Normal view

There are new articles available, click to refresh the page.
Before yesterdayMain stream

HHS updates a free risk tool to help hospitals size up their cybersecurity exposure

5 March 2026 at 14:20

The Department of Health and Human Services unveiled a tool Thursday to help health care facilities assess their cybersecurity risks, elevating the emphasis on those threats to the kind produced by weather conditions and other dangers.

The assistance from HHS’s Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response (ASPR) comes in the form of an update to the Risk Identification and Site Criticality (RISC) 2.0 Toolkit to include a specific focus on cybersecurity. 

RISC is a free tool to help organizations identify threats and vulnerabilities, estimate consequences and share their findings with others. Now it will include a cybersecurity module, too.

The module walks users through a series of questions and measures them against the influential National Institute for Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework 2.0, as well as HHS’s own voluntary cybersecurity performance goals.

John Knox, principal deputy assistant secretary at ASPR, said the change was a response to growing cyber threats.

“This module is the latest addition to our toolkit of resources to assist our health care and public health partners in preventing the disruption of patient care and strengthening national health security,” Knox said in a news release. “We must acknowledge that cyber safety is patient safety and that cyber threats can cause cascading problems across the health care industry. The new cybersecurity module will help our partners understand what is needed to strengthen their resilience and we strongly encourage them to take advantage of it.”

It continues an emphasis ASPR’s Charlee Hess discussed at CyberTalks last month, with the landmark Change Healthcare attack prompting the HHS division to look at ways to help organizations manage risk from third-party providers.

Errol Weiss, chief security officer at the Health Information Sharing and Analysis Center, said the creation of the cyber module was a “smart move,” with the RISC toolkit already being integrated into thousands of health care systems. He also liked the toolkit leaning on the NIST framework and HHS’s performance goals.

“By putting cyber side‑by‑side with other threats and hazards in a unified platform, RISC 2.0 can help hospital and health system leaders see cyber exposure in the same context as hurricanes, active shooters, or power failures,” he said in an emailed response to CyberScoop. “That visibility can drive more informed conversations at the executive and board levels about where to invest in cybersecurity, what gaps are most critical, and how cyber disruptions might cascade into real impacts on patient care.”

The post HHS updates a free risk tool to help hospitals size up their cybersecurity exposure appeared first on CyberScoop.

Across party lines and industry, the verdict is the same: CISA is in trouble

25 February 2026 at 06:00

“Decimated.” 

“Amateur hour.”

“Pretty much fallen apart.”

“It’s really hard to find something positive to say right now.”

It’s been a little more than one year into the second Trump administration, and there’s a large consensus, if not total unanimity, among those who have worked with and for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency: It has suffered significantly during that time. 

CISA has lost roughly a third of its personnel and shuttered entire divisions. Observers across the political spectrum told CyberScoop for this story that even on its core missions, like coordinating with industry and protecting federal networks, the agency is significantly diminished.

Many sources that spoke with CyberScoop did so under the condition of anonymity, in order to be more candid or avoid retribution. They told CyberScoop that CISA’s biggest problems, and their consequences, include:

  • Trump’s ire over the 2020 election results has led to the agency being deprioritized within the administration. Congress has yet to approve the administration’s permanent pick to lead the agency, Sean Plankey, and lawmakers have failed to do other things to strengthen it. 
  • CISA’s capabilities have been significantly diminished by the loss of personnel, expertise and programs. 
  • In the absence of a permanent leader, Acting Director Madhu Gottumukkala has struggled to lead the agency. “I don’t think anybody would argue he’s doing a great job,” one industry source said.
  • Organizations that previously turned to CISA for help now seek alternatives, like industry alliances, outside consultants or government-to-government partnerships.

Where to assign blame varied from source to source. Most criticized both the administration and Congress, though some faulted one more than the other.

Some see bright spots in CISA under the current administration. And while many are pessimistic about the agency’s future, others expressed optimism.

But the first year reviews are not glowing.

