The Coast Guard and FBI boarded two foreign vessels coming to the United States last month to investigate potential cyberattacks on the ships, according to a joint statement from the agencies Wednesday.

The “joint offshore security boardings” of the two commercial ships in the Gulf of Mexico on Aug. 21 and Aug. 24 “were designed to ensure integrity of the vessel’s operational and information technology systems following indications that the networks of both vessels were compromised,” according to the joint statement.

“Currently, there are no reports of operational disruptions, vessel instability, physical danger to crews, or environmental impacts,” the statement reads. “The Coast Guard is actively managing communications with port operators, vessel owners, and local maritime stakeholders to ensure port operations continue safely and without interruption.”

The vessels were reportedly tankers carrying oil and natural gas, and the first got hacked in the Strait of Gibraltar and lost communication for over 30 hours. Authorities were said to be  investigating whether Iran, or perhaps another group seeking to exploit the conflict between Iran and the United States, was behind the attacks.

Coast Guard cyber teams have been investigating “dark fleets” carrying sanctioned oil from Iran and Russia, which rely on digital masking to hide their operations and carry enhanced cyber risks, The Wall Street Journal reported in June.

Then-President Joe Biden signed an executive order in 2024 giving the Coast Guard additional authorities to respond to cybersecurity incidents, citing the risks that a maritime cyber incident could cause “cascading” harm to the global supply chain.

The Aug. 21 boarding party included Coast Guard law enforcement personnel, Coast Guard Cyber Protection Team members, a vessel inspector and FBI Cyber Action Team operators, who boarded “to conduct a comprehensive cyber security boarding and investigation,” according to the agencies’ joint statement. A similar team made up the Aug. 24 boarding party.

“The captain, crew, and shore-side corporate staff were critical partners in helping to ensure the threats were mitigated,” the statement reads.

Top Trump administration cyber officials have refused to answer questions from reporters recently about Iranian cyberattacks during the Middle East conflict. Trump himself has rejected the idea that Iran was behind a recent spate of attacks on U.S. water facilities.

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Citing cyber and other security threats, President Donald Trump signed an executive order Wednesday that declares a national emergency to secure the U.S. bulk-power system and aims to prohibit certain foreign-produced equipment, software and systems from being used in the  country.

The order says it forbids “any acquisition, importation, transfer, or installation” of such foreign-produced equipment if it’s determined to pose a significant national security risk.

“To deal with the threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, the Order, among other things, generally prohibits certain foreign-produced bulk-power system electric equipment, including associated critical software and digital capabilities that could pose cybersecurity or operational risks, from being purchased or installed in the United States, or appropriately conditions such purchases and installations to address those risks,” the White House said in a fact sheet.

The executive order is a response to fears of Chinese-made equipment housed within U.S. energy infrastructure, and a continuation of other measures from the Trump administration to shun that equipment.

The order, “Declaring a National Energy Emergency to Secure the United States Bulk-Power System,” cites “malicious cyber activities” as one impetus.

“The minimal restrictions on acquisition or operation in the United States of foreign-produced bulk-power system electric equipment augment the ability of some foreign entities to create and exploit vulnerabilities in such equipment; for instance, such equipment might have digital backdoors built into their systems that allow a foreign country to access that equipment remotely,” it states.

China supplies 85% of solar supply chain production capacity, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, and China is a major player in the power transformer manufacturing business.

In 2024, then-FBI Director Christopehr Wray told Congress that hackers prepositioning themselves in small office and home routers had the electricity grid as one of their targets should China and the United States go to war.

Near the end of Trump’s first term he also signed an executive order seeking to limit the purchase of foreign-made bulk-power equipment. The Biden administration suspended that order, citing the need to review its scope, and revoked and replaced a related Energy Department order. Some utilities found compliance with the 2020 executive order difficult.

For the new order, the Energy Department has 120 days to develop rules to implement the order, in consultation with other key departments.

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The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency published a guidebook for federal agencies Thursday to aid them on managing security risks with open-source software, touching on topics like patching and open-source AI models.

An executive order President Joe Biden signed and that President Donald Trump amended ordered CISA and other agencies to issue open-source security recommendations to federal agencies. But the guidance is also timely, given a recent slew of attacks on open-source software (OSS).

“As part of our statutory mission, CISA remains laser-focused on enhancing the nation’s cybersecurity by collaborating with government, industry and the open-source community to understand and securely use OSS,” said Chris Butera, acting executive assistant director for cybersecurity. “CISA encourages federal civilian agencies to review this guide and implement the principles and practices to improve risk management, better execute their mission, and better serve the public.” 

The document, “Open Source Software: Security Principles and Practices,” touts the advantages of open-source software — which anyone can use, modify and share — as offering benefits in efficiency, cost, security transparency and more, but notes that it also has unique tradeoffs.

