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Researchers say credential-stealing campaign used AI to build evasion ‘at every stage’

By: djohnson
30 March 2026 at 14:28

A new malware-based credential-stealing campaign, which researchers are calling “DeepLoad,” has been infecting enterprise business IT environments.

In a report released Monday, ReliaQuest AI researchers Thassanai McCabe and Andrew Currie say the most relevant feature of this attack is the way it uses artificial intelligence and other engineering “to defeat the controls most organizations rely on, turning one user action into persistent, credential-stealing access.”

DeepLoad is delivered to victims via “QuickFix” social-engineering techniques, such as fake browser prompts or error pages. If the user falls for the scheme, the malware developers — or more likely their AI tools — put a lot of work into building evasion of security technology “at every stage” of the attack chain.

The loader “buries functional code under thousands of meaningless variable assignments,” and the payload runs behind a Windows lock screen process that is “overlooked by security tools” monitoring for threats. ReliaQuest said “the sheer volume” of code padding likely rules out human-only involvement.

“We assess with high confidence that AI was used to build this obfuscation layer,” McCabe and Currie write. “If so, organizations should expect frequent updates to the malware and less time to adapt detection coverage between waves.”

DeepLoad can steal credentials through real-time keylogging, and even if security teams block the initial loader, it was able to persist through backup contingencies.

“In the incidents we investigated, the loader spread to connected USB drives, which means the initial host is unlikely to be the only impacted system,” McCabe and Currie wrote. “Even after cleanup, a hidden persistence mechanism not addressed by standard remediation workflows re-executed the attack three days later.”

ReliaQuest’s research offers more evidence that over the past year, some traditional static cybersecurity practices — such as searching for malware signatures or file-based patterns — may be fast becoming obsolete, as AI models can spin out endless variations of attack tooling with unique signatures.

Other organizations like Google and Anthropic have been sounding the alarm that AI-enhanced cyberattacks are dramatically shrinking the time defenders must respond to a compromise.  

At the RSA Conference in San Francisco this year, experts told CyberScoop that the next two years are set to be a “perfect storm” favoring AI-powered offense, with cybercriminals and nation-states more quickly adapting the technology to add greater speed and scale to their attacks than their defensive counterparts.

McCabe and Currie say the likely continued use of AI to frustrate static analysis monitoring means that defenders will need to shift focus to other indicators of compromise.

“Based on what we’ve observed, organizations must prioritize behavioral, runtime detection—not file-based scanning—to catch this campaign (and similar ones) early,” they wrote. 

The post Researchers say credential-stealing campaign used AI to build evasion ‘at every stage’ appeared first on CyberScoop.

Across party lines and industry, the verdict is the same: CISA is in trouble

25 February 2026 at 06:00

“Decimated.” 

“Amateur hour.”

“Pretty much fallen apart.”

“It’s really hard to find something positive to say right now.”

It’s been a little more than one year into the second Trump administration, and there’s a large consensus, if not total unanimity, among those who have worked with and for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency: It has suffered significantly during that time. 

CISA has lost roughly a third of its personnel and shuttered entire divisions. Observers across the political spectrum told CyberScoop for this story that even on its core missions, like coordinating with industry and protecting federal networks, the agency is significantly diminished.

Many sources that spoke with CyberScoop did so under the condition of anonymity, in order to be more candid or avoid retribution. They told CyberScoop that CISA’s biggest problems, and their consequences, include:

  • Trump’s ire over the 2020 election results has led to the agency being deprioritized within the administration. Congress has yet to approve the administration’s permanent pick to lead the agency, Sean Plankey, and lawmakers have failed to do other things to strengthen it. 
  • CISA’s capabilities have been significantly diminished by the loss of personnel, expertise and programs. 
  • In the absence of a permanent leader, Acting Director Madhu Gottumukkala has struggled to lead the agency. “I don’t think anybody would argue he’s doing a great job,” one industry source said.
  • Organizations that previously turned to CISA for help now seek alternatives, like industry alliances, outside consultants or government-to-government partnerships.

Where to assign blame varied from source to source. Most criticized both the administration and Congress, though some faulted one more than the other.