“Year one was a tough year for the agency,” said House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Andrew Garbarino, R-N.Y. He noted that a “lot of the best and brightest have left the agency,” though he expressed optimism about Plankey’s ability to turn CISA around. “The amount of cyberattacks that our nation is seeing every day, both on the private side and on the federal government side — you want your best people there fighting against it, and if they’re somewhere else, it definitely leaves us all vulnerable.”

Said Mississippi Rep. Bennie Thompson, the top Democrat on Garbarino’s panel: “It’s tough to have a robust entity when you cut the money…we are weaker because of CISA’s lack of manpower.”

When priorities shifted

Trump has harbored animosity toward CISA since 2020, when it contradicted his false claims related to widespread electoral fraud. He and his allies built on that animosity, recommending in Project 2025 that the agency be dismantled, divided by its core responsibilities, and farmed out to other federal agencies. 

“There was uniquely a target on its back,” said one CISA official who left in 2025. That hostility came from some Republicans in Congress, especially Kentucky Sen. Rand Paul, who chairs the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.

Said Thompson: “CISA wasn’t politicized for the most part, until the Trump administration came along and accused them of somehow contributing to his [election] loss.”

CISA has lost substantial personnel, including veterans and whole teams. Some employees were transferred to other divisions in the Department of Homeland Security. Election security was quickly cut. Two information sharing and analysis centers (ISACs) that serve state and local governments lost funding. A division coordinating with foreign governments, businesses and state and local governments was effectively closed.

The agency has lost senior leaders in programs like counter-ransomware initiatives, threat hunting and secure software development. Contracts for things like detecting threats in critical infrastructure networks, tracking vulnerabilities and collaborating with industry teetered, albeit sometimes only temporarily. 

DHS has unraveled multiple programs in which CISA plays a key role, such as by dismissing members of the Cyber Safety Review Board and disbanding the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council. Congress has lurched between letting both a key state and local cyber grant program and a cyber threat information sharing law lapse and temporarily re-upping them.

The departures and program changes likely haven’t ended, either. 

“It’s not a very harmonious place right now,” said one industry source. “I hear from people that are looking to leave.” Former CISA employees say those who remain either believe strongly in the mission, or are simply keeping their heads down until retirement from federal service.

“People I talk to say the morale is really low,” said James Lewis, distinguished fellow with the tech policy program at the Center for European Policy Analysis think tank.

CISA and DHS officials routinely say the changes are designed to get the agency “back on mission.” Lewis, industry officials and others say CISA probably never needed to get involved in combatting misinformation and disinformation, roles that rankled some conservatives, but the agency largely halted that work prior to Trump returning to office.

Some saw duplication and redundancy at CISA as legitimate problems. “I did see overlap between who was actually doing policy and who was actually doing the operational work,” said Ari Schwartz, managing director of cybersecurity services at the law firm Venable and a former Obama administration cybersecurity official.

It was not that long ago when CISA experienced quick budget growth, particularly after its establishment in 2018.

“As with any organization, the first few years are growth years and after a while, the agency needed to reevaluate how it was operating and meeting its statutory authorities,” said Kate DiEmidio, who formerly served as the agency’s director of legislative affairs and acting chief external affairs officer. “There was a need for the agency to refocus.”

Even among those who saw the need for change at CISA, though, many saw the Trump administration as going way too far. “CISA needed surgery,” Lewis said, but “what it needed was surgery with a scalpel, not a sledgehammer.” He added, “Not only is the White House hostile to CISA, but cybersecurity isn’t a priority for them.”

A question of capacity

The cuts have created real-world consequences for cybersecurity coordination. Former officials and industry partners describe broken relationships, unanswered requests for help and serious questions about whether CISA can handle a major crisis. The coordination and engagement that defined the agency’s approach have largely diminished.

The end result is that “they’ve dismantled all of those capabilities in units within government,” said Caitlin Durkovich, a former DHS official in the Obama administration and White House official in the Biden administration. She recently started a firm with former top CISA official Jeff Greene that offers services CISA has scaled back, such as security assessments.

“It’s been really hard to watch,” Greene said, how CISA has been working with the private sector and local governments on “developing a level of trust that is weakening or gone.”

One industry source said they used to meet regularly with top officials, but now can’t get a response. “We’ve got really good engagement elsewhere in government. We really would like the opportunity to do the same thing with CISA,” they said. “Some of the trust that had been built up has been eroded.”

