Democrats’ big win on Election Day, which saw them take control of both the House and Senate, has ramifications for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, artificial intelligence, surveillance policy and much more.

Here’s what lawmakers and cybersecurity experts have to say about the short-term and long-term prospects on Capitol Hill.

Leadership plans ahead

Maggie Hassan, D-N.H. is in line to take the gavel on the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, with Sen. Gary Peters, Mich., retiring.

“Our government’s number one job is to keep people safe, and the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee must work to ensure that our country remains safe, secure and free from all kinds of threats,” Hassan said in a statement to CyberScoop. “That work involves protecting against terrorism and fentanyl trafficking, but it also includes guarding against emerging threats like artificial intelligence security risks and strengthening our cybersecurity.”

“The Trump-Vance administration has undermined our security on these fronts, including by diverting resources away from combatting fentanyl trafficking and gutting CISA,” she continued. “We need to reverse these cuts, confront these challenges and put public safety first.”

Rep. Bennie Thompson, D-Miss., is poised to return once again as chair of the House Homeland Security Committee, said Democrats are taking over at a “pivotal time for CISA,” with it looking to add staff after cutting back by nearly one-third.

“First and foremost, we will aim to work with CISA to expedite its critical re-staffing effort and to ensure it has the expertise necessary to support stakeholders as they defend against the scale and velocity of AI-enabled cyber-attacks,” he said in a statement to CyberScoop. “Advances in AI can help defenders, but it will also accelerate the consequences of deferred investments in security and CISA must be well-positioned to help critical infrastructure owners and operators rapidly improve their cybersecurity posture.”

“We will prioritize getting resources straight into the hands for defenders — by extending the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program and improving support of under-resourced sectors, especially water,” he continued. “We will work to ensure CISA re-establishes its cross-sector coordination capacity, which was diminished when the Trump administration- terminated CIPAC, by making sure the Anchor-CI is eventually up and running and meets the needs of stakeholders. Finally, we will make sure CISA is well-positioned to support the secure development and deployment of AI.”

What happens in the lame-duck session

Before the GOP relinquishes control of the House and Senate to Democrats, though, there’s a lame-duck session ahead. 

Long-term renewal of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA 2015) is a bipartisan and industry priority, with it set to expire Dec. 11. Current Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Chairman Rand Paul, R-Ky., has been the biggest obstacle to reauthorization, but he could get “rolled” by GOP leadership on an extension, said Michael Garcia, a former government cyber official and vice president of the cybersecurity practice at Monument Advocacy. Possible vehicles for CISA 2015 to hitch a ride include an omnibus funding bill or the annual defense policy bill.

The Department of Homeland Security, and its subagency CISA, are currently operating on a continuing resolution that’s also set to expire Dec. 11, where lawmakers could temporarily extend CISA 2015 if a long-term solution can’t be reached in the lame duck. Another continuing resolution before Dec. 11 in lieu of an omnibus spending bill is an option for the lame duck. Both a CR and omnibus spending bill would theoretically include DHS funding, although the agency’s funding has been made more difficult in the past by the presence of Immigration and Customs Enforcement within the department.

Republicans have talked about wanting to get the fiscal 2027 National Defense Authorization Act done in the lame duck. Besides the possibilities of CISA 2015 being included in the bill, Nicholas Leiserson, senior vice president for policy at the Institute for Security and Technology, said the Senate version of the legislation has a pair of very noteworthy cyber provisions: a “very broad” authorization for contractor-owned, contractor-operated offensive cyber operations, and a requirement that every artificial intelligence product sold to the Defense Department have an AI bill of materials.   

Additional leadership shuffle

While Paul is losing his gavel, he’s shown he can be a disruptive force on passing cybersecurity legislation through the Senate in the minority. That makes what he does next possibly determinative for cyber bills, Leiserson and Garcia said. “If he leaves HSGAC, let a thousand cyber bills flourish!” Garia quipped on social media. Paul could opt to become the top Republican on the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee instead of HSGAC.

