Washington has rediscovered consequences. Just not consistently.

The March 6 executive order rests on a simple, correct idea: cyber-enabled fraud persists because it is profitable, scalable, and too often tolerated. So the government’s answer is to raise the cost. More coordination. More disruption. More prosecutions. More diplomatic pressure on the states that shelter these operations.

Good.

But weeks ago, an OMB Memo rescinded earlier federal software supply chain memos issued during the Biden administration. In practice, that pulled back from the prior attestation-centered model and made tools like the Secure Software Development Attestation Form and SBOM requests optional rather than durable expectations.

Put plainly, we are getting tougher on the people exploiting digital systems while getting softer on the conditions that make those systems so easy to exploit.

The executive order gets something important right. Cyber-enabled fraud is not a collection of random online annoyances. It is an industrialized form of predation: ransomware, phishing, impersonation, sextortion, and financial fraud that’s run as repeatable business models, often transnational and sometimes protected by permissive states. The order responds with a more centralized federal posture built around disruption, coordination, intelligence sharing, prosecution, resilience, and international pressure.

That is directionally correct. Criminal ecosystems do not retreat because we publish better guidance. They retreat when the cost of doing business rises.

But then we arrive at software.

The critique of the old federal assurance regime is not entirely wrong. Compliance can become theater. Bureaucracies are very good at turning legitimate security goals into rituals of form collection and checkbox management. Some skepticism was warranted. OMB says as much explicitly, arguing the prior model became burdensome and prioritized compliance over genuine security investment.

Still, the failure of bad compliance is not proof that accountability itself was the problem.

That is where the logic breaks. The administration is clearly willing to believe that criminal actors respond to deterrence. It is willing to use prosecutions, sanctions, visa restrictions, and coordinated pressure downstream. But upstream, where insecure technology shapes the terrain those criminals exploit, the theory suddenly changes. There, we are told to trust discretion. Local judgment. Flexible, risk-based decisions.

Sometimes that is wisdom. Often it is just a more elegant way of saying no one wants a hard requirement.

This is also why my own position has not changed. In a post I wrote in 2024, I argued that the industry did not need softer expectations or another round of polite encouragement. It needed more concrete action and consequences strong enough to change incentives. The problem was never that we were demanding too much accountability. The problem was that insecure software remained too cheap to ship.

That is the deeper issue. Cybercrime at scale does not thrive only because criminals exist. It thrives because the environment rewards them. Weak identity systems, brittle software, sprawling dependency chains, poor visibility, and diffuse accountability all make predation cheaper. The people who ship avoidable risk rarely absorb the full cost of it. Everyone else does.

So these two policy moves, taken together, reveal something uncomfortable. The government seems to believe in consequences for cybercriminals, but not quite in consequences for insecure production. It wants deterrence for the scammer, but discretion for the supplier.

A coherent cyber strategy would do both. It would aggressively disrupt criminal networks and also create meaningful pressure for secure-by-design production and procurement. It would recognize that punishing attackers matters, but so does changing the terrain that keeps making attack profitable.

The administration is right about one thing: cybercrime will not shrink until the costs of predation rise.

The unanswered question is why that logic should stop at the edge of the scam center.

Brian Fox is the co-founder and CTO of Sonatype.

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“Decimated.” 

“Amateur hour.”

“Pretty much fallen apart.”

“It’s really hard to find something positive to say right now.”

It’s been a little more than one year into the second Trump administration, and there’s a large consensus, if not total unanimity, among those who have worked with and for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency: It has suffered significantly during that time. 

CISA has lost roughly a third of its personnel and shuttered entire divisions. Observers across the political spectrum told CyberScoop for this story that even on its core missions, like coordinating with industry and protecting federal networks, the agency is significantly diminished.

Many sources that spoke with CyberScoop did so under the condition of anonymity, in order to be more candid or avoid retribution. They told CyberScoop that CISA’s biggest problems, and their consequences, include:

• Trump’s ire over the 2020 election results has led to the agency being deprioritized within the administration. Congress has yet to approve the administration’s permanent pick to lead the agency, Sean Plankey, and lawmakers have failed to do other things to strengthen it. 
• CISA’s capabilities have been significantly diminished by the loss of personnel, expertise and programs. 
• In the absence of a permanent leader, Acting Director Madhu Gottumukkala has struggled to lead the agency. “I don’t think anybody would argue he’s doing a great job,” one industry source said.
• Organizations that previously turned to CISA for help now seek alternatives, like industry alliances, outside consultants or government-to-government partnerships.