Some see bright spots in CISA under the current administration. And while many are pessimistic about the agency’s future, others expressed optimism.

But the first year reviews are not glowing.

“Year one was a tough year for the agency,” said House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Andrew Garbarino, R-N.Y. He noted that a “lot of the best and brightest have left the agency,” though he expressed optimism about Plankey’s ability to turn CISA around. “The amount of cyberattacks that our nation is seeing every day, both on the private side and on the federal government side — you want your best people there fighting against it, and if they’re somewhere else, it definitely leaves us all vulnerable.”

Said Mississippi Rep. Bennie Thompson, the top Democrat on Garbarino’s panel: “It’s tough to have a robust entity when you cut the money…we are weaker because of CISA’s lack of manpower.”

When priorities shifted

Trump has harbored animosity toward CISA since 2020, when it contradicted his false claims related to widespread electoral fraud. He and his allies built on that animosity, recommending in Project 2025 that the agency be dismantled, divided by its core responsibilities, and farmed out to other federal agencies. 

“There was uniquely a target on its back,” said one CISA official who left in 2025. That hostility came from some Republicans in Congress, especially Kentucky Sen. Rand Paul, who chairs the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.

Said Thompson: “CISA wasn’t politicized for the most part, until the Trump administration came along and accused them of somehow contributing to his [election] loss.”

CISA has lost substantial personnel, including veterans and whole teams. Some employees were transferred to other divisions in the Department of Homeland Security. Election security was quickly cut. Two information sharing and analysis centers (ISACs) that serve state and local governments lost funding. A division coordinating with foreign governments, businesses and state and local governments was effectively closed.

The agency has lost senior leaders in programs like counter-ransomware initiatives, threat hunting and secure software development. Contracts for things like detecting threats in critical infrastructure networks, tracking vulnerabilities and collaborating with industry teetered, albeit sometimes only temporarily. 

DHS has unraveled multiple programs in which CISA plays a key role, such as by dismissing members of the Cyber Safety Review Board and disbanding the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council. Congress has lurched between letting both a key state and local cyber grant program and a cyber threat information sharing law lapse and temporarily re-upping them.

The departures and program changes likely haven’t ended, either. 

“It’s not a very harmonious place right now,” said one industry source. “I hear from people that are looking to leave.” Former CISA employees say those who remain either believe strongly in the mission, or are simply keeping their heads down until retirement from federal service.

“People I talk to say the morale is really low,” said James Lewis, distinguished fellow with the tech policy program at the Center for European Policy Analysis think tank.

CISA and DHS officials routinely say the changes are designed to get the agency “back on mission.” Lewis, industry officials and others say CISA probably never needed to get involved in combatting misinformation and disinformation, roles that rankled some conservatives, but the agency largely halted that work prior to Trump returning to office.

Some saw duplication and redundancy at CISA as legitimate problems. “I did see overlap between who was actually doing policy and who was actually doing the operational work,” said Ari Schwartz, managing director of cybersecurity services at the law firm Venable and a former Obama administration cybersecurity official.

It was not that long ago when CISA experienced quick budget growth, particularly after its establishment in 2018.

“As with any organization, the first few years are growth years and after a while, the agency needed to reevaluate how it was operating and meeting its statutory authorities,” said Kate DiEmidio, who formerly served as the agency’s director of legislative affairs and acting chief external affairs officer. “There was a need for the agency to refocus.”

Even among those who saw the need for change at CISA, though, many saw the Trump administration as going way too far. “CISA needed surgery,” Lewis said, but “what it needed was surgery with a scalpel, not a sledgehammer.” He added, “Not only is the White House hostile to CISA, but cybersecurity isn’t a priority for them.”

A question of capacity

The cuts have created real-world consequences for cybersecurity coordination. Former officials and industry partners describe broken relationships, unanswered requests for help and serious questions about whether CISA can handle a major crisis. The coordination and engagement that defined the agency’s approach have largely diminished.

The end result is that “they’ve dismantled all of those capabilities in units within government,” said Caitlin Durkovich, a former DHS official in the Obama administration and White House official in the Biden administration. She recently started a firm with former top CISA official Jeff Greene that offers services CISA has scaled back, such as security assessments.

