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Congress kicks the can down the road on surveillance law (again)

Congress extended a controversial surveillance law for 45 days on Thursday, hours before its latest expiration following an earlier extension.

The Senate passed — then the House cleared — a 45-day extension of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which authorizes warrantless surveillance of foreign targets. But those targets are sometimes communicating electronically with Americans, and intelligence officials can search the database using their identifying information, which has long given privacy groups and privacy-minded lawmakers heartburn.

The 45-day reprieve gives lawmakers more time to hammer out a lasting deal, and comes after the leaders of the Senate Intelligence Committee agreed to send a letter to the Director of National Intelligence and attorney general, seeking swift declassification of a letter on a classified ruling from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.

Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., had sought release of that opinion, and had resisted giving unanimous consent for the latest short-term extension to move forward until Senate Intelligence Chairman Tom Cotton, R-Ark., and top panel Democrat Mark Warner of Virginia agreed to send the letter.

A declassification review was already underway, but the Cotton-Warner letter states that “We expect that this declassification review will be completed and the FISC opinion released publicly within 15 days,” according to Wyden, speaking on the Senate floor.

The March 17 opinion reportedly came with annual recertification of the warrantless surveillance program. The Justice Department is appealing that ruling because it blocked them from using certain tools to analyze communications.

“A few weeks ago, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court found major compliance problems related to the surveillance law known as section 702,” Wyden said earlier this month. “These compliance problems are directly related to Americans’ Constitutional rights.”

Senate Majority Leader John Thune, R-S.D., said the extension will give lawmakers additional room to hold “discussion on reforms.”

The House this week had passed a 3-year reauthorization with some changes to the surveillance program, but key to doing so was leadership’s agreement to attach legislative language on a separate matter that would ban a central bank digital currency. Thune had said that language was going nowhere in the Senate.

On Thursday, the House voted 261-111 to extend the law for 45 days. President Donald Trump has sought a “clean” 18-month reauthorization of the surveillance powers.

The extension continues a perennial ritual for the Hill when it comes to Section 702: A deadline looms, and Congress kicks the can down the road repeatedly.

The post Congress kicks the can down the road on surveillance law (again) appeared first on CyberScoop.

The surveillance law Congress can’t quit — and can’t explain

Congress is grappling with renewal of a surveillance law set to expire at the end of this month that critics say is a mystery on how much of a difference it has made for controversial government spying authorities — for better or worse.

The 2024 law reauthorized so-called Section 702 powers of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which authorizes warrantless surveillance of electronic communications of foreign targets. Most controversially, the law allows U.S. officials to search (“query”) those communications databases using Americans’ personal information, as long as the American is  in contact with someone overseas, which raises significant privacy concerns.

Backers of the 2024 law, known as the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (RISAA), point to 56 changes it made to deal with criticisms of Section 702, following a period where abuses came to light, including hundreds of thousands of improper searches. At the same time, the law made changes that some feared could actually expand Section 702 powers.

The House voted to extend the law as-is for 10 days early Friday. The Senate then did the same. The Trump administration has sought a 180-day “clean” reauthorization.

As Congress weighs potential extensions of the 2024 law without making changes to it, “I don’t think we know” what good has come of it, said Elizabeth Goitein, senior director of the Brennan Center for Justice’s liberty and national security program. By the same token, it’s difficult to know whether some of the expansion fears have come to fruition, she said: “We don’t have reliable information on this.”

Added Jake Laperruque of the Center for Democracy and Technology: “There’s a lot of black boxes here.”

Examining Past Changes

Both Goitein and Laperruque are skeptical of any positive change from RISAA, though, and have long advocated for a warrant requirement for U.S. person searches. Intelligence agencies have resisted that addition, claiming that it would dramatically slow down time-sensitive national security investigations.

By contrast, Glenn Gerstell, former general counsel at the National Security Agency, said RISAA constituted “the most significant set of reforms to the statute since its adoption in 2008.” and that “those reforms have had a dramatic effect.” 

One major point of dispute is to what degree the number of U.S. person searches dropped, particularly because of a conclusion in last year’s Justice Department inspector general report finding that an “advanced filtering tool generated queries that were not tracked by the FBI.” 

As the report outlines, an FBI system has an “‘advanced filter function’ that allows users to select a specific FBI casefile number or ‘facility’ (e.g., a phone number or email address), using a drop-down menu or search bar, to review communications with targeted facilities.

“This functionality enables users to select from lists of ‘participants’ in communication with targeted facilities and review communications of those participants.In or around August 2024,” the report continues. The National Security Division of the Justice Department “became aware of the participants filter function in [the system] and was concerned that searches conducted through use of the participants filter constituted separate queries that must satisfy the query standard and comply with all query procedural requirements.”

