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ODNI tackles AI, threat hunting, app cybersecurity in year-one tech review

26 March 2026 at 18:58

A year-long effort to strengthen cybersecurity and modernize tech at U.S. intelligence agencies has led to policy standards for using AI to bolster cyber defenses, a shared repository of all apps that have undergone a cybersecurity review and more, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence announced Thursday.

An unclassified summary of cyber and tech modernization work under the first year of DNI Tulsi Gabbard’s stewardship states that the office has expanded the automation of threat hunting across intelligence community networks. (The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency conducts threat hunting across federal civilian agencies.)

The ODNI also has developed a zero-trust strategy that shifts “to a data-centric security model that protects information regardless of location or network,” according to the summary.

“Over the past year, we have taken meaningful steps to begin fulfilling that responsibility through the largest IC-wide technology investment and modernization effort in history,” Gabbard said in a news release. “President Trump’s Intelligence Community is moving faster and more decisively on cybersecurity modernization and investments in IT than ever before, delivering stronger defenses, greater efficiency, and real cost savings for the American people.”   

It constitutes the first significant cybersecurity announcement out of the office under Gabbard and the second Trump administration.

While the year-long effort began before the recent release of a national cyber strategy, the ODNI initiatives reflect many of its goals, including better protection of federal networks, advancing artificial intelligence for defensive purposes and going on offense against cyber adversaries.

The ODNI directed its National Counterintelligence and Security Center “to proactively combat foreign intelligence actors seeking to engage in cyber-attacks against U.S. interests,” according to the summary. 

The idea of an intelligence community repository of cybersecurity authorizations is to save both time and money, as it would allow agencies to capitalize on the testing of apps that other agencies have done without having to repeat them. 

On AI, the ODNI is “developing the policy framework, governance, and standards necessary to accelerate AI adoption for cybersecurity and other critical technology,” the summary states.

“Protecting our nation’s most sensitive information from those who seek to exploit it, while making sure our intelligence professionals have the tools and access they need to do their jobs, is not optional. It is essential to our national security,” Gabbard said. 

Gabbard’s appearance earlier this year during an FBI search of an elections office in Georgia has drawn congressional scrutiny, an appearance she has defended in part by citing her office’s role in coordinating and analyzing intelligence related to cybersecurity. Gabbard’s own personal cybersecurity practices prior to taking the job of DNI have also raised questions.

The post ODNI tackles AI, threat hunting, app cybersecurity in year-one tech review appeared first on CyberScoop.

Across party lines and industry, the verdict is the same: CISA is in trouble

25 February 2026 at 06:00

“Decimated.” 

“Amateur hour.”

“Pretty much fallen apart.”

“It’s really hard to find something positive to say right now.”

It’s been a little more than one year into the second Trump administration, and there’s a large consensus, if not total unanimity, among those who have worked with and for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency: It has suffered significantly during that time. 

CISA has lost roughly a third of its personnel and shuttered entire divisions. Observers across the political spectrum told CyberScoop for this story that even on its core missions, like coordinating with industry and protecting federal networks, the agency is significantly diminished.

Many sources that spoke with CyberScoop did so under the condition of anonymity, in order to be more candid or avoid retribution. They told CyberScoop that CISA’s biggest problems, and their consequences, include:

  • Trump’s ire over the 2020 election results has led to the agency being deprioritized within the administration. Congress has yet to approve the administration’s permanent pick to lead the agency, Sean Plankey, and lawmakers have failed to do other things to strengthen it. 
  • CISA’s capabilities have been significantly diminished by the loss of personnel, expertise and programs. 
  • In the absence of a permanent leader, Acting Director Madhu Gottumukkala has struggled to lead the agency. “I don’t think anybody would argue he’s doing a great job,” one industry source said.
  • Organizations that previously turned to CISA for help now seek alternatives, like industry alliances, outside consultants or government-to-government partnerships.

Where to assign blame varied from source to source. Most criticized both the administration and Congress, though some faulted one more than the other.

Some see bright spots in CISA under the current administration. And while many are pessimistic about the agency’s future, others expressed optimism.