“It’s been really hard to watch,” Greene said, how CISA has been working with the private sector and local governments on “developing a level of trust that is weakening or gone.”

One industry source said they used to meet regularly with top officials, but now can’t get a response. “We’ve got really good engagement elsewhere in government. We really would like the opportunity to do the same thing with CISA,” they said. “Some of the trust that had been built up has been eroded.”

Thompson said the biggest losses have been in election security and secure-by-design, areas where his staff says personnel has been “decimated.”

Said another industry source: “I do feel like that when people, if organizations, want to reach out to CISA, it’s not clear who’s there… If we got into a major conflict, let’s say, with China, and they start triggering Volt Typhoon-related malware, are we organized and ready to roll? I don’t think so.”

Another former CISA official described the current situation as a “lack of capacity,” especially when it comes to coordinating with state and local governments and others on a regional basis.

“A bunch of regions are really grappling with the loss of really key personnel who were the ones that were establishing and maintaining these relationships, and really trying to build the trust between the agency and the private sector, and especially in critical infrastructure,” they said. “Not having as many people to help do that national coordinating function that CISA is supposed to do is a real issue.”

They also said there are fewer people working in “flagship programs” like secure-by-design and developing regulations for the landmark Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA). “People are overstretched,” they said. “They’re not doing all the things that they could or should be doing, or want to be doing, and I think that you see evidence of that with talk from the private sector and their inability to to reach people and to get help “

Schwartz said he worries about when “an incident happens, do they have the people to go in, go to the states, go locally, and really do the work that’s needed, as they did in the past? Because they’ve lost some of that ability.”

Lewis said that “overall, the impression is it’s a much weaker entity than it was a year ago.”

“Their power was in their ability to act as a focal point, to coordinate, to bring people together, and just the publication of vulnerabilities and some of the things they were starting to get into in the previous administration were big steps forward that’s been diminished because they don’t have the people now,” he said. “So a smaller organization, that’s just not going to be as powerful.”

State and local governments say they’ve lost critical connections with CISA, saying they’ve had to turn to one another to fill the gaps.

“We’re asking states to do a job they’re not resourced to do, while weakening the one federal agency designed to help them,” said Errol Weiss, chief security officer at the Health-ISAC. “This is precisely where you do need a strong, centralized federal security function. We already have a national shortage of cybersecurity experts, and you can’t just replicate that expertise 50 times over.”

Overall, Weiss said industry partners have felt the lack of outreach from the agency. “Fewer touchpoints, fewer briefings, fewer problem‑solving calls,” he told CyberScoop, adding that there’s “a growing perception that CISA is being hollowed out where it matters most to industry: stakeholder engagement, collaborative forums, and operational support during incidents.”

Rob Knake, a former top Biden administration official, recently said that “CISA as an organization has pretty much fallen apart.”

Leadership in limbo

One near-universal sentiment is that as Sean Plankey’s leadership nomination drags in the Senate, the agency is worse off.

“We need to start this year off right, and we’re already in February and can’t get Plankey confirmed,” Garbarino said. “There’s nothing better than having a Senate-confirmed person running the show.”

The acting director has also faced criticism beyond the operational issues. Gottumukkala, who served as South Dakota’s chief information officer under Kristi Noem before she became DHS secretary, has faced fire from both parties for his stewardship.

A string of embarrassing stories have emerged about Gottumukkala, from the tale of him failing a polygraph test and seeking to oust those who administered it; to his reported attempted ouster of veteran agency CIO Robert Costello; to his reported uploading of sensitive contract data to ChatGPT. DHS has defended Gottumukkala amid those revelations.

Reading stories like that, “It just sounds like amateur hour,” said one former CISA employee.

“I don’t think he’s up to the task. I believe that he’s not the best person, and I think he is just somebody the secretary likes, because they both are from South Dakota.” Thompson said. “I don’t know anybody before this administration who would be in sensitive areas and not have passed minimal standards like the polygraph.”

