which could perhaps lead to lower certainty about who’s being targeted, and that in turn could lead to a private sector company accidentally attacking a foreign government, he said.

That raises legal questions: “It’s in the Constitution —the federal government has the ability to wage war. And there are laws by which private citizens can’t take up arms,” Garcia said.

He wanted the memo to include court oversight of the program, similar to what’s been required for private sector takedown operations. .

Garcia also isn’t sure whether there will be a big enough pool of companies willing to jump into offensive cyber operations.

“From the lawyer perspective, it’s, ‘Are you okay with engaging in this kind of legal risk? And who knows what protections the government will provide?’” he said. “I’d be very curious to see what the foreign governments’ reactions are — ‘We’re going to cut ties with any participating company that engages in this.’”

Errata Security CEO Robert Graham wrote that under the program, companies “are not willy-nilly hacking back,” given the federal supervision elements. “Though, I wonder if it doesn’t eventually morph into law enforcement saying ‘Stop bothering us, just do what you think is best.’’” 

The Case For

The Trump administration and the memo’s supporters  have touted it as a means to put the United States on stronger ground in cyberspace. 

Amanda Naylor, the director of cyber policy at the National Security Council who worked on the memo, said on LinkedIn that it was designed “to bring the capabilities, speed, and innovation of the American private sector into the fight against transnational cybercrime and fraud.”

Former Trump White House cybersecurity official Joshua Steinman said he views the memo as a step toward “parity,” given how U.S. adversaries operate in cyberspace.

“The Chinese and the Russians do this at scale, and I guarantee you they have very few limiting tools when they do it,” said Steinman, now founder of the security firm Gavalnick. “It opens up an entire workforce that allows us to go out and achieve strategic objectives.”

The restrictions in the memo are important, he told CyberScoop.

“The most sensitive things are going to continue to be done by the uniformed and authorized civilian workforces, but there’s a lot of low-hanging fruit,” i.e., criminal organizations, Steinman said. He doesn’t have any fear of the program overstepping as a result.

“We operate like a Boy Scout in cyberspace,” he said. “It’s measured and reasoned.” He compared it to the Right to Try Act for medications.

He also said he expects to see a lot of interest in participating in the private sector.

Ari Redbord, global head of policy at TRM Labs, praised the memo too, calling it “a huge step toward empowering the private sector at a critical moment” that “has a real opportunity to be truly transformative.”

“Scammers are using AI to move with unprecedented speed and scale, stealing billions in life savings from average Americans and small businesses,” he said. “The private sector holds the data. The public sector holds the authorities. This [memo] puts them together.”

What’s Next

The coordination center charged with establishing the program under the memo has 60 days to complete its work. That process could determine a lot. Graham noted that the memo has a classified annex, too.

The memo as written is quiet about what becomes of any seized assets, Graham noted. Redbord raised the same topic as one of his questions about execution of the memo. 

“What government direction and control looks like in the middle of a live operation,” he said in listing his questions. “How disruption turns into actual dollars back in victims’ pockets, and whether we can build a true victim compensation fund as part of this program. What happens when an operation touches a third country with its own laws and its own interests. And how success gets measured, in money recovered and networks dismantled.”

Will Barker, cybersecurity adviser at Huntress, said what’s next could be key.

“The 60-day implementing guidance is where the real substance lives,” he said in a written quote. “Minimum standards, operational procedures, the adjudicatory framework for target selection.”

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A federal judge has issued a second injunction preventing the United States Postal Service from carrying out President Donald Trump’s executive order focused on mail-in voting.

Judge Indira Talwani had previously ruled that the White House order, which would have essentially placed the federal government in charge of deciding which voters in each state would receive mail-in ballots, was unconstitutional.

The order was part of an ongoing lawsuit between the federal government and 23 states over the order’s legality. The Trump administration has formally petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the case and reverse the decision.

In a new ruling issued Tuesday, Talwani’s said the court “finds it prudent to review the EO now, where less than 90 days pend before the midterms and the millions of citizens who rely on mail voting require clarity as to how or whether they will vote in November.”