Thompson said the biggest losses have been in election security and secure-by-design, areas where his staff says personnel has been “decimated.”

Said another industry source: “I do feel like that when people, if organizations, want to reach out to CISA, it’s not clear who’s there… If we got into a major conflict, let’s say, with China, and they start triggering Volt Typhoon-related malware, are we organized and ready to roll? I don’t think so.”

Another former CISA official described the current situation as a “lack of capacity,” especially when it comes to coordinating with state and local governments and others on a regional basis.

“A bunch of regions are really grappling with the loss of really key personnel who were the ones that were establishing and maintaining these relationships, and really trying to build the trust between the agency and the private sector, and especially in critical infrastructure,” they said. “Not having as many people to help do that national coordinating function that CISA is supposed to do is a real issue.”

They also said there are fewer people working in “flagship programs” like secure-by-design and developing regulations for the landmark Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA). “People are overstretched,” they said. “They’re not doing all the things that they could or should be doing, or want to be doing, and I think that you see evidence of that with talk from the private sector and their inability to to reach people and to get help “

Schwartz said he worries about when “an incident happens, do they have the people to go in, go to the states, go locally, and really do the work that’s needed, as they did in the past? Because they’ve lost some of that ability.”

Lewis said that “overall, the impression is it’s a much weaker entity than it was a year ago.”

“Their power was in their ability to act as a focal point, to coordinate, to bring people together, and just the publication of vulnerabilities and some of the things they were starting to get into in the previous administration were big steps forward that’s been diminished because they don’t have the people now,” he said. “So a smaller organization, that’s just not going to be as powerful.”

State and local governments say they’ve lost critical connections with CISA, saying they’ve had to turn to one another to fill the gaps.

“We’re asking states to do a job they’re not resourced to do, while weakening the one federal agency designed to help them,” said Errol Weiss, chief security officer at the Health-ISAC. “This is precisely where you do need a strong, centralized federal security function. We already have a national shortage of cybersecurity experts, and you can’t just replicate that expertise 50 times over.”

Overall, Weiss said industry partners have felt the lack of outreach from the agency. “Fewer touchpoints, fewer briefings, fewer problem‑solving calls,” he told CyberScoop, adding that there’s “a growing perception that CISA is being hollowed out where it matters most to industry: stakeholder engagement, collaborative forums, and operational support during incidents.”

Rob Knake, a former top Biden administration official, recently said that “CISA as an organization has pretty much fallen apart.”

Leadership in limbo

One near-universal sentiment is that as Sean Plankey’s leadership nomination drags in the Senate, the agency is worse off.

“We need to start this year off right, and we’re already in February and can’t get Plankey confirmed,” Garbarino said. “There’s nothing better than having a Senate-confirmed person running the show.”

The acting director has also faced criticism beyond the operational issues. Gottumukkala, who served as South Dakota’s chief information officer under Kristi Noem before she became DHS secretary, has faced fire from both parties for his stewardship.

A string of embarrassing stories have emerged about Gottumukkala, from the tale of him failing a polygraph test and seeking to oust those who administered it; to his reported attempted ouster of veteran agency CIO Robert Costello; to his reported uploading of sensitive contract data to ChatGPT. DHS has defended Gottumukkala amid those revelations.

Reading stories like that, “It just sounds like amateur hour,” said one former CISA employee.

“I don’t think he’s up to the task. I believe that he’s not the best person, and I think he is just somebody the secretary likes, because they both are from South Dakota.” Thompson said. “I don’t know anybody before this administration who would be in sensitive areas and not have passed minimal standards like the polygraph.”

The ChatGPT story drew concern from the right by Senate Judiciary Chairman Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, as well as from conservative figure Laura Loomer (the latter of whose remarks were racially tinged). Others were more perturbed by the lie detector story.

“When you have security issues with someone in a leadership position, you should find another place for them to go,” said a former Trump administration national security official. “There are plenty of competent people in DHS, in CISA, who could hold things together until Sean Plankey gets there. There are lots of serious things CISA needs to be working on right now. This is a drag on that. It’s not a place where you want any type of friction at the top.”