But the first year reviews are not glowing.

“Year one was a tough year for the agency,” said House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Andrew Garbarino, R-N.Y. He noted that a “lot of the best and brightest have left the agency,” though he expressed optimism about Plankey’s ability to turn CISA around. “The amount of cyberattacks that our nation is seeing every day, both on the private side and on the federal government side — you want your best people there fighting against it, and if they’re somewhere else, it definitely leaves us all vulnerable.”

Said Mississippi Rep. Bennie Thompson, the top Democrat on Garbarino’s panel: “It’s tough to have a robust entity when you cut the money…we are weaker because of CISA’s lack of manpower.”

When priorities shifted

Trump has harbored animosity toward CISA since 2020, when it contradicted his false claims related to widespread electoral fraud. He and his allies built on that animosity, recommending in Project 2025 that the agency be dismantled, divided by its core responsibilities, and farmed out to other federal agencies. 

“There was uniquely a target on its back,” said one CISA official who left in 2025. That hostility came from some Republicans in Congress, especially Kentucky Sen. Rand Paul, who chairs the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.

Said Thompson: “CISA wasn’t politicized for the most part, until the Trump administration came along and accused them of somehow contributing to his [election] loss.”

CISA has lost substantial personnel, including veterans and whole teams. Some employees were transferred to other divisions in the Department of Homeland Security. Election security was quickly cut. Two information sharing and analysis centers (ISACs) that serve state and local governments lost funding. A division coordinating with foreign governments, businesses and state and local governments was effectively closed.

The agency has lost senior leaders in programs like counter-ransomware initiatives, threat hunting and secure software development. Contracts for things like detecting threats in critical infrastructure networks, tracking vulnerabilities and collaborating with industry teetered, albeit sometimes only temporarily. 

DHS has unraveled multiple programs in which CISA plays a key role, such as by dismissing members of the Cyber Safety Review Board and disbanding the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council. Congress has lurched between letting both a key state and local cyber grant program and a cyber threat information sharing law lapse and temporarily re-upping them.

The departures and program changes likely haven’t ended, either. 

“It’s not a very harmonious place right now,” said one industry source. “I hear from people that are looking to leave.” Former CISA employees say those who remain either believe strongly in the mission, or are simply keeping their heads down until retirement from federal service.

“People I talk to say the morale is really low,” said James Lewis, distinguished fellow with the tech policy program at the Center for European Policy Analysis think tank.

CISA and DHS officials routinely say the changes are designed to get the agency “back on mission.” Lewis, industry officials and others say CISA probably never needed to get involved in combatting misinformation and disinformation, roles that rankled some conservatives, but the agency largely halted that work prior to Trump returning to office.

Some saw duplication and redundancy at CISA as legitimate problems. “I did see overlap between who was actually doing policy and who was actually doing the operational work,” said Ari Schwartz, managing director of cybersecurity services at the law firm Venable and a former Obama administration cybersecurity official.

It was not that long ago when CISA experienced quick budget growth, particularly after its establishment in 2018.

“As with any organization, the first few years are growth years and after a while, the agency needed to reevaluate how it was operating and meeting its statutory authorities,” said Kate DiEmidio, who formerly served as the agency’s director of legislative affairs and acting chief external affairs officer. “There was a need for the agency to refocus.”

Even among those who saw the need for change at CISA, though, many saw the Trump administration as going way too far. “CISA needed surgery,” Lewis said, but “what it needed was surgery with a scalpel, not a sledgehammer.” He added, “Not only is the White House hostile to CISA, but cybersecurity isn’t a priority for them.”

A question of capacity

The cuts have created real-world consequences for cybersecurity coordination. Former officials and industry partners describe broken relationships, unanswered requests for help and serious questions about whether CISA can handle a major crisis. The coordination and engagement that defined the agency’s approach have largely diminished.

The end result is that “they’ve dismantled all of those capabilities in units within government,” said Caitlin Durkovich, a former DHS official in the Obama administration and White House official in the Biden administration. She recently started a firm with former top CISA official Jeff Greene that offers services CISA has scaled back, such as security assessments.