“As to those elections occurring before or on November 3, 2026, the court preserves the current electoral status quo, grants the Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion…enjoins the USPS’s implementation of Section 3 of the EO,” Talwani wrote.

The opinion concluded that the states “are likely to succeed on the merits” in claiming that Section 3 of the executive order violates constitutional separation of powers, and noted that the federal government’s “sole attempts to grapple with the actual merits of Plaintiff Organizations’ constitutional challenge are their briefly presented unitary executive arguments.”

But Talwani wrote that whether the president has ultimate authority over USPS actions is irrelevant if it results in a “facially unconstitutional” act.

“Instead, the court need only determine whether the EO is facially unconstitutional based on the substance of the text’s directives,” the opinion said. “The court has already answered and will again resolve the question clearly and affirmatively. The executive branch has no authority to regulate elections.”

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Senators from both parties Thursday probed Trump administration officials about whether federal agencies and foreign governments are coordinated enough in the battle against scammers, something witnesses told the Foreign Relations Committee they were working to remedy.

At least 13 federal agencies have authorities to counter scams, raising questions about whether someone needs to be in charge of all those efforts. And while there was some bipartisan sentiment at Thursday’s hearing that the Trump administration has taken good actions to battle scammers, both lawmakers and administration officials said that scam operations have demonstrated that cracking down on them in one place often just leads to them going elsewhere.

Sen. Pete Ricketts, R-Neb., compared the situation to an international initiative that gained prominence in the 1990s to counter drug trafficking, Joint Interagency Task Force South.

“Given that today’s scam centers are similarly transnational, combining cybercrime, human trafficking, money laundering and cryptocurrency, has the threat reached the point that we should establish a comparable multinational coordination mechanism?” he asked.

Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, D-N.H., focused on federal coordination: She paraphrased a former federal official who said, “there is nobody that is heading that effort up across agencies. We need to treat this like combat, and so we need somebody in charge.”

Shaheen, the top Democrat on the panel, is a co-sponsor of the bipartisan Scam Compound Accountability and Mobilization (SCAM) Act, which seeks to unify federal efforts on the subject.

A State Department official told Shaeen scammers were a national security priority for President Donald Trump, and that his executive order on the topic sought to tackle coordination.

“I do understand that this is a whole-of-government approach, and many agencies are focused on this,” said David Bedard, deputy assistant secretary at State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs “The Action plan that was directed by the president is currently in the interagency review process to deconflict some of the concerns that you have raised. We certainly think the task force that will be implanted through the executive order will solve the problems you might be referencing.”

There’s also an international plan under the task force, he said. Currently, the administration shares intelligence on scammers with foreign allies, and Interpol has “productive” channels to work through there and is setting up its own task force, Bedard said, but there are concerns about other countries taking similar, duplicative action.

There have been signs of progress on the international front, Bedard and another State Department witness told the panel.

Michael DeSombre, assistant secretary at the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said Trump has raised the subject with Chinese President Xi Jinping, and that China has used its influence in Asia as its own citizens have become scam victims. Still, there’s been more progress in countries where the United States has stronger relations, such as Cambodia, than in those where ties aren’t as close, like Burma and Laos.

In Cambodia, one key has been pursuing scam center bosses first and foremost, Bedard said.

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The UK’s AI Security Institute said that their AI research system took “unsanctioned” actions over the internet to engage in “sustained, potentially harmful activity directed at real people.”

According to a blog post and technical report released Tuesday, the organization noticed “unusual data transfers” leaving their research systems through the pseudo-anonymous Tor network on July 28. The models, which included Anthropic’s Mythos 5 and OpenAI’s GPT-5.6-Sol models, were being tested for their cybersecurity capabilities.

Like the OpenAI and Anthropic incidents before it, the offending agents were attempting to solve a challenge. On 10 of 122 runs taken by two models, they took a combined 19 malicious actions, including attempting to insert malicious code into a real open-source software project and creating fake online identities to contact human maintainers and press them to approve it.