The ChatGPT story drew concern from the right by Senate Judiciary Chairman Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, as well as from conservative figure Laura Loomer (the latter of whose remarks were racially tinged). Others were more perturbed by the lie detector story.

“When you have security issues with someone in a leadership position, you should find another place for them to go,” said a former Trump administration national security official. “There are plenty of competent people in DHS, in CISA, who could hold things together until Sean Plankey gets there. There are lots of serious things CISA needs to be working on right now. This is a drag on that. It’s not a place where you want any type of friction at the top.”

Garbarino was more generous, noting Gottumukkala’s technical background. DiEmidio also noted Gottumukkala’s technical skills. But Garbarino and Nevada Rep. Mark Amodei, the GOP chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, have been seeking CISA’s organizational plans to no avail.

“I don’t think he’s intentionally lying to us by saying there’s no reorg plan,” Garbarino said. “But there’s got to be some reasoning behind all these moves, moving the people around, or layoffs or whatever. I want to give him the benefit of the doubt that he is the technical guy that has been given a non-technical job to do.”

Schwartz and some others largely blame Congress for CISA’s current woes, since they haven’t approved Plankey as a full-time, permanent leader. “A lot of the issue is the fact that just doesn’t have the leadership to be able to participate in senior-level discussions,” he said.

What’s left to build on

Despite myriad complaints, many observers still see value in the current iteration of CISA. Some are hopeful about its ability to rebound, too.

CISA says it’s still devoted to its missions. The agency published a 2025 year-in-review about its accomplishments.

“CISA remains steadfast in its mission to safeguard the systems Americans rely on by strengthening federal network defenses, empowering businesses, and fortifying critical infrastructure nationwide,” Gottumukkala said in a statement to CyberScoop.

Moving forward, “we will deepen collaboration with trusted partners, prioritize highly skilled technical professionals, and direct resources for maximum impact—accelerating innovation, operational coordination, and workforce right-sizing to reduce long-term risks while maintaining strong industry partnerships and cost efficiency,” he said. “The CISA leadership and workforce remains committed to this mission despite a small minority who are upset that accountability and reform have come to the agency.”

It’s a message Gottumukkala recently delivered to Congress. “He tried to give the impression that we haven’t lost any capacity,” Thompson said. “I wasn’t impressed.”

Others said CISA is still carrying out many of its old tasks, such as issuing public alerts on vulnerabilities and threats.

“There’s still some good reporting coming out,” Greene said. “But what I can’t know is the volume of what they can put out versus what they used to be able to put out.”

Weiss said “CISA still has tremendous value in areas only the federal government can truly provide: national‑level visibility, cross‑sector coordination and the ability to marshal resources across agencies in a crisis.” But it’s not clear whether CISA can rise to the occasion like it did during the 2024 Change Healthcare crisis.

“All of this means it’s more important than ever for the private sector to take the initiative,” he said. “Critical infrastructure owners and operators cannot assume the federal government will have the capacity to step in the way it once did.”

Weiss and others also said that CISA has refocused on federal networks, but others, such as Lewis, said it’s also diminished there. “That’s their primary mission, and they don’t have the policies or the bodies to do that,” Lewis said.

Garbarino and a number of industry sources say they’re encouraged by the idea that the Trump administration could write less onerous regulations for CIRCIA, with an earlier draft drawing bipartisan and industry criticism.

A Senate-confirmed leader could further brighten the agency’s prospects, many agree. “They still have some good talent there. It’s not totally that we’ve lost everything there,” Schwartz said. “If you have leadership in there, then you can build it up.”

DiEmidio said some of the staff changes have made sense. Election security had more people than other sectors that needed the help, she said. 

“In some ways, I think the external attention to CISA’s mission in the media and with Congress was completely focused on one or two things, and the focus on the things that really matter, and the good work that CISA is doing got overshadowed,” she said. For the agency’s cybersecurity division and other cyber teams, “there were several incidents over the summer where those teams were incredible. They were working evenings, weekends.”

But many agree that rebuilding CISA’s workforce will be difficult.

The Trump administration has deliberately made working for the federal government challenging as a matter of policy. Russell Vought, head of the Office of Management and Budget, said before the election that the goal was to put federal workers “in trauma.” Morale at CISA has been particularly bad, they say. Periodic DHS shutdowns haven’t helped.