Where to assign blame varied from source to source. Most criticized both the administration and Congress, though some faulted one more than the other.

Some see bright spots in CISA under the current administration. And while many are pessimistic about the agency’s future, others expressed optimism.

But the first year reviews are not glowing.

“Year one was a tough year for the agency,” said House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Andrew Garbarino, R-N.Y. He noted that a “lot of the best and brightest have left the agency,” though he expressed optimism about Plankey’s ability to turn CISA around. “The amount of cyberattacks that our nation is seeing every day, both on the private side and on the federal government side — you want your best people there fighting against it, and if they’re somewhere else, it definitely leaves us all vulnerable.”

Said Mississippi Rep. Bennie Thompson, the top Democrat on Garbarino’s panel: “It’s tough to have a robust entity when you cut the money…we are weaker because of CISA’s lack of manpower.”

When priorities shifted

Trump has harbored animosity toward CISA since 2020, when it contradicted his false claims related to widespread electoral fraud. He and his allies built on that animosity, recommending in Project 2025 that the agency be dismantled, divided by its core responsibilities, and farmed out to other federal agencies. 

“There was uniquely a target on its back,” said one CISA official who left in 2025. That hostility came from some Republicans in Congress, especially Kentucky Sen. Rand Paul, who chairs the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.

Said Thompson: “CISA wasn’t politicized for the most part, until the Trump administration came along and accused them of somehow contributing to his [election] loss.”

CISA has lost substantial personnel, including veterans and whole teams. Some employees were transferred to other divisions in the Department of Homeland Security. Election security was quickly cut. Two information sharing and analysis centers (ISACs) that serve state and local governments lost funding. A division coordinating with foreign governments, businesses and state and local governments was effectively closed.

The agency has lost senior leaders in programs like counter-ransomware initiatives, threat hunting and secure software development. Contracts for things like detecting threats in critical infrastructure networks, tracking vulnerabilities and collaborating with industry teetered, albeit sometimes only temporarily. 

DHS has unraveled multiple programs in which CISA plays a key role, such as by dismissing members of the Cyber Safety Review Board and disbanding the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council. Congress has lurched between letting both a key state and local cyber grant program and a cyber threat information sharing law lapse and temporarily re-upping them.

The departures and program changes likely haven’t ended, either. 

“It’s not a very harmonious place right now,” said one industry source. “I hear from people that are looking to leave.” Former CISA employees say those who remain either believe strongly in the mission, or are simply keeping their heads down until retirement from federal service.

“People I talk to say the morale is really low,” said James Lewis, distinguished fellow with the tech policy program at the Center for European Policy Analysis think tank.

CISA and DHS officials routinely say the changes are designed to get the agency “back on mission.” Lewis, industry officials and others say CISA probably never needed to get involved in combatting misinformation and disinformation, roles that rankled some conservatives, but the agency largely halted that work prior to Trump returning to office.

Some saw duplication and redundancy at CISA as legitimate problems. “I did see overlap between who was actually doing policy and who was actually doing the operational work,” said Ari Schwartz, managing director of cybersecurity services at the law firm Venable and a former Obama administration cybersecurity official.

It was not that long ago when CISA experienced quick budget growth, particularly after its establishment in 2018.

“As with any organization, the first few years are growth years and after a while, the agency needed to reevaluate how it was operating and meeting its statutory authorities,” said Kate DiEmidio, who formerly served as the agency’s director of legislative affairs and acting chief external affairs officer. “There was a need for the agency to refocus.”

Even among those who saw the need for change at CISA, though, many saw the Trump administration as going way too far. “CISA needed surgery,” Lewis said, but “what it needed was surgery with a scalpel, not a sledgehammer.” He added, “Not only is the White House hostile to CISA, but cybersecurity isn’t a priority for them.”

A question of capacity

The cuts have created real-world consequences for cybersecurity coordination. Former officials and industry partners describe broken relationships, unanswered requests for help and serious questions about whether CISA can handle a major crisis. The coordination and engagement that defined the agency’s approach have largely diminished.