“It’s been really hard to watch,” Greene said, how CISA has been working with the private sector and local governments on “developing a level of trust that is weakening or gone.”

One industry source said they used to meet regularly with top officials, but now can’t get a response. “We’ve got really good engagement elsewhere in government. We really would like the opportunity to do the same thing with CISA,” they said. “Some of the trust that had been built up has been eroded.”

Thompson said the biggest losses have been in election security and secure-by-design, areas where his staff says personnel has been “decimated.”

Said another industry source: “I do feel like that when people, if organizations, want to reach out to CISA, it’s not clear who’s there… If we got into a major conflict, let’s say, with China, and they start triggering Volt Typhoon-related malware, are we organized and ready to roll? I don’t think so.”

Another former CISA official described the current situation as a “lack of capacity,” especially when it comes to coordinating with state and local governments and others on a regional basis.

“A bunch of regions are really grappling with the loss of really key personnel who were the ones that were establishing and maintaining these relationships, and really trying to build the trust between the agency and the private sector, and especially in critical infrastructure,” they said. “Not having as many people to help do that national coordinating function that CISA is supposed to do is a real issue.”

They also said there are fewer people working in “flagship programs” like secure-by-design and developing regulations for the landmark Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA). “People are overstretched,” they said. “They’re not doing all the things that they could or should be doing, or want to be doing, and I think that you see evidence of that with talk from the private sector and their inability to to reach people and to get help “

Schwartz said he worries about when “an incident happens, do they have the people to go in, go to the states, go locally, and really do the work that’s needed, as they did in the past? Because they’ve lost some of that ability.”

Lewis said that “overall, the impression is it’s a much weaker entity than it was a year ago.”

“Their power was in their ability to act as a focal point, to coordinate, to bring people together, and just the publication of vulnerabilities and some of the things they were starting to get into in the previous administration were big steps forward that’s been diminished because they don’t have the people now,” he said. “So a smaller organization, that’s just not going to be as powerful.”

State and local governments say they’ve lost critical connections with CISA, saying they’ve had to turn to one another to fill the gaps.

“We’re asking states to do a job they’re not resourced to do, while weakening the one federal agency designed to help them,” said Errol Weiss, chief security officer at the Health-ISAC. “This is precisely where you do need a strong, centralized federal security function. We already have a national shortage of cybersecurity experts, and you can’t just replicate that expertise 50 times over.”

Overall, Weiss said industry partners have felt the lack of outreach from the agency. “Fewer touchpoints, fewer briefings, fewer problem‑solving calls,” he told CyberScoop, adding that there’s “a growing perception that CISA is being hollowed out where it matters most to industry: stakeholder engagement, collaborative forums, and operational support during incidents.”

Rob Knake, a former top Biden administration official, recently said that “CISA as an organization has pretty much fallen apart.”

Leadership in limbo

One near-universal sentiment is that as Sean Plankey’s leadership nomination drags in the Senate, the agency is worse off.

“We need to start this year off right, and we’re already in February and can’t get Plankey confirmed,” Garbarino said. “There’s nothing better than having a Senate-confirmed person running the show.”

The acting director has also faced criticism beyond the operational issues. Gottumukkala, who served as South Dakota’s chief information officer under Kristi Noem before she became DHS secretary, has faced fire from both parties for his stewardship.

A string of embarrassing stories have emerged about Gottumukkala, from the tale of him failing a polygraph test and seeking to oust those who administered it; to his reported attempted ouster of veteran agency CIO Robert Costello; to his reported uploading of sensitive contract data to ChatGPT. DHS has defended Gottumukkala amid those revelations.

Reading stories like that, “It just sounds like amateur hour,” said one former CISA employee.

“I don’t think he’s up to the task. I believe that he’s not the best person, and I think he is just somebody the secretary likes, because they both are from South Dakota.” Thompson said. “I don’t know anybody before this administration who would be in sensitive areas and not have passed minimal standards like the polygraph.”

The ChatGPT story drew concern from the right by Senate Judiciary Chairman Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, as well as from conservative figure Laura Loomer (the latter of whose remarks were racially tinged). Others were more perturbed by the lie detector story.