Garbarino was more generous, noting Gottumukkala’s technical background. DiEmidio also noted Gottumukkala’s technical skills. But Garbarino and Nevada Rep. Mark Amodei, the GOP chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, have been seeking CISA’s organizational plans to no avail.

“I don’t think he’s intentionally lying to us by saying there’s no reorg plan,” Garbarino said. “But there’s got to be some reasoning behind all these moves, moving the people around, or layoffs or whatever. I want to give him the benefit of the doubt that he is the technical guy that has been given a non-technical job to do.”

Schwartz and some others largely blame Congress for CISA’s current woes, since they haven’t approved Plankey as a full-time, permanent leader. “A lot of the issue is the fact that just doesn’t have the leadership to be able to participate in senior-level discussions,” he said.

What’s left to build on

Despite myriad complaints, many observers still see value in the current iteration of CISA. Some are hopeful about its ability to rebound, too.

CISA says it’s still devoted to its missions. The agency published a 2025 year-in-review about its accomplishments.

“CISA remains steadfast in its mission to safeguard the systems Americans rely on by strengthening federal network defenses, empowering businesses, and fortifying critical infrastructure nationwide,” Gottumukkala said in a statement to CyberScoop.

Moving forward, “we will deepen collaboration with trusted partners, prioritize highly skilled technical professionals, and direct resources for maximum impact—accelerating innovation, operational coordination, and workforce right-sizing to reduce long-term risks while maintaining strong industry partnerships and cost efficiency,” he said. “The CISA leadership and workforce remains committed to this mission despite a small minority who are upset that accountability and reform have come to the agency.”

It’s a message Gottumukkala recently delivered to Congress. “He tried to give the impression that we haven’t lost any capacity,” Thompson said. “I wasn’t impressed.”

Others said CISA is still carrying out many of its old tasks, such as issuing public alerts on vulnerabilities and threats.

“There’s still some good reporting coming out,” Greene said. “But what I can’t know is the volume of what they can put out versus what they used to be able to put out.”

Weiss said “CISA still has tremendous value in areas only the federal government can truly provide: national‑level visibility, cross‑sector coordination and the ability to marshal resources across agencies in a crisis.” But it’s not clear whether CISA can rise to the occasion like it did during the 2024 Change Healthcare crisis.

“All of this means it’s more important than ever for the private sector to take the initiative,” he said. “Critical infrastructure owners and operators cannot assume the federal government will have the capacity to step in the way it once did.”

Weiss and others also said that CISA has refocused on federal networks, but others, such as Lewis, said it’s also diminished there. “That’s their primary mission, and they don’t have the policies or the bodies to do that,” Lewis said.

Garbarino and a number of industry sources say they’re encouraged by the idea that the Trump administration could write less onerous regulations for CIRCIA, with an earlier draft drawing bipartisan and industry criticism.

A Senate-confirmed leader could further brighten the agency’s prospects, many agree. “They still have some good talent there. It’s not totally that we’ve lost everything there,” Schwartz said. “If you have leadership in there, then you can build it up.”

DiEmidio said some of the staff changes have made sense. Election security had more people than other sectors that needed the help, she said. 

“In some ways, I think the external attention to CISA’s mission in the media and with Congress was completely focused on one or two things, and the focus on the things that really matter, and the good work that CISA is doing got overshadowed,” she said. For the agency’s cybersecurity division and other cyber teams, “there were several incidents over the summer where those teams were incredible. They were working evenings, weekends.”

But many agree that rebuilding CISA’s workforce will be difficult.

The Trump administration has deliberately made working for the federal government challenging as a matter of policy. Russell Vought, head of the Office of Management and Budget, said before the election that the goal was to put federal workers “in trauma.” Morale at CISA has been particularly bad, they say. Periodic DHS shutdowns haven’t helped.

On the plus side for CISA, it’s a bad labor market, Lewis said.

Some of what CISA needs to do going forward is about managing expectations, said DiEmidio.

“What I would want to make sure is that CISA has a hiring plan in place to start hiring, especially in those key technical positions at all levels,” she said. “ I think you have to have an understanding that people are going to rotate in and out of government. Not everyone wants to stay in government long term and that’s okay.”