The end result is that “they’ve dismantled all of those capabilities in units within government,” said Caitlin Durkovich, a former DHS official in the Obama administration and White House official in the Biden administration. She recently started a firm with former top CISA official Jeff Greene that offers services CISA has scaled back, such as security assessments.

“It’s been really hard to watch,” Greene said, how CISA has been working with the private sector and local governments on “developing a level of trust that is weakening or gone.”

One industry source said they used to meet regularly with top officials, but now can’t get a response. “We’ve got really good engagement elsewhere in government. We really would like the opportunity to do the same thing with CISA,” they said. “Some of the trust that had been built up has been eroded.”

Thompson said the biggest losses have been in election security and secure-by-design, areas where his staff says personnel has been “decimated.”

Said another industry source: “I do feel like that when people, if organizations, want to reach out to CISA, it’s not clear who’s there… If we got into a major conflict, let’s say, with China, and they start triggering Volt Typhoon-related malware, are we organized and ready to roll? I don’t think so.”

Another former CISA official described the current situation as a “lack of capacity,” especially when it comes to coordinating with state and local governments and others on a regional basis.

“A bunch of regions are really grappling with the loss of really key personnel who were the ones that were establishing and maintaining these relationships, and really trying to build the trust between the agency and the private sector, and especially in critical infrastructure,” they said. “Not having as many people to help do that national coordinating function that CISA is supposed to do is a real issue.”

They also said there are fewer people working in “flagship programs” like secure-by-design and developing regulations for the landmark Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA). “People are overstretched,” they said. “They’re not doing all the things that they could or should be doing, or want to be doing, and I think that you see evidence of that with talk from the private sector and their inability to to reach people and to get help “

Schwartz said he worries about when “an incident happens, do they have the people to go in, go to the states, go locally, and really do the work that’s needed, as they did in the past? Because they’ve lost some of that ability.”

Lewis said that “overall, the impression is it’s a much weaker entity than it was a year ago.”

“Their power was in their ability to act as a focal point, to coordinate, to bring people together, and just the publication of vulnerabilities and some of the things they were starting to get into in the previous administration were big steps forward that’s been diminished because they don’t have the people now,” he said. “So a smaller organization, that’s just not going to be as powerful.”

State and local governments say they’ve lost critical connections with CISA, saying they’ve had to turn to one another to fill the gaps.

“We’re asking states to do a job they’re not resourced to do, while weakening the one federal agency designed to help them,” said Errol Weiss, chief security officer at the Health-ISAC. “This is precisely where you do need a strong, centralized federal security function. We already have a national shortage of cybersecurity experts, and you can’t just replicate that expertise 50 times over.”

Overall, Weiss said industry partners have felt the lack of outreach from the agency. “Fewer touchpoints, fewer briefings, fewer problem‑solving calls,” he told CyberScoop, adding that there’s “a growing perception that CISA is being hollowed out where it matters most to industry: stakeholder engagement, collaborative forums, and operational support during incidents.”

Rob Knake, a former top Biden administration official, recently said that “CISA as an organization has pretty much fallen apart.”

Leadership in limbo

One near-universal sentiment is that as Sean Plankey’s leadership nomination drags in the Senate, the agency is worse off.

“We need to start this year off right, and we’re already in February and can’t get Plankey confirmed,” Garbarino said. “There’s nothing better than having a Senate-confirmed person running the show.”

The acting director has also faced criticism beyond the operational issues. Gottumukkala, who served as South Dakota’s chief information officer under Kristi Noem before she became DHS secretary, has faced fire from both parties for his stewardship.

A string of embarrassing stories have emerged about Gottumukkala, from the tale of him failing a polygraph test and seeking to oust those who administered it; to his reported attempted ouster of veteran agency CIO Robert Costello; to his reported uploading of sensitive contract data to ChatGPT. DHS has defended Gottumukkala amid those revelations.

Reading stories like that, “It just sounds like amateur hour,” said one former CISA employee.

“I don’t think he’s up to the task. I believe that he’s not the best person, and I think he is just somebody the secretary likes, because they both are from South Dakota.” Thompson said. “I don’t know anybody before this administration who would be in sensitive areas and not have passed minimal standards like the polygraph.”

The ChatGPT story drew concern from the right by Senate Judiciary Chairman Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, as well as from conservative figure Laura Loomer (the latter of whose remarks were racially tinged). Others were more perturbed by the lie detector story.