Nebraska Sen. James Lankford would take over for Paul as top HSGAC Republican in that scenario, and an industry source said he’s viewed as a supporter of CISA 2015.

On Senate Intelligence, the panel’s leadership goes to a lawmaker who has placed a big emphasis on cybersecurity in his congressional career: Mark Warner, D-Va. 

On the House side, while Rep. Andrew Garbarino, R-N.Y., moves to the minority on the Homeland Security panel, he has proven willing to collaborate with Democrats on cybersecurity issues. Rep. Delia Ramirez, D-Ill., is poised to take the gavel of the panel’s cybersecurity subcommittee, and Rep. Vince Fong, R-of California looks set to become the subcommittee’s top Republican and has his own history of bipartisanship. Fong would replace current subcommittee chair Andy Ogles, the far-right Tennessee Republican who lost in the primaries.

One thing to watch in the House, Leiserson said, is how the House looks to tackle AI — through existing committees, a select committee or some other structure. Democrats haven’t put forward a unified front on AI guardrails yet.

With AI models uncovering as many vulnerabilities as they are, “highly capable frontier models are going to drive a lot of discussion” about AI and cybersecurity, said Craig Albright, the Business Software Alliance’s senior vice president for U.S. government relations.

Appropriations, oversight, legislation

If the NDAA or a CISA 2015 extension don’t pass in the lame duck, they’d be priorities in 2027, too.

“CISA 2015 has to happen, and if we can’t get it done, then we can’t move to the next thing,”  said Henry Young, BSA’s policy director. “Once we get it done, there’s an open question about which of these priorities that we’ve talked about gets to be number one. Is it post-quantum cryptography? Is it government IT modernization? Is it frontier AI cybersecurity systems? We don’t know that yet, and we can’t know until we pass this law.”

How damaged the agency CISA is by Trump administration’s budget cuts is something Democrats are expected to scrutinize closely. Another top budget issue is what to do with the expired State and Local Cybersecurity Grants Program housed at DHS, since even if it’s reauthorized, it will require appropriators taking steps to invest in it.

Democrats could take a look at a variety of other Trump administration changes at DHS and CISA, on topics like election security, the Cyber Safety Review Board, the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative and more. 

More broadly, Leiserson said an area of Democratic cyber oversight is likely to be the Department of Government Efficiency that cut cyber personnel at agencies at and beyond CISA, and “particularly the integrity of systems that DOGE touched when they were given very high privileged access to federal systems.”

If the White House puts forward a permanent nominee for director of CISA, Democrats would be poised to vet that person. They also would have a say in who leads the Office of the National Cyber Director, should the incumbent, Sean Cairncross, depart.

So far, Democrats haven’t put forward a unified posture on expired surveillance authorities known as Section 702, although both Warner and incoming House Intelligence Chairman Jim Himes, D-Conn., have fought in the past for its renewal. The surveillance program is operating similarly still due to a court order, but that order only lasts through next spring.

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Artificial intelligence has never been more important to the federal government.

Under the Trump administration, AI has been adopted rapidly across the private sector and federal agencies. Software developers now use large language models to generate much of their code. Frontier AI models are escaping testing sandboxes to hack live internet infrastructure. Foreign governments are conducting cyber and kinetic attacks targeting data centers and other AI-related infrastructure.

The AI industry’s lightning-fast evolution since 2022 and growing importance to U.S. economic and national security have prompted calls  for stronger federal oversight in order to better manage emerging threats.

A new report published Thursday from the nonprofit Americans for Responsible Innovation, shared exclusively with CyberScoop, calls for the federal government to declare key AI models, companies and its supporting industries as critical infrastructure. It also calls for naming the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency as the lead agency managing cyberthreats for the sector.

The report defines the AI sector as organizations, facilities, technologies, and industries “whose primary purpose is the development, training, deployment, and operation of AI systems.” It includes frontier model designs, model weights, evaluation and alignment systems, datacenters and AI-specific hardware, semiconductor chips and the platforms and infrastructure used to deploy and serve AI models at scale.