But there are some worries about CISA recruiting going forward. “Just the way they handle the departures, for a lot of folks, I don’t think it gives a lot of encouragement to individuals that ‘Hey, this is a great place to work,’” said one former DHS official.

The post Across party lines and industry, the verdict is the same: CISA is in trouble appeared first on CyberScoop.

HHS burrows into identifying risks to health sector from third-party vendors

19 February 2026 at 13:15

A Department of Health and Human Services official said Thursday that HHS is devoting a lot of attention to the security of third-party service providers after the 2024 Change Healthcare cyberattack.

That attack, which is widely regarded as the biggest ever in the sector — including by HHS’s Charlee Hess, who spoke Thursday at CyberTalks presented by CyberScoop — began with hackers exploiting the lack of multifactor authentication set up on a remote access portal at Change Healthcare.

“It wasn’t a hospital, it was a company most people have never heard of and had major impacts on our sector and threatened the liquidity of our entire health care system,” said Hess, director of the healthcare and public health sector cybersecurity at the Administration for Strategy Preparedness and Response division. “We recovered from that, but we realized there are third-party risks lurking in our health care system, and we don’t even know they’re there. Where are those entities or systems that will have an outsized impact on our sector?”

That realization arose from meetings between HHS and industry, she said. The focus on third-party service provider risk came next.

“We are going through and working through a methodology to identify that, and we’ve been working with industry on doing that, really finding where those places are,” Hess said.

The Change Healthcare breach, which exposed the data of 190 million people, has triggered other government responses, too, including on Capitol Hill.

It also prompted UnitedHealth Group, the parent company of Change Healthcare to “start over” on its use of computer systems. But industry has also bristled at the notion of mandatory cybersecurity requirements on hospitals — in part because, they note, the Change Healthcare attack wasn’t their fault.

The post HHS burrows into identifying risks to health sector from third-party vendors appeared first on CyberScoop.

Bipartisan health care cybersecurity legislation returns to address a cornucopia of issues

5 December 2025 at 13:46

A bipartisan group of senators are looking to tackle health care cybersecurity by reviving legislation that would update regulations and guidelines, authorize grants, offer training and clarify federal agency roles.

It’s a subset of cybersecurity where Congress hasn’t enacted any sweeping changes to date. The resurrected Health Care Cybersecurity and Resiliency Act from Health, Education Labor and Pension Committee Chairman Bill Cassidy, R-La., and his colleagues on both sides of the aisle emerges from a 2023 bipartisan health care cybersecurity working group.

Cassidy and his cosponsors — Mark Warner, D-Va., Maggie Hassan, D-N.H., and John Cornyn, R-Tex. — first introduced the bill in late November last year, with little time left in the session to take action on it before Congress adjourned at the beginning of 2025.

“Cyberattacks in the health care sector can have a wide range of devastating consequences, from exposing private medical information to disrupting care in ERs — and it can be particularly difficult for medical providers in rural communities with fewer resources to prevent and respond to these attacks,” Hassan said in a news release Thursday.

The legislation aspires to improve coordination between the Department of Health and Human Services and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, with steps like directing HHS to work with CISA state coordinators to provide training to health care owners and operators.

It would clarify HHS’s responsibilities and give it additional responsibilities, such as directing it to develop a cybersecurity incident response plan. It also requires HHS to update Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulations for health care identities to use modern cybersecurity practices, issue guidance for rural health clinics on breach prevention.

And it authorizes a five-year grant program at HHS for select health care entities, like academic health and cancer centers, although it doesn’t specify a dollar amount.

Some of those goals are similar to provisions from other health care cybersecurity bills that haven’t become law, some of which emerged after the Change Healthcare ransomware attack that led to the biggest breach of health care data ever reported to federal regulators.

“Patients deserve absolute confidence that their sensitive medical data stored online is protected and shielded from cybersecurity breaches or ransomware attacks,” Cornyn said.

The post Bipartisan health care cybersecurity legislation returns to address a cornucopia of issues appeared first on CyberScoop.

❌
❌