“When you have security issues with someone in a leadership position, you should find another place for them to go,” said a former Trump administration national security official. “There are plenty of competent people in DHS, in CISA, who could hold things together until Sean Plankey gets there. There are lots of serious things CISA needs to be working on right now. This is a drag on that. It’s not a place where you want any type of friction at the top.”

Garbarino was more generous, noting Gottumukkala’s technical background. DiEmidio also noted Gottumukkala’s technical skills. But Garbarino and Nevada Rep. Mark Amodei, the GOP chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, have been seeking CISA’s organizational plans to no avail.

“I don’t think he’s intentionally lying to us by saying there’s no reorg plan,” Garbarino said. “But there’s got to be some reasoning behind all these moves, moving the people around, or layoffs or whatever. I want to give him the benefit of the doubt that he is the technical guy that has been given a non-technical job to do.”

Schwartz and some others largely blame Congress for CISA’s current woes, since they haven’t approved Plankey as a full-time, permanent leader. “A lot of the issue is the fact that just doesn’t have the leadership to be able to participate in senior-level discussions,” he said.

What’s left to build on

Despite myriad complaints, many observers still see value in the current iteration of CISA. Some are hopeful about its ability to rebound, too.

CISA says it’s still devoted to its missions. The agency published a 2025 year-in-review about its accomplishments.

“CISA remains steadfast in its mission to safeguard the systems Americans rely on by strengthening federal network defenses, empowering businesses, and fortifying critical infrastructure nationwide,” Gottumukkala said in a statement to CyberScoop.

Moving forward, “we will deepen collaboration with trusted partners, prioritize highly skilled technical professionals, and direct resources for maximum impact—accelerating innovation, operational coordination, and workforce right-sizing to reduce long-term risks while maintaining strong industry partnerships and cost efficiency,” he said. “The CISA leadership and workforce remains committed to this mission despite a small minority who are upset that accountability and reform have come to the agency.”

It’s a message Gottumukkala recently delivered to Congress. “He tried to give the impression that we haven’t lost any capacity,” Thompson said. “I wasn’t impressed.”

Others said CISA is still carrying out many of its old tasks, such as issuing public alerts on vulnerabilities and threats.

“There’s still some good reporting coming out,” Greene said. “But what I can’t know is the volume of what they can put out versus what they used to be able to put out.”

Weiss said “CISA still has tremendous value in areas only the federal government can truly provide: national‑level visibility, cross‑sector coordination and the ability to marshal resources across agencies in a crisis.” But it’s not clear whether CISA can rise to the occasion like it did during the 2024 Change Healthcare crisis.

“All of this means it’s more important than ever for the private sector to take the initiative,” he said. “Critical infrastructure owners and operators cannot assume the federal government will have the capacity to step in the way it once did.”

Weiss and others also said that CISA has refocused on federal networks, but others, such as Lewis, said it’s also diminished there. “That’s their primary mission, and they don’t have the policies or the bodies to do that,” Lewis said.

Garbarino and a number of industry sources say they’re encouraged by the idea that the Trump administration could write less onerous regulations for CIRCIA, with an earlier draft drawing bipartisan and industry criticism.

A Senate-confirmed leader could further brighten the agency’s prospects, many agree. “They still have some good talent there. It’s not totally that we’ve lost everything there,” Schwartz said. “If you have leadership in there, then you can build it up.”

DiEmidio said some of the staff changes have made sense. Election security had more people than other sectors that needed the help, she said. 

“In some ways, I think the external attention to CISA’s mission in the media and with Congress was completely focused on one or two things, and the focus on the things that really matter, and the good work that CISA is doing got overshadowed,” she said. For the agency’s cybersecurity division and other cyber teams, “there were several incidents over the summer where those teams were incredible. They were working evenings, weekends.”

But many agree that rebuilding CISA’s workforce will be difficult.

The Trump administration has deliberately made working for the federal government challenging as a matter of policy. Russell Vought, head of the Office of Management and Budget, said before the election that the goal was to put federal workers “in trauma.” Morale at CISA has been particularly bad, they say. Periodic DHS shutdowns haven’t helped.

On the plus side for CISA, it’s a bad labor market, Lewis said.

Some of what CISA needs to do going forward is about managing expectations, said DiEmidio.

“What I would want to make sure is that CISA has a hiring plan in place to start hiring, especially in those key technical positions at all levels,” she said. “ I think you have to have an understanding that people are going to rotate in and out of government. Not everyone wants to stay in government long term and that’s okay.”