“When you have security issues with someone in a leadership position, you should find another place for them to go,” said a former Trump administration national security official. “There are plenty of competent people in DHS, in CISA, who could hold things together until Sean Plankey gets there. There are lots of serious things CISA needs to be working on right now. This is a drag on that. It’s not a place where you want any type of friction at the top.”

Garbarino was more generous, noting Gottumukkala’s technical background. DiEmidio also noted Gottumukkala’s technical skills. But Garbarino and Nevada Rep. Mark Amodei, the GOP chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, have been seeking CISA’s organizational plans to no avail.

“I don’t think he’s intentionally lying to us by saying there’s no reorg plan,” Garbarino said. “But there’s got to be some reasoning behind all these moves, moving the people around, or layoffs or whatever. I want to give him the benefit of the doubt that he is the technical guy that has been given a non-technical job to do.”

Schwartz and some others largely blame Congress for CISA’s current woes, since they haven’t approved Plankey as a full-time, permanent leader. “A lot of the issue is the fact that just doesn’t have the leadership to be able to participate in senior-level discussions,” he said.

What’s left to build on

Despite myriad complaints, many observers still see value in the current iteration of CISA. Some are hopeful about its ability to rebound, too.

CISA says it’s still devoted to its missions. The agency published a 2025 year-in-review about its accomplishments.

“CISA remains steadfast in its mission to safeguard the systems Americans rely on by strengthening federal network defenses, empowering businesses, and fortifying critical infrastructure nationwide,” Gottumukkala said in a statement to CyberScoop.

Moving forward, “we will deepen collaboration with trusted partners, prioritize highly skilled technical professionals, and direct resources for maximum impact—accelerating innovation, operational coordination, and workforce right-sizing to reduce long-term risks while maintaining strong industry partnerships and cost efficiency,” he said. “The CISA leadership and workforce remains committed to this mission despite a small minority who are upset that accountability and reform have come to the agency.”

It’s a message Gottumukkala recently delivered to Congress. “He tried to give the impression that we haven’t lost any capacity,” Thompson said. “I wasn’t impressed.”

Others said CISA is still carrying out many of its old tasks, such as issuing public alerts on vulnerabilities and threats.

“There’s still some good reporting coming out,” Greene said. “But what I can’t know is the volume of what they can put out versus what they used to be able to put out.”

Weiss said “CISA still has tremendous value in areas only the federal government can truly provide: national‑level visibility, cross‑sector coordination and the ability to marshal resources across agencies in a crisis.” But it’s not clear whether CISA can rise to the occasion like it did during the 2024 Change Healthcare crisis.

“All of this means it’s more important than ever for the private sector to take the initiative,” he said. “Critical infrastructure owners and operators cannot assume the federal government will have the capacity to step in the way it once did.”

Weiss and others also said that CISA has refocused on federal networks, but others, such as Lewis, said it’s also diminished there. “That’s their primary mission, and they don’t have the policies or the bodies to do that,” Lewis said.

Garbarino and a number of industry sources say they’re encouraged by the idea that the Trump administration could write less onerous regulations for CIRCIA, with an earlier draft drawing bipartisan and industry criticism.

A Senate-confirmed leader could further brighten the agency’s prospects, many agree. “They still have some good talent there. It’s not totally that we’ve lost everything there,” Schwartz said. “If you have leadership in there, then you can build it up.”

DiEmidio said some of the staff changes have made sense. Election security had more people than other sectors that needed the help, she said. 

“In some ways, I think the external attention to CISA’s mission in the media and with Congress was completely focused on one or two things, and the focus on the things that really matter, and the good work that CISA is doing got overshadowed,” she said. For the agency’s cybersecurity division and other cyber teams, “there were several incidents over the summer where those teams were incredible. They were working evenings, weekends.”

But many agree that rebuilding CISA’s workforce will be difficult.

The Trump administration has deliberately made working for the federal government challenging as a matter of policy. Russell Vought, head of the Office of Management and Budget, said before the election that the goal was to put federal workers “in trauma.” Morale at CISA has been particularly bad, they say. Periodic DHS shutdowns haven’t helped.