It also inserted malicious prompt injection instructions in places “where it reasoned that other automated AI systems might pick them up and execute them.” Sometimes multiple agents would collaborate on a task, with one model leaving public messages or notes for the other on GitHub.

However, AISI said their incident differs in one critical way.

“Importantly, this was not a case of a model escaping its secure test environment, or ‘sandbox,’” the institute wrote in an unsigned blog. “As was standard in our cyber testing, we had intentionally permitted internet access, and model-provider cyber classifiers were deliberately disabled – conditions that do not reflect how frontier models are made available to the public.”

The institute said that while their own design and evaluation choices “to some degree” enabled the malicious behavior, the models still displayed “novel, potentially deceptive behaviors” and were executed “to an extent and severity that we did not anticipate.”

The same day, OpenAI acknowledged AISI and another third-party cybersecurity tester,  private firm Irregular, had recently reported incidents where their models exceeded “beyond their intended testing boundaries.”

That included GPT-5.6-Sol reusing GitHub tokens left by another agent to attempt to recover accounts and to access a DNS server that contained malicious payloads meant to exploit a software vulnerability.

The setup did not work, there is no evidence any real resolver queried it, and the infrastructure was removed when the evaluation ended,” the company wrote in an unsigned blog post Tuesday.

OpenAI said it would review its own third-party testing procedures to focus on higher risk evaluations, assess requests by third-parties to enable internet access, stop conditions and other features for their models.

The incident with Irregular occurred on July 29 during a Capture-the-Flag cybersecurity evaluation of OpenAI’s models. Due to a “misconfiguration” the models were allowed to access the public internet, where they encountered and exploited a real domain, mistakenly believing it was still in a test environment.

OpenAI said an investigation by Irregular is ongoing, but also found that the models had found and used credentials for the site at one point. The blog also references other additional potential cybersecurity incidents.

“Irregular has informed us that all of the issues identified pertaining to the incident are no longer active and relevant safeguards were added to the testing environment,” the blog said. “Irregular has also communicated about related incidents involving other labs from the same testing environment.”

CyberScoop has reached out to Irregular for comment.

The incidents were made public the same day that the White House met with Anthropic, Open AI and other frontier AI companies to preview a new framework for evaluating models before they’re released publicly. Some media outlets have reported that after an executive order, export controls and other actions, the administration does not plan to make the new framework public.

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President Donald Trump blamed Minnesota Friday for the cyberattacks its water systems have suffered in recent days, saying the state was “behind it.”

Trump said the state being “incompetent” was the issue, but it wasn’t clear whom he thought actually conducted cyberattacks that U.S. investigators have attributed to Iran — if, perhaps, somehow Minnesota incompetently cyberattacked itself. The White House referred a request for clarification back to Trump’s remarks.

“I think that Minnesota is behind it,” Trump told reporters Friday. “Because they’re grossly incompetent. I don’t think there was an Iranian cyberattack. I think Minnesota ought to get its act together.”

The White House also didn’t clarify whom the president believed was behind similar attacks in other states, when asked for comment. Trump has repeatedly used federal power aggressively in Minnesota, a state led by Gov. Tim Walz, a Democrat who was on the ticket that ran against him in 2024 as the vice presidential nominee. Trump also has downplayed Iranian attacks amid the war he launched against the nation with Israel in February.

A number of cyber experts quickly pushed back on Trump’s comments after he made them.

“Victim blaming in cyber is so 2000 and late,” cybersecurity pioneer Chris Wysopal, Veracode co-founder and chief security evangelist, said on the Bluesky social media platform. Said Jake Williams, a member of the IANS faculty: “His own intelligence services are attributing this to Iran.”

Andy Jabbour — founder and CEO of Gate 15, a cybersecurity firm which provides support to the water sector — told CyberScoop that, “speaking candidly, I’m not even sure what he was actually saying or suggesting Minnesota’s government did or didn’t do.”