But there are some worries about CISA recruiting going forward. “Just the way they handle the departures, for a lot of folks, I don’t think it gives a lot of encouragement to individuals that ‘Hey, this is a great place to work,’” said one former DHS official.

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Moody’s recently reported that global investment in data centers will surpass $3 trillion over the next five years, driven by AI capacity growth and hyperscaler demand. As big tech companies, banks, and institutional investors pour capital into these projects, data center developers and their financial sponsors must prioritze cybersecurity.

Moody’s said that data center investments made by the six largest U.S. cloud computing providers  — Microsoft, Amazon, Alphabet, Oracle, Meta, and CoreWeave — approached $400 billion last year. The firm anticipates that annual global investment will grow by $200 billion over the next two years.

Real estate firm Jones Lang LaSalle forecasted similar investment flows in a separate report published earlier this year, projecting that “nearly 100 GW of new data centers will be added between 2026 and 2030, doubling global capacity.” JLL said that this infrastructure investment “supercycle,” one of the largest in the modern era, will result in $1.2 trillion in real estate asset value creation and the need for roughly $870 billion of new debt financing.

In concert, these reports reflect a growing reality: Data centers are strategic, interconnected infrastructure supporting our manufacturing, national security, and communication systems. Cyber disruptions, whether through ransomware, supply-chain compromise, or operational technology (OT) compromises, can cascade beyond a single facility, threatening grid stability, cloud services, economic activity, and public safety.

Data centers are now critical hubs of energy demand and digital dependency. Their cybersecurity posture is directly tied to the resilience of the industrial and energy ecosystem that support them. For investors and stakeholders, cybersecurity should be fundamental to asset value and risk management. Strong cybersecurity directly affects uptime guarantees, regulatory exposure, insurance coverage, financing terms, and long-term valuation.

The most significant cybersecurity risks now center on three critical areas: data center-grid convergence, supply-chain vulnerabilities, and secure-by-design considerations. Data center operators and their financial backers must address these interconnected threats to protect both individual facilities and the broader system they support.  

Hardwired for risk

The cybersecurity challenge facing the data center supercycle stems from how these campuses are tightly coupled with both the public power grid and their own industrial control systems. As hyperscale and AI‑optimized facilities proliferate, their constant demand for high‑quality electricity shapes grid planning and reliability. These large campuses function less like traditional real estate and more like critical energy infrastructure nodes.

This shift comes as grid capacity tightens. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) has warned that demand from new data centers will outpace energy supply growth in the coming years. A cyber incident that disrupts a major data center or degrades its industrial control systems can propagate into regional grid reliability issues, contract penalties, and broader economic disruption.

At the same time, the OT running these sites — building management, systems, cooling controls, battery and generator management — create dense cyber‑physical exposure. Global insurer Marsh notes that events in these systems, whether from human error or cyberattack, can cause physical damage and significant business interruption. The 2021 OVHcloud data center fire in Strasbourg, France destroyed an entire facility and disrupted services for thousands of customers, showing how failures in fire protection and cooling systems rapidly escalate. into catastrophic loss. Those safety functions now run through interconnected, remote-access-enabled OT systems.

Secure‑by‑design architectures for both grid‑side interfaces and on‑site OT are prerequisites for preventing this rapidly expanding energy–data infrastructure from becoming a single, converged point of failure.

Supply-chain integrity first

AI‑optimized campuses depend on massive volumes of GPUs, high‑density servers, network appliances, OT controllers, and edge devices. Many of these components are designed, manufactured, or assembled in jurisdictions at the center of great‑power competition, particularly China. Reports warn that state-aligned actors could introduce backdoors, malicious firmware, or weaponize delivery timelines to create strategic outages.

Secure‑by‑design must start at procurement. Security-conscious procurement requires stringent vendor due diligence, diversification away from single‑country dependencies, hardware and firmware validation before deployment, and alignment with export controls and national‑security guidance on high‑risk equipment. The bill of materials (BoM) for a modern data center must be treated like a living threat surface, with traceability from chip manufacture through installation, including approved vendor lists, tamper‑evident logistics, and mandatory firmware attestation.

Procurement teams need escalation paths for opaque supply chains, unexplained cost changes, or “gray‑market” alternatives, plus playbooks for rapidly substituting vendors when geopolitical shocks or sanctions make a product line unacceptable.