“The AI sector already bears all the hallmarks of critical infrastructure,” wrote authors Terrence Kelly and Jessica Maksimov. “It is interwoven with public and private services, concentrated among a handful of foundation models, and increasingly interdependent with [critical infrastructure] sectors, meaning a single attack on the AI stack could cascade across multiple sectors at once.”

In an interview, Maksimov told CyberScoop that while there are other options, CISA makes the most sense to lead the sector’s cybersecurity efforts because of its statutory mission, experience managing eight other critical infrastructure sectors and background dealing with cybersecurity problems that cross different sectors and industries.  

“We want an agency that has coordination authority across all other departments, because we believe that AI will just be so prevalent across different infrastructure [impacting] finance, energy, government services, that’s already equipped to coordinate across the entire interagency and talk about infrastructure in that way,” she said.

The U.S. is particularly susceptible to AI supply chain disruptions because frontier AI companies and most of their computing resources are based in the country. As the Trump administration pushes broader adoption across government and the private sector, experts warn that a major disruption could have outsized economic consequences. 

The past year has offered a potential vision of that future, with Iranian drones attacking Amazon-owned datacenters and Ukrainian drones striking Russian e-commerce giant Wildberries, causing disruptions to critical internet services.

“I would say that because of the value that attackers would put on U.S. AI capabilities and systems, that the infrastructure that supports all those capabilities is very vulnerable,” to both physical and cyber attacks, Maksimov said.

There are currently 16 critical infrastructure sectors managed by the federal government, and the designation carries real weight in terms of how departments and agencies prioritize their limited resources.

Matt Hayden, a former assistant secretary of homeland security for cyber infrastructure risk and resilience, said designating a sector or industry as critical infrastructure means the government puts you in a special category where you’re “identified as being a component of a national critical function that the U.S. population, the economy, depend on.”

The designation unlocks a wide range of federal tools and resources, often free of charge, including operational continuity and incident response services, cybersecurity software, access to federal systems like Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM), and bespoke, real-time threat intelligence.

Hayden said that the AI ecosystem described in the report captures many critical industries, and he believes that at the very least, frontier models will one day be covered as critical infrastructure, whether through a new designated sector or existing ones, like the IT and telecommunications sector.

But he noted that other sectors, such as space or cloud computing, have similarly argued for a critical infrastructure designation. He also predicted that any effort to formalize a federal lead for AI security would result in a bureaucratic turf war. Under the Trump administration, the Departments of Commerce and Treasury have played more prominent roles in shaping policy and regulation around AI systems.

“We have fought those battles in the policy circus for trying to get space-based critical infrastructure carved out, and it’s as complicated as trying to find an owner,” said Hayden, now a vice president at General Dynamics Information Technology. “Everyone in the government has to agree that that [agency] is the primary, and as a result it’s very difficult to get those documents across the finish line.”

Hayden also said that new programs like ANCHOR-CI allow CISA to quickly convene ad-hoc stakeholder meetings to address emerging cyber threats. It also gives the CISA director authority to add individual companies to existing critical infrastructure sectors.

Bob Kolasky, former director of the National Risk Management Center at CISA, told CyberScoop that he believes companies like OpenAI and Anthropic, as well as data center operators, will eventually be designated as critical infrastructure. He said it’s still an open question whether ANCHOR-CI, which was rolled out by DHS in July, will be an improvement over the existing processes scrapped by the Trump administration last year.

“Every sector is going to rely on artificial intelligence and making more resilient the sectors themselves and understanding how they use AI and the dependencies” is still going to be an important task, said Kolasky, now senior vice president of critical infrastructure at Exiger.

And while CISA is well-positioned as a potential lead, Kokasky said the AI sector is likely to bring its own unique set of challenges and coordination issues.

“If you just sort of layer on another sector and say ‘function like the other 16 sectors,’ right now, those 16 sectors are all over the place in terms of how they’re functioning,” said Kolasky. 

The post The push to designate AI as the next critical infrastructure sector appeared first on CyberScoop.