“Attribution is tricky business,” he continued, referencing recent alerts from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and others. “But logically, given an ongoing war with Iran, recent statements made by Iran-aligned threat groups, with assessments that the recent activity is aligned with recent CISA warnings, given yesterday’s statements from CISA and the FBI, random unsubstantiated allegations aimed at political opponents seem reckless and are a disservice to the American people.”

Walz struck back at Trump in a Facebook post, noting steps from his Department of Government Efficiency to slash federal funding. CISA has shrunken considerably under Trump, and his administration has pushed states to defend against cyberattacks that feds once countered.

“Trump knows exactly who is responsible for this attack, and knows that other states were hit too,” Walz said. “This is what modern warfare looks like, and it further illustrates there’s no plan to win a war with Iran.”

“DOGE took an axe to CISA and left the U.S. exposed to cyber attacks,” he continued. “Thankfully, our experts in Minnesota were able to identify the vulnerability quickly and work with local communities to stop it.”

A spokesperson for Minnesota IT Services, a state agency that has been responding to the water cyberattacks, declined to address Trump’s remarks.

“We remain focused on supporting affected communities, securing critical infrastructure and coordinating with local partners and federal officials as the investigation continues,” the spokesperson, Emily Zimmer, told CyberScoop. “We will not comment on political statements or speculate about attribution.”

Other cyber professionals declined to comment directly on Trump’s remarks, but offered thoughts on who was behind the attacks and their motives.

Bryson Bort, CEO and founder of Scythe said the evidence supports the attribution with Iran, and that it looks like hackers there found something they could exploit on the internet and seized the chance.

“This was a target of opportunity,” said Bort, co-founder of the ICS Village, a non-profit advancing awareness of industrial control system security; such systems are common in the water sector. “It wasn’t that Minnesota did something as a state to raise Iran’s ire.”

Cynthia Kaiser, a former top FBI cyber official, said that when the bureau conducts attributions, it looks at technical indicators but also who has the capability, who has conducted similar attacks in the past and what the purpose of the attacks is.

“Iran ticks all these kinds of things,” Kaiser, now senior vice president at cybersecurity firm Halcyon, told CyberScoop. “My view is, if it walks like a duck, if it talks like a duck, I strongly suspect it’s a duck. I’d be shocked if we found out it wasn’t Iran.”

Just last week, CISA updated an advisory about how Iranian hackers were targeting programmable logic controllers in the water sector and other sectors, a warning that the water industry’s information sharing and analysis center said it believed.

“WaterISAC is confident in our government partners’ assessment that the confirmed activity is aligned with the joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) AA26-097A ‘Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across U.S. Critical Infrastructure’ published and recently updated by CISA,” Tom Dobbins, executive director, WaterISAC, told CyberScoop. “We have evidence of earlier attacks from Iran even before this current conflict. Cyber attacks are the most viable way that Iran can directly attack our homeland, and it is logical that they would do so, especially given the challenges of absolute attribution.”

The water sector is often viewed as one of the most vulnerable critical infrastructure sectors, and Dobbins called on Congress to provide funding to provide funding for the ISAC.

Sen. Tina Smith, D-Minn., also took issue with Trump’s comments.

“The President provided an unserious response that is beneath the dignity of the office he holds. Iran’s purported cyberattack on Minnesota’s water infrastructure must be taken as a serious threat to our national security.  Smith said in a statement, adding that she’s been in touch with CISA and the FBI and was grateful to Minnesota’s IT experts. “The entire situation serves as a stark reminder of the danger this war puts us in the longer it drags on.”

Fellow Minnesota Democratic Sen. Amy Klobuchar had earlier been in touch with Sean Cairncross, the national cyber director and a Minnesota native, about the incident.

Trump has previously displayed a laissez-faire view toward other cyberattacks on the United States, such as when he’s been asked about Chinese and Russian cyberattacks and Trump shrugs them off as something America does, too.

He also has cast doubt before on his government officials’ assessments of who’s responsible for cyberattacks on the United States, such as when he asserted China rather than Russia was behind the landmark SolarWinds breach.

Updated 8/3/2026: with comments from Minnesota’s senators.

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