On the plus side for CISA, it’s a bad labor market, Lewis said.

Some of what CISA needs to do going forward is about managing expectations, said DiEmidio.

“What I would want to make sure is that CISA has a hiring plan in place to start hiring, especially in those key technical positions at all levels,” she said. “ I think you have to have an understanding that people are going to rotate in and out of government. Not everyone wants to stay in government long term and that’s okay.”

But there are some worries about CISA recruiting going forward. “Just the way they handle the departures, for a lot of folks, I don’t think it gives a lot of encouragement to individuals that ‘Hey, this is a great place to work,’” said one former DHS official.

The post Across party lines and industry, the verdict is the same: CISA is in trouble appeared first on CyberScoop.

The Curious Case of the Comburglar

By: BHIS
18 December 2025 at 12:55

By Troy Wojewoda During a recent Breach Assessment engagement, BHIS discovered a highly stealthy and persistent intrusion technique utilized by a threat actor to maintain Command-and-Control (C2) within the client’s […]

The post The Curious Case of the Comburglar appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..

The 10 key reforms that can close America’s cybersecurity gaps

By: Greg Otto
10 December 2025 at 07:00

For decades, the United States government and private sector have worked tirelessly to secure cyberspace, yet our nation remains frighteningly vulnerable to a litany of cyberthreats posed by cybercriminals and foreign adversaries alike. Daily news reports of cyber intrusions ranging from criminal ransomware attacks to foreign state-sponsored intrusions into power, water, and other critical infrastructure systems are a constant reminder that “by almost every measure, the cybersecurity threat landscape is actually worse.” We can, and must, do better. To develop an effective national cybersecurity strategy, policymakers should consider the following ten points.  

Prioritize “Key Systems”

Policymakers should prioritize securing critical infrastructure whose cybersecurity failures could have catastrophic impacts on national security, economic security, public health or safety. Such systems include the electrical grid, water systems, ports, rail and air transportation as well as national, state, and local governments. 

Use Memory Safe languages for key systems

A fundamental cybersecurity problem stems from the widespread use of  software written in unsafe programming languages. These languages, developed in the early days of computing—before cybersecurity was even a consideration—were designed for efficiency, but are vulnerable to a class of programming bugs known as “memory safety errors.” 

Memory safety errors have been described as “today’s biggest attack surface for hackers” and are estimated to be responsible for nearly 70% of software vulnerabilities. Fortunately, today’s memory safe programming languages (e.g., Rust) are specifically designed to eliminate memory safety errors.

The federal government has developed a roadmap to help companies transition to memory safe code, and many companies have begun the journey. Accelerating this transition will significantly strengthen the nation’s cybersecurity.  

Apply formal methods for key systems

Memory-safe languages eliminate many software vulnerabilities but are not a cure-all.  Using “formal methods” offers even greater security. Formal methods rely on mathematical proof “to create ultra-secure, ultra-reliable software.” In fact, when the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) used formal methods to program a military helicopter’s flight control computer, all subsequent hacking attempts failed.

Formal methods are currently in use by numerous leading technology companies, such as Amazon Web Services and Microsoft, and in high-assurance contexts, such as development of flight-control software. Implementation of formal methods requires some work, but the necessary tools are publicly available, the benefits are significant, and future advancements in automation will likely make implementation even easier. 

Establish resilient architectures

Migrating to resilient architectures based on “zero trust” principles will further strengthen the cybersecurity of key systems. Traditional security models automatically trust users within an organization’s perimeter.  In contrast, zero trust models trust no one by default. Taking a “never trust, always verify” approach, these models reduce the chance of breach by verifying every access request, regardless of where it originates.

Policymakers should ensure that zero trust architectures are established for key critical infrastructure through Congressional action and/or federal regulations akin to those already established for interstate electric transmission, railroads, and pipelines.