On July 1, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) published a seven-page notice in the Federal Register that could fundamentally change how the U.S. government works with private companies to protect critical infrastructure from cyber threats and natural disasters.

The notice, “Establishment of the Alliance of National Councils for Homeland Operational Resilience – Critical Infrastructure (ANCHOR-CI),” details a new framework for CISA to build councils that let private partners advise the government on cybersecurity and critical infrastructure issues. This replaces the 20-year framework that the federal government used to work with critical infrastructure partners, formerly known as the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC). For at least the next two years, ANCHOR-CI will dictate how the government and industry collaborate to protect critical infrastructure.

When former Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem terminated CIPAC in March of last year, Congress and private-sector partners objected immediately. The damage was real. The 16 sector-coordinating councils (SCCs), that brought together private partners from each critical infrastructure sector lost their legal mechanism to meet with the federal government. They could no longer advise and provide group consensus to their federal counterparts without triggering laws that CIPAC exempted. To be sure, CISA still had the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative. Department of Energy had the Energy Threat Analysis Center. The National Security Agency had the Cybersecurity Collaboration Center. But none, however, replaced what the SCC ’s did: stand as steady forums where industry and government hashed out how to best assist critical infrastructure owners and operators.

Not that the SCCs were flawless. I worked with or alongside SCCs for more than a decade, most recently at CISA, and I am familiar with their shortcomings. SCC membership could be stagnant. The quality of recommendations to the government varied.  New members faced barriers based on each sector’s rules.

The core problem was how the model locked each sector in. DHS built SCCs in an era when critical infrastructure risks were looked at through a sector-specific lens: energy, transportation, water, communications, and so on. Today’s cyber threats jump across these sectors. A vulnerability in a cloud service provider or industrial software platform can harm hospitals, pipelines, manufacturers, water utilities, and financial institutions simultaneously.

To see why ANCHOR-CI works better than the CIPAC structure, we need to go back 20 years and understand what CIPAC was trying to do. Congress didn’t codify CIPAC into law. Instead, Congress authorized DHS to establish advisory committees exempt from the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). This exemption let the federal government and SCCs hold private meetings without public notice, convene quickly without complying with FACA procedural requirements, pick members based on expertise rather than balanced public representation, and skip FACA’s public recordkeeping requirements. (But these FACA exemptions do not exempt records from the Freedom of Information Act, a common misconception.)

ANCHOR-CI carries this power forward. Crucially, ANCHOR-CI end the siloed, sector-by-sector approach by creating four types of councils: Critical Infrastructure Sector Councils; Cross-Sector Councils; Critical Infrastructure Industry Councils; and Regional Coordinating Councils.

Critical Infrastructure Sector Councils: These are basically the old SCCs, but with a change in power.  The CISA director now approves or removes any council member directly.

Cross-Sector Councils: These councils matter most. Specifically, they tackle “current and emerging threats, interdependencies, or other issues impacting multiple critical infrastructure sectors or industries.” Examples might include councils on countering unmanned aerial systems, AI threats, or reducing dependence on foreign supply chains. CISA could also revive and expand the Space Systems Critical Infrastructure Working Group.

Critical Infrastructure Industry Councils: Like cross-sector councils but designed for issues that span sectors in ways that don’t fit neatly into a given sector. After Volt Typhoon—a Chinese campaign that installed malicious malware in critical infrastructure—CISA could establish an Operational Technology council with original equipment manufacturers, software providers, and critical infrastructure owners to address and stop the threat.

Regional Coordinating Councils: CISA says these will help state and local governments tackle regional risks. What that means in practice is unclear. CISA could create 10 councils tied to 10 regional offices. Or it could create councils focused on real regional risks: preparing for the Cascadia subduction zone in the Pacific Northwest, droughts in the Southwest, or hurricane in the South and Mid-Atlantic.

In the end, like any policy, success hinges on how CISA carries it out. If CISA runs ANCHOR-CI thoughtfully and with transparency, it could become the biggest upgrade in of public-private cybersecurity collaboration work in two decades.

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