“All software carries risk, and OSS is no more or less risky than other software. The key distinction is that, with OSS, agencies can directly assess code quality and security, rather than relying solely on vendor assurances,” the guidance reads. “OSS is increasingly intertwined with emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence. Agencies that adapt to OSS’s unique characteristics will position themselves to meet future challenges and leverage new innovations.”

The guidance says that agencies need to take steps to evaluate the trustworthiness of an OSS project before approving an OSS component for use, and track OSS in their asset management repositories. It details how agencies should deal with patching, including when there’s a new OSS vulnerability that doesn’t have one. It offers advice on how agencies might contribute to OSS projects, produce them and secure rights for government reuse of code when contracting for custom software development. And it explains how it should approach open-weight AI models.

“Agencies should approach ‘open source’ AI systems differently from other OSS because open source licenses for AI software do not require the level of transparency needed to evaluate the trustworthiness of the software,” the guidance states.

Æva Black, an open-source security expert and former OSS lead at CISA, said she applauded her former agency for the guidance, telling CyberScoop that it “demonstrates a grounded understanding of the global, diverse, and participatory nature of open source software development, and provides essential guidance for federal agencies to safely use open soure during a crucial moment.” 

She singled out its recommendations on the risks of deploying unverifiable open-weight AI models on sensitive networks.

“Due to recent advances in AI, particularly in large language models capable of finding and exploiting software vulnerabilities, vulnerability management is facing a global crisis,” she said. “Many proprietary software vendors are using this as an opportunity to spread ‘fear, uncertainty, and doubt’ about open source in order to capture public attention, and, I presume, public money — but when used responsibly and maintained collaboratively, I believe open source software is, and will remain, the safest and most cost-effective means for building large scale public infrastructure.” 

CISA has produced a bevy of security guidance and updated advisory materials this week: on the creation of software bills of materials written in conjunction with other agencies and allied governments that won praise from experts; on the isolation of vital operational technology during a crisis, also written with other agencies and allied governments; and the release of updated secure cloud configuration baselines for Google Workspace.

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Industry groups who spoke at town halls hosted by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency about a pending cyber incident notification regulation had a few consistent messages:

We want this to apply to fewer of us. We don’t want to report to you on as many incidents. We want to give you less information when we do. 

CISA last week published transcripts from the town halls, where the agency sought feedback on the delayed rule for the 2022 Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act — perhaps the most significant cyber legislation Congress has ever passed. That law required critical infrastructure owners to report major cyberattacks to the federal government within 72 hours, and ransomware payments within 24 hours.

The law was designed to let the feds share information about significant incidents more widely to prepare other would-be victims. CISA published a proposed rule on the law in 2024 to define terms like “covered cyber incident” and more, and industry groups have persistently registered their objections since then.

CISA missed the October 2025 deadline for finalizing the rule, then missed a May reset target date, and now the administration says the rule will be completed in September.

Some industry sources told CyberScoop they consider that unlikely. Most also haven’t received any indications from CISA about how much of the town hall feedback it intends to embrace, they said.

Companies, incidents, information 

Those town hall comments over the course of four June dates were often very direct.

“The rule includes too many companies,” said Grant MacIntyre, director of regulatory affairs and senior attorney at the Auto Care Association. CISA estimated that more than 300,000 entities will be subject to its requirements.

Some industries advocated for their removal entirely, such as two different groups representing elements of the insurance sector. Some sought to reduce the number affected within their sector, such as the Nuclear Energy Institute wanting the list cut down to those already subject to Nuclear Regulatory Commission cybersecurity reporting requirements.

While CISA wrote the regulation with the intention to avoid overburdening small businesses, some feared it wouldn’t work that way in practice.

“The current approach where an entity qualifies either by size or by sector effectively negates the intended limitation on small businesses,” said Douglas Leigh, vice president of legislative affairs for the Alliance for Chemical Distribution. “In chemical distribution, even small entities could be swept in under multiple cyber categories.”

Where the rule specifies what kind of data organizations should report in a major incident, CISA should “seek to collect the least amount of information possible in the easiest to report fashion to facilitate information accuracy and reporting speed,” said Samantha Burch, vice president of technology public policy at government affairs at AHIP, a health insurance industry trade association.

Many, for instance, argued the report should not include information on the affected entities’ security measures.

Others worried about what kind of incidents would trigger reporting requirements.

“My big concern is that you’re going to be asking us to report incidents on every time some foreign entity tickles our firewall, whether they do anything or not, if they just do a ping or a search,” said Tim Pospisil, chief security officer for Nebraska Public Power District. “And that could be extremely burdensome.”

Industry Expectations

One industry representative told CyberScoop that CISA’s willingness to hold town halls, combined with the Trump administration strategy emphasizing “common sense regulation,” was a good sign about where the rule might be heading.