Build data resilience

Data resilience is the ability to keep data accessible and uncorrupted, even during a cyberattack. One effective way to improve data resilience is to back up key systems in the cloud—an approach Ukraine famously used just before Russia’s invasion. By migrating thousands of terabytes of critical government data to the cloud, Ukraine was able to maintain government operations despite intense kinetic operations and cyberattacks.

Defend proactively through threat hunting 

Policymakers should ensure that defensive cyber “threat hunting”—proactively searching networks for undetected cyberthreats—is conducted regularly undertaken on key networks.  Many key systems already receive threat hunting services through contracts with private firms, but policymakers should make sure that every key system is covered, potentially by establishing necessary baseline requirements. While private companies can provide much of this support, government agencies— such as the Coast Guard under its “Captain of the Port” authorities to protect critical port infrastructure—can also play a role. Finally, because defensive threat hunting on key networks serves the public interest, Congress should consider providing financial support, such as tax credits or dedicated budget allocations.

Coordinate government and private sector cybersecurity actions

Effective cybersecurity requires close collaboration between the government and the private sector. To ensure this coordination, a central body overseen by the National Cyber Director should be established. The NCD would act as a “head coach,” guiding efforts across both sectors, while leaving day-to-day operations to the organizations best equipped to handle them.

Establish “Regional Resilience Districts” 

Policymakers should support regional approaches to cybersecurity, which help manage risks across sectors in critical areas. Piloting regional resilience districts in places with major military installations, such as Charleston, South Carolina or the Houston ship channel, would strengthen cross-sector protection, limit cascading effects from cybersecurity failures, and improve recovery from major attacks.

Incorporate adversary disruption into cyber campaigns 

Policymakers should collaborate with key private sector firms to assess their ability to disrupt adversarial cyber attacks—for example, by banning entities that violate terms of service from their networks. They should then determine when and how private sector and government actions, whether individually or together, can most effectively contribute to disrupting adversaries.

Governments have previously worked with the private sector to take down criminal cyber organizations, sometimes using the Fourth Amendment’s asset seizure authority. Given the rise in cyber intrusions by both criminals (e.g., ransomware operators) and nation-state adversaries (e.g., China’s Typhoons), policymakers should consider expanding these efforts beyond asset seizure to include active disruption.

Capitalize on emerging technology 

Finally, policymakers should leverage the innovation pipeline—including expertise from industry, government, federal R&D centers, national laboratories, and academia—to effectively apply emerging technologies like artificial intelligence in support of both offensive and defensive cybersecurity missions. 

Cybersecurity policymakers have a unique opportunity to dramatically strengthen our digital defenses by following the ten steps outlined above. Implementing these measures will help safeguard national security, critical infrastructure, and the public good in an increasingly complex threat environment. The time for decisive action is now.

This op-ed is derived from the forthcoming Atlantic Council report by the authors on “Cybersecurity Strategy for the United States.”

Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished fellow at and serves on the board of the Atlantic Council. He is a former assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

Robert J. Butler is the co-founder and managing director of Cyber Strategies LLC, served as the first deputy assistant secretary of defense for space and cyber policy, and served as the Chief Security Officer for IO Data Centers, a global data center enterprise, among other cybersecurity-related roles in both corporate and government organizations.

Melanie J. Teplinsky is an adjunct professor and senior fellow in the Technology, Law and Security Program at American University (AU), Washington College of Law.  She previously practiced technology law at Steptoe & Jonson LLP and served on the pre-IPO advisory board for CrowdStrike.

The post The 10 key reforms that can close America’s cybersecurity gaps appeared first on CyberScoop.

Questions From a Beginner Threat Hunter

By: BHIS
30 January 2025 at 10:00

Answered by Chris Brenton of Active Countermeasures | Questions compiled from the infosec community by Shelby Perry This article was originally published in the Threat Hunting issue of our infosec […]

The post Questions From a Beginner Threat Hunter appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..

PODCAST: Beacon Analysis

By: BHIS
17 September 2018 at 12:21

Join special guest Chris Brenton, COO of Active Countermeasures, as he discusses the anatomy of beacons and why you need to be looking for them during a threat hunt. He […]

The post PODCAST: Beacon Analysis appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..

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