Governance around supply‑chain risk must reach the same level as power, cooling, and uptime guarantees in contracts with hyperscalers and large tenants. Secure‑by‑design campuses will embed requirements for hardware provenance, firmware update hygiene, and ongoing vulnerability disclosure into master service agreements and construction/operations contracts, with clear accountability when a supplier is implicated in espionage or sabotage.

Data center sponsors who cannot prove supply‑chain integrity will face growing pressure from regulators, insurers, and investors who see hardware trust as a prerequisite for AI and cloud infrastructure resilience.

Securing the infrastructure supply chain pipeline

Engineering secure-by-design campuses begins with assuming adversaries will target internet‑exposed and OT edge devices. Security architects must design environments that prevent any foothold at the edge from escalating into grid‑scale disruption or safety‑critical failure.

Geopolitically motivated campaigns against energy infrastructure are accelerating. Recent Russia-nexus attacks on the Polish power system and Romania’s national oil pipeline demonstrate that state‑linked and criminal groups see energy and digital infrastructure as leverage points. Last December, actors linked to Russia’s Sandworm APT compromised remote terminal units (RTUs), firewalls, and communications gateways at Polish substations and distributed energy facilities.

This precedent-setting cyberattack—the first to directly target distributed energy resources in a NATO member’s power system—is indicative of the current threat landscape. Sandworm’s campaign underscores how fragile edge devices are and how vital it is to harden the gateways at the OT boundary. The first pillar of secure-by-design campuses is disciplined network segmentation that treats OT as a distinct, high‑consequence domain.

OT networks should be carved into functional and geographic zones—separating building management from generator controls, from battery systems, from grid‑interconnection protection—with tightly controlled conduits between them, enforced by OT‑aware firewalls and protocol‑constrained paths.

Hardware‑enforced unidirectional gateways and data diodes offer uniquely strong protection at key boundaries. Data diodes allow telemetry and process data to flow outward from OT to IT and monitoring systems while physically blocking any return path, sharply reducing the chances that a web-based intrusion can reach OT systems.

Data diodes should be placed at key demarcation points—between the data center’s OT and corporate IT, between on‑site generation controls and the broader campus, and at interfaces with utility systems—so operators preserve visibility without exposing those domains to bidirectional network risk.

A second foundational element of secure‑by‑design campuses is a clear, continuously maintained OT asset inventory capturing every PLC, RTU, relay, drive, building controller, gateway, sensor, and engineering workstation, along with its network location, firmware version, vendor, and criticality. Effective segmentation depends on knowing what you have and how it communicates.

Operators cannot isolate critical power and cooling functions, or confidently place diodes and firewalls, without understanding which devices participate in those functions and which paths they rely on. This inventory must fully cover the same class of gateways and field devices abused in the Polish grid attack.

When asset inventories are linked to configuration and vulnerability management, operators can quickly identify exposed OT devices when they are approaching end  of life or when new flaws are disclosed. A comprehensive OT asset inventory also enables security teams to quickly locate high‑risk remote access paths and prioritize segments for additional hardening.

Secure‑by‑design engineering mandates the  mitigation of accelerating cyber risks posed by remote access gateways and the mass-automation of industrial functions. Every orchestration platform, management API, and remote session is a potential high‑impact attack vector.  This threat model requires consolidating OT access through hardened jump hosts with strong authentication and just‑in‑time privileges; sharply limiting what automation tools can change on OT networks, enforcing strict segregation between automation platforms and safety‑critical functions, continuously monitoring automated and remote actions, and hardening configuration‑management workflows.

Lastly, secure‑by‑design architecture demands OT‑aware visibility that can actually see and understand what is happening on control networks. This means instrumenting OT segments with monitoring tuned to industrial protocols and behaviors, correlating alerts with asset context, and wiring those insights into playbooks that can quickly isolate, triage, and physically replace compromised edge devices before an intrusion escalates.

Resilience is the only path to funding

The threat modeling, procurement, and design best practices detailed here directly constrain the blast radius of geopolitically charged campaigns that threaten data center reliability and safety. Data center developers, operators, and investors need this systems‑level blueprint for building AI‑era campuses that remain resilient as the energy and threat landscape becomes more contested.