On the plus side for CISA, it’s a bad labor market, Lewis said.

Some of what CISA needs to do going forward is about managing expectations, said DiEmidio.

“What I would want to make sure is that CISA has a hiring plan in place to start hiring, especially in those key technical positions at all levels,” she said. “ I think you have to have an understanding that people are going to rotate in and out of government. Not everyone wants to stay in government long term and that’s okay.”

But there are some worries about CISA recruiting going forward. “Just the way they handle the departures, for a lot of folks, I don’t think it gives a lot of encouragement to individuals that ‘Hey, this is a great place to work,’” said one former DHS official.

The post Across party lines and industry, the verdict is the same: CISA is in trouble appeared first on CyberScoop.

Malware Analysis: How to Analyze and Understand Malware

By: BHIS
25 February 2026 at 09:00

Malware analysis is an amazing field that can be interesting, fun, and useful for your cybersecurity career. If you’re wondering WHY anyone would want to dig into malware, it’s all for a better understanding of cybersecurity!

The post Malware Analysis: How to Analyze and Understand Malware appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..

We moved fast and broke things. It’s time for a change.

By: Greg Otto
2 February 2026 at 06:00

The phrase “Move fast and break things” is a guiding philosophy in the technology industry. The phrase was coined by Meta CEO and founder Mark Zuckerberg more than two decades ago: an operational directive for Facebook developers to prioritize speed and innovation even at the cost of stability. “Unless you are breaking stuff,” Zuckerberg told Business Insider in a 2009 interview, “you are not moving fast enough.” 

But Zuckerberg’s call was heard well beyond Facebook’s offices. The tech industry has embraced the philosophy for close to two decades, with benefits that are visible all around us: from Tik-Tok influencers, to contactless mobile payments, self-driving taxis, and AI-powered glasses. 

Practically, however, the culture of “move fast and break things” produced firms that prioritize fast release cycles and feature development over software security and resilience. They move fast and make broken things: vulnerable and poorly designed applications, services and devices that are preyed on by cybercriminal groups and hostile nations. Consider the China-backed APT groups targeting both known and “zero-day” flaws in on-premises Microsoft Sharepoint instances in 2025 and Ivanti VPN devices in 2023. Those campaigns led to the compromise of hundreds of organizations globally, including U.S. federal agencies and critical infrastructure operators. 

Then there was the campaign by the China-backed threat actor UNC6395 who targeted customers of Salesforce using OAuth tokens stolen from the third party application Salesloft Drift to exfiltrate large volumes of data from hundreds of Salesforce instances

These incidents highlight two key features of today’s cyberthreat landscape. First, attackers exploit older applications with legacy code that contains high-severity security vulnerabilities. Second, they target large, complex cloud platforms like Salesforce by compromising vulnerable third-party integrations, software dependencies, and poorly managed APIs. 

This problem is compounded by a dangerous assumption: that software suppliers are trustworthy and secure. This mindset is outdated. In the past, supply chain attacks were rare, development cycles took months or years, and applying patches quickly was the gold standard. Today, in the “move fast” era, code can go from development to production in days, hours, or even seconds.”

Consider the recent Trust Wallet breach. In December, the cryptocurrency application vendor disclosed that hackers stole approximately $8.5 million in crypto assets through a compromised Google Chrome extension. The root cause was a November outbreak of the Shai Hulud registry-native worm, which leaked Trust Wallet developers’ GitHub credentials. With these credentials, attackers accessed Trust Wallet’s browser extension source code and the Chrome Web Store (CWS) API key, the company said in a blog post. This allowed them to upload malicious extension builds directly to the store, bypassing Trust Wallet’s standard security reviews. Within days, Trust Wallet users awoke to find their wallets emptied

By compromising “pre-blessed” channels like software updates from trusted suppliers or open source projects, criminal and nation-state attackers can extend their reach into sensitive IT environments.