‘They are not picking up on the Biden administration’s approach and tweaking it. They’re thinking, ‘What are the specific pieces of information we need during a cyber incident to help critical infrastructure companies respond?’” said Henry Young, senior director of policy for the Business Software Alliance. “In general, industry is optimistic that what we’ll end up with are a few of the most important pieces of information, so that in the emergency, companies can act quickly and actually respond to an incident rather than completing lots of paperwork.”

But multiple industry sources said they haven’t gotten many indications about CISA’s intentions. Nor are they optimistic CISA can meet the September target date in the Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions.

“It could slip,” one said. “But I think they’re going to try.”

That industry source said they’d like to see a proposal from CISA before it cements anything forever.

Another industry source said it’s hard to trust the September date given past CISA delays, some of which aren’t CISA’s fault, such as dealing with multiple government shutdowns. Some of the delays trace to the Trump administration, given the massive cuts to CISA’s personnel.

Congress is also getting impatient.

The House Appropriations Committee “is concerned about delays in publishing the final CIRCIA rule and urges CISA to finalize it promptly following stakeholder review and feedback,” the panel wrote in the committee report for its fiscal 2027 Department of Homeland Security spending bill.

It’s a much different world than when CISA began writing the rule, something the agency also has to take into account now.

“AI has fundamentally changed the playing field,” the source said. “When this was set up, we didn’t even have the first generation of ChatGPT. We’re now in a mythos class environment.” That’s changed “how quickly we can identify threats, mitigate them, the level of human intervention, potential machine engagement.”

While CISA might have good intentions, past interactions give cause for skepticism about how capable it is of working collaboratively with industry, the source said.

Another industry source said conversations with CISA suggest the agency will look to simplify the regulation to keep it smaller and narrower, then potentially build upon it later.

From CISA’s mouth

Nick Andersen, the acting director of CISA, talked about his overarching intentions with CIRCIA at the town halls.

“CISA does not view CIRCIA as simply a check-the-box compliance exercise,” Andersen said at one. “CIRCIA will enhance visibility into the cyberthreat landscape to enable a robust national early warning capability for critical infrastructure. By quickly reporting covered cyber incidents and ransom payments to CISA, we will be able to provide timely and actionable defensive and eviction measures to your network defenders.”

Asked by CyberScoop about next steps for CIRCIA, and how it might incorporate the industry feedback, a spokesperson provided a statement.

“CISA recognizes the importance of CIRCIA, however, multiple funding lapses impacted CISA’s ability to conduct rulemaking activity for CIRCIA. CISA continues to work on the final rule,” the spokesperson said, adding that 1,200 critical infrastructure stakeholders attended the town halls.  “CISA will continue to communicate updates on the CIRCIA rulemaking process and timeline through CISA.gov/CIRCIA and the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs’ Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions.”

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Seven out of 10 federal cyber regulations requiring written reports to federal agencies are duplicated elsewhere, a report from a government watchdog found in a report to Congress Wednesday.

And so far, efforts to de-conflict haven’t had much success, the report from the Government Accountability Office concluded.

At the request of two top lawmakers, the GAO examined federal cyber regulations at 37 agencies. It counted 80 out of 117 rules that “either contain the same kind of reporting requirement applicable to a sector or the same reporting requirement as at least one other regulation.”

The desire to harmonize those conflicting rules gathered steam under the Biden administration, as it undertook a more aggressive push to regulate cybersecurity than prior administrations. It has continued into the second Trump administration.

The GAO scrutinized regulations that required the private sector to report cybersecurity incidents, plans and reviews to federal agencies, as part of a study sought by House Homeland Security Chairman Andrew Garbarino, R-N.Y., and the top Democrat on the Senate counterpart to Garbarino’s panel, Gary Peters, D-Mich.

In some cases, a single critical infrastructure sector could have duplication with several agencies. For example, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency has been working on a regulation stemming from the 2022 Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA), which would require critical infrastructure owners and operators to report when they are the victims of major attacks or make ransomware payments.

Elements of the financial services sector might fall under one of 15 preexisting cybersecurity reporting rules, depending on the agency that has oversight, but they may also be subject to the pending CIRCIA rules, GAO noted.

A 2024 national security memorandum tasked the Office of the National Cyber Director and the Department of Homeland Security to harmonize conflicting regulations, and both agencies made some progress on those goals.

But the executive branch paused some of those efforts after Trump issued an executive order in March of last year while the administration conducted a study of the 2024 memo, a study that was still underway as of last month, according to the GAO.

As such, on harmonization, “many past federal efforts have experienced delays and made limited progress,” the GAO concluded in its report Wednesday, its latest on the topic. 

Congress has also looked at ways to streamline cybersecurity regulations.

GAO’s study was focused only on federal rules. BreachRx, a cyber incident response firm, published its own report Wednesday looking at major cyber incidents and how overlapping regulatory reporting obligations came into play, folding in regulations from states and other sources.

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