Banks and institutional sponsors are deploying trillions of dollars in construction, fit‑out, and power capacity on the assumption that AI demand will translate into durable, high‑availability cash flows. Underinvesting in cybersecurity directly threatens covenants, refinancing options, insurance coverage, and asset valuation. Outages, safety incidents, or regulatory findings will capsize the investment thesis.

The campuses that will secure the best financing over the next decade will be those that can point to their secure‑by‑design architectures, campus-wide OT governance, and defensible supply‑chain practices. In this intertwining infrastructure supercycle and macro OT threat environment, power usage efficiency (PUE) metrics and fast build schedules will matter less that proven security safeguards.

The stakes are escalating rapidly. Developers and utilities are pairing energy‑hungry data centers with small modular reactors (SMRs) and other non‑traditional power generation. These campuses will converge with the security and risk profile of nuclear and high‑hazard industrial facilities, bringing heightened  regulations and adversary interest.

SMR data centers fundamentally change the threat model. When nuclear systems sit alongside AI clusters, secure-by-design takes on a new dimension. Operators, investors, regulators, and security professionals must prepare for this convergence. The integration of compute and power generation creates a dynamic that demands the security rigor of both digital and infrastructure and nuclear facilities. The window to build these protections into design is closing.

Jeffrey Knight is Director of Global Critical Infrastructure Services at InfraShield. Jeff brings more than 35 years of experience in nuclear engineering and cybersecurity across the Department of Defense (DoD), SWIFT, the NRC, and the Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratory complex.

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The Trump administration is rescinding a Biden-era memo that was intended to help agencies buy secure software, with the current Office of Management and Budget saying it relied on “unproven and burdensome” processes.

A former Biden administration official said the move is “the first major policy step back that I have seen in the administration on a cybersecurity front.”

At issue is the 2022 OMB memo titled “Enhancing the Security of the Software Supply Chain through Secure Software Development Practices,” M-22-18. The administration rescinded the memo Friday.

That memo led to the creation of a common “Secure Software Development Attestation Form” for government agencies that contractors had to use to vouch that their software adheres to a set of security practices. Agencies couldn’t buy from software vendors that couldn’t attest to the security of their products.

“Each agency head is ultimately responsible for assuring the security of software and hardware that is permitted to operate on the agency’s network,” OMB Director Russell Vought wrote in a brief memo Friday to agency heads. “There is no universal, one-size-fits-all method of achieving that result. Each agency should validate provider security utilizing secure development principles and based on a comprehensive risk assessment.”

Nick Leiserson, who served as assistant national cyber director for cyber policy and programs under Biden’s Office of the National Cyber Director, told CyberScoop that rescinding the 2022 memo was a step backward because the memo was meant to use government purchasing power to influence the market, and its repeal “is not good for the security of government systems and for the software that’s used throughout the whole U.S. economy.”

The memo stemmed from the first Biden administration executive order, a response to the major SolarWinds breach that led to agencies being penetrated by alleged Russian hackers, among other notable cyber incidents.

Rescinding it leaves nothing in its place, said Leiserson, now senior vice president for policy at the Institute for Security and Technology, at a time of rising exploitation of software vulnerabilities.

Friday’s decision doesn’t ban everything from the 2022 memo. Vought said agencies could use the common attestation form if they choose; agencies must “maintain a complete inventory of software and hardware and develop software and hardware assurance policies and processes that match their risk determinations and mission needs”; and that agencies could adopt contract terms that require software makers to provide a list of software ingredients, known as a software bill of materials, upon request.

Lieserson disputed the idea that the 2022 memo was burdensome, based on government estimates that the common form would consume three hours and 20 minutes of paperwork. And Leiserson said rescinding it goes against the Trump administration’s goal of deconflicting a tangle of cybersecurity rules: In the place of one common form for all contractors, agency-by-agency forms will increase the regulatory burden.

The Trump administration had previously signaled a desire to roll back other cybersecurity directions for agencies from President Joe Biden.

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MICROSOFT 365 By Peter Deegan If you ever want to make someone feel special, maybe for an achievement, a milestone, or for fun, creating a certificate is a great way to do it. Microsoft Word and PowerPoint make it easy and fun to design certificates that look professional but are unique. In this guide, I’ll […]

Joff Thyer // One of my observations over time in the Information Security market is that the vendors seem to want to solve challenges with appliance point solutions.  It is […]

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