By the intelligence community’s count, the number of U.S. person searches has otherwise mostly declined even going back to before the 2024 law’s passage: 119,383 in 2022, 57,094 in 2023, 5,518 in 2024 and 7,413 in 2025.

“It is quite clear that the searches that were run using this filter function met the statutory definition of queries, and yet the FBI for some significant period of time decided to not count them as queries,” Goitein said.

Laperruque, deputy director of CDT’s security and surveillance project, said an audit mandate in the 2024 law was potentially useful, but hasn’t proven to be in reality.

“At least it should mean that it should help try to detect abuse if it is happening,” he said. “The problem there, though, is you’re still relying on the FBI to properly log all of its quarries and hand them over for DOJ to be checked, which hasn’t happened. You’re trusting DOJ and the executive to engage in self-policing, and that’s something where folks rightfully have a lot of skepticism based on how DOJ has conducted itself recently.”

Gerstell, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, points to numerous reviews — including a staff report from the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) — that indicate a drop in U.S. person searches. It’s the biggest change of RISAA, he said.

“The most significant one is a very substantial drop in the number of queries of the database for U.S. person information, which has been a big focus for privacy advocates, and there’s been a dramatic drop, so much so that both the Inspector General for the Department of Justice and the staff of the PCLOB have said, ‘I wonder if we’re overdoing it.’ … Every single one of them presents those numbers, without caveat.”

On the advanced filter function count, Gerstell acknowledged the ambiguity, but referred to reports that said, as he summarized, “If they had been considered queries, it appears that most would have been compliant anyway… because they were a subset of something that was already compliant. But we don’t know if any of them were noncompliant, and we don’t have the data.”

On the other side of the RISAA debate, critics argued that its revised definition of “electronic communications service provider” could dramatically expand surveillance to include businesses like coffee shops or landlords. The reported, but formally undisclosed, real target of the change was data centers.

“That was a pretty big expansion with a lot of potential abuse,” Laperruque said. But “we don’t really know much about how it’s changed” anything, he said.

Virginia Sen. Mark Warner, the top Democrat on the Intelligence Committee, sought to advance clarifying language about that subject after RISAA’s passage, and the Biden administration said it would confine the provision’s use to the kind of undisclosed businesses that prompted the provision in the first place. Laperreque noted that the Trump administration has made no such promises, and Warner’s clarifying language never became law.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) has issued its annual opinion re-certifying the Section 702 program for another year. However, the court reportedly took issue with the program’s f filtering systems, saying that when such a system is used to look for information on Americans it must be counted as a query, subjecting it to additional restrictions. The Trump administration plans to appeal the ruling.

Other critiques of the 2024 law include that many of its biggest changes weren’t changes at all, but instead codifications of changes that then-FBI Director Christopher Wray had implemented. Abuses continued after those changes, Goitein said.

Gerstell said enshrining those changes into law wasn’t a bad thing. “The statute expressly codified some but not all of Wray reforms — and some went beyond that in many ways,” he said. Those changes included requiring FBI deputy director approval of U.S. person queries that target elected officials, government appointees, political candidates or organizations, or media. Those were some of the more criticized prior targeting abuses.

The fight still ahead

Republicans remain divided over extending the law. Some who had reservations about a clean reauthorization have come on board, such as Senate Judiciary Chairman Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, who had taken issue with limitations on congressional attendance of FISC proceedings but since has had that concern resolved.

Others may have been swayed by direct lobbying from the Trump administration, including a social media post from Trump himself this week, where he wrote, “I am willing to risk the giving up of my Rights and Privileges as a Citizen for our Great Military and Country!” Still others have had their position against a clean extension hardened by the FISC court opinion and additional concerns.

Other issues have become enmeshed in the reauthorization debate, such as calls to block government agencies from purchasing information from data brokers. But “this has nothing to do with this authority,” said George Barnes, former deputy director of the NSA. 

But lawmakers of both parties have complained for months that the administration was silent for too long as the law’s expiration loomed.

Only recently did the Trump administration share new examples of the law’s successes, including that it had thwarted a 2024 terrorist attack on a Taylor Swift concert. Barnes said releasing such examples might offer a public case for the law, but has its downsides, too.

“I was always understanding but frustrated by the need to release examples just because they choreographed to the adversary what we could do,” said Barnes, now Red Cell’s cyber practice president. 

Reauthorizing Section 702 is urgent, though, for cybersecurity purposes, he said.

“A lot of the impact that I saw the authority having over my time was in cybersecurity as well,” he said. “And so when you have foreign entities that are targeting the U.S., or U.S. interests overseas, that authority can be positioned to help eliminate those activities.”

The post The surveillance law Congress can’t quit — and can’t explain appeared first on CyberScoop.