The solution to problems like this starts with recognizing that the “move fast and break things” era must end. As software powers everything from database servers to dishwashers and tractors, vendors must prioritize security to meet market demands and regulatory requirements. This means proving their software is secure. Traditional application security testing tools—like software composition analysis (SCA), static application security testing (SAST), and dynamic application security testing (DAST)—are part of the solution.

However, today’s threat landscape requires software publishers to look beyond appsec’s “usual suspects.” They must test compiled binaries before release to detect tampering or malicious code that typically evades traditional application security tools. After all, that’s what we saw with incidents like the hacks of Solarwinds’ Orion or VoIP provider 3CX’s Desktop App

Software publishers also need to prioritize code quality, security and transparency. They can do that by establishing ambitious “zero vulnerability” goals that incentivize them to address problems like “code rot” (reliance on old and vulnerable software modules). They must also embrace transparency by publishing bills of materials for their products—including SBOMs (software bills of materials), MLBOMs (machine learning bills of materials), and SaaSBOMs. Knowing what is in the software your organization consumes can be critical to heading off attacks that exploit vulnerable software dependencies or other supply chain weaknesses. 

Should tech firms still move fast and innovate? Absolutely. But in 2026, innovation and rapid releases must be balanced with an even greater priority: building secure, resilient technology that protects both vendors and customers from attacks. Instead of “move fast and break things,” we need a new rallying cry: “Make Smart and Safe Things.”  

Saša Zdjelar is the Chief Trust Officer (CTrO) at ReversingLabs and Operating Partner at Crosspoint Capital with nearly 20 years of Fortune 10 global executive leadership experience. His CTrO scope includes leadership, oversight and governance of the CISO/CSO function, including product security, as well as partnering with other leaders on corporate and product strategy, strategic partnerships and research, and customer and technology advisory boards, including sponsoring the ReversingLabs CISO Council.

The post We moved fast and broke things. It’s time for a change. appeared first on CyberScoop.

Why You Got Hacked – 2025 Super Edition

By: BHIS
19 November 2025 at 12:50

This article was written to provide readers with an overview of a selection of our pentest results from the last 15 months. This data was gathered toward the end of September 2025. Shockingly, the data does not differ much from our prior analyses conducted at the end of 2022 or 2023.

The post Why You Got Hacked – 2025 Super Edition appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..

Introduction to Zeek Log Analysis

By: BHIS
13 January 2025 at 11:00

In this video, Troy Wojewoda discusses the intricacies of Zeek log analysis, focusing on how this network security monitoring system can be used to understand traffic and analyze logs effectively.

The post Introduction to Zeek Log Analysis appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..

Webcast: How to Prepare Before the Compromise

By: BHIS
21 October 2019 at 09:16

Click on the timecodes to jump to that part of the video (on YouTube) Slides for this webcast can be found here: https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/SLIDES_HowtoPrepareBeforeCompromise.pdf 00:40 Intro, background information, how to deal with […]

The post Webcast: How to Prepare Before the Compromise appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..

Webcast: Attack Tactics 7 – The Logs You Are Looking For

By: BHIS
22 July 2019 at 12:10

Slides for this webcast can be found here: https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/SLIDES_AttackTactics7LogsYouAreLookingFor.pdf So we went through an attack in the BHIS Webcast, “Attack Tactics 5! Zero to Hero Attack.” Then we went through […]

The post Webcast: Attack Tactics 7 – The Logs You Are Looking For appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..

PODCAST: Beacon Analysis

By: BHIS
17 September 2018 at 12:21

Join special guest Chris Brenton, COO of Active Countermeasures, as he discusses the anatomy of beacons and why you need to be looking for them during a threat hunt. He […]

The post PODCAST: Beacon Analysis appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..

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WEBCAST: RITA

By: BHIS
27 February 2017 at 11:54

John Strand // Want to get started on a hunt team and discover “bad things” on your network? In this webcast, we will walk through the installation and usage of […]

The post WEBCAST: RITA appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..

WEBCAST: Live Forensics & Memory Analysis

By: BHIS
20 January 2017 at 12:38

John Strand // So you think you might have a compromised Windows system. If you do, where do you start? How would you review the memory of that system? What […]

The post WEBCAST: Live Forensics & Memory Analysis appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..

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