Senate Intel chair urges national cyber director to safeguard against open-source software threats

Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Tom Cotton is raising the spectre of foreign adversaries playing too heavy a role in open-source software, and asking the national cyber director to counter the risks.

The Arkansas Republican wrote to National Cyber Director Sean Cairncross Thursday, saying he was concerned about reports that “state-sponsored software developers and cyber espionage groups have started to exploit this communal environment, which assumes that contributors are benevolent, to insert malicious code into widely used open source codebases.”

Cotton cited last year’s alarms about a shadowy suspected nation-state hacker, Jia Tan, inserting a backdoor into a beta version of the compression utility XZ Utils. He also noted a Russia-based developer being the sole maintainer of a piece of open-source software (OSS) that’s in Defense Department software packages, and citations about Chinese tech companies Alibaba and Huawei being top OSS contributors.

“As the Office of the National Cyber Director holds responsibility for coordinating implementation of national cyber policy and government-wide cybersecurity, you are well-positioned to lead the U.S. government in addressing this cross-cutting vulnerability,” Cotton wrote. “I respectfully request that you take steps to build up the federal government’s capability to maintain awareness of provenance and foreign influence on OSS and track contributions from developers in adversary nations.”

Cotton’s letter adds to warnings from the Hill this year about the risks that Chinese involvement in open-source tech poses, following a letter from the House select committee on China on the subject to Biden-era Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo. Legislation designed to improve open-source cybersecurity didn’t advance in the Senate after leading lawmakers introduced it in 2023.

The senator noted that open-source software is part of critical government and defense systems. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in July ordered the Pentagon’s chief information officer to take steps to guard against foreign influence in department technology.

“The DoD will not procure any hardware or software susceptible to adversarial foreign influence that presents risk to mission accomplishment and must prevent such adversaries from introducing malicious capabilities into the products and services that are utilized by the Department,” he wrote.

At the same time, a Trump administration executive order this year puzzled experts by deleting language from a previous Biden administration executive order emphasizing the importance of open-source software.

The post Senate Intel chair urges national cyber director to safeguard against open-source software threats appeared first on CyberScoop.

Top Senate Intel Dem warns of ‘catastrophic’ cyber consequences of Trump admin national security firings, politicization

Politicization of intelligence in the Trump administration, as well as the “hollowing out” of government expertise, is leaving the United States dangerously vulnerable to cyberattacks and other threats, the top Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee said in a floor speech Thursday.

Mark Warner of Virginia chastised the president over what he called the politically-motivated personnel decisions that he said jeopardized national security, including layoffs of one-third of the workforce at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency, the firing of a top FBI cyber official and the vacant leadership at the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command.

“One-third of CISA, the agency established for the absolutely explicit purpose of protecting our critical infrastructure — water, power, our elections — to prevent those entities from being attacked by cyber tools, a third of that agency, fired,” Warner said. 

The administration has eliminated election security workers at CISA, he noted — rolling back improvements innovated when Trump was first president.

“The irony is stark: despite persistent efforts by China, Russia, Iran and other adversaries, the 2020 presidential election was one of the most secure in history, thanks in large part due to steps taken during the Trump administration’s first term to safeguard our critical infrastructure,” he said. “Yet now, much of that hard-won protection has been dismantled, leaving Americans more vulnerable than ever.”

Warner criticized the firing of Michael Nordwall, the former head of the FBI’s criminal cyber response branch that oversees the bureau’s fight against ransomware, online fraud and more.

He also criticized the firing of former NSA/Cyber Command boss Tim Haugh, and his deputy, Wendy Noble, “at the behest of the conspiracy theorist Laura Loomer.” Warner pointed out that those positions remain vacant, after the firings occurred in April. Many national security firings have come in retaliation for work under the prior administration to which Trump objected, or even because the fired personnel are friendly with administration critics, he said.

The cutbacks and firings are happening at a time when Trump administration national security leaders are warning about cyberattacks and malign foreign influence from China, Russia and Iran, in addition to non-cyber threats, Warner said.

“Firing agents who investigate terrorists, foreign spies, cyber hackers and child predators does not make America safer, especially when the president’s own intelligence officials warn, publicly and repeatedly, of the many threats facing our nation,” he said.

If the administration fails to keep classified information safe, if it fails to protect critical infrastructure, “We will beat the costs later,” Warner said. “A cost that could be catastrophic.”

A National Security Council spokesperson did not immediately respond to a request for comment. In the past, Trump administration officials have characterized firings and government layoffs as necessary for getting those agencies focused on their primary missions, and has refuted allegations of politicizing intelligence, saying it was the Biden administration that did so instead.

The post Top Senate Intel Dem warns of ‘catastrophic’ cyber consequences of Trump admin national security firings, politicization appeared first on CyberScoop.

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